究竟如何理解“‘p’说p”?——试论前期维特根斯坦关于命题态度的分析
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摘要
前期维特根斯坦持有强的外延原则,他试图将其适用于一切真正的命题。关于命题态度的分析,是维特根斯坦达成这一目的步骤之一。他认为心理学命题并不构成外延原则的反例,但是关于心理学命题如何不违反外延原则,解释者们给出了各种不同的,甚至截然相反的解释。这些解释固有其优势,但却过度拘泥于"‘p’说p"是什么的问题,且基本撇开了罗素的判断理论来解释。这不仅无益于维特根斯坦分析主旨的理解,而且难逃过度解释之嫌。而若是着眼于维特根斯坦的论证主旨及其与罗素判断理论的密切关系,聚焦于"‘p’说p"的作用问题,则可以在悬置诸多争论的同时,对维特根斯坦的观点作出合理解释。
Wittgenstein had a strong principle of extensionality(PE) in the early period, he tried to apply PE to all real propositions. The analysis of propositional attitudes is one of Wittgenstein's step to achieve the goal.According to Wittgenstein, psychological propositions are not the exceptional cases of PE.But how is it possible? The interpreters of Wittgenstein gave different,even diametrically opposite explanations, which have some advantages.However, its flaw lies in too focused on how to understand what is "‘p' says p",whatsmore, the relationship between Wittgenstein and Russell's theory of judgement was almost ignored. This not only does not help to understand the subject of Wittgenstein's analysis, and it is even unavoidable that it is over-interpret.If focus on the subject of Wittgenstein's argument and grasp its relationship with Russell's theory of judgment, focus on what's the role of "‘p' says p", then we can suspend many disputes without affecting the proper understanding of Wittgenstein's viewpoint.
Wittgenstein had a strong principle of extensionality(PE) in the early period, he tried to apply PE to all real propositions. The analysis of propositional attitudes is one of Wittgenstein's step to achieve the goal.According to Wittgenstein, psychological propositions are not the exceptional cases of PE.But how is it possible? The interpreters of Wittgenstein gave different,even diametrically opposite explanations, which have some advantages.However, its flaw lies in too focused on how to understand what is "‘p' says p",whatsmore, the relationship between Wittgenstein and Russell's theory of judgement was almost ignored. This not only does not help to understand the subject of Wittgenstein's analysis, and it is even unavoidable that it is over-interpret.If focus on the subject of Wittgenstein's argument and grasp its relationship with Russell's theory of judgment, focus on what's the role of "‘p' says p", then we can suspend many disputes without affecting the proper understanding of Wittgenstein's viewpoint.
引文
[1][2][3][8][9][10][11][12][22]罗素.逻辑与知识[C].苑莉均译,张家龙校.北京:商务印书馆,1996.
[4][31][41]Kenneth J.Perszyk.Tractatus 5.54-5.5422[J].Philosophia,1987,17(2).
[5][23]Nicholas Griffin.Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement[J].Philosophical Studies,1985,47(2).
[6]施太格缪勒.当代哲学主流(上册)[M].王炳文等译.北京:商务印书馆,1986.
[7]B.Russell.The Principles of Mathematics[M].London,Allen and Unwin,1903.
[13][17][21]José Zalabardo.Wittgenstein’s nonsense objection to Russell’s theory of judgement,in Wittgenstein and Perception.London and New York:Routledge,2015.
[14][18][20]维特根斯坦.维特根斯坦全集·第一卷[M].涂纪亮主编.陈启伟译.河北教育出版社,2003.
[15][16][24][25][26][36]Wittgenstein.Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus[M].Translated by D.F.Pears&B.F.Mc Guinness,Routledge&Kegan Paul,1974.
[19]维特根斯坦.战时笔记:1914-1917[M].韩林合译.北京:商务印书馆,2005
[27]G.E.M.Anscombe.An Introduction To Wittgenstein’s Tractatus[M].Hutchinson University Library,1963.
[28]G.Pitcher.The Philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].New York:Englewood Cliffs,1964.
[29]A.Kenny.Wittgenstein.Cambridge,Massachussets:Harvard U-niversity Press.2006.
[30][40]Eric B.Dayton.Tractatus 5.54-5.5422[J].Canadian Journal of Philosophy,1976,6(2).
[32][44]Gert-Jan C.Lokhorst.Wittgenstein on Structure of the Soul:A New Interpretation of Tractatus 5.5421.Philosophical Investigation 14:4,1991.
[33]Stefano Predelli.A Czar’s Ukase Explained:An Analysis of“Tractactus”5.54ff[J].Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition,1993,71(1).
[34]姚东旭.《逻辑哲学论》5.54-5.5423再解读[J].逻辑学研究,2016年第1期.
[35]Pamela M.Huby.Is“Tractatus”5.542 More Obscure in English than it is in German?[J]Philosophy,1969,44(169).
[37]汉斯·斯鲁格.维特根斯坦[M].张学广译.北京:北京出版社,2015.
[38][39]David Favrholdt.Tractatus 5.542.Mind,New Series,1964,73(292).
[42]韩林合.《逻辑哲学论》研究[M].北京:商务印书馆,2007.
[43]Irving M.Copi.Tractatus 5.542[J].Analysis,1958,18(5).
[45]罗素.我的哲学发展[M].温锡增译.北京:商务印书馆,1985.
[46]Peter W.Hanks.How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Synthese,2007,154(1).
[47]Fraser Mac Bride.The Russell-Wittgenstein Dispute:A New Perspective.In Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology.Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan,2013.
① “命题动词”是罗素的用法,罗素说他不喜欢“态度”这个心理学词项,因而称之为“命题动词”。([1]174)。维特根斯坦在前期著作中将带命题态度的命题称为“心理学命题”(如[15]53)。本文按照惯例在下文中使用“命题态度”,而不用“命题动词”;使用“态度命题”和“心理学命题”指带有命题态度的命题。
(1)一般认为罗素分别提出过两种判断理论,即二元关系判断理论和多元关系判断理论。讨论二元关系时不会引起大的歧义,但是讨论多元关系则不一样,因为罗素在不同时期为多元关系理论提出了不同的版本。为了避免歧义以及考虑到本文的主旨,文中所说的“罗素的判断理论”或“罗素的判断的多元关系理论”,主要是指与维特根斯坦前期的批评直接相关的版本。根据扎拉巴多(José Zalabardo)、格里芬(Nicholas Griffin)等人的研究,这主要涉及罗素1910-1913年著作和论文中的版本,而在1918年的《逻辑原子主义哲学》演讲中具体表明了维特根斯坦批评的本质。(见[5] [13])。
(2)相关争论可参考文献[46][47]。
(3)译文参考了陈启伟、贺绍甲、韩林合及黄敏的译文,文中未直接引用《逻辑哲学论》部分,以“Tr+码段”的形式标示。
(4)A1,A2和A3参考了普雷德利(Stefano Predelli)的总结,见[33]。
(5)在《逻辑哲学论》中,维特根斯坦使用“具有”来表达“A相信p”和“‘p’说p”的关系。在《向摩尔口述的笔记》中则使用“比之于”来表达二者的关系。([14]45)。
[4][31][41]Kenneth J.Perszyk.Tractatus 5.54-5.5422[J].Philosophia,1987,17(2).
[5][23]Nicholas Griffin.Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement[J].Philosophical Studies,1985,47(2).
[6]施太格缪勒.当代哲学主流(上册)[M].王炳文等译.北京:商务印书馆,1986.
[7]B.Russell.The Principles of Mathematics[M].London,Allen and Unwin,1903.
[13][17][21]José Zalabardo.Wittgenstein’s nonsense objection to Russell’s theory of judgement,in Wittgenstein and Perception.London and New York:Routledge,2015.
[14][18][20]维特根斯坦.维特根斯坦全集·第一卷[M].涂纪亮主编.陈启伟译.河北教育出版社,2003.
[15][16][24][25][26][36]Wittgenstein.Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus[M].Translated by D.F.Pears&B.F.Mc Guinness,Routledge&Kegan Paul,1974.
[19]维特根斯坦.战时笔记:1914-1917[M].韩林合译.北京:商务印书馆,2005
[27]G.E.M.Anscombe.An Introduction To Wittgenstein’s Tractatus[M].Hutchinson University Library,1963.
[28]G.Pitcher.The Philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].New York:Englewood Cliffs,1964.
[29]A.Kenny.Wittgenstein.Cambridge,Massachussets:Harvard U-niversity Press.2006.
[30][40]Eric B.Dayton.Tractatus 5.54-5.5422[J].Canadian Journal of Philosophy,1976,6(2).
[32][44]Gert-Jan C.Lokhorst.Wittgenstein on Structure of the Soul:A New Interpretation of Tractatus 5.5421.Philosophical Investigation 14:4,1991.
[33]Stefano Predelli.A Czar’s Ukase Explained:An Analysis of“Tractactus”5.54ff[J].Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition,1993,71(1).
[34]姚东旭.《逻辑哲学论》5.54-5.5423再解读[J].逻辑学研究,2016年第1期.
[35]Pamela M.Huby.Is“Tractatus”5.542 More Obscure in English than it is in German?[J]Philosophy,1969,44(169).
[37]汉斯·斯鲁格.维特根斯坦[M].张学广译.北京:北京出版社,2015.
[38][39]David Favrholdt.Tractatus 5.542.Mind,New Series,1964,73(292).
[42]韩林合.《逻辑哲学论》研究[M].北京:商务印书馆,2007.
[43]Irving M.Copi.Tractatus 5.542[J].Analysis,1958,18(5).
[45]罗素.我的哲学发展[M].温锡增译.北京:商务印书馆,1985.
[46]Peter W.Hanks.How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Synthese,2007,154(1).
[47]Fraser Mac Bride.The Russell-Wittgenstein Dispute:A New Perspective.In Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology.Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan,2013.
① “命题动词”是罗素的用法,罗素说他不喜欢“态度”这个心理学词项,因而称之为“命题动词”。([1]174)。维特根斯坦在前期著作中将带命题态度的命题称为“心理学命题”(如[15]53)。本文按照惯例在下文中使用“命题态度”,而不用“命题动词”;使用“态度命题”和“心理学命题”指带有命题态度的命题。
(1)一般认为罗素分别提出过两种判断理论,即二元关系判断理论和多元关系判断理论。讨论二元关系时不会引起大的歧义,但是讨论多元关系则不一样,因为罗素在不同时期为多元关系理论提出了不同的版本。为了避免歧义以及考虑到本文的主旨,文中所说的“罗素的判断理论”或“罗素的判断的多元关系理论”,主要是指与维特根斯坦前期的批评直接相关的版本。根据扎拉巴多(José Zalabardo)、格里芬(Nicholas Griffin)等人的研究,这主要涉及罗素1910-1913年著作和论文中的版本,而在1918年的《逻辑原子主义哲学》演讲中具体表明了维特根斯坦批评的本质。(见[5] [13])。
(2)相关争论可参考文献[46][47]。
(3)译文参考了陈启伟、贺绍甲、韩林合及黄敏的译文,文中未直接引用《逻辑哲学论》部分,以“Tr+码段”的形式标示。
(4)A1,A2和A3参考了普雷德利(Stefano Predelli)的总结,见[33]。
(5)在《逻辑哲学论》中,维特根斯坦使用“具有”来表达“A相信p”和“‘p’说p”的关系。在《向摩尔口述的笔记》中则使用“比之于”来表达二者的关系。([14]45)。