企业产权性质与个人所得税筹划决策——基于政府扶持、政府压力及管理层权力的分析
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摘要
如何激励职工努力工作,一直是实务界及理论界关注的热点话题,为职工开展个人所得税筹划能够提高职工的税后薪酬,可能具有职工激励作用。本文以我国2010～2016年的A股上市公司为研究对象,分析了企业产权性质与个人所得税筹划之间的关系。研究发现:(1)个人所得税是非国有企业交换政府扶持的重要工具,非国企不倾向于为职工开展个税筹划;(2)国企利用个人所得税交换政府扶持的动机较小,倾向于开展个税筹划,且地方国企的个税筹划倾向高于中央直属国企。进一步研究发现,地方政府面临的压力以及过大的管理层权力,均会降低国企的个税筹划倾向。本文首次研究了企业个税筹划决策的影响因素,不仅丰富了纳税筹划的相关研究,也为提高职工激励效率提供了新的思路。
Employee incentive has been a hot topic. Implementing personal income tax planning for employees can improve their after-tax salary and may improve incentive effect. Using the sample of A-share Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2016,the paper examines the impact of ownership on personal income tax planning decision of enterprises.We find that,( 1) for non-state-owned enterprises,personal income tax is a valuable resource to exchange government support,so non-state-owned enterprises are not inclined to carry out personal income tax planning for employees.( 2) State-owned firms are inclined to implement personal income tax planning since they are less motivated to exchange personal income tax for government support,among which local government-owned enterprises exhibit more willingness than central government-owned enterprises. In addition,the pressure of local government and excessive managerial power have significantly negative effects on personal income tax planning of SOEs. This is the first study,to the best of our knowledge,to investigate factors that influence personal income tax planning decisions of enterprises. It not only enriches the correlation researches of tax planning,but also provides a new way to improve the efficiency of employee incentive.
Employee incentive has been a hot topic. Implementing personal income tax planning for employees can improve their after-tax salary and may improve incentive effect. Using the sample of A-share Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2016,the paper examines the impact of ownership on personal income tax planning decision of enterprises.We find that,( 1) for non-state-owned enterprises,personal income tax is a valuable resource to exchange government support,so non-state-owned enterprises are not inclined to carry out personal income tax planning for employees.( 2) State-owned firms are inclined to implement personal income tax planning since they are less motivated to exchange personal income tax for government support,among which local government-owned enterprises exhibit more willingness than central government-owned enterprises. In addition,the pressure of local government and excessive managerial power have significantly negative effects on personal income tax planning of SOEs. This is the first study,to the best of our knowledge,to investigate factors that influence personal income tax planning decisions of enterprises. It not only enriches the correlation researches of tax planning,but also provides a new way to improve the efficiency of employee incentive.
引文
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[7]王跃堂,王亮亮,彭洋.产权性质、债务税盾与资本结构[J].经济研究,2010,45(9):122-136.
[8]王跃堂,王国俊,彭洋.控制权性质影响税收敏感性吗?———基于企业劳动力需求的检验[J].经济研究,2012,47(4):52-63.
[9]王亮亮.研发支出资本化或费用化:税收视角的解释[J].会计研究,2016,(9):17-24.
[10]王亮亮,王跃堂.企业研发投入与资本结构选择———基于非债务税盾视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2015,(11):125-140.
[11]王亮亮,王跃堂,杨志进.会计准则国际趋同、研究开发支出及其经济后果[J].财经研究,2012,38(2):49-60.
[12]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,45(11):73-87.
[13]傅颀,汪祥耀,路军.管理层权力、高管薪酬变动与公司并购行为分析[J].会计研究,2014,(11):30-37,96.
[14]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
[15]陈冬华,范从来,沈永建,等.职工激励、工资刚性与企业绩效———基于国有非上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,45(7):116-129.
[16]江伟,李斌.制度环境、国有产权与银行差别贷款[J].金融研究,2006,(11):116-126.
[17]金太军,袁建军.政府与企业的交换模式及其演变规律———观察腐败深层机制的微观视角[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1):102-118,222.
[18] Qian Y Y,Xu C G. Why China’s economic reforms differ:the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector[J]. Economics of Transition,1993,1(2):135-170.
[19] Acemoglu D. Why not a political coase theorem? Social conflict,commitment and politics[J]. Joumal of Comparative Economic,2003,31(4):620-652.
[20]曹越,姜丽平,张肖飞,等.地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制与国有企业税负[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(5):103-112.
[21]刘骏,刘峰.财政集权、政府控制与企业税负———来自中国的证据[J].会计研究,2014,(1):21-27,94.
[22]潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,46(9):108-120.
[23]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[24]卢锐.企业创新投资与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2014,(10):36-42,96.
[25]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011,46(4):107-120.
[26]郭正模,李晓梅.工资收入差距与政府宏观调控[J].社会科学研究,2006,(3):39-42.
[27]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率———来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92,112.
[28] Morse A,Nanda V,Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs[J]. The Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1779-1821.
[29]李维安,徐业坤.政治身份的避税效应[J].金融研究,2013,(3):114-129.
[2] Shapiro C,Stiglitz J. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device[J]. American Economic Review,1984,74(3):433-444.
[3] Lenoard J S. Carrots and sticks:pay,supervision,and turnover[J]. Journal of Labor Economics,1987,5(4):136-152.
[4]王雄元,史震阳,何捷.企业工薪所得税筹划与职工薪酬激励效应[J].管理世界,2016,(7):137-153,171.
[5]吴敬琏.收入差距过大的症结[J].经济研究信息,2006,(10):19-20.
[6]陆正飞,王雄元,张鹏.国有企业支付了更高的职工工资吗?[J].经济研究,2012,47(3):28-39.
[7]王跃堂,王亮亮,彭洋.产权性质、债务税盾与资本结构[J].经济研究,2010,45(9):122-136.
[8]王跃堂,王国俊,彭洋.控制权性质影响税收敏感性吗?———基于企业劳动力需求的检验[J].经济研究,2012,47(4):52-63.
[9]王亮亮.研发支出资本化或费用化:税收视角的解释[J].会计研究,2016,(9):17-24.
[10]王亮亮,王跃堂.企业研发投入与资本结构选择———基于非债务税盾视角的分析[J].中国工业经济,2015,(11):125-140.
[11]王亮亮,王跃堂,杨志进.会计准则国际趋同、研究开发支出及其经济后果[J].财经研究,2012,38(2):49-60.
[12]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,45(11):73-87.
[13]傅颀,汪祥耀,路军.管理层权力、高管薪酬变动与公司并购行为分析[J].会计研究,2014,(11):30-37,96.
[14]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
[15]陈冬华,范从来,沈永建,等.职工激励、工资刚性与企业绩效———基于国有非上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,45(7):116-129.
[16]江伟,李斌.制度环境、国有产权与银行差别贷款[J].金融研究,2006,(11):116-126.
[17]金太军,袁建军.政府与企业的交换模式及其演变规律———观察腐败深层机制的微观视角[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1):102-118,222.
[18] Qian Y Y,Xu C G. Why China’s economic reforms differ:the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector[J]. Economics of Transition,1993,1(2):135-170.
[19] Acemoglu D. Why not a political coase theorem? Social conflict,commitment and politics[J]. Joumal of Comparative Economic,2003,31(4):620-652.
[20]曹越,姜丽平,张肖飞,等.地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制与国有企业税负[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(5):103-112.
[21]刘骏,刘峰.财政集权、政府控制与企业税负———来自中国的证据[J].会计研究,2014,(1):21-27,94.
[22]潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究,2011,46(9):108-120.
[23]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[24]卢锐.企业创新投资与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2014,(10):36-42,96.
[25]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011,46(4):107-120.
[26]郭正模,李晓梅.工资收入差距与政府宏观调控[J].社会科学研究,2006,(3):39-42.
[27]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率———来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92,112.
[28] Morse A,Nanda V,Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs[J]. The Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1779-1821.
[29]李维安,徐业坤.政治身份的避税效应[J].金融研究,2013,(3):114-129.