零售商成本信息不对称下三级供应链协调研究
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摘要
针对零售商边际成本信息不对称的情形,研究由制造商、分销商及零售商组成的三级供应链收益共享契约协调问题。假设制造商和分销商通过合作博弈的方式共同设计契约模型,以此来最大化供应链总利润。在此基础上,结合数值仿真,将零售商边际成本信息对称和不对称两种情况下的利润模型进行对比分析。结果表明,相对信息对称而言,信息不对称下制造商和分销商的利润减少,而零售商获得了私有信息带来的超额利润,但此种情况会降低整个三级供应链系统的效率。
As for retailer having asymmetric information about production marginal cost,how to coordinate the three echelon supply chain under revenue-sharing contract is studied. In order to maximize the total profit of the supply chain,the manufacturer has the right to design the contract model together with the distributor through cooperative game. On this basis,combining with numerical simulation,a comparative analysis about the optimal revenue-sharing strategy under symmetrical information and asymmetrical information are made. The result shows that within the asymmetric information,the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of distributor are all reduced,while the retailer obtains the excess profit from private information. However in this case,the efficiency of the whole three echelon supply chain system is reduced.
As for retailer having asymmetric information about production marginal cost,how to coordinate the three echelon supply chain under revenue-sharing contract is studied. In order to maximize the total profit of the supply chain,the manufacturer has the right to design the contract model together with the distributor through cooperative game. On this basis,combining with numerical simulation,a comparative analysis about the optimal revenue-sharing strategy under symmetrical information and asymmetrical information are made. The result shows that within the asymmetric information,the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of distributor are all reduced,while the retailer obtains the excess profit from private information. However in this case,the efficiency of the whole three echelon supply chain system is reduced.
引文
[1]王先甲,周亚平,钱桂生.生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(1):17-31.
[2]马雪松.基于服务合作价值的服务供应链模型及协调策略[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2016,38(6):690-695.
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[4]侯玉梅,林梦楠.需求受服务努力影响的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调性研究[J].燕山大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,15(4):118-124.
[5]朱宝琳,戚亚萍,戢守峰,等.风险规避下不确定供应链收益共享契约模型[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2017,38(1):138-142.
[6]庞庆华,蒋晖,侯岳铭,等.需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):371-378.
[7]MUKHOPADHYAY S K,SU X,GHOSE S.Motivating retail marketing effort:optimal contract design[J].Production&Operations Management,2009,18(2):197-211.
[8]杨勇.基于信息不对称和预售的采购合同研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2016,38(4):474-479.
[9]YEHEZKEL Y.Motivating a supplier to test product quality[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2014,62(2):309-345.
[10]王勇,乔伟清,姜林.制造商生产成本信息不对称下三级供应链定价和利润研究[J].物流技术,2015,34(13):198-203.
[2]马雪松.基于服务合作价值的服务供应链模型及协调策略[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2016,38(6):690-695.
[3]ARANI H V,RABBANI M,RAFIEI H.A revenuesharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016(178):42-56.
[4]侯玉梅,林梦楠.需求受服务努力影响的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调性研究[J].燕山大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,15(4):118-124.
[5]朱宝琳,戚亚萍,戢守峰,等.风险规避下不确定供应链收益共享契约模型[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2017,38(1):138-142.
[6]庞庆华,蒋晖,侯岳铭,等.需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):371-378.
[7]MUKHOPADHYAY S K,SU X,GHOSE S.Motivating retail marketing effort:optimal contract design[J].Production&Operations Management,2009,18(2):197-211.
[8]杨勇.基于信息不对称和预售的采购合同研究[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2016,38(4):474-479.
[9]YEHEZKEL Y.Motivating a supplier to test product quality[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2014,62(2):309-345.
[10]王勇,乔伟清,姜林.制造商生产成本信息不对称下三级供应链定价和利润研究[J].物流技术,2015,34(13):198-203.