银行治理:超越审慎监管与声誉激励的结合
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摘要
该研究面对的问题是监管者应当如何限制商业银行当中高管的过度冒险行为。基于此,文章的亮点可能在于:其一,质疑"超越审慎监管"(1)的正当性,并在认同其合理性的同时对其措施进行了修正。其二,结合相关理论,对超越审慎监管措施与声誉激励机制的结合进行了学理上的论证。其三,结合公司治理理论分析并解释了产生矛盾的特殊性原因,并提出了解决方案。其四,基于上述论证总结并提出修正的监管构造,即将声誉激励措施与超越审慎监管措施统一于银行治理的框架之下。
The question facing the article is how regulators should limit the excessive risk-taking behavior of executives in commercial banks.Based on this,the highlight of this paper may be:First,question the legitimacy of " beyond prudential supervision" 1,and correct its measures while acknowledging its rationality.Second,combined with relevant theories,it has theoretically demonstrated the combination of beyond prudential supervision measures and reputation incentive mechanisms.Third,combined with the theory of corporate governance to analyze and explain the specific reasons for the contradiction,and proposed a solution.Fourth,based on the above arguments and proposed a revised regulatory structure,the reputation incentives and beyond the prudential supervision measures are unified under the framework of bank governance.
The question facing the article is how regulators should limit the excessive risk-taking behavior of executives in commercial banks.Based on this,the highlight of this paper may be:First,question the legitimacy of " beyond prudential supervision" 1,and correct its measures while acknowledging its rationality.Second,combined with relevant theories,it has theoretically demonstrated the combination of beyond prudential supervision measures and reputation incentive mechanisms.Third,combined with the theory of corporate governance to analyze and explain the specific reasons for the contradiction,and proposed a solution.Fourth,based on the above arguments and proposed a revised regulatory structure,the reputation incentives and beyond the prudential supervision measures are unified under the framework of bank governance.
引文
[1]高丝敏,沈朝晖.全球行政法与金融监管改革[J].武大国际法评论,2012,15(1):54-76.
[2]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2017年第三季度中国货币政策执行报告[R/OL].(2017-11-17)[2018-10-08].http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/18/content_5240675.htm.
[3]LucianA.Bebchuk&Holger Spamann,Regulating Bankers’Pay,98GEO.L.J.247(2010).
[4]LucianA.Bebchuk&Holger Spamann,Regulating Bankers’Pay,98GEO.L.J.247(2010).
[5]Brown v.Board of Education of Topeka,347U.S.483(1954).
[6]Lochnerv.NewYork,198US 45(1905).
[7]West Coast Hotel Co.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937).
[8]沈朝晖,高丝敏.美国重构金融监管的政治学逻辑---党争选举与利益集团对金融立法的影响[J].国际经济法学刊,2010,17(4):233-262.
[9]West Coast Hotel Co.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937).
[10]贺伟,龙立荣.内外在薪酬组合激励模型研究[J].管理评论,2011,23(9):93-101.
[11]Validity Evidence for Measures of Procedural/Distributive Justice and Pay/Benefit Satisfaction[J].Larry W.Howard.Journal of Business and Psychology,1999(1).
[12]神玉飞.中国银行业制度风险规制研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2008.
[13]彭文平,杨蓝蓝.业绩评价、职业声誉和基金经理行为异化[J].经济管理,2013,35(6):81-94.
[14]闫森,郭瑜桥.商业银行高管声誉激励机制的完善[J].上海金融,2012(05):112-119.
[15]王帅.高管声誉激励的治理效应及作用机理:质性与量化整合框架下的研究[D].济南:山东大学,2017.
[16]王旭,徐向艺.基于企业生命周期的高管激励契约最优动态配置---价值分配的视角[J].经济理论与经济管理,2015(6):80-93.
[17]Ferris G R,Blass F R,Douglas C,Kolodinsky R W,Treadway D C.Personal reputation in organizations[A].In J.Greenberg9(EA),Organizational Behavior[C].Mahwah,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates;2003:211-246.
[18]Milboum T T.CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[19]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理瓦[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[20]Ranft A L,ZinkoR,Ferris G R,et al.Marketing the image of management:the costs and benefits of CEOreputation[J].Organizational Dynamics,2006,35(3):279-290.
[21]Graffin S D,Ward A J.Certifications and reputation:determining the standard of desirability amidst uncertainty[J]Organization Science,2010,21(2):331-346.
[22]Koh K.Value or glamour?An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and fine performance[J].Accounting&Finance,2011,51(2):547.
[23]Fetscherin M.The CEO branding mix[J].Journal of Business Strategy,2015,36(6):22-28.
[24]冀县卿.我国上市公司经理层激励缺失及其矫正[J].管理世界,2007(4):160-161.
[25]Milbourn T T.CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[26]Fama E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980(88):288-307.
[27]Wade J B.Graffln S D.The burden of celebrity:the impact of CEO certification contests on CEO pay and performance[J].Academy of Management Journal,2006,49(4):643-660.
[28]Bednar M K,Love E G,Kraatz M.Paying the price?The impact of controversial governance practices on managerial reputatio[J].Academy of Management Journal,2015,58(6):1740-1760.
[29]Porter M E.Competitive advantage of nations:Creating and sustainingsuperior performance[M].Human Resource Management,2010.
[30]马喜芳,钟根元,颜世富.基于胜任力的薪酬激励机制设计及激励协同[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(06):1015-1021.
(1)超越审慎监管译自:Going Beyond Prudential Regulation.
(2)社会达尔文主义:主张用达尔文的生存竞争与自然选择的观点来解释社会的发展规律和人类之间的关系。认为优胜劣汰、适者生存的现象存在于人类社会。
[2]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2017年第三季度中国货币政策执行报告[R/OL].(2017-11-17)[2018-10-08].http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/18/content_5240675.htm.
[3]LucianA.Bebchuk&Holger Spamann,Regulating Bankers’Pay,98GEO.L.J.247(2010).
[4]LucianA.Bebchuk&Holger Spamann,Regulating Bankers’Pay,98GEO.L.J.247(2010).
[5]Brown v.Board of Education of Topeka,347U.S.483(1954).
[6]Lochnerv.NewYork,198US 45(1905).
[7]West Coast Hotel Co.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937).
[8]沈朝晖,高丝敏.美国重构金融监管的政治学逻辑---党争选举与利益集团对金融立法的影响[J].国际经济法学刊,2010,17(4):233-262.
[9]West Coast Hotel Co.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937).
[10]贺伟,龙立荣.内外在薪酬组合激励模型研究[J].管理评论,2011,23(9):93-101.
[11]Validity Evidence for Measures of Procedural/Distributive Justice and Pay/Benefit Satisfaction[J].Larry W.Howard.Journal of Business and Psychology,1999(1).
[12]神玉飞.中国银行业制度风险规制研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2008.
[13]彭文平,杨蓝蓝.业绩评价、职业声誉和基金经理行为异化[J].经济管理,2013,35(6):81-94.
[14]闫森,郭瑜桥.商业银行高管声誉激励机制的完善[J].上海金融,2012(05):112-119.
[15]王帅.高管声誉激励的治理效应及作用机理:质性与量化整合框架下的研究[D].济南:山东大学,2017.
[16]王旭,徐向艺.基于企业生命周期的高管激励契约最优动态配置---价值分配的视角[J].经济理论与经济管理,2015(6):80-93.
[17]Ferris G R,Blass F R,Douglas C,Kolodinsky R W,Treadway D C.Personal reputation in organizations[A].In J.Greenberg9(EA),Organizational Behavior[C].Mahwah,NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates;2003:211-246.
[18]Milboum T T.CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[19]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理瓦[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[20]Ranft A L,ZinkoR,Ferris G R,et al.Marketing the image of management:the costs and benefits of CEOreputation[J].Organizational Dynamics,2006,35(3):279-290.
[21]Graffin S D,Ward A J.Certifications and reputation:determining the standard of desirability amidst uncertainty[J]Organization Science,2010,21(2):331-346.
[22]Koh K.Value or glamour?An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and fine performance[J].Accounting&Finance,2011,51(2):547.
[23]Fetscherin M.The CEO branding mix[J].Journal of Business Strategy,2015,36(6):22-28.
[24]冀县卿.我国上市公司经理层激励缺失及其矫正[J].管理世界,2007(4):160-161.
[25]Milbourn T T.CEO reputation and stock-based compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(2):233-262.
[26]Fama E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980(88):288-307.
[27]Wade J B.Graffln S D.The burden of celebrity:the impact of CEO certification contests on CEO pay and performance[J].Academy of Management Journal,2006,49(4):643-660.
[28]Bednar M K,Love E G,Kraatz M.Paying the price?The impact of controversial governance practices on managerial reputatio[J].Academy of Management Journal,2015,58(6):1740-1760.
[29]Porter M E.Competitive advantage of nations:Creating and sustainingsuperior performance[M].Human Resource Management,2010.
[30]马喜芳,钟根元,颜世富.基于胜任力的薪酬激励机制设计及激励协同[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(06):1015-1021.
(1)超越审慎监管译自:Going Beyond Prudential Regulation.
(2)社会达尔文主义:主张用达尔文的生存竞争与自然选择的观点来解释社会的发展规律和人类之间的关系。认为优胜劣汰、适者生存的现象存在于人类社会。