构建中美核战略稳定性框架:非对称性战略平衡的视角
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摘要
权力转移导致中美战略竞争加剧,维护中美战略稳定成为攸关中美关系发展以及世界和平与稳定的重大问题。构建中美核战略稳定性框架是实现中美战略稳定的基石。传统战略稳定理论主要基于美苏两大对称性阵营的敌对关系,对于不对称性和动态权力转移背景下的中美核战略稳定性的理论解释力和实践指导性不足。基于非对称战略平衡视角,中美核战略稳定性框架应以保证中国第二次核打击能力为基础。在机制层面,中美要加强交流、协商和谈判以建立相关机制,逐渐形成中美核战略关系的共识,推动达成稳定中美核战略关系的协议、条约等法律性承诺,从而构建稳定中美核战略关系的政治框架。在结构层面,中国无需谋求与美国对等的核力量。统筹考虑军事效用和政治效果,构筑包括核实力、核威慑决心和核威慑信息传递的完备核威慑战略,确保处于弱势的中国拥有对美国进行核反击造成美不可承受损失的能力,是实现中美核战略稳定的关键。
Given that the power transition taking place between China and the US has led to intensified strategic competition between the two countries, maintaining Sino-US strategic stability has become a major concern in the development of Sino-US relations and the course of world peace and stability. Constructing a Sino-US nuclear strategic stability framework is the cornerstone for achieving Sino-US strategic stability. The traditional strategic stability theory, which is mainly based on the hostile relationship between the two major symmetric camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, can hardly offer theoretical explanation and practical guidance for the stability of Sino-US nuclear strategy under the background of asymmetry and dynamic power shift. Therefore, from the perspective of asymmetric strategic balance, ensuring China's second-strike capability should be at the core of the Sino-US nuclear strategic stability framework.At the institutional level, both sides should establish relevant mechanisms by strengthening communication, consultation and negotiation, build consensus and fulfill legal commitments via agreements and treaties in order to construct a political framework that stabilizes Sino-US nuclear strategic dynamics. At the structural level,it is not necessary for China to seek nuclear forces equivalent to those of the United States. The key to Sino-US nuclear strategic stability lies in the overall consideration of military utility and political effects, the formulation of an integrated nuclear deterrence strategy, which includes enhancing the combat capability of China's nuclear forces, strengthening the determination to carry out deterrence operations and facilitating information transmission regarding nuclear deterrence so that China can be well equipped with the capacity to launch a nuclear counterattack against and cause unbearable losses to the United States.
Given that the power transition taking place between China and the US has led to intensified strategic competition between the two countries, maintaining Sino-US strategic stability has become a major concern in the development of Sino-US relations and the course of world peace and stability. Constructing a Sino-US nuclear strategic stability framework is the cornerstone for achieving Sino-US strategic stability. The traditional strategic stability theory, which is mainly based on the hostile relationship between the two major symmetric camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, can hardly offer theoretical explanation and practical guidance for the stability of Sino-US nuclear strategy under the background of asymmetry and dynamic power shift. Therefore, from the perspective of asymmetric strategic balance, ensuring China's second-strike capability should be at the core of the Sino-US nuclear strategic stability framework.At the institutional level, both sides should establish relevant mechanisms by strengthening communication, consultation and negotiation, build consensus and fulfill legal commitments via agreements and treaties in order to construct a political framework that stabilizes Sino-US nuclear strategic dynamics. At the structural level,it is not necessary for China to seek nuclear forces equivalent to those of the United States. The key to Sino-US nuclear strategic stability lies in the overall consideration of military utility and political effects, the formulation of an integrated nuclear deterrence strategy, which includes enhancing the combat capability of China's nuclear forces, strengthening the determination to carry out deterrence operations and facilitating information transmission regarding nuclear deterrence so that China can be well equipped with the capacity to launch a nuclear counterattack against and cause unbearable losses to the United States.
引文
(1)James D.Fearon,“Rationalist Explanations for War,”International Organization,Vol.49,No.3,1995,pp.379-414.
(2)该报告提到,“数十年来,美国的政策植根于这样的信念,即支持中国崛起和融入战后国际秩序有助于实现中国的开放。然而,与我们的愿望相反,中国以牺牲他国主权为代价来扩张自己的权力。”参见“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf,pp.3,25。
(1)有研究指出,中国旨在回应美国常规能力的常规弹道和巡航导弹项目,引发了美国的抵消性回应。参见John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,Imagined Enemies:China Prepares for Uncertain War,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2006,p.39;Michael S.Chase and Andrew S.Erickson,“The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force:Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,”Asian Security,Vol.8,No.2,2012,pp.120-122;Thomas Rowden and Peter Fanta,“Distributed Lethality,”Proceedings,January 2015,https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-01/distributed-lethality。
(2)James M.Acton,“The Dragon Dance:U.S.-China Security Cooperation,”in Jessica T.Matthews,ed.,Global Ten:Challenges and Opportunities for the President in 2013,Washington,D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,pp.121-123,http://carnegieendowment.org/files/global_ten.pdf.
(3)Yao Yunzhu,“Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,”Strategic Insights,Vol.6,No.9,2005,https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36704818.pdf.
(4)“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”pp.3-4,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
(5)相关论述参见Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe,“Ties that Bind:Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Relationship,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.36,No.4,2013,pp.125-138。
(1)David S.Yost,Strategic Stability in the Cold War:Lessons for Continuing Challenges,Paris,France:French Institute of International Relations(IFRI)Security Studies Center,2011.
(1)Thomas C.Schelling,The Strategy of Conflict,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1960,p.232;Thomas C.Schelling,Arms and Influence,New Haven:Yale University Press,1967,p.229.
(2)Elbridge A.Colby and Michael S.Gerson,eds.,Strategic Stability:Contending Interpretations,Carlisle Barracks,PA:Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press,2013.
(3)Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe,“Ties that Bind:Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Relationship,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.36,No.4,2013,pp.125-138.
(1)Office of the Secretary of Defense,Nuclear Posture Review,April 2010,https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.
(1)中美之间开展的与战略稳定相关的对话渠道非常有限,主要集中于自2004年开始由中国国际战略研究基金会和美国战略与国际研究中心太平洋论坛举办的“中美战略核关系与战略互信”国际研讨会、2005年的中美战略对话以及2008年4月在华盛顿举行的官方核领域对话。
(2)Elbridge A.Colby and Abraham M.Denmark,Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations:AWay Forward,Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS),Report of the PONI Working Groupon U.S-China Nuclear Dynamics,2013.
(3)Elbridge A.Colby and Wu Riqiang,“Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain,”in Travis Tanner and Wang Dong,eds.,U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains,The National Bureau of Asian Research,NBR Special Report#57,April 2016,p.28.
(4)James R.Schlesinger,“The Historical and Modern Context for U.S.-Russian Arms Control,”Testimony before the U.S.Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations,Washington,D.C,April 29,2010,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2010/04/29/the-historical-and-modern-context-for-us-russianarms-control.
(1)Elbridge A.Colby and Wu Riqiang,“Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain,”in Travis Tanner and Wang Dong,eds.,U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains,The National Bureau of Asian Research,NBR Special Report#57,April 2016,pp.33-34.
(1)埃尔布里奇·科尔比(Elbridge Colby)2013年8月8~9日在北京举办的“军备控制与战略稳定”国际研讨会上的发言。
(2)Office of The Secretary of Defense,Nuclear Posture Review,February 2018,https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
(1)Jeffrey Lewis,“The Fifty-Megaton Elephant in the Room:Why Aren’t America and China Talking about Their Nukes?”Foreign Policy,September 19,2012,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/the_fifty_megaton_elephant_in_the_room?wp_login_redirect=0.
(2)此观点以及与美国核态势相关的其他关切,可参见Thomas Fingar,“Worrying about Washington:China’s Views of the US Nuclear Posture,”The Nonproliferation Review,Vol.18,No.1,2011,pp.51-68。
(3)Thomas Fingar,“Worrying about Washington:China’s Views of the US Nuclear Posture,”The Nonproliferation Review,Vol.18,No.1,2011,pp.51-68.
(1)没有所谓美国对中国第二次核打击能力的问题。
(1)所谓“滚动形式”是指将已达成的共识记录在案,对分歧内容再进行讨论,以逐步缩小分歧,推动最终达成一致的磋商方式。
(1)Robert S.McNamara,“The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,”Department of State Bulletin,Vol.57,No.1476,1967,pp.443-451.
(2)该报告提到,“数十年来,美国的政策植根于这样的信念,即支持中国崛起和融入战后国际秩序有助于实现中国的开放。然而,与我们的愿望相反,中国以牺牲他国主权为代价来扩张自己的权力。”参见“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf,pp.3,25。
(1)有研究指出,中国旨在回应美国常规能力的常规弹道和巡航导弹项目,引发了美国的抵消性回应。参见John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,Imagined Enemies:China Prepares for Uncertain War,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2006,p.39;Michael S.Chase and Andrew S.Erickson,“The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force:Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,”Asian Security,Vol.8,No.2,2012,pp.120-122;Thomas Rowden and Peter Fanta,“Distributed Lethality,”Proceedings,January 2015,https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-01/distributed-lethality。
(2)James M.Acton,“The Dragon Dance:U.S.-China Security Cooperation,”in Jessica T.Matthews,ed.,Global Ten:Challenges and Opportunities for the President in 2013,Washington,D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,pp.121-123,http://carnegieendowment.org/files/global_ten.pdf.
(3)Yao Yunzhu,“Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,”Strategic Insights,Vol.6,No.9,2005,https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36704818.pdf.
(4)“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”pp.3-4,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
(5)相关论述参见Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe,“Ties that Bind:Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Relationship,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.36,No.4,2013,pp.125-138。
(1)David S.Yost,Strategic Stability in the Cold War:Lessons for Continuing Challenges,Paris,France:French Institute of International Relations(IFRI)Security Studies Center,2011.
(1)Thomas C.Schelling,The Strategy of Conflict,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1960,p.232;Thomas C.Schelling,Arms and Influence,New Haven:Yale University Press,1967,p.229.
(2)Elbridge A.Colby and Michael S.Gerson,eds.,Strategic Stability:Contending Interpretations,Carlisle Barracks,PA:Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press,2013.
(3)Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe,“Ties that Bind:Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Relationship,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol.36,No.4,2013,pp.125-138.
(1)Office of the Secretary of Defense,Nuclear Posture Review,April 2010,https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.
(1)中美之间开展的与战略稳定相关的对话渠道非常有限,主要集中于自2004年开始由中国国际战略研究基金会和美国战略与国际研究中心太平洋论坛举办的“中美战略核关系与战略互信”国际研讨会、2005年的中美战略对话以及2008年4月在华盛顿举行的官方核领域对话。
(2)Elbridge A.Colby and Abraham M.Denmark,Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations:AWay Forward,Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS),Report of the PONI Working Groupon U.S-China Nuclear Dynamics,2013.
(3)Elbridge A.Colby and Wu Riqiang,“Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain,”in Travis Tanner and Wang Dong,eds.,U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains,The National Bureau of Asian Research,NBR Special Report#57,April 2016,p.28.
(4)James R.Schlesinger,“The Historical and Modern Context for U.S.-Russian Arms Control,”Testimony before the U.S.Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations,Washington,D.C,April 29,2010,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2010/04/29/the-historical-and-modern-context-for-us-russianarms-control.
(1)Elbridge A.Colby and Wu Riqiang,“Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain,”in Travis Tanner and Wang Dong,eds.,U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains,The National Bureau of Asian Research,NBR Special Report#57,April 2016,pp.33-34.
(1)埃尔布里奇·科尔比(Elbridge Colby)2013年8月8~9日在北京举办的“军备控制与战略稳定”国际研讨会上的发言。
(2)Office of The Secretary of Defense,Nuclear Posture Review,February 2018,https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
(1)Jeffrey Lewis,“The Fifty-Megaton Elephant in the Room:Why Aren’t America and China Talking about Their Nukes?”Foreign Policy,September 19,2012,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/the_fifty_megaton_elephant_in_the_room?wp_login_redirect=0.
(2)此观点以及与美国核态势相关的其他关切,可参见Thomas Fingar,“Worrying about Washington:China’s Views of the US Nuclear Posture,”The Nonproliferation Review,Vol.18,No.1,2011,pp.51-68。
(3)Thomas Fingar,“Worrying about Washington:China’s Views of the US Nuclear Posture,”The Nonproliferation Review,Vol.18,No.1,2011,pp.51-68.
(1)没有所谓美国对中国第二次核打击能力的问题。
(1)所谓“滚动形式”是指将已达成的共识记录在案,对分歧内容再进行讨论,以逐步缩小分歧,推动最终达成一致的磋商方式。
(1)Robert S.McNamara,“The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,”Department of State Bulletin,Vol.57,No.1476,1967,pp.443-451.