消费者双重偏好下闭环供应链渠道差异研究
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摘要
本文基于消费者对于产品性能和环境影响的两种偏好,分别构建了有、无政府补贴时再造品具有不同销售渠道的闭环供应链模型,针对不同渠道闭环供应链的最优决策差异、政府补贴作用差异、环境影响差异进行比较分析,并讨论了消费者双重偏好对上述渠道差异的影响.研究表明,当考虑消费者双重偏好时,渠道差异表现为:1)与单渠道闭环供应链相比,双渠道闭环供应链具有更大的市场规模和市场利润,但是会造成零售商利润的受损;2)政府补贴在不同渠道闭环供应链中发挥的作用不同:在单渠道闭环供应链中不会扩大系统规模,但会增加系统利润;在双渠道闭环供应链中,会同时增加系统的规模和利润;3)政府补贴状态相同时,双渠道闭环供应链对环境的影响程度较大;政府补贴会降低单渠道闭环供应链产生的环境影响,对双渠道闭环供应链产生的环境影响的作用取决于再造品的环境友好性与其初始环境影响的关系;4)消费者对于再造品性能认可度以及再造品环境友好性对于渠道差异具有不同的影响,性能认可度的提高会加大渠道差异,但环境友好性对于渠道差异的影响与性能认可度的大小有关.
Based on the consumers' preferences of property characteristic and environmental influence,this paper establishes four closed loop supply chain(CLSC) models of different kinds of remanufacturing products sale channels with or without the government subsidy. And then we analysis the differences between single and dual channel CLSCs including the optimal decisions, the effects of the government subsidy and the environmental influences, and discuss the impacts of dual consumer preferences on above differences. Considering dual consumer preferences, this research shows that: 1) Compared with singlechannel CLSC, the dual-channel CLSC has bigger market size and more profits, but the profit of the retailer decreases; 2) The government subsidy performs different effects on different channel CLSCs: It doesn't expand the market size of the single-channel CLSC, but it can increase the system profit; however it will increase both the market size and profit in the dual-channel CLSC; 3) In the same subsidy situation, the dual-channel CLSC has more serious environmental influence; and the government subsidy can decrease the environmental influence in the single-channel CLSC, the government subsidy's impact on the environmental influence of dual-channel CLSC depends on the relationship between the environmental friendliness of remanufacturing products and their original environmental influence; 4) The dual consumer preferences have different impacts on the channel differences, the increasing of preference of property can wide the differences, but the impact of environmental friendliness depends on the value of preference of property.
Based on the consumers' preferences of property characteristic and environmental influence,this paper establishes four closed loop supply chain(CLSC) models of different kinds of remanufacturing products sale channels with or without the government subsidy. And then we analysis the differences between single and dual channel CLSCs including the optimal decisions, the effects of the government subsidy and the environmental influences, and discuss the impacts of dual consumer preferences on above differences. Considering dual consumer preferences, this research shows that: 1) Compared with singlechannel CLSC, the dual-channel CLSC has bigger market size and more profits, but the profit of the retailer decreases; 2) The government subsidy performs different effects on different channel CLSCs: It doesn't expand the market size of the single-channel CLSC, but it can increase the system profit; however it will increase both the market size and profit in the dual-channel CLSC; 3) In the same subsidy situation, the dual-channel CLSC has more serious environmental influence; and the government subsidy can decrease the environmental influence in the single-channel CLSC, the government subsidy's impact on the environmental influence of dual-channel CLSC depends on the relationship between the environmental friendliness of remanufacturing products and their original environmental influence; 4) The dual consumer preferences have different impacts on the channel differences, the increasing of preference of property can wide the differences, but the impact of environmental friendliness depends on the value of preference of property.
引文
[1] Savaskan R C, Bhattacharya S, Van Wassenhove L N. Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(2):239-252.
[2] Atasu A, Toktay L B, Van Wassenhove L N. How collection cost structure drives a manufacturer's reverse channel choice[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(5):1089-1102.
[3] Ferguson M E, Toktay L B. The effect of competition on recovery strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(3):351-368.
[4] Ferrer G, Swaminathan J M. Managing new and differentiated remanufactured products[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 203(2):370-379.
[5]郑本荣,杨超,杨珺.专利保护下双渠道闭环供应链的定价与协调决策[J].系统工程学报,2017, 32(1):103-113.Zheng B R, Yang C, Yang J. Pricing and coordination strategy of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under patent protection[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering, 2017, 32(1):103-113.
[6] Park S Y, Keh H T. Modelling hybrid distribution channels:A game-theoretic analysis[J]. Journal of Retailingand Consumer Services, 2003, 10(3):155-167.
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[8] Wang K Z, Zhao Y X, Cheng Y H, et al. Cooperation or competition? Channel choice for a remanufacturing fashion supply chain with government subsidy[J]. Sustainability, 2014, 6(10):7292-7310.
[9]易余胤,袁江.渠道冲突环境下的闭环供应链协调定价模型[J].管理科学学报,2012, 15(1):54-65.Yi Y Y, Yuan J. Pricing coordination of closed-loop supply chain in channel conflicts environment[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2012, 15(1):54-65.
[10]林杰,曹凯.双渠道竞争环境下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014, 34(6):1416-1424.Lin J, Cao K. Pricing models of closed-loop supply chain in double channels competitions environment[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2014, 34(6):1416-1424.
[11]郝新军.双渠道销售与回收的闭环供应链协调机制研究[J].统计与信息论坛,2015, 30(6):87-92.Hao X J. Research on the closed-loop supply chain coordination mechanism of dual channel sales and recycling[J].Statistics and Information Forum, 2015, 30(6):87-92.
[12] Ma W M, Zhao Z, Ke H. Dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with government consumption-subsidy[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 226(2):221-227.
[13] Li J, Du W, Yang F, et al. The carbon subsidy analysis in remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain[J]. Sustain?ability, 2014, 6(6):3861-3877.
[14] Liu H H, Lei M, Deng H H, et al. A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy[J]. Omega, 2016(59):290-302.
[15] Hong I H, Lee Y T, Chang P Y. Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain[J]. Resource Conservation and Recycling,2014, 82(82):75-85.
[16]王文宾,张雨,范玲玲,等.不同政府政策目标下逆向供应链的奖惩机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015, 23(7):68-76.Wang W B, Zhang Y, Fan L L, et al. Research on the premium and penalty mechanism of the reverse supply chain considering various goals of government[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(7):68-76.
[17]李新然,王奇琦.政府补贴下考虑销售努力的闭环供应链研究[J].科研管理,2017, 38(8):51-63.Li X R, Wang Q Q. A research on the closed-loop supply chain with sales effort under the government subsidy[J].Science Research Management, 2017, 38(8):51-63.
[18] Liu Z L, Anderson T D, Cruz J M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218(3):602-613.
[19] Wang Y, Hazen B T. Consumer product knowledge and intention to purchase remanufacturing products[J].International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 181:460-469.
[20] Debabrata G, Janat S. Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164:319-329.
[21]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016, 36(12):3111-3122.Chen X H, Wang J, Wang F Q. Decision research for dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under the consumer's preferences and government subsidies[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory Practice, 2016, 36(12):3111-3122.
[22]李新然,左宏炜.政府双重干预对双销售渠道闭环供应链的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(10):2600-2610.Li X R, Zuo H W. Impacts of government double intervention on dual-sale-channel closed-loop supply chain[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(10):2600-2610.
[23]李新然,吴义彪.以旧换再补贴对双渠道销售闭环供应链的影响[J].科研管理,2015, 36(9):106-118.Li X R, Wu Y B. Impacts od replacement subsidy on the dual-channel sale closed-loop supply chain[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(9):106-118.
[24]徐兵,吴明.双渠道闭环供应链的三种回收模式的建模分析[J]·数学的实践与认识,2012, 42(11):10-19.Xu B, Wu M. Modeling and analyzing the dual channel closed supply chain under three different product recycle modes[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2012, 42(11):10-19.
[25]李新然,吴义彪.政府“以旧换再,,补贴下的差别定价闭环供应链[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015, 35(8):1983-1995.Li X R, Wu Y B. Differential price closed-loop supply chain under the government replacement-subsidy[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(8):1983-1995.
[26] Conrad K. Price competition and product differentiation when consumers care for the environment[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2005, 31(1):1-19.
[27] Bansal S, Gangopadhyay S. Tax/subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics of and Management, 2003, 45(2):333-355.
[28]人民网.大众一汽发动机(大连)公司再制造项目投产[EB/OL].[2018-07-03]. http://auto.people.com.cn/GB/14555/15522960.html.
[29] Yan W, Xiong Y, Xiong Z, et al. Bricks vs. clicks:Which is better for marketing remanufactured products?[J].European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, 242(2):434-444.
[2] Atasu A, Toktay L B, Van Wassenhove L N. How collection cost structure drives a manufacturer's reverse channel choice[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(5):1089-1102.
[3] Ferguson M E, Toktay L B. The effect of competition on recovery strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(3):351-368.
[4] Ferrer G, Swaminathan J M. Managing new and differentiated remanufactured products[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 203(2):370-379.
[5]郑本荣,杨超,杨珺.专利保护下双渠道闭环供应链的定价与协调决策[J].系统工程学报,2017, 32(1):103-113.Zheng B R, Yang C, Yang J. Pricing and coordination strategy of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under patent protection[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering, 2017, 32(1):103-113.
[6] Park S Y, Keh H T. Modelling hybrid distribution channels:A game-theoretic analysis[J]. Journal of Retailingand Consumer Services, 2003, 10(3):155-167.
[7] Chiang W K, Chhajed D, Hess J D. Direct marketing, indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design[J]. Management Science, 2003, 49(1):1-20.
[8] Wang K Z, Zhao Y X, Cheng Y H, et al. Cooperation or competition? Channel choice for a remanufacturing fashion supply chain with government subsidy[J]. Sustainability, 2014, 6(10):7292-7310.
[9]易余胤,袁江.渠道冲突环境下的闭环供应链协调定价模型[J].管理科学学报,2012, 15(1):54-65.Yi Y Y, Yuan J. Pricing coordination of closed-loop supply chain in channel conflicts environment[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2012, 15(1):54-65.
[10]林杰,曹凯.双渠道竞争环境下的闭环供应链定价模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014, 34(6):1416-1424.Lin J, Cao K. Pricing models of closed-loop supply chain in double channels competitions environment[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2014, 34(6):1416-1424.
[11]郝新军.双渠道销售与回收的闭环供应链协调机制研究[J].统计与信息论坛,2015, 30(6):87-92.Hao X J. Research on the closed-loop supply chain coordination mechanism of dual channel sales and recycling[J].Statistics and Information Forum, 2015, 30(6):87-92.
[12] Ma W M, Zhao Z, Ke H. Dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with government consumption-subsidy[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 226(2):221-227.
[13] Li J, Du W, Yang F, et al. The carbon subsidy analysis in remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain[J]. Sustain?ability, 2014, 6(6):3861-3877.
[14] Liu H H, Lei M, Deng H H, et al. A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy[J]. Omega, 2016(59):290-302.
[15] Hong I H, Lee Y T, Chang P Y. Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain[J]. Resource Conservation and Recycling,2014, 82(82):75-85.
[16]王文宾,张雨,范玲玲,等.不同政府政策目标下逆向供应链的奖惩机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015, 23(7):68-76.Wang W B, Zhang Y, Fan L L, et al. Research on the premium and penalty mechanism of the reverse supply chain considering various goals of government[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(7):68-76.
[17]李新然,王奇琦.政府补贴下考虑销售努力的闭环供应链研究[J].科研管理,2017, 38(8):51-63.Li X R, Wang Q Q. A research on the closed-loop supply chain with sales effort under the government subsidy[J].Science Research Management, 2017, 38(8):51-63.
[18] Liu Z L, Anderson T D, Cruz J M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218(3):602-613.
[19] Wang Y, Hazen B T. Consumer product knowledge and intention to purchase remanufacturing products[J].International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 181:460-469.
[20] Debabrata G, Janat S. Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164:319-329.
[21]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016, 36(12):3111-3122.Chen X H, Wang J, Wang F Q. Decision research for dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under the consumer's preferences and government subsidies[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory Practice, 2016, 36(12):3111-3122.
[22]李新然,左宏炜.政府双重干预对双销售渠道闭环供应链的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(10):2600-2610.Li X R, Zuo H W. Impacts of government double intervention on dual-sale-channel closed-loop supply chain[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(10):2600-2610.
[23]李新然,吴义彪.以旧换再补贴对双渠道销售闭环供应链的影响[J].科研管理,2015, 36(9):106-118.Li X R, Wu Y B. Impacts od replacement subsidy on the dual-channel sale closed-loop supply chain[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(9):106-118.
[24]徐兵,吴明.双渠道闭环供应链的三种回收模式的建模分析[J]·数学的实践与认识,2012, 42(11):10-19.Xu B, Wu M. Modeling and analyzing the dual channel closed supply chain under three different product recycle modes[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2012, 42(11):10-19.
[25]李新然,吴义彪.政府“以旧换再,,补贴下的差别定价闭环供应链[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015, 35(8):1983-1995.Li X R, Wu Y B. Differential price closed-loop supply chain under the government replacement-subsidy[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(8):1983-1995.
[26] Conrad K. Price competition and product differentiation when consumers care for the environment[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2005, 31(1):1-19.
[27] Bansal S, Gangopadhyay S. Tax/subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics of and Management, 2003, 45(2):333-355.
[28]人民网.大众一汽发动机(大连)公司再制造项目投产[EB/OL].[2018-07-03]. http://auto.people.com.cn/GB/14555/15522960.html.
[29] Yan W, Xiong Y, Xiong Z, et al. Bricks vs. clicks:Which is better for marketing remanufactured products?[J].European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, 242(2):434-444.