社会网络视角下的管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性——基于董事联结的调节效应
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摘要
董事联结作为一种非正式的制度安排,是企业获取异质性信息和稀缺资源的重要渠道。本文基于社会网络关系视角,构建了公司层面的董事网络中心度,考察董事联结对管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性的作用机理。研究结果表明,管理层权力越大,高管薪酬粘性越强;董事网络中心度弱化了二者之间的关系,具有显著的负向调节效应。进一步区分联结强度后发现,内外部董事联结关系的强弱会对治理效应产生差异化影响,需要警惕内部董事的强联结关系存在正向调节效应而加剧高管薪酬粘性。以上发现意味着,网络位置与联结强度是影响董事联结治理效果的两大关键要素,董事联结的网络位置对管理层权力及薪酬粘性会产生重要的治理机制,但其作用的发挥同时需要依赖于内外部董事联结关系的强弱。
As the informal institutional arrangement,the board interlocks is an important channel to obtain heterogeneous information and scarce resources for enterprises. Based on the perspective of social network relations,this paper constructs the board network centrality at the company level,and investigates the mechanism of board interlocks on managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation. The results show that there is positive correlation between managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation,and the board network centrality has a significantly negative regulation effect weakening the relation between them. After distinguishing the interlocks strength,further research finds that the internal and external board interlocks relations have differentiated impact on the governance effect,and stronger interlocks relations from internal directors need to be vigilant,which the positive regulation effect would increase stickiness of executive compensation. The above findings mean that network location and interlocks strength are the two key factors influencing the governance effect of board interlocks,and the network location will have an important governance mechanism for managerial power and compensation stickiness,but its role depends on the strength of internal and external board interlocks relations.
As the informal institutional arrangement,the board interlocks is an important channel to obtain heterogeneous information and scarce resources for enterprises. Based on the perspective of social network relations,this paper constructs the board network centrality at the company level,and investigates the mechanism of board interlocks on managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation. The results show that there is positive correlation between managerial power and stickiness of executive compensation,and the board network centrality has a significantly negative regulation effect weakening the relation between them. After distinguishing the interlocks strength,further research finds that the internal and external board interlocks relations have differentiated impact on the governance effect,and stronger interlocks relations from internal directors need to be vigilant,which the positive regulation effect would increase stickiness of executive compensation. The above findings mean that network location and interlocks strength are the two key factors influencing the governance effect of board interlocks,and the network location will have an important governance mechanism for managerial power and compensation stickiness,but its role depends on the strength of internal and external board interlocks relations.
引文
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[3]谢德仁,陈运森.董事网络:定义、特征和计量[J].会计研究,2012(3):44-51.
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[7]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效---基于并购双方之间信息不对称的研究视角[J].管理世界,2013(12):117-132.
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[15]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012(10):35-41.
[16]高文亮,罗宏,程培先.管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性[J].经济经纬,2011(6):82-86.
[17]张华荣,李波.管理层权力是否加剧了上市公司高管薪酬粘性?[J].财经问题研究,2018(6):169-178.
[18]罗家德.社会网络分析讲义(第二版)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010:187-226.
[19]洪峰.独立董事治理、管理层权力与超额薪酬---基于董事网络的实证分析[J].贵州财经大学学报,2015(2):31-40.
[20]郝云宏,左雪莲.管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬[J].商业经济与管理,2018(7):41-48.
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[22]Bizjak J,Lemmon M,Whitby R.Option Backdating and Board Interlocks[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(11):4821-4847.
[23]李敏娜,王铁男.董事网络、高管薪酬激励与公司成长性[J].中国软科学,2014(4):138-148.
[24]步丹璐,文彩虹.高管薪酬粘性增加了企业投资吗?[J].财经研究,2013(6):63-72.
[25]Finkelstein S.Power in Top Management Teams:Dimensions,Measurement,and Validation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[26]陶文杰,金占明.CEO权力、企业社会责任和企业绩效的关系[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2015(12):1354-1360.
[27]Wasserman S,Faust K.Social Network Analysis:Methods and Application[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1994:234-256.
[28]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[29]Granovetter M.The Strength of Weak Ties[J].American Journal of Sociology,1973,78(6):1360-1380.
[30]Gulati R.Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns:A Longitudinal Analysis[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1995,40(4):619-652.
[2]左晓宇,孙谦.董事网络、公司中心度与投资效率[J].经济与管理研究,2018(6):110-121.
[3]谢德仁,陈运森.董事网络:定义、特征和计量[J].会计研究,2012(3):44-51.
[4]Cohen L,Frazzini A,Malloy C.The Small World of Investing:Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns[J].Journal of Political Economy,2008,116(5):951-979.
[5]李留闯.相对业绩评价与CEO薪酬---基于董事联结的分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2015(5):73-83.
[6]Larcker D F,So E C,Wang C C Y.Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2013,55(2-3):225-250.
[7]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效---基于并购双方之间信息不对称的研究视角[J].管理世界,2013(12):117-132.
[8]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].Journal of Economics Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[9]Larcker D F,So E C,Wang C C Y.Boardroom Centrality and Stock Returns[R].Working Paper,Stanford University,2010:123-134.
[10]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012(2):168-182.
[11]Gaver J J,Gaver K M.The Relation between Nonrecurring Accounting Transactions and CEO Cash Compensation[J].The Accounting Review,1998,73(2):235-253.
[12]Jackson S B,Lopez T J,Reitenga A L.Accounting Fundamental and CEO Bonus Compensation[J].Journal of accounting and public policy,2008,27(5):374-393.
[13]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009(3):110-124.
[14]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M,Walker D I.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[15]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012(10):35-41.
[16]高文亮,罗宏,程培先.管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性[J].经济经纬,2011(6):82-86.
[17]张华荣,李波.管理层权力是否加剧了上市公司高管薪酬粘性?[J].财经问题研究,2018(6):169-178.
[18]罗家德.社会网络分析讲义(第二版)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010:187-226.
[19]洪峰.独立董事治理、管理层权力与超额薪酬---基于董事网络的实证分析[J].贵州财经大学学报,2015(2):31-40.
[20]郝云宏,左雪莲.管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬[J].商业经济与管理,2018(7):41-48.
[21]Beckman C M,Haunschild P R.Network Learning:The Effects of Partner Experience Heterogeneity on Corporate Acquisitions[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(1):92-124.
[22]Bizjak J,Lemmon M,Whitby R.Option Backdating and Board Interlocks[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(11):4821-4847.
[23]李敏娜,王铁男.董事网络、高管薪酬激励与公司成长性[J].中国软科学,2014(4):138-148.
[24]步丹璐,文彩虹.高管薪酬粘性增加了企业投资吗?[J].财经研究,2013(6):63-72.
[25]Finkelstein S.Power in Top Management Teams:Dimensions,Measurement,and Validation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[26]陶文杰,金占明.CEO权力、企业社会责任和企业绩效的关系[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2015(12):1354-1360.
[27]Wasserman S,Faust K.Social Network Analysis:Methods and Application[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1994:234-256.
[28]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[29]Granovetter M.The Strength of Weak Ties[J].American Journal of Sociology,1973,78(6):1360-1380.
[30]Gulati R.Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns:A Longitudinal Analysis[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1995,40(4):619-652.