“五年规划”与中国企业跨境并购
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摘要
在国家产业政策的激励下,中国企业越来越多地通过跨境并购来贯彻产业政策,以在短期内实现产业升级。然而,中国企业的跨境并购普遍存在溢价高和完成率低的现象。针对此现象,本文以1991—2015年间中国企业的跨境并购交易为样本,考察"五年规划"中的产业政策与中国企业海外并购之间的关联。实证结果表明,与所在行业不受当期"五年规划"产业政策支持的企业相比,受到支持的企业支付了更高的并购溢价,平均达到8%—10%;然而,并购完成的平均概率却要低36%左右。进一步,本文发现,受产业政策支持的企业能从金融体系中得到更多廉价的资金,并从政府得到更多补贴。基于上述实证结果,本文认为,在完成"政策性任务"的激励以及金融体系等的支持下,中国企业倾向于支付高价以实现并购。然而,正是因为中国企业跨境并购的重要意图是为了贯彻国家战略,因此更容易受到被并购企业所在国的阻挠,导致完成率较低。
The share of Chinese firms in global cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions(M&As) transactions is increasing. In 2016, China surpassed the U.S. to become the world's largest cross-border purchaser. However, Chinese firms' cross-border M&As also have problems with relatively high M&As premium rates but low completion rates. We argue that this is related to China's industrial policies.The five-year plans for industrial policies are a salient feature of China's economic development. These policies support the development of certain industries to promote industrial upgrading and economic development. We argue that there are several links between China's industrial policies and Chinese firms' cross-border M&As. First, cross-border M&As are a way for Chinese firms to respond to industrial policies and achieve industrial upgrading in the short run. Second, industrial policies guide firms to invest and innovate and play an important role in guiding resource allocation. In particular, financial systems such as banks often give priority to these industries when providing credit support. Third, because Chinese firms supported by industrial policies are mainly implementing national strategies and policies, resistance from host countries are stronger, resulting in lower M&As completion rates despite Chinese firms' higher bids.We empirically examine these conjectures on the relationship between Chinese industrial policies and cross-border M&A activities. We use cross-border M&As data for Chinese firms from the Thomson One M&As transaction database for the eighth to twelfth five-year plans(1991-2015). We divide firms into two groups depending on whether their industries are supported by the contemporary five-year plan and study the impact of such industrial policies on the cross-border M&As premium rates and completion rates.Our results show that, compared with firms whose industries are not supported by the contemporary five-year plan, supported firms pay a higher merger premium of 8-10%. However, the average completion rate of supported firms is about 36% lower. Furthermore, supported firms are more likely to obtain debt financing such as bank loans and their interest expenses are lower. These firms also receive more government subsidies. Our findings suggest that even if cross-border M&As are effective in promoting China's overall industrial and technological upgrading, Chinese firms pay a high price. Therefore, for cross-border M&As transactions proposed by Chinese firms with high asset-liability ratios and those supported by industrial policies, more stringent audits and restrictions are required. Improving the regulatory system would stabilize the pace of Chinese firms' international expansion and improve the implementation of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.The first contribution of this paper is to link the industrial upgrading led by the Chinese government with the cross-border M&As activities of Chinese firms. We document features of Chinese firms' cross-border M&As such as high premium rates and low completion rates and connect these features to the implementation of national industrial policies. This explanation deepens our understanding of the motivations and determinants of Chinese firms' cross-border M&As activities. Second, we point out that cross-border M&As have gradually become an important mechanism for the implementation of China's industrial policies. We provide evidence that industrial policies play a role in allocating bank loans and government subsidies. It should be noted that we do not assess how much such cross-border M&As contribute to industrial and technological upgrading or whether they improve the performance of Chinese firms in the long run. A detailed analysis of these issues could be a subject of future research.
The share of Chinese firms in global cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions(M&As) transactions is increasing. In 2016, China surpassed the U.S. to become the world's largest cross-border purchaser. However, Chinese firms' cross-border M&As also have problems with relatively high M&As premium rates but low completion rates. We argue that this is related to China's industrial policies.The five-year plans for industrial policies are a salient feature of China's economic development. These policies support the development of certain industries to promote industrial upgrading and economic development. We argue that there are several links between China's industrial policies and Chinese firms' cross-border M&As. First, cross-border M&As are a way for Chinese firms to respond to industrial policies and achieve industrial upgrading in the short run. Second, industrial policies guide firms to invest and innovate and play an important role in guiding resource allocation. In particular, financial systems such as banks often give priority to these industries when providing credit support. Third, because Chinese firms supported by industrial policies are mainly implementing national strategies and policies, resistance from host countries are stronger, resulting in lower M&As completion rates despite Chinese firms' higher bids.We empirically examine these conjectures on the relationship between Chinese industrial policies and cross-border M&A activities. We use cross-border M&As data for Chinese firms from the Thomson One M&As transaction database for the eighth to twelfth five-year plans(1991-2015). We divide firms into two groups depending on whether their industries are supported by the contemporary five-year plan and study the impact of such industrial policies on the cross-border M&As premium rates and completion rates.Our results show that, compared with firms whose industries are not supported by the contemporary five-year plan, supported firms pay a higher merger premium of 8-10%. However, the average completion rate of supported firms is about 36% lower. Furthermore, supported firms are more likely to obtain debt financing such as bank loans and their interest expenses are lower. These firms also receive more government subsidies. Our findings suggest that even if cross-border M&As are effective in promoting China's overall industrial and technological upgrading, Chinese firms pay a high price. Therefore, for cross-border M&As transactions proposed by Chinese firms with high asset-liability ratios and those supported by industrial policies, more stringent audits and restrictions are required. Improving the regulatory system would stabilize the pace of Chinese firms' international expansion and improve the implementation of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.The first contribution of this paper is to link the industrial upgrading led by the Chinese government with the cross-border M&As activities of Chinese firms. We document features of Chinese firms' cross-border M&As such as high premium rates and low completion rates and connect these features to the implementation of national industrial policies. This explanation deepens our understanding of the motivations and determinants of Chinese firms' cross-border M&As activities. Second, we point out that cross-border M&As have gradually become an important mechanism for the implementation of China's industrial policies. We provide evidence that industrial policies play a role in allocating bank loans and government subsidies. It should be noted that we do not assess how much such cross-border M&As contribute to industrial and technological upgrading or whether they improve the performance of Chinese firms in the long run. A detailed analysis of these issues could be a subject of future research.
引文
顾露露、Robert Reed,2011:《中国企业海外并购失败了吗?》,《经济研究》第7期。
胡彦宇、吴之雄,2011:《中国企业海外并购影响因素研究——基于新制度经济学视角的经验分析》,《财经研究》第8期。
刘莉亚、何彦淋、杨金强,2016:《生产率与企业并购:基于中国宏观层面的分析》,《经济研究》第3期。
刘青、陶攀、洪俊杰,2017:《中国海外并购的动因研究——基于广延边际与集约边际的视角》,《经济研究》第1期。
陆正飞、韩非池,2013:《宏观经济政策如何影响公司现金持有的经济效应?——基于产品市场和资本市场两重角度的研究》,《管理世界》第6期。
邵新建、巫和懋、肖立晟、杨骏、薛熠,2012:《中国企业跨国并购的战略目标与经营绩效:基于A股市场的评价》,《世界经济》第5期。
王永钦、杜巨澜、王凯,2014:《中国对外直接投资区位选择的决定因素:制度、税负和资源禀赋》,《经济研究》第12期。
余鹏翼、王满四,2014:《国内上市公司跨国并购绩效影响因素的实证研究》,《会计研究》第3期。
张建红、卫新江、海柯、艾伯斯,2010:《决定中国企业海外收购成败的因素分析》,《管理世界》第3期。
张建红、周朝鸿,2010:《中国企业走出去的制度障碍研究》,《经济研究》第6期。
钟宁桦、刘志阔、何嘉鑫、苏楚林,2016:《我国企业债务的结构性问题》,《经济研究》第7期。
Bris,A.,and C.Cabolis,2008,“The Value of Investor Protection:Firm Evidence from Cross-border Mergers”,Review of Financial Studies,21(2),605—648.
Chen,D.,O.Z.Li,and F.Xin,2017,“Five-year Plans,China Finance and Their Consequences”,China Journal of Accounting Research,10(3),189—226.
Crowley,M.A.,and H.Song,2015,“Policy Shocks and Stock Market Returns:Evidence from Chinese Solar Panels”,Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Dikova,D.,P.R.Sahib,and A.Van Witteloostuijn,2010,“Cross-border Acquisition Abandonment and Completion:The Effect of Institutional Differences and Organizational Learning in the International Business Service Industry,1981—2001”,Journal of International Business Studies,41(2),223—245.
Finkelstein,S.,and J.Haleblian,2002,“Understanding Acquisition Performance:The Role of Transfer Effects”,Organization Science,13(1),36—47.
Gaffney,N.T.,2012,“An Analysis of the Cross-border Acquisition Behavior of Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises”,The University of Memphis.
King,D.R.,D.R.Dalton,C.M.Daily,and J.G.Covin,2004,“Meta-analyses of Post-acquisition Performance:Indications of Unidentified Moderators”,Strategic Management Journal,25(2),187—200.
Kogut,B.,and H.Singh,1988,“The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode”,Journal of International Business Studies,19(3),411—432.
Skaife,H.A.,and D.D.Wangerin,2013,“Target Financial Reporting Quality and M&A Deals that Go Bust”,Contemporary Accounting Research,30(2),719—749.
Tuch,C.,and N.O'Sullivan,2007,“The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance:A Review of the Evidence”,International Journal of Management Reviews,9(2),141—170.
Weitzel,U.,and S.Berns,2006,“Cross-border Takeovers,Corruption,and Related Aspects of Governance”,Journal of International Business Studies,37(6),786—806.
Zhang,J.,C.Zhou,and H.Ebbers,2011,“Completion of Chinese Overseas Acquisitions:Institutional Perspectives and Evidence”,International Business Review,20(2),226—238.
① 参见中华人民共和国商务部官网,“商务部合作司负责人谈2016年我国对外投资合作情况”,http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aa/201701/20170102504436.shtml。
② 参见搜狐网,“热点丨央企巨亏,震惊中央(笨鸟投资)”,http://mt.sohu.com/20170214/n480720689.shtml。
③ 参见中国经济网,“中国化工收购先正达取得关键进展”,http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2017/04-07/8193340.shtml。
(1)跨境并购中的分手费与反向分手费是指双方在达成协议后,因为当事方自身融资、决策等失败,或未获相关政府部门、投资审批及反垄断部门的审批等各种因素,从而造成并购失败所需承担的经济损失,触发条件可由双方在合同签订时自行约定。卖方向买方支付的称为分手费,买方向卖方支付的称为反向分手费。
(2)参见人民网,“中国企业海外并购持续升温,交易完成率远低于发达国家”,http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/0924/c1004-27630860.html。
(3)参见:“外媒:几乎每家进行海外收购的中企都成了‘债王’”,https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1571255194137490&wfr=spider&for=pc。总债务除以EBITDA(即息税、折旧和摊销前利润)是一个常用的衡量负债率的指标,这个指标直观地说明一个企业的总债务需要用多少年的息税前利润才能还清。
(4)参见:英国《金融时报》,“习近平:中国10年内对外投资将增长三倍”,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001059035。
(5)另外,笔者在对某高新区的调研中发现,各级政府部门会成立数额较大的专项基金,直接补贴属于国家产业政策支持行业的企业。
(6)参见国家发改委官网:http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/wzly/jwtz/jwtzzl/200507/t20050714_670533.html。
(7)波士顿咨询,2015:《迎接中国企业海外并购新时代》,下载地址:http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Gearing-Up-New-Era-China-Outbound-MandA-Sep-2015-CHN_tcm55-127562.pdf。
(8)参见中华人民共和国商务部官网,“2016年中国企业海外并购大幅增长的主要原因及特点”,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201606/20160601332292.shtml。
(9)鉴于篇幅有限,正文中未展示各次“五年规划”覆盖的行业名称,读者若有兴趣请与作者邮件联系。
(10)霍夫斯泰德(Hofstede)网站,参见https://www.hofstede-insights.com/。
(11)由于是否为OECD国家虚拟变量与这些国家层面特征变量存在较为严重的共线性问题,加上本文研究样本数量相对较少,所以不把变量OECD与这些国家层面特征变量放在同一个回归方程里。换个角度来说,是否为OECD国家虚拟变量是一个国家的综合特征,本身就包含了政治、经济和文化等特征等基本信息。
(12)因两个变量的异常值较多,本文对它们分别做了取前后5%并删除的处理。考虑到本文的核心解释变量是SIC二位码行业层面的dummy,因此在剔除异常值时,本文分SIC二位码行业剔除各行业前后5%的异常值。值得一提的是,计算并购溢价率时,只有被并购方为上市公司样本才有收盘价的信息,因此其样本数要少于并购完成率。
(13)参照Finkelstein & Haleblian (2002)的做法。
(14)本文使用霍夫斯泰德文化维度理论(Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory)的六个文化维度数据计算得到,这六个维度分别为:权力距离(power distance),个人主义与集体主义(individualism versus collectivism),男性化与女性化(masculinity versus femininity),不确定性的规避(uncertainty avoidance),长期取向与短期取向(long-term versus short-term),自身放纵与约束(indulgence versus restraint)。参照Kogut & Singh(1988)的做法,本文将六个文化维度的得分数据转换成一个统一的指数,即文化差异(CD):CDj=∑[(Iij-IiC)2/Vi]/6。其中,CDj是被并购企业所在国j与中国的文化差异,Iij是国家j在文化维度i上的得分,IiC是中国在文化维度i上的得分,Vi表示各国在文化维度i上得分的方差。CDj越大,表示中国与国家j的文化差异越大。
(15)根据审稿人的建议,本文对这几个变量也分别做了取前后5%并删除的处理。
(16)需要指出的是,这里统计的只是完成率,严格说来,并不是并购的“成功率”。一项并购是否成功,还需看并购后两个公司能否实现整合和协同,需要更细致的考察。
(17)参见“Robin Bew:海外并购公关先行”,《中国经营报》2013年1月7日版,http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20130105/093614190605.shtml。
(18)在美国SIC产业分类中,二位码行业处于10—14的行业为资源类行业,本文将这些样本剔除。
(19)近期的一些官方公告和媒体新闻都对此表示了忧虑。比如,2017年6月底,国家审计署发布了对20家央企2015年度财务收支审计结果公告。在被抽查的20家央企的155项境外业务中,竟有61项形成了风险,合计384.91亿元。以中国华能集团公司为例,2011年4月至2013年6月,华能集团所属境外企业以103.27亿元实施的收购项目经营亏损。而在审计署审计的这20家央企中,像华能集团这样投资项目出现亏损的还有不少。
(20)根据全国政协委员、审计署原副审计长董大胜在2017年两会前召开的“完善国有资产监管体制研讨会”会上披露,央企境外资产总额已超过4.3万亿元,而审计机关对这4.3万亿元境外资产“基本上没有进行审计”。
(21)最近在中国发展高层论坛2017年年会上,央行副行长潘功胜提到,“在中国资本走出去的过程中,不乏一些打着买足球俱乐部旗号的企业借机转移资产,尤其是那些资产负债率较高的企业”。
胡彦宇、吴之雄,2011:《中国企业海外并购影响因素研究——基于新制度经济学视角的经验分析》,《财经研究》第8期。
刘莉亚、何彦淋、杨金强,2016:《生产率与企业并购:基于中国宏观层面的分析》,《经济研究》第3期。
刘青、陶攀、洪俊杰,2017:《中国海外并购的动因研究——基于广延边际与集约边际的视角》,《经济研究》第1期。
陆正飞、韩非池,2013:《宏观经济政策如何影响公司现金持有的经济效应?——基于产品市场和资本市场两重角度的研究》,《管理世界》第6期。
邵新建、巫和懋、肖立晟、杨骏、薛熠,2012:《中国企业跨国并购的战略目标与经营绩效:基于A股市场的评价》,《世界经济》第5期。
王永钦、杜巨澜、王凯,2014:《中国对外直接投资区位选择的决定因素:制度、税负和资源禀赋》,《经济研究》第12期。
余鹏翼、王满四,2014:《国内上市公司跨国并购绩效影响因素的实证研究》,《会计研究》第3期。
张建红、卫新江、海柯、艾伯斯,2010:《决定中国企业海外收购成败的因素分析》,《管理世界》第3期。
张建红、周朝鸿,2010:《中国企业走出去的制度障碍研究》,《经济研究》第6期。
钟宁桦、刘志阔、何嘉鑫、苏楚林,2016:《我国企业债务的结构性问题》,《经济研究》第7期。
Bris,A.,and C.Cabolis,2008,“The Value of Investor Protection:Firm Evidence from Cross-border Mergers”,Review of Financial Studies,21(2),605—648.
Chen,D.,O.Z.Li,and F.Xin,2017,“Five-year Plans,China Finance and Their Consequences”,China Journal of Accounting Research,10(3),189—226.
Crowley,M.A.,and H.Song,2015,“Policy Shocks and Stock Market Returns:Evidence from Chinese Solar Panels”,Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Dikova,D.,P.R.Sahib,and A.Van Witteloostuijn,2010,“Cross-border Acquisition Abandonment and Completion:The Effect of Institutional Differences and Organizational Learning in the International Business Service Industry,1981—2001”,Journal of International Business Studies,41(2),223—245.
Finkelstein,S.,and J.Haleblian,2002,“Understanding Acquisition Performance:The Role of Transfer Effects”,Organization Science,13(1),36—47.
Gaffney,N.T.,2012,“An Analysis of the Cross-border Acquisition Behavior of Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises”,The University of Memphis.
King,D.R.,D.R.Dalton,C.M.Daily,and J.G.Covin,2004,“Meta-analyses of Post-acquisition Performance:Indications of Unidentified Moderators”,Strategic Management Journal,25(2),187—200.
Kogut,B.,and H.Singh,1988,“The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode”,Journal of International Business Studies,19(3),411—432.
Skaife,H.A.,and D.D.Wangerin,2013,“Target Financial Reporting Quality and M&A Deals that Go Bust”,Contemporary Accounting Research,30(2),719—749.
Tuch,C.,and N.O'Sullivan,2007,“The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance:A Review of the Evidence”,International Journal of Management Reviews,9(2),141—170.
Weitzel,U.,and S.Berns,2006,“Cross-border Takeovers,Corruption,and Related Aspects of Governance”,Journal of International Business Studies,37(6),786—806.
Zhang,J.,C.Zhou,and H.Ebbers,2011,“Completion of Chinese Overseas Acquisitions:Institutional Perspectives and Evidence”,International Business Review,20(2),226—238.
① 参见中华人民共和国商务部官网,“商务部合作司负责人谈2016年我国对外投资合作情况”,http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aa/201701/20170102504436.shtml。
② 参见搜狐网,“热点丨央企巨亏,震惊中央(笨鸟投资)”,http://mt.sohu.com/20170214/n480720689.shtml。
③ 参见中国经济网,“中国化工收购先正达取得关键进展”,http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2017/04-07/8193340.shtml。
(1)跨境并购中的分手费与反向分手费是指双方在达成协议后,因为当事方自身融资、决策等失败,或未获相关政府部门、投资审批及反垄断部门的审批等各种因素,从而造成并购失败所需承担的经济损失,触发条件可由双方在合同签订时自行约定。卖方向买方支付的称为分手费,买方向卖方支付的称为反向分手费。
(2)参见人民网,“中国企业海外并购持续升温,交易完成率远低于发达国家”,http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/0924/c1004-27630860.html。
(3)参见:“外媒:几乎每家进行海外收购的中企都成了‘债王’”,https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1571255194137490&wfr=spider&for=pc。总债务除以EBITDA(即息税、折旧和摊销前利润)是一个常用的衡量负债率的指标,这个指标直观地说明一个企业的总债务需要用多少年的息税前利润才能还清。
(4)参见:英国《金融时报》,“习近平:中国10年内对外投资将增长三倍”,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001059035。
(5)另外,笔者在对某高新区的调研中发现,各级政府部门会成立数额较大的专项基金,直接补贴属于国家产业政策支持行业的企业。
(6)参见国家发改委官网:http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/wzly/jwtz/jwtzzl/200507/t20050714_670533.html。
(7)波士顿咨询,2015:《迎接中国企业海外并购新时代》,下载地址:http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Gearing-Up-New-Era-China-Outbound-MandA-Sep-2015-CHN_tcm55-127562.pdf。
(8)参见中华人民共和国商务部官网,“2016年中国企业海外并购大幅增长的主要原因及特点”,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201606/20160601332292.shtml。
(9)鉴于篇幅有限,正文中未展示各次“五年规划”覆盖的行业名称,读者若有兴趣请与作者邮件联系。
(10)霍夫斯泰德(Hofstede)网站,参见https://www.hofstede-insights.com/。
(11)由于是否为OECD国家虚拟变量与这些国家层面特征变量存在较为严重的共线性问题,加上本文研究样本数量相对较少,所以不把变量OECD与这些国家层面特征变量放在同一个回归方程里。换个角度来说,是否为OECD国家虚拟变量是一个国家的综合特征,本身就包含了政治、经济和文化等特征等基本信息。
(12)因两个变量的异常值较多,本文对它们分别做了取前后5%并删除的处理。考虑到本文的核心解释变量是SIC二位码行业层面的dummy,因此在剔除异常值时,本文分SIC二位码行业剔除各行业前后5%的异常值。值得一提的是,计算并购溢价率时,只有被并购方为上市公司样本才有收盘价的信息,因此其样本数要少于并购完成率。
(13)参照Finkelstein & Haleblian (2002)的做法。
(14)本文使用霍夫斯泰德文化维度理论(Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory)的六个文化维度数据计算得到,这六个维度分别为:权力距离(power distance),个人主义与集体主义(individualism versus collectivism),男性化与女性化(masculinity versus femininity),不确定性的规避(uncertainty avoidance),长期取向与短期取向(long-term versus short-term),自身放纵与约束(indulgence versus restraint)。参照Kogut & Singh(1988)的做法,本文将六个文化维度的得分数据转换成一个统一的指数,即文化差异(CD):CDj=∑[(Iij-IiC)2/Vi]/6。其中,CDj是被并购企业所在国j与中国的文化差异,Iij是国家j在文化维度i上的得分,IiC是中国在文化维度i上的得分,Vi表示各国在文化维度i上得分的方差。CDj越大,表示中国与国家j的文化差异越大。
(15)根据审稿人的建议,本文对这几个变量也分别做了取前后5%并删除的处理。
(16)需要指出的是,这里统计的只是完成率,严格说来,并不是并购的“成功率”。一项并购是否成功,还需看并购后两个公司能否实现整合和协同,需要更细致的考察。
(17)参见“Robin Bew:海外并购公关先行”,《中国经营报》2013年1月7日版,http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20130105/093614190605.shtml。
(18)在美国SIC产业分类中,二位码行业处于10—14的行业为资源类行业,本文将这些样本剔除。
(19)近期的一些官方公告和媒体新闻都对此表示了忧虑。比如,2017年6月底,国家审计署发布了对20家央企2015年度财务收支审计结果公告。在被抽查的20家央企的155项境外业务中,竟有61项形成了风险,合计384.91亿元。以中国华能集团公司为例,2011年4月至2013年6月,华能集团所属境外企业以103.27亿元实施的收购项目经营亏损。而在审计署审计的这20家央企中,像华能集团这样投资项目出现亏损的还有不少。
(20)根据全国政协委员、审计署原副审计长董大胜在2017年两会前召开的“完善国有资产监管体制研讨会”会上披露,央企境外资产总额已超过4.3万亿元,而审计机关对这4.3万亿元境外资产“基本上没有进行审计”。
(21)最近在中国发展高层论坛2017年年会上,央行副行长潘功胜提到,“在中国资本走出去的过程中,不乏一些打着买足球俱乐部旗号的企业借机转移资产,尤其是那些资产负债率较高的企业”。