税收竞争对中国环境污染的影响的实证检验
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摘要
以中国30个省、自治区和直辖市的工业污染数据为样本建立三维时序立体数据表,运用极值熵值法测度中国环境污染排放强度,从税收总量和税收结构双重视角建立动态面板回归模型,利用差分广义矩估计方法对税收竞争对环境污染的影响进行实证检验,得出以下结论:①2000—2016年,中国环境污染呈现上升趋势。2003年以前,东部地区污染排放强度高于中西部地区,此后,东部地区环境污染改善明显;2005年以后,中部地区环境污染压力上升;2012年以前,西部地区污染排放强度呈现交替升降的演变趋势,而近年来西部地区环境污染压力超越东部和中部地区。②从税收总量来看,政府间税收竞争显著抑制污染排放,是一种"趋优竞争"。③从税收结构来看,增值税竞争加剧污染恶化,企业所得税竞争有效抑制污染排放。④分地区看,东部地区税收竞争程度低,对污染排放影响不显著,而中西部地区税收竞争对污染排放的影响较为显著。⑤从政府环境管制来看,政府间税收竞争与政府环保政策相互影响,显著抑制环境污染。改革官员晋升考核体系、完善税收分权体制和实行差异化税收政策是当务之急。
Based on the industrial pollution data of 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of China, this article establishes three-dimensional data table and measures China's environmental pollution emission intensity applying the extreme value entropy method, it sets up a panel regression model from the dual perspective of tax amount and structure and uses differential generalized moment estimation method to empirically test the impact of tax competition on environmental pollution. The main conclusions include: 1) The environmental pollution shows an upward trend in China from 2000 to 2016. The intensity of pollution emission was higher in the eastern region than that in the central and western regions before 2003, then, the environmental pollution has improved significantly in the eastern region; the pressure of environmental pollution has increased in the central region after 2005; the intensity of pollution emission showed an alternating upward and downward trend in the western region before 2012, the pressure of environmental pollution was higher in the western region recent years than that in the eastern and central regions. 2) From the perspective of total tax revenue, the intergovernmental tax competition has significantly restrained pollution emissions,which is a kind of "preferential competition". 3) From the perspective of tax structure, the value added tax competition has aggravated the deterioration of pollution, and enterprise income tax competition has effectively restrained pollution emissions. 4) In term of region, tax competition is low in the eastern region, and its impact on pollution emissions is not significant; tax competition has a significant impact on pollution emissions in the central and western regions. 5) From the point of view of government environmental control, tax competition between governments and interaction of government environmental protection policies significantly inhibit environmental pollution. This paper argues that it is imperative to reform the evaluation system of official promotion, improve the tax decentralization system and implement the differential tax policy.
Based on the industrial pollution data of 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of China, this article establishes three-dimensional data table and measures China's environmental pollution emission intensity applying the extreme value entropy method, it sets up a panel regression model from the dual perspective of tax amount and structure and uses differential generalized moment estimation method to empirically test the impact of tax competition on environmental pollution. The main conclusions include: 1) The environmental pollution shows an upward trend in China from 2000 to 2016. The intensity of pollution emission was higher in the eastern region than that in the central and western regions before 2003, then, the environmental pollution has improved significantly in the eastern region; the pressure of environmental pollution has increased in the central region after 2005; the intensity of pollution emission showed an alternating upward and downward trend in the western region before 2012, the pressure of environmental pollution was higher in the western region recent years than that in the eastern and central regions. 2) From the perspective of total tax revenue, the intergovernmental tax competition has significantly restrained pollution emissions,which is a kind of "preferential competition". 3) From the perspective of tax structure, the value added tax competition has aggravated the deterioration of pollution, and enterprise income tax competition has effectively restrained pollution emissions. 4) In term of region, tax competition is low in the eastern region, and its impact on pollution emissions is not significant; tax competition has a significant impact on pollution emissions in the central and western regions. 5) From the point of view of government environmental control, tax competition between governments and interaction of government environmental protection policies significantly inhibit environmental pollution. This paper argues that it is imperative to reform the evaluation system of official promotion, improve the tax decentralization system and implement the differential tax policy.
引文
[1]郑洁,付才辉,张彩虹.财政分权与环境污染:基于新结构经济学视角[J].财政研究,2018(3):57-70.
[2] Pearce D. The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming[J]. Economic Journal,1991,101(407):938-948.
[3] Cumberland. Efficiency and Equity in Interregional Environmental Management[J]. Review of Regional Studies,1981(2):1-9.
[4] Wilson J D. A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition[J].Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):296-315.
[5] Rauscher M. Economic Growth and Tax-competition Leviathans[J]. International Tax and Public Finance,2005,12:457-474.
[6] Potoski M. Clean Air Federalism:Do States Race to the Bottom?[J]. Public Administration Review,2001,61(3):335-343.
[7] Sundar S A K,Mishra R Naresh. Effect of Environmental Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emission:A Mathematical Model[J]. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics,2016,4(1):16-23.
[8] Wilson,John D.Theories of Tax Competition[J]. National Tax Journal,1999,52(2):269-304.
[9]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果:基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008(7):7-17.
[10]崔亚飞,刘小川.中国省级税收竞争与环境污染:基于1998—2006年面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2010,36(4):46-55.
[11]张宏翔,张宁川,匡素帛.政府竞争与分权通道的交互作用对环境质量的影响研究[J].统计研究,2015(6):74-80.
[12]李香菊,贺娜.税收对环境污染的影响分析:基于财政分权视角[J].中国地质大学学报:社科版,2017,17(6):54-66.
[13]朱小会,陆远权.环境财税政策的治污效应研究:基于区域和门槛效应视角[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(1):83-90.
[14]黎斌,贺灿飞,周沂.相关多样化、地方政府竞争与中国重化工业企业动态[J].经济地理,2016,36(6):91-99.
[15] Cremer H,Gahvari F. Environmental Taxation,Tax Competition,and Harmonization[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2004,55(1):21-45.
[16]卢洪友,唐飞,许文立.税收政策能增强企业的环境责任吗:来自我国上市公司的证据[J].财贸研究,2017,28(1):85-91.
[17]王丽萍,夏文静.中国污染产业强度划分与区际转移路径[J].经济地理,2019,39(3):152-161.
[18]张克中,王娟,崔小勇.财政分权与环境污染:碳排放的视角[J].中国工业经济,2011(10):65-75.
[19]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(4):110-117.
[20] Diamond P A,Mirrlees J A. Optimal Taxation and Public Production,I:Production Efficiency[J]. American Economic Association,1971,61(1):8-27.
[21]姚公安.横向税收竞争的环境效应研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2014(12):79-83.
[22] Fredriksson P G,Millimet D L. Strategic Interaction and the Determinants of Environmental Policy Across US States[J].Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51(1):101-122.
[23] Millimet D L. Assessing the Empirical Impact of EnvironmentalFederalism[J]. Journal of Regional Science,2003,43(4):711-733.
[24]沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效[J].经济研究,2006(6):16-26.
(1)依据中国经济区域划分标准,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区包括吉林、黑龙江、山西、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区包括广西、内蒙古、重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏和新疆。因数据缺失,本次研究不考察西藏。
(1)依据中国经济区域划分标准,计量分析的地区划分方法同前文的污染指数的地区划分一致。
[2] Pearce D. The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming[J]. Economic Journal,1991,101(407):938-948.
[3] Cumberland. Efficiency and Equity in Interregional Environmental Management[J]. Review of Regional Studies,1981(2):1-9.
[4] Wilson J D. A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition[J].Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):296-315.
[5] Rauscher M. Economic Growth and Tax-competition Leviathans[J]. International Tax and Public Finance,2005,12:457-474.
[6] Potoski M. Clean Air Federalism:Do States Race to the Bottom?[J]. Public Administration Review,2001,61(3):335-343.
[7] Sundar S A K,Mishra R Naresh. Effect of Environmental Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emission:A Mathematical Model[J]. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics,2016,4(1):16-23.
[8] Wilson,John D.Theories of Tax Competition[J]. National Tax Journal,1999,52(2):269-304.
[9]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果:基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008(7):7-17.
[10]崔亚飞,刘小川.中国省级税收竞争与环境污染:基于1998—2006年面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2010,36(4):46-55.
[11]张宏翔,张宁川,匡素帛.政府竞争与分权通道的交互作用对环境质量的影响研究[J].统计研究,2015(6):74-80.
[12]李香菊,贺娜.税收对环境污染的影响分析:基于财政分权视角[J].中国地质大学学报:社科版,2017,17(6):54-66.
[13]朱小会,陆远权.环境财税政策的治污效应研究:基于区域和门槛效应视角[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(1):83-90.
[14]黎斌,贺灿飞,周沂.相关多样化、地方政府竞争与中国重化工业企业动态[J].经济地理,2016,36(6):91-99.
[15] Cremer H,Gahvari F. Environmental Taxation,Tax Competition,and Harmonization[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2004,55(1):21-45.
[16]卢洪友,唐飞,许文立.税收政策能增强企业的环境责任吗:来自我国上市公司的证据[J].财贸研究,2017,28(1):85-91.
[17]王丽萍,夏文静.中国污染产业强度划分与区际转移路径[J].经济地理,2019,39(3):152-161.
[18]张克中,王娟,崔小勇.财政分权与环境污染:碳排放的视角[J].中国工业经济,2011(10):65-75.
[19]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(4):110-117.
[20] Diamond P A,Mirrlees J A. Optimal Taxation and Public Production,I:Production Efficiency[J]. American Economic Association,1971,61(1):8-27.
[21]姚公安.横向税收竞争的环境效应研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2014(12):79-83.
[22] Fredriksson P G,Millimet D L. Strategic Interaction and the Determinants of Environmental Policy Across US States[J].Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51(1):101-122.
[23] Millimet D L. Assessing the Empirical Impact of EnvironmentalFederalism[J]. Journal of Regional Science,2003,43(4):711-733.
[24]沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效[J].经济研究,2006(6):16-26.
(1)依据中国经济区域划分标准,东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区包括吉林、黑龙江、山西、安徽、江西、河南、湖北、湖南;西部地区包括广西、内蒙古、重庆、四川、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏和新疆。因数据缺失,本次研究不考察西藏。
(1)依据中国经济区域划分标准,计量分析的地区划分方法同前文的污染指数的地区划分一致。