多主体互动博弈下建筑企业低碳转型的演化机理
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摘要
从多利益主体视角出发,构建建筑企业、政府、消费者三方演化博弈模型,考虑政府的声誉成本以及低碳消费补偿因素,研究建筑企业低碳转型的内在规律、稳定均衡策略和影响机理,并利用仿真模拟分析相关参数对建筑企业低碳转型演化路径的影响。研究结果表明:(1)影响建筑企业低碳转型的主要因素是政府环境规制力度和低碳生产时的额外技术成本。政府环境规制力度越大,低碳生产的额外技术成本越低,建筑企业越倾向于进行低碳生产。(2)政府是否进行环境调控主要取决于环境规制的管理成本、声誉成本以及对非低碳建筑企业的罚金。(3)影响消费者低碳购买决策的主要因素是污染补偿以及选择低碳产品时的额外收益。因此从建筑企业自身的技术创新水平、低碳交易市场机制、政府监管力度等方面提出促进建筑企业低碳转型的对策建议。
From the perspective of game strategy, a tripartite evolutionary game model of construction enterprises, government and consumers was constructed. Considering the government's reputation cost and low-carbon consumption compensation factors, the inherent law of low-carbon transformation, stable equilibrium strategy and influencing mechanism in building enterprises was studied through evolutionary game strategy analysis, and simulation analysis was used to analyze the influence of relevant parameters on the low carbon transformation and evolution path of construction enterprises. The results showed that:(1)The main factors that affected low-carbon transformation of construction enterprises were government environmental regulation and the additional technical costs of low-carbon production. The greater the government environmental regulation, the lower the additional technical costs of low-carbon production, the more construction companies were inclined to engage in low-carbon production.(2)Whether or not the government controlled the environment mainly depended on the management cost of environmental regulation, the cost of political reputation, and the fines for non-low carbon construction companies.(3)The main factors affecting consumer decision-making on low carbon purchase were the compensation for pollution and the extra income from choosing low-carbon products. Overall, the results of the study can guide the improvement of environmental governance in the construction industry.
From the perspective of game strategy, a tripartite evolutionary game model of construction enterprises, government and consumers was constructed. Considering the government's reputation cost and low-carbon consumption compensation factors, the inherent law of low-carbon transformation, stable equilibrium strategy and influencing mechanism in building enterprises was studied through evolutionary game strategy analysis, and simulation analysis was used to analyze the influence of relevant parameters on the low carbon transformation and evolution path of construction enterprises. The results showed that:(1)The main factors that affected low-carbon transformation of construction enterprises were government environmental regulation and the additional technical costs of low-carbon production. The greater the government environmental regulation, the lower the additional technical costs of low-carbon production, the more construction companies were inclined to engage in low-carbon production.(2)Whether or not the government controlled the environment mainly depended on the management cost of environmental regulation, the cost of political reputation, and the fines for non-low carbon construction companies.(3)The main factors affecting consumer decision-making on low carbon purchase were the compensation for pollution and the extra income from choosing low-carbon products. Overall, the results of the study can guide the improvement of environmental governance in the construction industry.
引文
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[31]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3111-3122.
[32]李妍.不完全信息动态博弈视角下的PPP项日风险分担研究——基于参与方不同的出价顺序[J].财政研究,2015(10):50-57.
[33]赵惠珍,倪稞,王要武,等. 2017年上半年建筑业发展统计分析[J].建筑,2017(23):14-23.
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[2] LIU Z,ANDERSON T D,CRUZ J M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218(3):602-613.
[3] BRIGHT S. Carbon reduction and commercial leases in the UK[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2010,2(3):218-231.
[4] BEAUREGARD S,HOQUE S,FISETTE P. Is boston building better? an analysis of the leed certifiable standard in the boston zoning code[J]. Journal of Green Building,2014,9(3):131-150.
[5] HO C S,MATSUOKA Y,SIMSON J. Low carbon urban development strategy in Malaysia—the case of Iskandar Malaysia development corridor[J]. Habitat International,2013,37(1):43-51.
[6] BARRETT S. Strategic environmental policy and intrenational trade[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1994,54(3):435-445.
[7] KENNEDY P W. Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,1994,27(1):49-63.
[8]崔亚飞,刘小川.中国地方政府间环境污染治理策略的博弈分析——基于政府社会福利目标的视角[J].理论与改革,2009(6):62-65.
[9]朱平芳,张征宇,姜国麟. FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究[J].经济研究,2011(6):133-145.
[10]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):62-70.
[11]范斌,周德群.中央与地方政府促进产业发展的关系——基于光伏产业准入规制政策的演化博弈分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(3):8-14.
[12] MOLEDINA A A,COGGINS J S,POLASKY S. Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms:prices versus quantities[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2007,45(2):356-376.
[13] SHEU J B,CHEN Y J. Impact of government financial intervention on competition among green supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(1):201-213.
[14]张学刚,钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,126(2):31-35.
[15]吕荣胜,马广蔚,闫越.低碳经济背景下节能减排管理政企博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2013,26(2):214-218.
[16]何丽红,王秀.低碳供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,163(S1):27-30.
[17]王志国,李磊,杨善林,等.动态博弈下引导企业低碳技术创新的政府低碳规制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(12):139-147.
[18]孟凡生,韩冰.政府环境规制对企业低碳技术创新行为的影响机制研究[J].预测,2017,36(1):74-80.
[19]刘小兰,李洁云.政府、旅游企业和旅游消费者的演化博弈分析——基于低碳视角[J].会计与经济研究,2017(3):117-127.
[20]吴瑶,肖静华,谢康,等.从价值提供到价值共创的营销转型——企业与消费者协同演化视角的双案例研究[J].管理世界,2017(4):138-157.
[21] WEBSTER F E. Determining the characteristics of the socially conscious consumer[J]. Journal of Consumer Research,1975,2(3):188-196.
[22]王芹鹏,赵道致,何龙飞.供应链企业碳减排投资策略选择与行为演化研究[J].管理工程学报,2014,28(3):181-189.
[23]朱庆华,窦一杰.基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):86-95.
[24]张倩.基于动态演化博弈的企业技术创新均衡策略[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(21):19-24.
[25] PRZYCHODZEN J,PRZYCHODZEN W. Relationships between eco-innovation and financial performance-evidence from publicly traded companies in Poland and Hungary[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production,2015(90):253-263.
[26] CAO X,WEN Z,CHEN J. Contributing to differentiated technology policy-making on thepromotion of energy efficiency technologies in heavy industrial sector:a case study of China[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production,2016(112):1486-1497.
[27] KIM S B,CHO J H. A study on forecasting green infrastructure construction market[J]. Ksce Journal of Civil Engineering,2014,18(2):430-443.
[28]牛晓叶.企业低碳决策是利益驱使亦或制度使然?[J].中国科技论坛,2013(7):105-111.
[29]徐春秋,赵道致,原白云,等.上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(2):53-65.
[30]程发新,邵世玲.基于阶段划分的企业主动碳减排创新策略实施研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(8):28-36.
[31]陈晓红,汪继,王傅强.消费者偏好和政府补贴下双渠道闭环供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3111-3122.
[32]李妍.不完全信息动态博弈视角下的PPP项日风险分担研究——基于参与方不同的出价顺序[J].财政研究,2015(10):50-57.
[33]赵惠珍,倪稞,王要武,等. 2017年上半年建筑业发展统计分析[J].建筑,2017(23):14-23.
[34]国家统计局固定资产投资统计司.中国建筑业统计年鉴[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2016.