数字市场中平台限制竞争行为规制的研究——以我国颁布的《电子商务法》为背景
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摘要
近年来以平台为核心的电子商务市场出现的法律问题,越发地受到人们的指责和关注,究其原因在于电子商务的兴起,不仅激活了世界的创新和经济的发展,而且使平台限制竞争的行为出于监管的边缘,给社会总体福利抹上了灰色的阴影。虽然电子商务有效地是零售竞争的问题,正在运营中的动态明显地不同于比较传统的零售市场。其显著特点包括主要的平台跨不同行业进行交易行为的出现、更大的透明性、收集和使用数据的剧增的重要性、算法竞争机制的使用。电子商务的增长有潜力增加零售市场的竞争、极大提高消费者的选择和促进产品经销的创新。然而,某种动态竞争也促进了企业经营者的限制竞争的协同行为和单边行为。广泛地考虑电子商务市场内潜在竞争法的关注,其焦点特别集中在纵向限制和滥用市场支配地位上。根据国内外电子商务的实际情况,提出平台限制竞争的行为规制措施,可以超出竞争法的视域,采取特殊行业、消费者保护、数据隐私为标准的规制方法。
The emerging law problems within e-commerce markets at the core of platforms are increasingly condemed and concerned. Its reasons lie in the fact that the rising ecommerce not only stimulates world innovation and economic development,but also makes restraint conpetition of platforms on the verge of regulation,covering social total welfare with gray shadow. Although e-commerce is effectively a question of retailcompetition,the dynamics at play differ significantly from more traditional brick-andmortar retail markets. Notable features include the emergence of leading online platformoperators which conduct business across multiple product segments,greater transparency,the increasing importance of data collection and exploitation,and the use of algorithmic competition mechanisms. The growth of e-commerce has the potential toincrease competition within retail markets, to greatly enhance consumer choice,and to prompt and facilitate innovation in product distribution. Yet certain dynamics may also prompt or facilitate anticompetitive coordinated and unilateral conduct by economic operators. This background paper provides a wideranging consideration of potential competition law concerns within e-commerce markets. It focuses, in particular, on vertical restraints and abusive dominant conduct. The paper concludeswith an examination of possible regulatory solutions beyond the realm of competitionlaw, encompassing sector-specific, consumer protection and data privacy oriented approaches.
The emerging law problems within e-commerce markets at the core of platforms are increasingly condemed and concerned. Its reasons lie in the fact that the rising ecommerce not only stimulates world innovation and economic development,but also makes restraint conpetition of platforms on the verge of regulation,covering social total welfare with gray shadow. Although e-commerce is effectively a question of retailcompetition,the dynamics at play differ significantly from more traditional brick-andmortar retail markets. Notable features include the emergence of leading online platformoperators which conduct business across multiple product segments,greater transparency,the increasing importance of data collection and exploitation,and the use of algorithmic competition mechanisms. The growth of e-commerce has the potential toincrease competition within retail markets, to greatly enhance consumer choice,and to prompt and facilitate innovation in product distribution. Yet certain dynamics may also prompt or facilitate anticompetitive coordinated and unilateral conduct by economic operators. This background paper provides a wideranging consideration of potential competition law concerns within e-commerce markets. It focuses, in particular, on vertical restraints and abusive dominant conduct. The paper concludeswith an examination of possible regulatory solutions beyond the realm of competitionlaw, encompassing sector-specific, consumer protection and data privacy oriented approaches.
引文
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[2]Elyse Dorsey,Jonathan M. Jacobson. Exclusionary Conduct in Antitrust[J],St. John's Law. Revie,Num-ber 1 Volume 89,Spring 2015. 123-124.
[3]韩伟.数字市场竞争政策研究[M].法律出版社,2017. 315.
[4]王珉.电子商务合同主体地位与法律关系研究[J].行政与法,2011,(5):121.
[5]Rupprech. How to Reform the Law on Abusive Practices:The study that will serve as a basis for reform inGermany(and Europe?)[J]. CPI’s Europe Column Presents,2018(09). 4.
[6]Maggiolino,Mariateresa. Personalized Prices in European Competition Law[J]. Bocconi Legal Studies Re-search Paper No. 2984840,2017. 2-6.
[7]Townley,Christopher,Eric Morrison and Karen Yeung. Big Data and Personalised Price Discrimination inEU Competition Law[J]. King's College London Law School Research Paper 38,2017. 38.
[8]Nathan Newman. The Cost of Lost Privacy:Consumer Harm andRising Economic Inequality in the Age ofGoogle[J]. Vol. 40,Issue2,WM. Michell L. Rev,2014. 850,865-873.
[9]10th report of session2015-2016 of selet committee on EU,Online Platforms andtheDigital Single Market[R]. Authority of theHouse of Loards,2016,April 20. 34.
[10]Pinar Akman. A Competition Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses[J]. Journalof Competition Law&Economics,2016,12(4). 781.
[11]Hovenkamp,Herbert. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. 68 Florida Law Review,2016. 419.
[12]Lina. M. khan. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. The Yale Law Journal,Vol. 123,No. 3,2017. 762.
[13]Herbert Hovenkamp. Federal Antitrust Policy:The Law of Competition and Its Practice(4th ed.)[M].2011. 121-123.
[14]Konstantinos Stylianou. Exclusion in Digital Markets[J]. Vol. 24. Telecommunications and Technology LawReview,2018. 198.
[15]Stéphane Ciriani,Marc Lebourges. The Market Dominance of US Digital Platforms:Antitrust Implications forthe European Union[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2018(04). 4-5.
[16]Miguel Sousa Ferro,De Gratis Non Curat Lex. Abuse of Dominance in Online Free Services[J]. THE Com-petition Law. Review,Volume 12 Issue 2,2017(07). 167.
[17]Pinar Akman. The Theory of Abuse in Google Search:A Positive and Normative Assessment under EUCompetition Law[J]. Journal of Law,Technology and Policy,(2017). 3-80.
[18]Akman,Pinar. The Theory of Abuse in Google Search:A Positive and Normative Assessment under EUCompetition Law[J]. University of Illinois Journal of Law,Technology and Policy,2017. 301.
[19]Edelman,Benjamin. Does Google Leverage Market Power through Tying and Bundling?[J]. 11 Journal ofCompetition Law and Economics,2015. 365.
[20]Friso,Bostoen. Margin Squeeze———Where competition law and sector regulation compete[J]. Jura Falco-nis 2016-2017,Vol. 53(1),2017. 9,13-43.
[21]Howard A. Shelanski. Information,Innovation andCompetitionPolicuforthe Internet[J]. University of Penn-sylvania Law Review,Vol. 161,2013. 1663.
[22]Carrier,Michael A. Only'Scraping'the Surface:The Copyright Hole in the FTC's Google Settlement[J]46UBC Law Review,2013. 759.
[23]Khan,Lina M. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. 126 Yale Law Journal,2017. 710.
[24]Wiethaus,Lars. Google's Favouring of Own Services:Comments from an EconomicPerspective[J]. 6 Journalof European Competition Law and Practice. 2015. 506.
[25]Vesterdorf,Bo ad Kyriakos Fountoukakos. An Appraisal of the Remedy in the Commission's Google Search(Shopping)Decision and a Guide to its Interpretation in Light of an AnalyticalReading of the Case Law[J].Journal of European Competition Law&Practice,Vol. 9,No. 1,2018. 3.
[26]Dogan,Cihan. Turkey:Turkish Competition Board Refused to Launch Investigation into CertainPractices ofGoogle[J]. 39 European Competition Law Review,2018. 64.
[27]Ezrachi,Ariel,Maurice E. Stucke. The Fight over Antitrust's Soul[J]. 9 Journal of EuropeanCompetitionLaw and Practice,2018. 1.
[28]Mandrescu,Daniel. Applying EU Competition Law to Online Platforms:the Road Ahead—Part2[J]. 38European Competition Law Review,2017. 410.
[29]Hovenkamp,Herbert. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. 68 Florida Law Review,2016. 419.
[30]Office of Fair Trading(OFT). The Impact of Reverse-Fixed Payments on Competition[G]. published 4 July,2013.
[31]MLex Market Insight. Amazon Japan raided by JFTC on suspicions of abuse of dominance[EB/OL]. pub-lished 15 March 2018,available online at:https://mlexmarketinsight. com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/asia/amazon-japan-raided-by-jftc-on-suspicions-of-abuse-of-dominance.
[32]Iacovides,Marios,Jakub Jeanrond. Keep Calm and Carry On Applying the Existing Rules—EU Competi-tion Law and the Digital Economy[J]. Stockholm Faculty of Law Research Paper Series No. 36,2017. 21.
[33]Lindsay,Alistair,Eithne McCarthy. Do we need to prevent pricing algorithms cooking upmarkets?[J]. 38European Competition Law Review. 2017. 533.
[34]Eric Hovenkamp. Platform Antitrust[J]. Journal of Corporation Law,2019,Forthcoming. 43.
[35]Ezrachi,Ariel. The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce[J]. Oxford Legal StudiesResearch Paper N. 55,2015. 517.
[36]Von Rompuy,Ben. A Europe without digital borders:Beyond the Reach of Antitrust?[J]. CoRe(02),2017. 93.
[37]Busch,Christoph,Hans Schulte-Nlke,Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska and Fryderyk Zoll. The Rise ofthe Platform Economy:A New Challenge for EU Consumer Law?[J]. Journal of European Consumer andMarket Law(05),2016. 3.
[38]Cardona,Melisande,Néstor Duch-Brown,Bertin Martens. Consumer Perceptions of(CrossBorder)eCom-merce in the EU Digital Single Market[J]. Institute for Prospective Technological StudiesDigital EconomyWorking Paper(06),2015. 3-44.
[39]CERRE. Big Data and Competition Policy:Market power,personalised pricing and advertising[R]. pub-lished 16 February,2017. 8,48.
[40]Saldivia,Juan Pablo Prieto. E-Commerce in Chile:Best Practices,Self-Regulation and Integration[J]. 33Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,2016. 249.
[41] Ohlhausen,Maureen K,Alexander P. Okuliar. Competition,Consumer Protection and The Right[Ap-proach]to Privacy[J]. 80 Antitrust Law Journal,2015. 121.
[42]Spencer,Shaun B. Privacy and Predictive Analytics in E-Commerce[J]. 49 New England LawReview,2015. 101.
[43]Zuiderveen,Frederik Borgesius. Online Price Discrimination and Data Protection Law[J]. Amsterdam LawSchool Research Paper No. 32,2015. 5.
[44]Khan,Lina M. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. 126 Yale Law Journal,2017. 710.
[45]O'Connor,Daniel. Understanding Online Platform Competition:Common Misunderstandings[J]. in AitorOrtiz(ed.),Internet Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms,Competition Policy International,2016. 7-8.
[46]Baldwin,Robert,Martin Cave,Martin Lodge. Understanding Regulation,2nd ed[M]. Oxford UniversityPress,2011.
[47]Kjlbye,Lars,Alessio Aresu and Sophia Stephanou. The Commission's E-Commerce SectorInquiry:Analy-sis of Legal Issues and Suggested Practical Approach[J]. 7 Journal of European Competition Law and Prac-tice,2015. 465.
[48]Cohen,Julie E. Law for the Platform Economy[J]. 51 UC Davis Law Review,2017. 33.
[49]邱宝昌.《电子商务法》需要注意的十个问题[EB/OL].法制晚报,http://www. foodm ate. net/zhiliang/guanli/166793. html,2018-09-13.
(1)Leegin.Creative Leather Products,Inc.v.PSKS,Inc.,551 U.S.877(2007).
(2)See,e.g.,European Commission,Guidelines on Vertical Restraints(OJ C 130/1,19.5.2010),paras.106-9 in particular.
(1)Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusi ve exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,OJ C 45,24.02.2009,7-20,para.80.
(1)《欧盟运行条约》第102条规定:特殊的滥用行为包括:(1)直接或间接地施加不公平的购买或销售价格或者不公平的其他交易条件;(2)限制对消费者有偏见的产品、市场或者技术开发;(3)对同等交易的其他贸易伙伴适用不同的条件,从而使其处于不利的竞争地位;(4)使合同的缔结取决于贸易伙伴对额外义务的接受,而无论是依其性质或按照商业惯例,该额外义务均与合同的标的无关。
(1)See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google's Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc.,FTC File Number 111-0163,3 January 2013,fn.2.
(2)Decision of 27 June 2017 in Case AT.39740-Google Search(Shopping),available at:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
(1)Pending Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission.
(2)Office of Competition and Consumer Protection Press Release.Competition authoritysearches premis es of Grupa Allegro,published 7 July 2017,available online at:https://uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=1 3332.
(1)For example,the UK's Groceries(Supply Chain Practices)Market Investigation Order,2009,and Irela nd’s Consumer Protection Act 2007(Grocery Goods Undertakings)Regulation 2016.
(1)Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,the Council,the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,Online Platforms and theDigital Single Marke t.Opportunities and Challenges for Europe(COM(2016)288 final),published 25 May 2017.A useful disc ussion is provided by Oxera,“When should onlineplatforms be regulated?Oxera’s initial analysis of th e European Commission’s thinking,”published 7 June 2016.
(2)See,e.g.The Telegraph,“There is no justification for regulating online giants as if they were public utilities,”4 August 2017;The Economist,“What if large tech firms were regulated like sewage compa nies?”23September 2017;and Financial Times,“Why we need to regulate the tech platforms,”5 N ovember 2017.
[2]Elyse Dorsey,Jonathan M. Jacobson. Exclusionary Conduct in Antitrust[J],St. John's Law. Revie,Num-ber 1 Volume 89,Spring 2015. 123-124.
[3]韩伟.数字市场竞争政策研究[M].法律出版社,2017. 315.
[4]王珉.电子商务合同主体地位与法律关系研究[J].行政与法,2011,(5):121.
[5]Rupprech. How to Reform the Law on Abusive Practices:The study that will serve as a basis for reform inGermany(and Europe?)[J]. CPI’s Europe Column Presents,2018(09). 4.
[6]Maggiolino,Mariateresa. Personalized Prices in European Competition Law[J]. Bocconi Legal Studies Re-search Paper No. 2984840,2017. 2-6.
[7]Townley,Christopher,Eric Morrison and Karen Yeung. Big Data and Personalised Price Discrimination inEU Competition Law[J]. King's College London Law School Research Paper 38,2017. 38.
[8]Nathan Newman. The Cost of Lost Privacy:Consumer Harm andRising Economic Inequality in the Age ofGoogle[J]. Vol. 40,Issue2,WM. Michell L. Rev,2014. 850,865-873.
[9]10th report of session2015-2016 of selet committee on EU,Online Platforms andtheDigital Single Market[R]. Authority of theHouse of Loards,2016,April 20. 34.
[10]Pinar Akman. A Competition Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses[J]. Journalof Competition Law&Economics,2016,12(4). 781.
[11]Hovenkamp,Herbert. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. 68 Florida Law Review,2016. 419.
[12]Lina. M. khan. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. The Yale Law Journal,Vol. 123,No. 3,2017. 762.
[13]Herbert Hovenkamp. Federal Antitrust Policy:The Law of Competition and Its Practice(4th ed.)[M].2011. 121-123.
[14]Konstantinos Stylianou. Exclusion in Digital Markets[J]. Vol. 24. Telecommunications and Technology LawReview,2018. 198.
[15]Stéphane Ciriani,Marc Lebourges. The Market Dominance of US Digital Platforms:Antitrust Implications forthe European Union[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2018(04). 4-5.
[16]Miguel Sousa Ferro,De Gratis Non Curat Lex. Abuse of Dominance in Online Free Services[J]. THE Com-petition Law. Review,Volume 12 Issue 2,2017(07). 167.
[17]Pinar Akman. The Theory of Abuse in Google Search:A Positive and Normative Assessment under EUCompetition Law[J]. Journal of Law,Technology and Policy,(2017). 3-80.
[18]Akman,Pinar. The Theory of Abuse in Google Search:A Positive and Normative Assessment under EUCompetition Law[J]. University of Illinois Journal of Law,Technology and Policy,2017. 301.
[19]Edelman,Benjamin. Does Google Leverage Market Power through Tying and Bundling?[J]. 11 Journal ofCompetition Law and Economics,2015. 365.
[20]Friso,Bostoen. Margin Squeeze———Where competition law and sector regulation compete[J]. Jura Falco-nis 2016-2017,Vol. 53(1),2017. 9,13-43.
[21]Howard A. Shelanski. Information,Innovation andCompetitionPolicuforthe Internet[J]. University of Penn-sylvania Law Review,Vol. 161,2013. 1663.
[22]Carrier,Michael A. Only'Scraping'the Surface:The Copyright Hole in the FTC's Google Settlement[J]46UBC Law Review,2013. 759.
[23]Khan,Lina M. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. 126 Yale Law Journal,2017. 710.
[24]Wiethaus,Lars. Google's Favouring of Own Services:Comments from an EconomicPerspective[J]. 6 Journalof European Competition Law and Practice. 2015. 506.
[25]Vesterdorf,Bo ad Kyriakos Fountoukakos. An Appraisal of the Remedy in the Commission's Google Search(Shopping)Decision and a Guide to its Interpretation in Light of an AnalyticalReading of the Case Law[J].Journal of European Competition Law&Practice,Vol. 9,No. 1,2018. 3.
[26]Dogan,Cihan. Turkey:Turkish Competition Board Refused to Launch Investigation into CertainPractices ofGoogle[J]. 39 European Competition Law Review,2018. 64.
[27]Ezrachi,Ariel,Maurice E. Stucke. The Fight over Antitrust's Soul[J]. 9 Journal of EuropeanCompetitionLaw and Practice,2018. 1.
[28]Mandrescu,Daniel. Applying EU Competition Law to Online Platforms:the Road Ahead—Part2[J]. 38European Competition Law Review,2017. 410.
[29]Hovenkamp,Herbert. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. 68 Florida Law Review,2016. 419.
[30]Office of Fair Trading(OFT). The Impact of Reverse-Fixed Payments on Competition[G]. published 4 July,2013.
[31]MLex Market Insight. Amazon Japan raided by JFTC on suspicions of abuse of dominance[EB/OL]. pub-lished 15 March 2018,available online at:https://mlexmarketinsight. com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/asia/amazon-japan-raided-by-jftc-on-suspicions-of-abuse-of-dominance.
[32]Iacovides,Marios,Jakub Jeanrond. Keep Calm and Carry On Applying the Existing Rules—EU Competi-tion Law and the Digital Economy[J]. Stockholm Faculty of Law Research Paper Series No. 36,2017. 21.
[33]Lindsay,Alistair,Eithne McCarthy. Do we need to prevent pricing algorithms cooking upmarkets?[J]. 38European Competition Law Review. 2017. 533.
[34]Eric Hovenkamp. Platform Antitrust[J]. Journal of Corporation Law,2019,Forthcoming. 43.
[35]Ezrachi,Ariel. The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce[J]. Oxford Legal StudiesResearch Paper N. 55,2015. 517.
[36]Von Rompuy,Ben. A Europe without digital borders:Beyond the Reach of Antitrust?[J]. CoRe(02),2017. 93.
[37]Busch,Christoph,Hans Schulte-Nlke,Aneta Wiewiórowska-Domagalska and Fryderyk Zoll. The Rise ofthe Platform Economy:A New Challenge for EU Consumer Law?[J]. Journal of European Consumer andMarket Law(05),2016. 3.
[38]Cardona,Melisande,Néstor Duch-Brown,Bertin Martens. Consumer Perceptions of(CrossBorder)eCom-merce in the EU Digital Single Market[J]. Institute for Prospective Technological StudiesDigital EconomyWorking Paper(06),2015. 3-44.
[39]CERRE. Big Data and Competition Policy:Market power,personalised pricing and advertising[R]. pub-lished 16 February,2017. 8,48.
[40]Saldivia,Juan Pablo Prieto. E-Commerce in Chile:Best Practices,Self-Regulation and Integration[J]. 33Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,2016. 249.
[41] Ohlhausen,Maureen K,Alexander P. Okuliar. Competition,Consumer Protection and The Right[Ap-proach]to Privacy[J]. 80 Antitrust Law Journal,2015. 121.
[42]Spencer,Shaun B. Privacy and Predictive Analytics in E-Commerce[J]. 49 New England LawReview,2015. 101.
[43]Zuiderveen,Frederik Borgesius. Online Price Discrimination and Data Protection Law[J]. Amsterdam LawSchool Research Paper No. 32,2015. 5.
[44]Khan,Lina M. Amazon's Antitrust Paradox[J]. 126 Yale Law Journal,2017. 710.
[45]O'Connor,Daniel. Understanding Online Platform Competition:Common Misunderstandings[J]. in AitorOrtiz(ed.),Internet Competition and Regulation of Online Platforms,Competition Policy International,2016. 7-8.
[46]Baldwin,Robert,Martin Cave,Martin Lodge. Understanding Regulation,2nd ed[M]. Oxford UniversityPress,2011.
[47]Kjlbye,Lars,Alessio Aresu and Sophia Stephanou. The Commission's E-Commerce SectorInquiry:Analy-sis of Legal Issues and Suggested Practical Approach[J]. 7 Journal of European Competition Law and Prac-tice,2015. 465.
[48]Cohen,Julie E. Law for the Platform Economy[J]. 51 UC Davis Law Review,2017. 33.
[49]邱宝昌.《电子商务法》需要注意的十个问题[EB/OL].法制晚报,http://www. foodm ate. net/zhiliang/guanli/166793. html,2018-09-13.
(1)Leegin.Creative Leather Products,Inc.v.PSKS,Inc.,551 U.S.877(2007).
(2)See,e.g.,European Commission,Guidelines on Vertical Restraints(OJ C 130/1,19.5.2010),paras.106-9 in particular.
(1)Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusi ve exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,OJ C 45,24.02.2009,7-20,para.80.
(1)《欧盟运行条约》第102条规定:特殊的滥用行为包括:(1)直接或间接地施加不公平的购买或销售价格或者不公平的其他交易条件;(2)限制对消费者有偏见的产品、市场或者技术开发;(3)对同等交易的其他贸易伙伴适用不同的条件,从而使其处于不利的竞争地位;(4)使合同的缔结取决于贸易伙伴对额外义务的接受,而无论是依其性质或按照商业惯例,该额外义务均与合同的标的无关。
(1)See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google's Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc.,FTC File Number 111-0163,3 January 2013,fn.2.
(2)Decision of 27 June 2017 in Case AT.39740-Google Search(Shopping),available at:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
(1)Pending Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission.
(2)Office of Competition and Consumer Protection Press Release.Competition authoritysearches premis es of Grupa Allegro,published 7 July 2017,available online at:https://uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=1 3332.
(1)For example,the UK's Groceries(Supply Chain Practices)Market Investigation Order,2009,and Irela nd’s Consumer Protection Act 2007(Grocery Goods Undertakings)Regulation 2016.
(1)Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,the Council,the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,Online Platforms and theDigital Single Marke t.Opportunities and Challenges for Europe(COM(2016)288 final),published 25 May 2017.A useful disc ussion is provided by Oxera,“When should onlineplatforms be regulated?Oxera’s initial analysis of th e European Commission’s thinking,”published 7 June 2016.
(2)See,e.g.The Telegraph,“There is no justification for regulating online giants as if they were public utilities,”4 August 2017;The Economist,“What if large tech firms were regulated like sewage compa nies?”23September 2017;and Financial Times,“Why we need to regulate the tech platforms,”5 N ovember 2017.