农村资产流转与村委会合约角色的重新定位——基于广西农村的调研
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摘要
本文是在广西农村调查的基础上对农村集体组织定位的研究。农村资产确权除了保证资产的收益权以外,还旨在有力推进农村资产的流转,其主体是土地的流转。在当前的资产流转中,鉴于村委会的法律地位以及信息优势等,村委会在很大程度上充当着签约双方代理人的角色,也就是说村委会担当着资产流转中介组织的角色。事实上,农村资产流转合约是一个三方合约:资产承包方、村委会和资产经营方。但是,由于农村资产的专用性特征、人口流动、信息不对称和土地零散化分布等复杂因素导致农户存在着三方合约的退出障碍。这些因素与村委会权力因素的叠加可能导致村委会在资产流转中的机会主义行为,比如串谋和过度合约化,损害资产承包人的利益。因此,扩大流转中介组织的可选择性是消除资产流转中机会主义行为的关键问题,也就是说代理人的市场化是未来可选择的方向。村委会的角色面临着转换,但在新合约中仍然担负着重要职能,可以充当签约的协调者以及合约履行的监督者,资产流转合约由三方合约演变为四方合约,形成有效的合约制衡机制。
The goal to ensure property right not only to protect the return of property right,but also intended to promote the transfer of rural assets,is the land transfer. In the current asset transfer,in the view of the legal status and the information superiority of the village committee,the organization usually acts as a signing agent role to a great extent,that is to say the village committee plays the important role of intermediary organizations. In fact,the asset transfer contract is a three-party contract: the contractor,the village committee and the asset manager. However,due to the characteristics of the floating population,information asymmetry,fragmented distribution and other complex factors of the rural assets,that cause farmer's barriers to exit three-party contract. The superposition between this factor and the power of village committee may lead to opportunism of the village committee in the transfer of the assets,such as collusion and excessive contracts. It will damage the contractor's benefit.Therefore,expanding the optional intermediary organization is the key to eliminate the problem of opportunism in the transfer of assets,that is to say marketization of agent is the future direction of choice. The role of village committee is facing transformation,but still plays an important role in the new contract,it can act as a coordinator and supervisor of signing contracts. The asset transfer contract will evolve from three-party contract to four-party contract and promote the formation of effective balance mechanism of contract.
The goal to ensure property right not only to protect the return of property right,but also intended to promote the transfer of rural assets,is the land transfer. In the current asset transfer,in the view of the legal status and the information superiority of the village committee,the organization usually acts as a signing agent role to a great extent,that is to say the village committee plays the important role of intermediary organizations. In fact,the asset transfer contract is a three-party contract: the contractor,the village committee and the asset manager. However,due to the characteristics of the floating population,information asymmetry,fragmented distribution and other complex factors of the rural assets,that cause farmer's barriers to exit three-party contract. The superposition between this factor and the power of village committee may lead to opportunism of the village committee in the transfer of the assets,such as collusion and excessive contracts. It will damage the contractor's benefit.Therefore,expanding the optional intermediary organization is the key to eliminate the problem of opportunism in the transfer of assets,that is to say marketization of agent is the future direction of choice. The role of village committee is facing transformation,but still plays an important role in the new contract,it can act as a coordinator and supervisor of signing contracts. The asset transfer contract will evolve from three-party contract to four-party contract and promote the formation of effective balance mechanism of contract.
引文
[1]王志章,兰剑.农村土地流转中介组织相关问题研究[J].科学决策,2010,(3):43-51.
[2]任勤,李福军.农村土地流转中介组织模式:问题及对策[J].财经科学,2010,(6):117-124.
[3]钟涨宝,狄金华.中介组织在土地流转中的地位与作用[J].农村经济,2005,(3):35-37.
[4]崔宝敏.组织缺失、不完全市场与农地合约[J].经济与管理研究,2009,(9):57-63.
[5]陈姝洁,马贤磊,陆凤平,等.中介组织的作用对农户农地流转决策的影响[J].中国土地科学,2015,(11):48-55.
[6]王颜齐,郭翔宇.土地承包经营权流转:双边交易与集中交易[J].农业技术经济,2011,(10):46-54.
[7]杨展.土地流转中的中介组织:非合作博弈框架下的分析[J].世界经济情况,2006,(2):30-34.
[8]周其仁.确权是土地流转的前提与基础[J].农村工作通讯,2009,(14):40.
[9]程令国,张晔,刘志彪.农地确权促进了中国农村土地的流转吗?[J].管理世界,2016,(1):88-98.
[10]孔祥智,刘同三,郑力文.土地流转中村委会的角色及其成因探析[J].东岳论丛,2013,(5):103-108.
[11]张正瑞.农村集体土地流转的政府主导与法律规制[J].江苏农业科学,2011,(2):531-534.
[12]于传岗.农村集体土地流转演化趋势分析——基于政府主导型流转模式的视角[J].西北农林工业大学学报(社会科学版),2013,(9):10-21.
[13]夏涛.当前国内农村土地流转中介组织研究评述[J].西部论坛,2013,(3):54-59.
[14]李孔岳.农地专用资产与交易的不确定性对农地流转交易费用的影响[J].管理世界,2009,(3):92-98.
[15]林毅夫.重塑农民土地主人地位[J].农村工作通讯,2004,(2):26-26.
[16]伍振军,张云华,孔祥智.交易费用、政府行为和模式比较:中国土地承包经营权流转实证研究[J].中国软科学,2011,(4):175-183.
[17]许恒周,曲福田.农村土地流转与农民权利保障[J].农村经济,2007,(4):29-31.
(1)有些学者也将此类的中介组织称为“内生型中介组织”,将以政府为依托的中介组织称为“外生型中介组织”。
[2]任勤,李福军.农村土地流转中介组织模式:问题及对策[J].财经科学,2010,(6):117-124.
[3]钟涨宝,狄金华.中介组织在土地流转中的地位与作用[J].农村经济,2005,(3):35-37.
[4]崔宝敏.组织缺失、不完全市场与农地合约[J].经济与管理研究,2009,(9):57-63.
[5]陈姝洁,马贤磊,陆凤平,等.中介组织的作用对农户农地流转决策的影响[J].中国土地科学,2015,(11):48-55.
[6]王颜齐,郭翔宇.土地承包经营权流转:双边交易与集中交易[J].农业技术经济,2011,(10):46-54.
[7]杨展.土地流转中的中介组织:非合作博弈框架下的分析[J].世界经济情况,2006,(2):30-34.
[8]周其仁.确权是土地流转的前提与基础[J].农村工作通讯,2009,(14):40.
[9]程令国,张晔,刘志彪.农地确权促进了中国农村土地的流转吗?[J].管理世界,2016,(1):88-98.
[10]孔祥智,刘同三,郑力文.土地流转中村委会的角色及其成因探析[J].东岳论丛,2013,(5):103-108.
[11]张正瑞.农村集体土地流转的政府主导与法律规制[J].江苏农业科学,2011,(2):531-534.
[12]于传岗.农村集体土地流转演化趋势分析——基于政府主导型流转模式的视角[J].西北农林工业大学学报(社会科学版),2013,(9):10-21.
[13]夏涛.当前国内农村土地流转中介组织研究评述[J].西部论坛,2013,(3):54-59.
[14]李孔岳.农地专用资产与交易的不确定性对农地流转交易费用的影响[J].管理世界,2009,(3):92-98.
[15]林毅夫.重塑农民土地主人地位[J].农村工作通讯,2004,(2):26-26.
[16]伍振军,张云华,孔祥智.交易费用、政府行为和模式比较:中国土地承包经营权流转实证研究[J].中国软科学,2011,(4):175-183.
[17]许恒周,曲福田.农村土地流转与农民权利保障[J].农村经济,2007,(4):29-31.
(1)有些学者也将此类的中介组织称为“内生型中介组织”,将以政府为依托的中介组织称为“外生型中介组织”。