官员激励和政府创新偏好对工业创新效率的影响
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摘要
由于市场机制的固有缺陷以及创新产出外部性等原因,区域创新系统建设对地方政府力量具有内在的依赖性。而作为政府行为的主导者,地方官员决策很大程度上取决于其所面临的各种激励,并进一步决定了区域创新系统建设中政府职能的发挥。基于2009年至2015年省级工业面板数据,对官员激励、政府创新偏好这二者之于工业创新效率影响的实证分析结果表明:官员晋升激励和经济权力激励直接提升了工业创新效率,但也会降低政府创新偏好,进而抑制工业创新效率提升;官员寻租激励下的腐败行为会侵蚀创新效率,但由于创新产出价值难以评估等属性,寻租激励下的政府官员也倾向于提高创新支出,这在一定程度上促进了创新效率提升。晋升激励和经济权力激励对创新效率的净效应为正,而寻租激励的净效应为负。有鉴于此,应当完善地方官员考核、薪酬等激励机制,加强对地方政府参与区域创新活动的监督,发挥政府在区域创新型经济建设中的引领作用。
Due to the inherent defects of market mechanism and the externality feature of innovation output,the construction of regional innovation system internally depends on the guidance and support of local government.As government actioninitiators,local officials may be influenced by various incentives when making decisions,which may have a further impact on the innovational function of government in the construction of regional innovation system.Based on the provincial industrial panel data from 2009 to 2015,this paper empirically analyzes how incentives for officials and government innovation preferences affect the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.The results demonstrate that promotion incentives and economic power incentives directly enhance the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises as well as reduce the government innovation preferences,thereby inhibiting the increase of the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.Officials' rent-seeking incentive may cause corruption and erode innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.As the value produced by innovation is difficult to assess,officials' rent-seeking may also improve the government innovation preferences,and promote the efficiency of regional innovation to some extent.The net effect of promotion incentives and economic power incentives on innovation efficiency is positive,while that of rent-seeking incentive negative.Therefore,the incentive mechanism of local officials' assessment and compensation should be improved,and local governments actions should be supervised so that they can play a leading role in the regional innovative economy.
Due to the inherent defects of market mechanism and the externality feature of innovation output,the construction of regional innovation system internally depends on the guidance and support of local government.As government actioninitiators,local officials may be influenced by various incentives when making decisions,which may have a further impact on the innovational function of government in the construction of regional innovation system.Based on the provincial industrial panel data from 2009 to 2015,this paper empirically analyzes how incentives for officials and government innovation preferences affect the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.The results demonstrate that promotion incentives and economic power incentives directly enhance the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises as well as reduce the government innovation preferences,thereby inhibiting the increase of the innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.Officials' rent-seeking incentive may cause corruption and erode innovation efficiency of industrial enterprises.As the value produced by innovation is difficult to assess,officials' rent-seeking may also improve the government innovation preferences,and promote the efficiency of regional innovation to some extent.The net effect of promotion incentives and economic power incentives on innovation efficiency is positive,while that of rent-seeking incentive negative.Therefore,the incentive mechanism of local officials' assessment and compensation should be improved,and local governments actions should be supervised so that they can play a leading role in the regional innovative economy.
引文
陈庆江,2017:《政府科技投入能否提高企业技术创新效率?》,《经济管理》第2期。
李政、杨思莹,2017:《十年创新型国家建设:成就、经验与问题》,《学习与探索》第1期。
李政、杨思莹、何彬,2017:《FDI抑制还是提升了中国区域创新效率?》,《经济管理》第4期。
李猛、沈坤荣,2010:《地方政府行为对中国经济波动的影响》,《经济研究》第12期。
刘贯春,2017:《金融结构影响城乡收入差距的传导机制》,《财贸经济》第6期。
刘小元、林嵩,2013:《地方政府行为对创业企业技术创新的影响》,《研究与发展管理》第10期。
毛其淋、许家云,2015:《政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响》,《中国工业经济》第6期。
聂辉华,2014:《腐败对效率的影响:一个文献综述》,《金融评论》第1期。
吴延兵,2017:《中国式分权下的偏向性投资》,《经济研究》第6期。
曾萍、邬绮虹,2014:《政府支持与企业创新:研究述评与未来展望》,《研究与发展管理》第2期。
张莉、王贤彬、徐现祥,2011:《财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为》,《中国工业经济》第4期。
钟祖昌,2011:《研发创新SBM效率的国际比较研究》,《财经研究》第9期。
张军、高远、傅勇、张弘,2007:《中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?》,《经济研究》第3期。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
周黎安、李宏彬、陈烨,2005:《相对绩效考核:关于中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究》,《经济学报》第1期。
周游、谭光荣、王涛生,2016:《财政分权的门槛与FDI技术溢出效应的非线性研究》,《管理世界》第4期。
Acemoglu,D.,U.Akcigit,N.Bloom and W.R.Kerr,2013,“Innovation,Reallocation and Growth”,NBER Working Paper,No.w18993.
Bardhan,P.,1997,“Corruption and Development:AReview of Issues”,Journal of Economic Literature,35(3):1320-1346.
Blanchard,O.and A.Shleifer,2000,“Federalism with and Without Political Centralization:China Versus Russia”,NBER Working Paper,No.7616.
Catozzella,A.and M.Vivarelli,2011,“Beyond Additionality:Are Innovation Subsidies Counterproductive?”,IZA Discussion Paper,No.5746.
Chames,A.,W.W.Coope and E.Rhodes,1978,“Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units”,European Journal of Operational Research,2(6):429-444.
Chen,Y.,H.Li and L.Zhou,2005,“Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China”,Economics Letters,88(3):421-245.
Claessens,S.and L.Laeven,2003,“Financial Development,Property Rights,and Growth”,The Journal of Finance,58(6):2401-2436.
Czarnitzki,D.and C.Lopes-Bento,2013,“Value for Money?New Microeconometric:Evidence on Public R&DGrants in Flanders”,Research Policy,42(1):76-89.
Dong,B.and B.Torgler,2013,“Causes of Corruption:Evidence from China”,China Economic Review,26:152-169.
Guo,D.,Y.Guo and K.Jiang,2016,“Government-subsidized R&D and Firm Innovation:Evidence from China”,Research policy,45(6):1129-1144.
Hessami,Z.,2014,“Political Corruption,Public Procurement,and Budget Composition:Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries”,European Journal of Political E-conomy,34(6):372-389.
Jin,H.,Y.Qian and B.R.Weingast,2005,“Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style”,Journal of Public Economics,89(9/10):1719-1742.
L9f,H.and A.Hesmati,2005,“The Impact of Public Funding on Private R&D Investment:New Evidence from a Firm Level Innovation Study”,CESIS ElectronicWorking Paper Series.
Mazzucato,M.,2013,The Entrepreneurial State:Debunking Public vs.Private Sector Myths,London:Anthem Press.
Smarzynska,B.and S.J.Wei,2000,“Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment:Firm-level Evidence”,NBER Working Paper,No.7969.
Tanzi,V.,1998,“Corruption around the World:Causes,Consequences,Scope,and Cures”,Staff Papers,45(4):559-594.
Weingast,B.R.,2009,“Second Generation Fiscal Federalism:The Implications of Fiscal Incentives”,Journal of Urban Economics,65(3):279-293.
Zhang,T.and H.F.Zou,1998,“Fiscal Decentralization,Public Spending,and Economic Growth in China”,Journal of Public Economics,67(2):221-240.
(1)数据由作者依据《2015年全国科技经费投入统计公报》和《2016年全国科技经费投入统计公报》计算得出。
(2)数据来源于中国科学技术发展战略研究院:《国家创新指数报告2016-2017》,北京:经济科学出版社。
李政、杨思莹,2017:《十年创新型国家建设:成就、经验与问题》,《学习与探索》第1期。
李政、杨思莹、何彬,2017:《FDI抑制还是提升了中国区域创新效率?》,《经济管理》第4期。
李猛、沈坤荣,2010:《地方政府行为对中国经济波动的影响》,《经济研究》第12期。
刘贯春,2017:《金融结构影响城乡收入差距的传导机制》,《财贸经济》第6期。
刘小元、林嵩,2013:《地方政府行为对创业企业技术创新的影响》,《研究与发展管理》第10期。
毛其淋、许家云,2015:《政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响》,《中国工业经济》第6期。
聂辉华,2014:《腐败对效率的影响:一个文献综述》,《金融评论》第1期。
吴延兵,2017:《中国式分权下的偏向性投资》,《经济研究》第6期。
曾萍、邬绮虹,2014:《政府支持与企业创新:研究述评与未来展望》,《研究与发展管理》第2期。
张莉、王贤彬、徐现祥,2011:《财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为》,《中国工业经济》第4期。
钟祖昌,2011:《研发创新SBM效率的国际比较研究》,《财经研究》第9期。
张军、高远、傅勇、张弘,2007:《中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?》,《经济研究》第3期。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
周黎安、李宏彬、陈烨,2005:《相对绩效考核:关于中国地方官员晋升机制的一项经验研究》,《经济学报》第1期。
周游、谭光荣、王涛生,2016:《财政分权的门槛与FDI技术溢出效应的非线性研究》,《管理世界》第4期。
Acemoglu,D.,U.Akcigit,N.Bloom and W.R.Kerr,2013,“Innovation,Reallocation and Growth”,NBER Working Paper,No.w18993.
Bardhan,P.,1997,“Corruption and Development:AReview of Issues”,Journal of Economic Literature,35(3):1320-1346.
Blanchard,O.and A.Shleifer,2000,“Federalism with and Without Political Centralization:China Versus Russia”,NBER Working Paper,No.7616.
Catozzella,A.and M.Vivarelli,2011,“Beyond Additionality:Are Innovation Subsidies Counterproductive?”,IZA Discussion Paper,No.5746.
Chames,A.,W.W.Coope and E.Rhodes,1978,“Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units”,European Journal of Operational Research,2(6):429-444.
Chen,Y.,H.Li and L.Zhou,2005,“Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China”,Economics Letters,88(3):421-245.
Claessens,S.and L.Laeven,2003,“Financial Development,Property Rights,and Growth”,The Journal of Finance,58(6):2401-2436.
Czarnitzki,D.and C.Lopes-Bento,2013,“Value for Money?New Microeconometric:Evidence on Public R&DGrants in Flanders”,Research Policy,42(1):76-89.
Dong,B.and B.Torgler,2013,“Causes of Corruption:Evidence from China”,China Economic Review,26:152-169.
Guo,D.,Y.Guo and K.Jiang,2016,“Government-subsidized R&D and Firm Innovation:Evidence from China”,Research policy,45(6):1129-1144.
Hessami,Z.,2014,“Political Corruption,Public Procurement,and Budget Composition:Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries”,European Journal of Political E-conomy,34(6):372-389.
Jin,H.,Y.Qian and B.R.Weingast,2005,“Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style”,Journal of Public Economics,89(9/10):1719-1742.
L9f,H.and A.Hesmati,2005,“The Impact of Public Funding on Private R&D Investment:New Evidence from a Firm Level Innovation Study”,CESIS ElectronicWorking Paper Series.
Mazzucato,M.,2013,The Entrepreneurial State:Debunking Public vs.Private Sector Myths,London:Anthem Press.
Smarzynska,B.and S.J.Wei,2000,“Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment:Firm-level Evidence”,NBER Working Paper,No.7969.
Tanzi,V.,1998,“Corruption around the World:Causes,Consequences,Scope,and Cures”,Staff Papers,45(4):559-594.
Weingast,B.R.,2009,“Second Generation Fiscal Federalism:The Implications of Fiscal Incentives”,Journal of Urban Economics,65(3):279-293.
Zhang,T.and H.F.Zou,1998,“Fiscal Decentralization,Public Spending,and Economic Growth in China”,Journal of Public Economics,67(2):221-240.
(1)数据由作者依据《2015年全国科技经费投入统计公报》和《2016年全国科技经费投入统计公报》计算得出。
(2)数据来源于中国科学技术发展战略研究院:《国家创新指数报告2016-2017》,北京:经济科学出版社。