雾霾污染、规制治理与公众参与的演化仿真研究
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摘要
研究公众参与雾霾治理和地方政府规制污染企业减排的策略选择对于"坚持全民共治、源头防治,持续实施大气污染防治行动,打赢蓝天保卫战"具有重要的理论与现实意义。本文首先基于一个公众以健康损失和迁徙损失为代价要求地方政府规制污染企业减排的"公众不参与,政府不规制"囚徒困境博弈模型,然后引入中央政府环保督查和公众参与第三方监管,构建中央-地方-公众三方非合作演化博弈模型,借助数值模拟技术对模型收敛于理想"合作"演化均衡进行实证分析。研究发现,中央政府能够以环境行政管制调控地方政府不规制行为与动机,公众参与的第三方监管作用以改变地方政府理性预期为前提,系统能够实现"中央给压力,地方来推动,公众都参与"理想演化稳定均衡。进一步研究表明,对于地方政府环境规制策略影响公众第三方监管可完全替代中央政府行政管制作用,有助于形成解决大气污染防治地方政府"中梗阻"问题的共同制约机制。新时期,为了构建政府为主导、企业为主体、社会组织和公众共同参与的"合作"治理模式,中国环境管理需要形成生态文明理性预期,建立环保督查长效机制;强化地方治污监督责任,落实企业主体治污责任;保障公众参与法律途径,完善公众参与监督机制。
Studying on the public's participation in haze governance and local government's strategy options of regulating enterprises' pollution reduction has important theoretical and practical significance for ‘adhering to the common governance of the people,preventing and controlling of pollution sources,continuously implementing air pollution prevention and control actions,and defending the blue-sky'. In this paper,we design a prisoner's dilemma game model that the public asks local governments to regulate the emission reduction of polluting enterprises at the cost of health loss and migration loss. However,Nash equilibrium is that the public does not participate and the government does not regulate. Then we introduce the central government environmental regulation constraints and public participation in third-party supervision,construct a central-local-public three-party non-cooperative evolutionary game model,and use numerical simulation technology to empirically analyze the model convergence to the ideal ‘cooperative 'evolutionary equilibrium. Model simulations indicate that the central government can regulate local government's unregulated behaviors and motives with environmental administrative control. The third-party supervision role of public participation is based on the premise of changing local government's rational expectations. The system can reach the ideal evolutionary game equilibrium of‘central pressure,local promotion,and public participation'. Consequently,a general finding is that the public third-party supervision can completely replace the role of central government 's administrative control attached to effects of local government environmental regulation strategies,which helps to form a common constraint mechanism to solve the problem of ‘intestinal obstruction ' in air pollution prevention and control. In the new era,in order to build a‘cooperative'governance model for the government,enterprises,society,the public and other co-governing liability subjects,China's environmental management needs to form ecological civilization rational expectations and establish a long-term mechanism for environmental supervision. Moreover,the central government should strengthen the supervisory responsibility for local pollution control,implement the subject responsibility of enterprise governance for pollution,ensure public participation in legal channels,and improve public participation in supervision mechanisms.
Studying on the public's participation in haze governance and local government's strategy options of regulating enterprises' pollution reduction has important theoretical and practical significance for ‘adhering to the common governance of the people,preventing and controlling of pollution sources,continuously implementing air pollution prevention and control actions,and defending the blue-sky'. In this paper,we design a prisoner's dilemma game model that the public asks local governments to regulate the emission reduction of polluting enterprises at the cost of health loss and migration loss. However,Nash equilibrium is that the public does not participate and the government does not regulate. Then we introduce the central government environmental regulation constraints and public participation in third-party supervision,construct a central-local-public three-party non-cooperative evolutionary game model,and use numerical simulation technology to empirically analyze the model convergence to the ideal ‘cooperative 'evolutionary equilibrium. Model simulations indicate that the central government can regulate local government's unregulated behaviors and motives with environmental administrative control. The third-party supervision role of public participation is based on the premise of changing local government's rational expectations. The system can reach the ideal evolutionary game equilibrium of‘central pressure,local promotion,and public participation'. Consequently,a general finding is that the public third-party supervision can completely replace the role of central government 's administrative control attached to effects of local government environmental regulation strategies,which helps to form a common constraint mechanism to solve the problem of ‘intestinal obstruction ' in air pollution prevention and control. In the new era,in order to build a‘cooperative'governance model for the government,enterprises,society,the public and other co-governing liability subjects,China's environmental management needs to form ecological civilization rational expectations and establish a long-term mechanism for environmental supervision. Moreover,the central government should strengthen the supervisory responsibility for local pollution control,implement the subject responsibility of enterprise governance for pollution,ensure public participation in legal channels,and improve public participation in supervision mechanisms.
引文
[1]初钊鹏,刘昌新,朱婧.基于集体行动逻辑的京津冀雾霾合作治理演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(9):56-65.
[2]初钊鹏,卞晨,刘昌新,等.基于演化博弈的京津冀雾霾治理环境规制政策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(12):63-75.
[3]刘思宇.政策论证与共识建构的多源流嵌套——以“PM2. 5事件”和空气治理为例[J].甘肃行政学院学报,2018(2):26-40.
[4]郝亮,黄宝荣,苏利阳,等.环保约谈对政策执行“中梗阻”的疏通机制研究:以临沂市为例[J].中国环境管理,2017,9(1):75-80.
[5]DEGROOT I,LORING W,RIHM JR A,et al. People and air pollution:a study of attitudes in Buffalo,NY[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1966,16(5):245-247.
[6]SMITH W S,SCHUENEMAN J J,ZEIDBERG L D. Public reaction to air pollution in Nashville,Tennessee[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1964,14(10):418-423.
[7]TUAN Y F. Topophilia:a study of environmental perceptions,attitudes,and values[M]. Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1974:88-89.
[8]CREER R N,GRAY R M,TRESHOW M. Differential responses to air pollution as an environmental health problem[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1970,20(12):814-818.
[9]MOFFATT S,PHILLIMORE P,BHOPAL R,et al. If this is what it’s doing to our washing,what is it doing to our lungs? industrial pollution and public understanding in North-East England[J]. Social science&medicine,1995,41(6):883-891.
[10]ZEIDNER M, SHECHTER M. Psychological responses to air pollution:some personality and demographic correlates[J]. Journal of environmental psychology,1988,8(3):191-208.
[11]ROTTON J, FREY J. Psychological costs of air pollution:atmospheric conditions, seasonal trends, and psychiatric emergencies[J]. Population and environment,1984,7(1):3-16.
[12]ELLIOTT S J,COLE D C,KRUEGER P,et al. The power of perception:health risk attributed to air pollution in an urban industrial neighbourhood[J]. Risk analysis,1999,19(4):621-634.
[13]WANG Y, SUN M, YANG X, et al. Public awareness and willingness to pay for tackling smog pollution in China:a case study[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2016,112:1627-1634.
[14]张君,孙岩,陈丹琳.公众理解雾霾污染——海淀区居民对雾霾的感知调查[J].科学学研究,2017,35(4):491-499.
[15]XU X. SYLWESTER K. Environmental quality and international migration[J]. Kyklos,2016,69(1):157-180.
[16]陈友华,施旖旎.雾霾与人口迁移——对社会阶层结构影响的探讨[J].探索与争鸣,2017(4):76-80,88.
[17]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[18]徐鹏杰,卢娟.异质性环境规制对雾霾污染物排放绩效的影响——基于中国式分权视角的动态杜宾与分位数检验[J].科学决策,2018(1):48-74.
[19]黄寿峰.环境规制、影子经济与雾霾污染——动态半参数分析[J].经济学动态,2016(11):33-44.
[20]金帅,张洋,杜建国.动态惩罚机制下企业环境行为分析与规制策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2015(S1):637-644.
[21]焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150.
[22]付喜娥,绿色基础设施合作建设中政府与企业演化博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2018,39(12):106-109.
[23]崔雅雯,杨磊,郭延禄.供给侧改革下的政府规制与企业的标准化行为演化博弈分析[J].技术与创新管理,2018,39(6):753-760.
[24]潘峰,西宝,王琳.地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):97-102.
[25]彭皓玥.公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析[J].科技进步与对策,2016,33(7):42-47.
[26]潘峰,西宝,王琳.环境规制中地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(3):88-93,204.
[27]王欢明,陈洋愉,李鹏.基于演化博弈理论的雾霾治理中政府环境规制策略研究[J].环境科学研究,2017,30(4):621-627.
[28]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):62-70.
[29]游达明,邓亚玲,夏赛莲.基于竞争视角下央地政府环境规制行为策略研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(11):120-129.
[30]徐松鹤.公众参与下地方政府与企业环境行为的演化博弈分析[J].系统科学学报,2018,26(4):68-72.
[31]游达明,杨金辉.公众参与下政府环境规制与企业生态技术创新行为的演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2017(12):1-8.
[32]曹霞,张路蓬.环境规制下企业绿色技术创新的演化博弈分析——基于利益相关者视角[J].系统工程,2017,35(2):103-108.
[33]王玮,徐逸伦,杨文娟,等.科技创新能力对区域经济发展关系的影响[J].山东师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,32(4):126-131.
[34]DUAN W,LI C,ZHANG P,et al. Game modeling and policy research on the system dynamics:based tripartite evolution for government environmental regulation[J]. Cluster computing,2016,19(4):1-14.
[35]曲卫华,颜志军.企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析[J].智能系统学报,2017,12(2):237-249.
[36]姚洋.中国经济成就的政治经济学原因[J].经济与管理研究,2018,39(1):3-12.
[37]孟庆国,杜洪涛,王君泽.利益诉求视角下的地方政府雾霾治理行为分析[J].中国软科学,2017(11):66-76.
[38]SELTEN R. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts[J]. Journal of theoretical biology,1980,84(1):93-101.
[39]许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26.
[40]马腾,曹吉鸣,李冲,等.基于知识中介的项目型组织知识转移多群体演化博弈分析[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2016,13(3):86-96.
[41]姜珂,游达明.基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):139-148.
[42]周正柱,王俊龙.长江经济带区域生态环境质量综合评价与预测研究[J].山东师范大学学报(自然科学版),2018,33(4):465-473.
[43]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”——来自中国地方“两会”的证据[J].中国工业经济,2016(5):40-56.
[2]初钊鹏,卞晨,刘昌新,等.基于演化博弈的京津冀雾霾治理环境规制政策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(12):63-75.
[3]刘思宇.政策论证与共识建构的多源流嵌套——以“PM2. 5事件”和空气治理为例[J].甘肃行政学院学报,2018(2):26-40.
[4]郝亮,黄宝荣,苏利阳,等.环保约谈对政策执行“中梗阻”的疏通机制研究:以临沂市为例[J].中国环境管理,2017,9(1):75-80.
[5]DEGROOT I,LORING W,RIHM JR A,et al. People and air pollution:a study of attitudes in Buffalo,NY[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1966,16(5):245-247.
[6]SMITH W S,SCHUENEMAN J J,ZEIDBERG L D. Public reaction to air pollution in Nashville,Tennessee[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1964,14(10):418-423.
[7]TUAN Y F. Topophilia:a study of environmental perceptions,attitudes,and values[M]. Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1974:88-89.
[8]CREER R N,GRAY R M,TRESHOW M. Differential responses to air pollution as an environmental health problem[J]. Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association,1970,20(12):814-818.
[9]MOFFATT S,PHILLIMORE P,BHOPAL R,et al. If this is what it’s doing to our washing,what is it doing to our lungs? industrial pollution and public understanding in North-East England[J]. Social science&medicine,1995,41(6):883-891.
[10]ZEIDNER M, SHECHTER M. Psychological responses to air pollution:some personality and demographic correlates[J]. Journal of environmental psychology,1988,8(3):191-208.
[11]ROTTON J, FREY J. Psychological costs of air pollution:atmospheric conditions, seasonal trends, and psychiatric emergencies[J]. Population and environment,1984,7(1):3-16.
[12]ELLIOTT S J,COLE D C,KRUEGER P,et al. The power of perception:health risk attributed to air pollution in an urban industrial neighbourhood[J]. Risk analysis,1999,19(4):621-634.
[13]WANG Y, SUN M, YANG X, et al. Public awareness and willingness to pay for tackling smog pollution in China:a case study[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2016,112:1627-1634.
[14]张君,孙岩,陈丹琳.公众理解雾霾污染——海淀区居民对雾霾的感知调查[J].科学学研究,2017,35(4):491-499.
[15]XU X. SYLWESTER K. Environmental quality and international migration[J]. Kyklos,2016,69(1):157-180.
[16]陈友华,施旖旎.雾霾与人口迁移——对社会阶层结构影响的探讨[J].探索与争鸣,2017(4):76-80,88.
[17]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[18]徐鹏杰,卢娟.异质性环境规制对雾霾污染物排放绩效的影响——基于中国式分权视角的动态杜宾与分位数检验[J].科学决策,2018(1):48-74.
[19]黄寿峰.环境规制、影子经济与雾霾污染——动态半参数分析[J].经济学动态,2016(11):33-44.
[20]金帅,张洋,杜建国.动态惩罚机制下企业环境行为分析与规制策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2015(S1):637-644.
[21]焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150.
[22]付喜娥,绿色基础设施合作建设中政府与企业演化博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2018,39(12):106-109.
[23]崔雅雯,杨磊,郭延禄.供给侧改革下的政府规制与企业的标准化行为演化博弈分析[J].技术与创新管理,2018,39(6):753-760.
[24]潘峰,西宝,王琳.地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):97-102.
[25]彭皓玥.公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析[J].科技进步与对策,2016,33(7):42-47.
[26]潘峰,西宝,王琳.环境规制中地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(3):88-93,204.
[27]王欢明,陈洋愉,李鹏.基于演化博弈理论的雾霾治理中政府环境规制策略研究[J].环境科学研究,2017,30(4):621-627.
[28]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):62-70.
[29]游达明,邓亚玲,夏赛莲.基于竞争视角下央地政府环境规制行为策略研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(11):120-129.
[30]徐松鹤.公众参与下地方政府与企业环境行为的演化博弈分析[J].系统科学学报,2018,26(4):68-72.
[31]游达明,杨金辉.公众参与下政府环境规制与企业生态技术创新行为的演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2017(12):1-8.
[32]曹霞,张路蓬.环境规制下企业绿色技术创新的演化博弈分析——基于利益相关者视角[J].系统工程,2017,35(2):103-108.
[33]王玮,徐逸伦,杨文娟,等.科技创新能力对区域经济发展关系的影响[J].山东师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,32(4):126-131.
[34]DUAN W,LI C,ZHANG P,et al. Game modeling and policy research on the system dynamics:based tripartite evolution for government environmental regulation[J]. Cluster computing,2016,19(4):1-14.
[35]曲卫华,颜志军.企业、政府与公众公共健康提升激励机制演化分析[J].智能系统学报,2017,12(2):237-249.
[36]姚洋.中国经济成就的政治经济学原因[J].经济与管理研究,2018,39(1):3-12.
[37]孟庆国,杜洪涛,王君泽.利益诉求视角下的地方政府雾霾治理行为分析[J].中国软科学,2017(11):66-76.
[38]SELTEN R. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts[J]. Journal of theoretical biology,1980,84(1):93-101.
[39]许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26.
[40]马腾,曹吉鸣,李冲,等.基于知识中介的项目型组织知识转移多群体演化博弈分析[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2016,13(3):86-96.
[41]姜珂,游达明.基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):139-148.
[42]周正柱,王俊龙.长江经济带区域生态环境质量综合评价与预测研究[J].山东师范大学学报(自然科学版),2018,33(4):465-473.
[43]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”——来自中国地方“两会”的证据[J].中国工业经济,2016(5):40-56.