京津冀地区散煤治理资金优化研究（英文）
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摘要
2017年京津冀三地联合开展散煤综合治理工作,全面治理散煤污染。本文采用合作博弈论研究2017年度京津冀区域散煤综合治理中如何选择合适的策略才能使环境效益最大化的均衡问题。本文根据2017年度京津冀地区散煤治实际使用量、散煤燃烧对PM2.5的影响情况以及散煤实际治理成本,利用合作博弈模型中线性优化、博弈理论和Shapley值法研究京津冀地区散煤的治理总成本最小化以及治理资金在京津冀三省市之间合理分配及转移的问题。研究结果显示,在治理的过程中河北省的任务量最大,所需资金也最多,需要得到其他两市的资金支持,增资额度约为6亿元。同时,经计算得出天津优化后节省的成本最多,可以适当调整资金额度给予河北省散煤治理工作。本文的模型构建可以探讨解决京津冀地区散煤使用量的问题,还能通过对资金的有效分配使得三个省市达到合作共赢。
Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei each contributed to the comprehensive governance of bulk coal to treat bulk coal pollution in a mutually beneficial way in 2017. The cooperative game theory is used in this paper to study the environmental benefits and cost effectiveness brought about by this comprehensive governance strategy, primarily focusing on the issue of how to maximize the environmental benefits by choosing an appropriate strategy since the benefits to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are closely related. Therefore, the linear optimization, game theory and Shapley value method in the cooperative game model are used to find the ways to minimize the total governance cost of bulk coal in the three areas. In addition, the issues of how to carry out rational distribution and transfer of governance capital among the three places are explored according to the actual amounts of consumption of bulk coal, the influence of the coal burning on the PM2.5 and the actual cost of coal governance in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2017. The results show that the governance task in Hebei Province is the most onerous, and requires more investment than the other two cities. Thus, it requires the support from other two cities, with the amount of increased capital required of about 600 million Yuan. At the same time, the cost saved after optimization in Tianjin is calculated to be the largest, which thus can be adjusted appropriately and allocated to Hebei for the governance of bulk coal. The model constructed in this paper can not only be used to solve the issues related to bulk coal consumption in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, but also to carry out the effective distribution of capital, by which a win-win scenario among the three places can be achieved.
Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei each contributed to the comprehensive governance of bulk coal to treat bulk coal pollution in a mutually beneficial way in 2017. The cooperative game theory is used in this paper to study the environmental benefits and cost effectiveness brought about by this comprehensive governance strategy, primarily focusing on the issue of how to maximize the environmental benefits by choosing an appropriate strategy since the benefits to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are closely related. Therefore, the linear optimization, game theory and Shapley value method in the cooperative game model are used to find the ways to minimize the total governance cost of bulk coal in the three areas. In addition, the issues of how to carry out rational distribution and transfer of governance capital among the three places are explored according to the actual amounts of consumption of bulk coal, the influence of the coal burning on the PM2.5 and the actual cost of coal governance in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2017. The results show that the governance task in Hebei Province is the most onerous, and requires more investment than the other two cities. Thus, it requires the support from other two cities, with the amount of increased capital required of about 600 million Yuan. At the same time, the cost saved after optimization in Tianjin is calculated to be the largest, which thus can be adjusted appropriately and allocated to Hebei for the governance of bulk coal. The model constructed in this paper can not only be used to solve the issues related to bulk coal consumption in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, but also to carry out the effective distribution of capital, by which a win-win scenario among the three places can be achieved.
引文
Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau,2018.“Results of‘Research Project for the Mid-and Long-term Planning of Deepened Air Pollution Control in Beijing,Tianjin,Heibei and Surrounding Areas’”.May 4,2018.(in Chinese)
Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau,2017.Notice of the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau on the Publication of the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution in Beijing during the Period of13th Five-Year Plan.Beijing:07 09,2017.(in Chinese)
Beijing Municipal Government,2018.Report of the Beijing Municipal Government on the Completion of the Environmental Situation and Environmental Protection Objectives of the City in 2017.Beijing:People.cn,March 30,2018.(in Chinese)
Chen Wenying,Hou Dun.1999.Optimal treatment cost allocation based on multiple person cooperation game in total emission control.Acta Scientiae Circumstantiae,19(1):57-62.(in Chinese)
China Economic Information Service.2017.Report on Clean Heating in Beijing,Tianjin and Surrounding Areas(2017-2018).Beijing:Xinhua News Agency,April,2017.(in Chinese)
Dinar A,Howitt R E.1997.Mechanisms for allocation of environmental control cost:Empirical tests of acceptability and stability.Journal of Environmental Management,49:183-203.
Halkos G E.1996.Incomplete information in the acid rain game.Empirica,23:129-148.
Halkos G E.1994.Optimal abatement of sulphur in Europe.Environmental and Resource Economics,4:127-150.
Halkos G E.1993.Sulphur abatement policy:Implications of cost differentials.Energy Policy,1:1035-1043.
Hebei Environmental Protection Department,2018.“The contribution rate of‘RCGE’to the improvement of air quality accounting for about 30%in Hebei”.Hebei Daily:January 8,2018.(in Chinese)
Hebei Environmental Protection Department,2016.The PM2.5 concentration of Hebei in 2015 Decreased by 18.9%on a Year-on-year Basis.April 17,2016.(in Chinese)
Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Agency,2018.How to make further efforts concerning the prevention and control of air pollution.Hebei Daily:May 31,2018.(in Chinese)
Krawczyk J B.2005.Coupled constraint Nash equilibria in environmental games.Resource and Energy Economics,27:157-181.
Liu Honggang,Chen Xingeng,Peng Xiaochun.2011.Study on the model of total pollution load allocation in tidal network river regions with Cooperative Game Theory.Ecology and Environmental Sciences,20(3):456-462.(in Chinese)
Ministry of Ecology and Environmental Protection,2016.Rectification Scheme of Hebei Province Based on the Feedback concerning the Inspection of the Environmental Protection Supervision Team of the Central Government,July 06,2016.(in Chinese)
NDRC.2015.The Eco-environmental protection planning for the coordinated development in Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei.Beijing,December 30,2015.
Nir B,Easter K W.1997.Water diversion from the Great Lakes:Is a cooperative approach possible?Water Resources Development,13(1):53-65.
Petrosjan L,Zaccour G.2003.Time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction.Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,27:381-398.
Shapley,Lloyd S.1958.A value for n-person games.Annals of Mathematical Studies,28:307-317.
Tan Zhongfu,Yu Chao,Li Li,et al.2011.Benefits distribution optimization models of energy-saving and SO2 emission-reducing based on power generation side and supply side’s cooperation.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,31(6):1182-1190.(in Chinese)
Tianjin Environmental Protection Bureau,2018.The completion of the task of action plan for the prevention and control of air pollution in Tianjin.Tianjin:January 09,2018.(in Chinese)
Wen Wen,2017.Winter Disease Cured in Summer--Prioritizing of the Task of Bulk Coal Governance.Beijing:China Environmental News,April 12,2017,http://www.cenews.com.cn/tbtj/201704/t20170412_827891.html.(in Chinese)
Xu Gang,Wang Chunlan,Xu Cheng et al.2016.Assessment of air pollutants emission from bulk coal and electric heating in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.Research of Environmental Sciences,2016:1735-1742.(in Chinese)
Xue Jian,Xie Wanlin,Li Changmin.2014.The Inter-provincial Cooperation Game Model of Air Pollution Control in Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei Province.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,34(3):810-816.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Cao Wei.2011.Study of regulating model of cooperation and reallocation of benefits on transboundary pollution of lake basin.Journal of Systems Engineering,26(3):367-372.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Li Huaizu.2005.Study on model of regulation and control with tax of transboundary water pollution dissensions.Chinese Journal of Management Science,13(5):144-148.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Li Xu,Zhu Daoli,et al.2005.Study on model of macroscopical regulation with emissions trading on transboundary water pollution dispute of river basin.Journal of Systems Engineering,20(8):398-403.(in Chinese)
Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau,2017.Notice of the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau on the Publication of the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution in Beijing during the Period of13th Five-Year Plan.Beijing:07 09,2017.(in Chinese)
Beijing Municipal Government,2018.Report of the Beijing Municipal Government on the Completion of the Environmental Situation and Environmental Protection Objectives of the City in 2017.Beijing:People.cn,March 30,2018.(in Chinese)
Chen Wenying,Hou Dun.1999.Optimal treatment cost allocation based on multiple person cooperation game in total emission control.Acta Scientiae Circumstantiae,19(1):57-62.(in Chinese)
China Economic Information Service.2017.Report on Clean Heating in Beijing,Tianjin and Surrounding Areas(2017-2018).Beijing:Xinhua News Agency,April,2017.(in Chinese)
Dinar A,Howitt R E.1997.Mechanisms for allocation of environmental control cost:Empirical tests of acceptability and stability.Journal of Environmental Management,49:183-203.
Halkos G E.1996.Incomplete information in the acid rain game.Empirica,23:129-148.
Halkos G E.1994.Optimal abatement of sulphur in Europe.Environmental and Resource Economics,4:127-150.
Halkos G E.1993.Sulphur abatement policy:Implications of cost differentials.Energy Policy,1:1035-1043.
Hebei Environmental Protection Department,2018.“The contribution rate of‘RCGE’to the improvement of air quality accounting for about 30%in Hebei”.Hebei Daily:January 8,2018.(in Chinese)
Hebei Environmental Protection Department,2016.The PM2.5 concentration of Hebei in 2015 Decreased by 18.9%on a Year-on-year Basis.April 17,2016.(in Chinese)
Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Agency,2018.How to make further efforts concerning the prevention and control of air pollution.Hebei Daily:May 31,2018.(in Chinese)
Krawczyk J B.2005.Coupled constraint Nash equilibria in environmental games.Resource and Energy Economics,27:157-181.
Liu Honggang,Chen Xingeng,Peng Xiaochun.2011.Study on the model of total pollution load allocation in tidal network river regions with Cooperative Game Theory.Ecology and Environmental Sciences,20(3):456-462.(in Chinese)
Ministry of Ecology and Environmental Protection,2016.Rectification Scheme of Hebei Province Based on the Feedback concerning the Inspection of the Environmental Protection Supervision Team of the Central Government,July 06,2016.(in Chinese)
NDRC.2015.The Eco-environmental protection planning for the coordinated development in Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei.Beijing,December 30,2015.
Nir B,Easter K W.1997.Water diversion from the Great Lakes:Is a cooperative approach possible?Water Resources Development,13(1):53-65.
Petrosjan L,Zaccour G.2003.Time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction.Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,27:381-398.
Shapley,Lloyd S.1958.A value for n-person games.Annals of Mathematical Studies,28:307-317.
Tan Zhongfu,Yu Chao,Li Li,et al.2011.Benefits distribution optimization models of energy-saving and SO2 emission-reducing based on power generation side and supply side’s cooperation.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,31(6):1182-1190.(in Chinese)
Tianjin Environmental Protection Bureau,2018.The completion of the task of action plan for the prevention and control of air pollution in Tianjin.Tianjin:January 09,2018.(in Chinese)
Wen Wen,2017.Winter Disease Cured in Summer--Prioritizing of the Task of Bulk Coal Governance.Beijing:China Environmental News,April 12,2017,http://www.cenews.com.cn/tbtj/201704/t20170412_827891.html.(in Chinese)
Xu Gang,Wang Chunlan,Xu Cheng et al.2016.Assessment of air pollutants emission from bulk coal and electric heating in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region.Research of Environmental Sciences,2016:1735-1742.(in Chinese)
Xue Jian,Xie Wanlin,Li Changmin.2014.The Inter-provincial Cooperation Game Model of Air Pollution Control in Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei Province.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,34(3):810-816.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Cao Wei.2011.Study of regulating model of cooperation and reallocation of benefits on transboundary pollution of lake basin.Journal of Systems Engineering,26(3):367-372.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Li Huaizu.2005.Study on model of regulation and control with tax of transboundary water pollution dissensions.Chinese Journal of Management Science,13(5):144-148.(in Chinese)
Zhao Laijun,Li Xu,Zhu Daoli,et al.2005.Study on model of macroscopical regulation with emissions trading on transboundary water pollution dispute of river basin.Journal of Systems Engineering,20(8):398-403.(in Chinese)