印度洋安全治理:现状、挑战与发展路径
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摘要
印度洋地区的安全状况攸关全球繁荣与稳定。提升印度洋安全治理水平、有效应对各种安全风险挑战,已成为国际社会的共识和努力方向。特别是进入21世纪以来,印度洋安全治理机制加速演进,在参与主体、治理规则、涉及领域等方面都有所发展,逐步形成多层次、多领域、多主体的治理体系。不过,现有治理体系仍面临缺乏主导性机制、效率有待提升、受到地缘政治因素干扰等难题。未来,国际社会应坚持开放、包容、务实、可持续的治理理念,在安全认知、机制建设、公共产品供给等方面加强沟通合作,不断提升印度洋安全治理水平,营造和平、合作、共赢的印度洋。
In view of its unique geographical advantages, dense international shipping routes and abundant energy resources, the security situation of the Indian Ocean region is significantly relevant to the global peace, stability and prosperity. Thus, the international community has reached consensus on and moved forward towards improving security governance in the Indian Ocean and effectively addressing various security risks and challenges. In particular, since the beginning of the 21 st century, the Indian Ocean security governance mechanism has been evolving at an accelerated pace. It has developed in terms of the participants, governance rules and related fields, and gradually boasted of a multi-layered, multi-domain and multi-agent governance system. However, the existing governance system still faces difficulties such as lack of dominant mechanism, the need to improve efficiency, and the negative over-spilling effects of geopolitical factors. In the future, the international community should adhere to the concept of open, inclusive, pragmatic and sustainable governance, strengthen communication and cooperation in security perception, mechanism building and supply of public goods, and continuously improve security governance to build a peaceful, cooperative and win-win Indian Ocean.
In view of its unique geographical advantages, dense international shipping routes and abundant energy resources, the security situation of the Indian Ocean region is significantly relevant to the global peace, stability and prosperity. Thus, the international community has reached consensus on and moved forward towards improving security governance in the Indian Ocean and effectively addressing various security risks and challenges. In particular, since the beginning of the 21 st century, the Indian Ocean security governance mechanism has been evolving at an accelerated pace. It has developed in terms of the participants, governance rules and related fields, and gradually boasted of a multi-layered, multi-domain and multi-agent governance system. However, the existing governance system still faces difficulties such as lack of dominant mechanism, the need to improve efficiency, and the negative over-spilling effects of geopolitical factors. In the future, the international community should adhere to the concept of open, inclusive, pragmatic and sustainable governance, strengthen communication and cooperation in security perception, mechanism building and supply of public goods, and continuously improve security governance to build a peaceful, cooperative and win-win Indian Ocean.
引文
[1]Robert D Kaplan,“Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century:Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,”Foreign Affairs,No.2,March/April 2009,p.13.
[2]Anthony H.Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan,The Indian Ocean:A Strategic Net Assessment,Center for Strategic&International Studies,August,2014,pp.6-7.
[3]Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research,University of Heidelberg,Conflict Barometer 2017,https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en.(上网时间:2018年12月4日)
[1]Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin,Our Western Front:Australia and the Indian Ocean,Australian Strategic Policy Institute,March 2010,p.24.
[2]2012年12月30日,阿什利·泰利斯来华就印度洋问题进行调研,在清华-卡内基全球政策中心的座谈会上作此表述。
[1]“习近平:加强合作推动全球治理体系变革共同促进人类和平与发展崇高事业”,新华网,2016年9月28日,http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-09/28/c_1119641652.htm。(上网时间:2018年10月26日)
[2]国家发展和改革委员会、国家海洋局:《“一带一路”建设海上合作设想》,新华网,2017年6月20日,http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-06/20/c_1121176798.htm。(上网时间:2018年12月4日)
[1]The Editorial Board,“Sri Lanka Turmoil Points to China’s Increasing Role,”Financial Times,November 15,2018.
[2]U.S.National Intelligence Council,Global Trends 2030:Alternative Worlds,2012,p.viii.
[1]Integrated Headquarters,Ministry of Defence(Navy),Ensuring Secure Seas:Indian Maritime Security Strategy,2015,pp.37-38,155.
[2]Associated Press,“Amid US Sanctions,Iran Threatens Again to Close Key Strait,”The Washington Post,December 4,2018.
[3]Anthony H.Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan,The Indian Ocean:A Strategic Net Assessment,pp.14,viii.
[4]Dennis Rumley,The Indian Ocean Region:Security,Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century,Melbourne:Australia India Institute,2013,http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/publications/indianocean-securiyt-and-stability.(上网时间:2018年10月26日)
[5]中国现代国际关系研究院海上通道安全课题组:《海上通道安全与国际合作》,时事出版社,2005年,第193页。
[1]Robert D Kaplan,“Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century:Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,”p.13.
[2]David Michel et al.,Indian Ocean Rising:Maritime Security and Policy Challenges,The Stimson Center,July 2012,p.26.
[3]“Indian Ocean’s Growing Vulnerability to Natural Disasters Calls for More Investment in Preparedness,”the website of IFRC,September 26,2017,https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/press-release/indian-oceans-growing-vulnerability-natural-disasters-calls-investment-preparedness/.(上网时间:2018年11月8日)
[1]Integrated Headquarters,Ministry of Defence(Navy),Ensuring Secure Seas:Indian Maritime Security Strategy,p.43.
[2]Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,“Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,Fact Sheet,”January 20,2017,https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2017/266864.htm.(上网时间:2018年10月8日)
[1]“Twenty-first Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,Final Communique,”July 13,2018,http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2018/07/Communique-ofthe-CGPCS-21st-Plenary-Session.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[2]该基金2010年1月成立,主要是为在索马里海域进行反海盗活动筹集资金。2012年12月,该基金转交给联合国开发计划署多伙伴信托基金办公室管理。参见“Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,”http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/APF00。(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[3]“UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme,”https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[4]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,Global Maritime Crime Programme Annual Report 2017,January 2018,pp.10-13;“Maritime Crime Programme-Indian Ocean,”https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/Indian-Ocean.html.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[1]《印度洋特设委员会的报告》,2017年7月10日,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1293638/files/A_72_29-ZH.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]U.S.Naval Forces Central Command,“Combined Maritime Forces,”http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/.(上网时间:2018年10月25日)
[3]Office of the Spokesperson,“U.S.Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region,”August 4,2018,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/284927.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[1]EU NAVFOR Somalia,“Mission,”https://eunavfor.eu/mission/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]“The Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa,”https://eunavfor.eu/the-maritime-securitycentre-horn-of-africa/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[3]“Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa:3124th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,”Brussels,November 14,2011,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[4]C.Raja Mohan,“Modi and the Indian Ocean:Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,”June18,2015,https://amti.csis.org/modi-and-the-indian-ocean-restoring-indias-sphere-of-influence/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[5]“Remarks by External Affairs Minister at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference,”August 27,2018,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statesments.htm?dtl/30327/Remarks+by+External+Affairs+Minister+at+the+3rd+Indian+Ocean+Conference+Vietnam+August+27+2018.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]“First Meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs,”March 21,2017,http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28193/First_meeting_of_the_BIMSTEC_National_Security_Chiefs_March_21_2017;“The Second Meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs,”March 29,2018,https://bimstec.org/?event=the-second-meeting-of-the-bimstec-national-security-chiefs.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[2]“Regional Fusion&Law Enforcement Center for Safety&Security at Sea,”http://www.rappicc.sc/aboutus.html;“REFLECS3-Fighting Transnational Organized Crime,”March 20,2014,http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000845.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[3]参见印度洋海军论坛官方网站及2018年轮值主席国伊朗关于印度洋海军论坛的官方网站:http://www.ions.global/;https://www.ionsirannavy.ir/cnf/about?goals。(上网时间:2018年12月20日)
[1]资料来源为加勒对话官网:http://galledialogue.lk/.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]International Maritime Organization,“Djibouti Code of Conduct,”http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[2]该机构官网:http://www.iomou.org/historymain.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]刘思伟:“印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁与重构”,《国际安全研究》2017年第5期,第89-90页。
[2]Dinakar Peri,“India to Host First BIMSTEC War Games in September,”The Hindu,June11,2018.
[3]Constanino Xavier,Bridging the Bay of Bengal:Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC,Carnegie India,February 22,2018,p.12.
[4]The White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,December2017,p.45.
[1]Alice Welles,“Remarks at the Third Indian Ocean Conference,”August 28,2018,https://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2018/285557.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]Robert Blake,“The Rajapaksas,the SLPP and the Unfolding Indo-Pacific Great Game,”Daily Mirror,December 7,2018.
[3]Alice G.Wells,“U.S.Policy in the Indian Ocean Region,”August 20,2018,https://fpc.state.gov/08/285237.htm;Thomas L.Vajda,“Remarks at the 18th Indian Ocean Rim Association(IORA)Council of Ministers Meeting,”November 2,2018,https://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2018/287094.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]“Remarks by External Affairs Minister at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference,”August 27,2018.
[1]Eleanor Albert,“Competition in the Indian Ocean,”Council on Foreign Relations,May 19,2016,https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/competition-indian-ocean.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]Michael McDevitt,Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean:The Past as Prologue,Center for Naval Analyses,March 2018,p.5.
[2]David Brewster,Between Giants:The Sino-Indian Cold War in the Indian Ocean,Institut Francais Des Relations Internationales,December 2018.
[3]“Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,”June 1,2018,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]Shiv Shankar Menon,“Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy,”Maritime Affairs,Vol.5,No.2,2009,p.20.
[2]Anthony H.Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan,The Indian Ocean:A Strategic Net Assessment,Center for Strategic&International Studies,August,2014,pp.6-7.
[3]Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research,University of Heidelberg,Conflict Barometer 2017,https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en.(上网时间:2018年12月4日)
[1]Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin,Our Western Front:Australia and the Indian Ocean,Australian Strategic Policy Institute,March 2010,p.24.
[2]2012年12月30日,阿什利·泰利斯来华就印度洋问题进行调研,在清华-卡内基全球政策中心的座谈会上作此表述。
[1]“习近平:加强合作推动全球治理体系变革共同促进人类和平与发展崇高事业”,新华网,2016年9月28日,http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-09/28/c_1119641652.htm。(上网时间:2018年10月26日)
[2]国家发展和改革委员会、国家海洋局:《“一带一路”建设海上合作设想》,新华网,2017年6月20日,http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-06/20/c_1121176798.htm。(上网时间:2018年12月4日)
[1]The Editorial Board,“Sri Lanka Turmoil Points to China’s Increasing Role,”Financial Times,November 15,2018.
[2]U.S.National Intelligence Council,Global Trends 2030:Alternative Worlds,2012,p.viii.
[1]Integrated Headquarters,Ministry of Defence(Navy),Ensuring Secure Seas:Indian Maritime Security Strategy,2015,pp.37-38,155.
[2]Associated Press,“Amid US Sanctions,Iran Threatens Again to Close Key Strait,”The Washington Post,December 4,2018.
[3]Anthony H.Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan,The Indian Ocean:A Strategic Net Assessment,pp.14,viii.
[4]Dennis Rumley,The Indian Ocean Region:Security,Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century,Melbourne:Australia India Institute,2013,http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/publications/indianocean-securiyt-and-stability.(上网时间:2018年10月26日)
[5]中国现代国际关系研究院海上通道安全课题组:《海上通道安全与国际合作》,时事出版社,2005年,第193页。
[1]Robert D Kaplan,“Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century:Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,”p.13.
[2]David Michel et al.,Indian Ocean Rising:Maritime Security and Policy Challenges,The Stimson Center,July 2012,p.26.
[3]“Indian Ocean’s Growing Vulnerability to Natural Disasters Calls for More Investment in Preparedness,”the website of IFRC,September 26,2017,https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/press-release/indian-oceans-growing-vulnerability-natural-disasters-calls-investment-preparedness/.(上网时间:2018年11月8日)
[1]Integrated Headquarters,Ministry of Defence(Navy),Ensuring Secure Seas:Indian Maritime Security Strategy,p.43.
[2]Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,“Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,Fact Sheet,”January 20,2017,https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2017/266864.htm.(上网时间:2018年10月8日)
[1]“Twenty-first Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,Final Communique,”July 13,2018,http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2018/07/Communique-ofthe-CGPCS-21st-Plenary-Session.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[2]该基金2010年1月成立,主要是为在索马里海域进行反海盗活动筹集资金。2012年12月,该基金转交给联合国开发计划署多伙伴信托基金办公室管理。参见“Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,”http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/APF00。(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[3]“UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme,”https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[4]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,Global Maritime Crime Programme Annual Report 2017,January 2018,pp.10-13;“Maritime Crime Programme-Indian Ocean,”https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/Indian-Ocean.html.(上网时间:2018年11月6日)
[1]《印度洋特设委员会的报告》,2017年7月10日,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1293638/files/A_72_29-ZH.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]U.S.Naval Forces Central Command,“Combined Maritime Forces,”http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/.(上网时间:2018年10月25日)
[3]Office of the Spokesperson,“U.S.Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region,”August 4,2018,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/284927.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[1]EU NAVFOR Somalia,“Mission,”https://eunavfor.eu/mission/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]“The Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa,”https://eunavfor.eu/the-maritime-securitycentre-horn-of-africa/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[3]“Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa:3124th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,”Brussels,November 14,2011,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[4]C.Raja Mohan,“Modi and the Indian Ocean:Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,”June18,2015,https://amti.csis.org/modi-and-the-indian-ocean-restoring-indias-sphere-of-influence/.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[5]“Remarks by External Affairs Minister at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference,”August 27,2018,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statesments.htm?dtl/30327/Remarks+by+External+Affairs+Minister+at+the+3rd+Indian+Ocean+Conference+Vietnam+August+27+2018.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]“First Meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs,”March 21,2017,http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28193/First_meeting_of_the_BIMSTEC_National_Security_Chiefs_March_21_2017;“The Second Meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs,”March 29,2018,https://bimstec.org/?event=the-second-meeting-of-the-bimstec-national-security-chiefs.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[2]“Regional Fusion&Law Enforcement Center for Safety&Security at Sea,”http://www.rappicc.sc/aboutus.html;“REFLECS3-Fighting Transnational Organized Crime,”March 20,2014,http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000845.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[3]参见印度洋海军论坛官方网站及2018年轮值主席国伊朗关于印度洋海军论坛的官方网站:http://www.ions.global/;https://www.ionsirannavy.ir/cnf/about?goals。(上网时间:2018年12月20日)
[1]资料来源为加勒对话官网:http://galledialogue.lk/.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]International Maritime Organization,“Djibouti Code of Conduct,”http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[2]该机构官网:http://www.iomou.org/historymain.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]刘思伟:“印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁与重构”,《国际安全研究》2017年第5期,第89-90页。
[2]Dinakar Peri,“India to Host First BIMSTEC War Games in September,”The Hindu,June11,2018.
[3]Constanino Xavier,Bridging the Bay of Bengal:Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC,Carnegie India,February 22,2018,p.12.
[4]The White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,December2017,p.45.
[1]Alice Welles,“Remarks at the Third Indian Ocean Conference,”August 28,2018,https://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2018/285557.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月10日)
[2]Robert Blake,“The Rajapaksas,the SLPP and the Unfolding Indo-Pacific Great Game,”Daily Mirror,December 7,2018.
[3]Alice G.Wells,“U.S.Policy in the Indian Ocean Region,”August 20,2018,https://fpc.state.gov/08/285237.htm;Thomas L.Vajda,“Remarks at the 18th Indian Ocean Rim Association(IORA)Council of Ministers Meeting,”November 2,2018,https://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2018/287094.htm.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]“Remarks by External Affairs Minister at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference,”August 27,2018.
[1]Eleanor Albert,“Competition in the Indian Ocean,”Council on Foreign Relations,May 19,2016,https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/competition-indian-ocean.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]Michael McDevitt,Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean:The Past as Prologue,Center for Naval Analyses,March 2018,p.5.
[2]David Brewster,Between Giants:The Sino-Indian Cold War in the Indian Ocean,Institut Francais Des Relations Internationales,December 2018.
[3]“Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,”June 1,2018,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.(上网时间:2018年11月5日)
[1]Shiv Shankar Menon,“Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy,”Maritime Affairs,Vol.5,No.2,2009,p.20.