贫困治理中精英俘获研究综述
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  • 英文篇名:Research review on elite capture in poverty governance
  • 作者:胡联 ; 卢杨 ; 张小雨 ; 沈鹏程
  • 英文作者:Hu Lian;Lu Yang;Zhang Xiaoyu;Shen Pengcheng;Research Institute of Urban and Rural Development,Anhui University of Finance and Economics;College of Economics,Anhui University of Finance and Economics;
  • 关键词:精英俘获 ; 扶贫资源 ; 挑战 ; 产生机制
  • 英文关键词:Elite capture;;Poverty alleviation resources;;Challenges;;Generation mechanism
  • 中文刊名:SXND
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
  • 机构:安徽财经大学城乡发展研究院;安徽财经大学经济学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-07-15 11:52
  • 出版单位:山西农业大学学报(社会科学版)
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.18;No.143
  • 基金:教育部规划基金项目(19YJAZH031);; 国家社会科学基金项目(18BJY204);; 安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxyqZD2018040);; 安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(ACYC2017141)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:SXND201905006
  • 页数:6
  • CN:05
  • ISSN:14-1305/C
  • 分类号:40-45
摘要
精英俘获是导致扶贫资源瞄准偏离的重要原因,在各国贫困治理中引发了诸多问题。国外对精英俘获的研究开始得较早,国内研究主要关注贫困治理领域。从精英俘获的现象、产生机制、不良后果以及规避机制等方面对国内外文献进行了梳理,以期为国内精英俘获的研究提供研究基础。
        Elite capture is an important reason that leads to the deviation of poverty alleviation resources targeting,which has caused many problems in the poverty governance of various countries.Foreign research on elite capture started earlier,while domestic research focuses on poverty control.This paper reviews the domestic and foreign literatures on the phenomenon,mechanism,consequences and control of elite capture,so as to provide a basis for the further research on elite capture in China.
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