媒体报道、行政监管与财务违规传染——基于威慑信号传递视角的分析
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摘要
基于威慑理论和信号传递理论,实证分析了媒体报道和行政监管对企业财务违规传染的阻断作用。研究结果表明:媒体对违规企业的报道能够阻断财务违规传染,权威媒体的负面报道能够释放更强的威慑信号,不仅可以阻断违规传染,而且可以促使行业中的其他企业纠正违规行为;行业中的行政监管频率高、介入速度快、处罚力度大,均能释放明确的威慑信号;媒体的负面报道特别是影响力较大媒体的负面报道和财务舞弊报道有助于增强监管的威慑作用,从而弥补行政监管的不足,提高行政监管介入效率。
Based on deterrence theory and signal transmission theory,this paper studied whether media reports and administrative supervision can release and transmit deterrence signals,which can block financial irregularities contagion. Results show that media report can block the contagion of financial irregularities,and the negative reports of authoritative media can release strong deterrent signals,which not only blocks the contagion but also causes other companies in the industry to correct. Meanwhile,higher frequency of supervision,faster reaction and heavier punishment would release clear deterrent signals. Media reports,especiall negative reports with greater infulence or reports of financial fraud,can not only improve the deterrent effect of administrative supervision,but also effectively substitute for administrative supervision and improve the efficiency of administrative supervision.
Based on deterrence theory and signal transmission theory,this paper studied whether media reports and administrative supervision can release and transmit deterrence signals,which can block financial irregularities contagion. Results show that media report can block the contagion of financial irregularities,and the negative reports of authoritative media can release strong deterrent signals,which not only blocks the contagion but also causes other companies in the industry to correct. Meanwhile,higher frequency of supervision,faster reaction and heavier punishment would release clear deterrent signals. Media reports,especiall negative reports with greater infulence or reports of financial fraud,can not only improve the deterrent effect of administrative supervision,but also effectively substitute for administrative supervision and improve the efficiency of administrative supervision.
引文
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[2]刘海明,王哲伟,曹廷求.担保网络传染效应的实证研究[J].管理世界,2016(4):81-96.
[3]Miao Q,Newman A,Yu J,et al.The Relationship between Ethical Leadership and Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior:Linear or Curvilinear Effects?[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2013,116(3):641-653.
[4]陆瑶,朱玉杰,胡晓元.机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):13-23.
[5]戴亦一,陈冠霖,潘健平.独立董事辞职、政治关系与公司治理缺陷[J].会计研究,2014(11):16-23.
[6]Core J E.Discussion of Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(2):273-287.
[7]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[8]蔡志岳,吴世农.董事会特征影响上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6):62-68.
[9]Ge W,Kim J.Boards,Takeover Protection,and Real Earnings Management[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2014,43(4):651-682.
[10]Chen G,Firth M,Gao D N,et al.Ownership Structure,Corporate Governance,and Fraud:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):424-448.
[11]Hass L H,Tarsalewska M,Zhan F.Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,138(4):723-742.
[12]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014(7):124-139.
[13]马晨,程茂勇,张俊瑞.事务所变更能帮助公司提升审计质量吗?——来自二次财务重述的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2014(10):109-120.
[14]王克敏,刘博.公司控制权转移与盈余管理研究[J].管理世界,2014(7):144-156.
[15]于忠泊,田高良,齐保垒,等.媒体关注的公司治理机制——基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011(9):127-140.
[16]Cohen J,Ding Y,Lesage C,et al.Media Bias and the Persistence of the Expectation Gap:An Analysis of Press Articles on Corporate Fraud[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2017,144(3):637-659.
[17]Chen L.Local Institutions,Audit Quality,and Corporate Scandals of US-Listed Foreign Firms[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,133(2):351-373.
[18]Humphery Jenner M.Takeover Defenses,Innovation,and Value Creation:Evidence from Acquisition Decisions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(5):668-690.
[19]Fang V W,Maffett M,Zhang B.Foreign Institutional Ownership and the Global Convergence of Financial Reporting Practices[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2015,53(3):593-631.
[20]Brown N C,Wei K D,Wermers R.Analyst Recommendations,Mutual Fund Herding,and Overreaction in Stock Prices[J].Management Science,2013,60(1):1-20.
[21]Shi W,Connelly B L,Hoskisson R E.External Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud:Cognitive Evaluation Theory Insights on Agency Theory Prescriptions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(6):1268-1286.
[22]王怡,梁循,付虹蛟,等.社会网络中信息的扩散机理及其定量建模[J].中国管理科学,2017(12):147-157.
[23]钟田丽,张天宇.我国企业资本结构决策行为的“同伴效应”——来自深沪两市A股上市公司面板数据的实证检验[J].南开管理评论,2017(2):58-70.
[24]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(3):1093-1135.
[25]Geis G.White-Collar Criminal:The Offender in Business and the Professions[M].Abingdon:Transaction Publishers,2006.
[26]Lieberman M B,Asaba S.Why Do Firms Imitate Each Other?[J].Academy of Management Review,2006,31(2):366-385.
[27]Hirshleifer D,Hong Teoh S.Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets:A Review and Synthesis[J].European Financial Management,2003,9(1):25-66.
[28]马壮,李延喜,王云,等.媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理[J].管理评论,2018,30(4):219-234.
[29]孔东民,刘莎莎,应千伟.公司行为中的媒体角色:激浊扬清还是推波助澜?[J].管理世界,2013(7):145-162.
[30]Jamieson K H,Campbell K K.The Interplay of Influence:News,Advertising,Politics,and the Internet(with InfoTrac)[M].Belmont:Wadsworth Publishing Company,1997.
[31]Liebman B L,Milhaupt C J.Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2008,108(4):1377.
[32]Gibbs J P.Crime,Punishment,and Deterrence[M].New York:Elsevier,1975.
[33]Nagin D S,Pogarsky G.Integrating Celerity,Impulsivity,and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence:Theory and Evidence[J].Criminology,2001,39(4):865-892.
[34]王云,李延喜,马壮,等.媒体关注、环境规制与企业环保投资[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(6):83-94.
[35]陈佳声.上市公司、审计师与监管机构的财务舞弊博弈研究[J].审计研究,2014(4):89-96.
[36]顾小龙,辛宇,滕飞.违规监管具有治理效应吗——兼论股价同步性指标的两重性[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(5):41-54.
[37]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):2023-2052.
(1)媒体报道数据的过滤词表如下:公告、报告、说明书、摘要、电子邮件、上市公司最新消息、信息速递、信息快递、招股意向书、公司治理与股东权利、年年报、年度年报、年中报、交易备忘、最新信息全公开、上市公司重组事项总览。
(2)负面报道的判别词表如下:亏损、舞弊、会计政策变更、资产减值、操纵、逮捕、误导性陈述、犯罪、非法、腐败、国有资产流失、行贿、贿赂、拘留、拘捕、滥用职权、漏税、内幕交易、挪用公款、挪用资金、判刑、欺诈、侵占、涉嫌、失误、受贿、双规、双开、贪污、偷税、推迟披露、违法、违规、虚假、虚列、虚增、隐瞒重大事项、造假、诈骗、占用上市公司资产、走私。
(3)权威媒体包括《中国证券报》《金融时报》《第一财经日报》《中国经营报》《上海证券报》《经济日报》《21世纪经济报道》《中国贸易报》《证券时报》《中国经济时报》《中国企业报》《中华工商时报》《财经时报》《经济参考报》等财经媒体,以及《人民日报》《新民晚报》《北京晚报》《光明日报》《广州日报》《楚天都市报》《齐鲁晚报》《羊城晚报》《南方都市报》《北京青年报》等发行量靠前的综合媒体。
(4)财务舞弊报道的判别词表如下:误导性陈述、推迟披露、违法、违规、虚假、虚列、虚增、隐瞒重大事项、造假、舞弊、会计政策变更。
[2]刘海明,王哲伟,曹廷求.担保网络传染效应的实证研究[J].管理世界,2016(4):81-96.
[3]Miao Q,Newman A,Yu J,et al.The Relationship between Ethical Leadership and Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior:Linear or Curvilinear Effects?[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2013,116(3):641-653.
[4]陆瑶,朱玉杰,胡晓元.机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):13-23.
[5]戴亦一,陈冠霖,潘健平.独立董事辞职、政治关系与公司治理缺陷[J].会计研究,2014(11):16-23.
[6]Core J E.Discussion of Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(2):273-287.
[7]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[8]蔡志岳,吴世农.董事会特征影响上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6):62-68.
[9]Ge W,Kim J.Boards,Takeover Protection,and Real Earnings Management[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2014,43(4):651-682.
[10]Chen G,Firth M,Gao D N,et al.Ownership Structure,Corporate Governance,and Fraud:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):424-448.
[11]Hass L H,Tarsalewska M,Zhan F.Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,138(4):723-742.
[12]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014(7):124-139.
[13]马晨,程茂勇,张俊瑞.事务所变更能帮助公司提升审计质量吗?——来自二次财务重述的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2014(10):109-120.
[14]王克敏,刘博.公司控制权转移与盈余管理研究[J].管理世界,2014(7):144-156.
[15]于忠泊,田高良,齐保垒,等.媒体关注的公司治理机制——基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011(9):127-140.
[16]Cohen J,Ding Y,Lesage C,et al.Media Bias and the Persistence of the Expectation Gap:An Analysis of Press Articles on Corporate Fraud[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2017,144(3):637-659.
[17]Chen L.Local Institutions,Audit Quality,and Corporate Scandals of US-Listed Foreign Firms[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,133(2):351-373.
[18]Humphery Jenner M.Takeover Defenses,Innovation,and Value Creation:Evidence from Acquisition Decisions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(5):668-690.
[19]Fang V W,Maffett M,Zhang B.Foreign Institutional Ownership and the Global Convergence of Financial Reporting Practices[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2015,53(3):593-631.
[20]Brown N C,Wei K D,Wermers R.Analyst Recommendations,Mutual Fund Herding,and Overreaction in Stock Prices[J].Management Science,2013,60(1):1-20.
[21]Shi W,Connelly B L,Hoskisson R E.External Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud:Cognitive Evaluation Theory Insights on Agency Theory Prescriptions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(6):1268-1286.
[22]王怡,梁循,付虹蛟,等.社会网络中信息的扩散机理及其定量建模[J].中国管理科学,2017(12):147-157.
[23]钟田丽,张天宇.我国企业资本结构决策行为的“同伴效应”——来自深沪两市A股上市公司面板数据的实证检验[J].南开管理评论,2017(2):58-70.
[24]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(3):1093-1135.
[25]Geis G.White-Collar Criminal:The Offender in Business and the Professions[M].Abingdon:Transaction Publishers,2006.
[26]Lieberman M B,Asaba S.Why Do Firms Imitate Each Other?[J].Academy of Management Review,2006,31(2):366-385.
[27]Hirshleifer D,Hong Teoh S.Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets:A Review and Synthesis[J].European Financial Management,2003,9(1):25-66.
[28]马壮,李延喜,王云,等.媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理[J].管理评论,2018,30(4):219-234.
[29]孔东民,刘莎莎,应千伟.公司行为中的媒体角色:激浊扬清还是推波助澜?[J].管理世界,2013(7):145-162.
[30]Jamieson K H,Campbell K K.The Interplay of Influence:News,Advertising,Politics,and the Internet(with InfoTrac)[M].Belmont:Wadsworth Publishing Company,1997.
[31]Liebman B L,Milhaupt C J.Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2008,108(4):1377.
[32]Gibbs J P.Crime,Punishment,and Deterrence[M].New York:Elsevier,1975.
[33]Nagin D S,Pogarsky G.Integrating Celerity,Impulsivity,and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence:Theory and Evidence[J].Criminology,2001,39(4):865-892.
[34]王云,李延喜,马壮,等.媒体关注、环境规制与企业环保投资[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(6):83-94.
[35]陈佳声.上市公司、审计师与监管机构的财务舞弊博弈研究[J].审计研究,2014(4):89-96.
[36]顾小龙,辛宇,滕飞.违规监管具有治理效应吗——兼论股价同步性指标的两重性[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(5):41-54.
[37]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):2023-2052.
(1)媒体报道数据的过滤词表如下:公告、报告、说明书、摘要、电子邮件、上市公司最新消息、信息速递、信息快递、招股意向书、公司治理与股东权利、年年报、年度年报、年中报、交易备忘、最新信息全公开、上市公司重组事项总览。
(2)负面报道的判别词表如下:亏损、舞弊、会计政策变更、资产减值、操纵、逮捕、误导性陈述、犯罪、非法、腐败、国有资产流失、行贿、贿赂、拘留、拘捕、滥用职权、漏税、内幕交易、挪用公款、挪用资金、判刑、欺诈、侵占、涉嫌、失误、受贿、双规、双开、贪污、偷税、推迟披露、违法、违规、虚假、虚列、虚增、隐瞒重大事项、造假、诈骗、占用上市公司资产、走私。
(3)权威媒体包括《中国证券报》《金融时报》《第一财经日报》《中国经营报》《上海证券报》《经济日报》《21世纪经济报道》《中国贸易报》《证券时报》《中国经济时报》《中国企业报》《中华工商时报》《财经时报》《经济参考报》等财经媒体,以及《人民日报》《新民晚报》《北京晚报》《光明日报》《广州日报》《楚天都市报》《齐鲁晚报》《羊城晚报》《南方都市报》《北京青年报》等发行量靠前的综合媒体。
(4)财务舞弊报道的判别词表如下:误导性陈述、推迟披露、违法、违规、虚假、虚列、虚增、隐瞒重大事项、造假、舞弊、会计政策变更。