环境规制下区域合作减排演化博弈研究
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摘要
通过构建政府间减排演化博弈模型,模拟了无约束条件下区域内地方政府间独立减排、合作减排及在环境规制的条件下区域内地方政府独立减排的策略选择演化过程。研究发现,(1)无环境规制的独立减排情形下,先发地区减排意向薄弱,后发地区有减排意愿,但减排效果不显著;(2)合作减排时,当协同收益小于交易成本时,随着地方政府经济发展,减排博弈最终会向地方政府一方减排一方不减排的方向演进;当协同收益大于交易成本时,通过合作减排,提高了减排意愿。(3)地方政府独立减排条件下,环境规制仅在经济后发地区可以起到作用,减排效果并不显著。通过提高协同收益、减低交易成本及有效促进区域合作减排,对实现减排目标具有重要意义。
It is a key step to reduce the influence of externality by coordinating the interests of the subjects in the agglomeration space and promoting interregional cooperation.Through the construction of the intergovernmental emission reduction evolutionary game model,the local government in the region under the conditions of independent emission reduction,cooperative emission reduction and environmental regulation in the region under the local government independent emission reduction strategy selection process of evolution.The study found that:(1)when the level of economic development of local government and external government are relatively small,whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction,{reduction,reduction}is local government stability strategy,however the mitigation effect is not significant;(2)In the case of independent emission reduction,when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree,{emission reduction,non-emission reduction}or{non-emission reduction,emission reduction}is stability strategy of the system;(3)In the case of cooperative emission reduction,when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs,with the local government economic development,local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not.If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost,the optimization of resources were achieved,reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions,improve the willingness of reduce emissions.(4)Due to the special characteristics of carbon emissions space product attributes,environmental regulation can't play agood effect,only in the economic backward areas can make sense,the emission reduction effect is not significant.Finally,the validity of the model is verified through a numerical simulation.By improving synergies,or reducing transaction costs,promote regional cooperation in emission reduction has great significance to achieve emission reduction targets.
It is a key step to reduce the influence of externality by coordinating the interests of the subjects in the agglomeration space and promoting interregional cooperation.Through the construction of the intergovernmental emission reduction evolutionary game model,the local government in the region under the conditions of independent emission reduction,cooperative emission reduction and environmental regulation in the region under the local government independent emission reduction strategy selection process of evolution.The study found that:(1)when the level of economic development of local government and external government are relatively small,whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction,{reduction,reduction}is local government stability strategy,however the mitigation effect is not significant;(2)In the case of independent emission reduction,when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree,{emission reduction,non-emission reduction}or{non-emission reduction,emission reduction}is stability strategy of the system;(3)In the case of cooperative emission reduction,when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs,with the local government economic development,local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not.If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost,the optimization of resources were achieved,reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions,improve the willingness of reduce emissions.(4)Due to the special characteristics of carbon emissions space product attributes,environmental regulation can't play agood effect,only in the economic backward areas can make sense,the emission reduction effect is not significant.Finally,the validity of the model is verified through a numerical simulation.By improving synergies,or reducing transaction costs,promote regional cooperation in emission reduction has great significance to achieve emission reduction targets.
引文
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[18]张新华,卢灿华,陈志伟.碳调度模式下火力发电商的碳减排投资策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(11):179-188.
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[21]李玮玮,姜农娟.政府政策调控与市场机制双重影响下商业模式低碳重塑的研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):914-920.
[22]Pigou A C.The economics of welfare[M].London:Macmillan and Co.,1920.
[23]李贲,吴利华.中小企业减排动力来源:环境规制与外部网络[J].中国科技论坛,2017,(5):94-100.
[24]石佑启,朱最新.论区域府际合作治理与公法变革[J].江海学刊,2013,(1):116-123.
[25]Schou P.When environmental policy is superfluous:Growth and polluting resources[J].Scandinavian Journal of Economics,2002,104(4):605-620.
[26]Sinn H W.Public policies against global warming:A supply side approach[J].International Tax&Public Finance,2007,15(4):360-394.
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[28]徐盈之,杨英超,郭进.环境规制对碳减排的作用路径及效应——基于中国省级数据的实证分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(10):135-146.
[29]薄燕.合作意愿与合作能力——一种分析中国参与全球气候变化治理的新框架[J].世界经济与政治,2013,(1):135-155.
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[31]王明喜,王明荣,汪寿阳,等.最优减排策略及其实施的理论分析[J].管理评论,2010,(6):42-47.
[32]Friedman D.Evolution game in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-666.
[2]林伯强,黄光晓.梯度发展模式下中国区域碳排放的演化趋势——基于空间分析的视角[J].金融研究,2011,(12):35-46.
[3]邓万江,马士华,关旭.碳交易背景下存在顾客环保偏好的双企业竞争策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(12):17-26.
[4]焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150.
[5]苑清敏,李想.基于产业梯度的京津冀合作减排分析[J].科技管理研究,2015,(16):225-229.
[6]李炫榆,宋海清.区域减排合作路径探寻——基于结构效应与二氧化碳排放的空间面板数据实证分析[J].福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,(1):29-35.
[7]邢华.我国区域合作的纵向嵌入式治理机制研究:基于交易成本的视角[J].中国行政管理,2015,(10):80-84.
[8]张俊荣,王孜丹,汤铃,余乐安.基于系统动力学的京津冀碳排放交易政策影响研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):1-8.
[9]Uddin N,Taplin R.Regional cooperation in widening energy access and mitigating climate change:Current programs and future potential[J].Global Environmental Change,2015,35:497-504.
[10]王金南,宁淼,孙亚梅.区域大气污染联防联控的理论与方法分析[J].环境与可持续发展,2012,37(5):5-10.
[11]Tang Xiangbo,Chen Xiaohong.Mechanism of regional atmospheric pollution collaborative reduction compensation[J].China population,resources and environment,2017,27(9):76-82.
[12]Wang Yan.A game pattern analysis of the cooperation and competition of global carbon emission reduction[J].Advanced Materials Research,2012,524-527:2352-2355.
[13]刘利源,时政勗,宁立新.非对称国家越境污染最优控制模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(1):43-49.
[14]Zhang B,Wang Z,Yin J,et al.CO2emission reduction within Chinese iron&steel industry:Practices,determinants and performance[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2012,33:167-178.
[15]曹斌斌,肖忠东,祝春阳.考虑政府低碳政策的双销售模式供应链决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):30-40.
[16]孙嘉楠,肖忠东.考虑消费者双重偏好的低碳供应链减排策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):49-56.
[17]Pan Xinyu,Zhao Daozhi,Wu Chengxia.Enterprises’emission reduction cooperation in carbon supply chain[J].Open Cybernetics&Systemics Journal,2014,8(1):931-937.
[18]张新华,卢灿华,陈志伟.碳调度模式下火力发电商的碳减排投资策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(11):179-188.
[19]Nash J.Two-person cooperative games[J].Econometrical,1953,21(1):128-140.
[20]黄清煌,高明.中国环境规制工具的节能减排效果研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):19-27.
[21]李玮玮,姜农娟.政府政策调控与市场机制双重影响下商业模式低碳重塑的研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):914-920.
[22]Pigou A C.The economics of welfare[M].London:Macmillan and Co.,1920.
[23]李贲,吴利华.中小企业减排动力来源:环境规制与外部网络[J].中国科技论坛,2017,(5):94-100.
[24]石佑启,朱最新.论区域府际合作治理与公法变革[J].江海学刊,2013,(1):116-123.
[25]Schou P.When environmental policy is superfluous:Growth and polluting resources[J].Scandinavian Journal of Economics,2002,104(4):605-620.
[26]Sinn H W.Public policies against global warming:A supply side approach[J].International Tax&Public Finance,2007,15(4):360-394.
[27]Porter M E,Claas V D L.Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):97-118.
[28]徐盈之,杨英超,郭进.环境规制对碳减排的作用路径及效应——基于中国省级数据的实证分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(10):135-146.
[29]薄燕.合作意愿与合作能力——一种分析中国参与全球气候变化治理的新框架[J].世界经济与政治,2013,(1):135-155.
[30]陈文颖,高鹏飞,何建坤.二氧化碳减排对中国未来GDP增长的影响[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2004,(6):744-747.
[31]王明喜,王明荣,汪寿阳,等.最优减排策略及其实施的理论分析[J].管理评论,2010,(6):42-47.
[32]Friedman D.Evolution game in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-666.