意识的统一性何以可能?
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摘要
"意识的统一性"是当代认知哲学和脑科学中一个颇有争议的论题,但不可否认它是理解意识现象的关键。随着认知神经科学的发展,尤其是对割裂脑病人的研究,发现了意识统一性的反例,对意识本质上具有一致性通道的主张产生了质疑。由于大脑模块间的知觉内容不一,且涉及不同模块性的视觉和触觉经验需要不同类型的表征内容,认知科学家赫尔利从副现象论对统一意识观点做了修正,试图通过意识的局部统一性建立物理主义框架下的意识统一性论题。然而,从认知哲学的视角看,无论是统一性论题的反例,还是副现象论的修正,都不足以驳倒意识的统一性论题,根本原因在于我们直觉上感觉意识是整体感知世界的,但这种直觉还缺乏确凿的经验证据支持。
It has been traditionally held that consciousness has unity access, but more and more scholars have questioned this view, because the visual sense has its own content, the tactile sense also has its own, and the pattern of multi-perception seems to have inconsistency. It seems that different modules of visual and tactile experience have different content. When experiences for multi-perceptual modularity are different, then the intentionality of the object is not the same. Epiphenomenalism has become more and more popular in cognitive science as the unity of consciousness came under growing criticism. So a "local"(rather than global) concept of unity will help to establish a thesis of unity of consciousness cohering with physicalism.
It has been traditionally held that consciousness has unity access, but more and more scholars have questioned this view, because the visual sense has its own content, the tactile sense also has its own, and the pattern of multi-perception seems to have inconsistency. It seems that different modules of visual and tactile experience have different content. When experiences for multi-perceptual modularity are different, then the intentionality of the object is not the same. Epiphenomenalism has become more and more popular in cognitive science as the unity of consciousness came under growing criticism. So a "local"(rather than global) concept of unity will help to establish a thesis of unity of consciousness cohering with physicalism.
引文
[1]Block,N.'Concepts of Consciousness'[A],Chalmers,D.J.(Ed)Philosophy of Mind[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002,206-208.
[2]魏屹东等.认知、模型与表征:一种基于认知哲学的探讨[M].北京:科学出版社,2016,267-270.
[3]Searle,J.Mind:A Brief Introduction[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004,137.
[4]Baars,B.J.'How Does a Serial,Integrated and Very Limited Stream of Consciousness Emerge from a Nervous System That is Mostly Unconscious,Distributed,and of Enormous Capacity?'[A].Bock,G.,Marsh,J.(Eds)CIBASymposium on Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness[C],London:Wiley,1993,282-290.
[5]Tim,B.The Unity of Consciousness[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2010,78.
[6]Tim,B.'The Unity of Consciousness:A Cartography'[A],Marraffa,M.,DeCaro,M.,Ferretti,F.(Eds)Cartographies of the Mind:Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection[C],Dordrecht:Springer,2007,201-210.
[7]Zalla,T.'The Cognitive Role of Phenomenal Consciousness'[A],Marraffa,M.,De Caro,M.,Ferretti,F.(Eds)Cartographies of the Mind:Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection[C],Dordrecht:Springer,2007,189-200.
[8]Damasio,A.R.'The Brain Binds Entities and Events by Multiregional Activation from Convergence Zones'[J].Neural Computation,1989,1(1):123-132.
[9]Crick,F.'Function of the Thalamic Reticular Complex:The Searchlight Hypothesis'[A],Kosslyn,S.M.,Andersen,R.A.(Eds)Frontiers in Cognitive Neuroscience[C],Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1992,366-372.
[10]Wilkes,K.V.'Is Consciousness Important?'[J].British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,1984,35(3):223-243.
[11]Rosenthal,D.M.'Two Concepts of Consciousness'[J].Philosophical Studies,1986,49(3):329-359.
[12]Gazzaniga,M.S.,Ivry,R.B.,Mangunden,G.R.认知神经科学:关于心智的生物学[M].周晓林、高定国等译,北京:中国轻工业出版社,2011,394-396.
[13]Sperry,R.W.,Gazzaniga,M.S.,Bogen,J.E.'Interhemispheric Relationships:The Neocortical C o m m i s s u r e s;S y n d r o m e s o f H e m i s p h e r e Disconnection'[A],Vinken,P.J.,Bruyn,G.W.(Eds)Handbook of Clinical Neurology[C],Vol.4.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1969,273-290.
[14]Frisby,J.P.Seeing[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1979,101.
[15]Bayne,T'The Unity of Consciousness'[EB/OL].https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/.2018-03-18.
[16]Jaegwon,K.Supereminence and Mind[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993,246.
[17]Hurley,S.L.'Action,the Unity of Consciousness,and Vehicle Externalism'[A],Cleeremans,A.(Ed)The Unity of Consciousness:Binding,Integration,and Dissociation[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,72-94.
(1)托马斯·内格尔(Thomas Nagel)将意识划分为P-意识(Phenomenal consciousness)和A-意识(Access consciousness)。P-意识即现象意识,其属性是经验属性,其状态也是经验状态,也就是说,若一种状态是P-意识的话,它有经验属性;一种状态具有经验属性是说“拥有它像什么样”的属性。例如,当我们看、听、嗅、味和感觉到痛时,我们就拥有P-意识。P-意识的经验属性既包括感觉、感受和知觉的属性,也包括思想、希望和情感的属性,它的一个重要特征是意向内容上的差异往往造成了这种意识的差异。此外,P-意识的不同通常产生了意向差异性。A-意识又称为存取意识,是一种推理意识,一种可访问意识,很容易与现象意识混为一谈。如果一种表征是A-意识,那么它是可以直接在推理中使用的,即直接使用“理性”来控制行动。
(1)麦科洛(Celeste McCollough Howard)1965年发现了一种颜色视觉的附随性后效现象。她先让观察者交替观察通过红色滤光片投射的黑-白垂直栅条和通过绿色滤光片投射的黑-白水平栅条,把这两个图形作为适应图形。若干分钟之后再呈现一个测验图形,这个测验图形一半是黑-白垂直栅条;另一半是黑-白水平栅条,这时观察者就把图形上所有的白垂直栅条看成是发绿的,把所有白水平栅条看成是发红的。这种现象就是麦科洛颜色后效应。
[2]魏屹东等.认知、模型与表征:一种基于认知哲学的探讨[M].北京:科学出版社,2016,267-270.
[3]Searle,J.Mind:A Brief Introduction[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004,137.
[4]Baars,B.J.'How Does a Serial,Integrated and Very Limited Stream of Consciousness Emerge from a Nervous System That is Mostly Unconscious,Distributed,and of Enormous Capacity?'[A].Bock,G.,Marsh,J.(Eds)CIBASymposium on Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness[C],London:Wiley,1993,282-290.
[5]Tim,B.The Unity of Consciousness[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2010,78.
[6]Tim,B.'The Unity of Consciousness:A Cartography'[A],Marraffa,M.,DeCaro,M.,Ferretti,F.(Eds)Cartographies of the Mind:Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection[C],Dordrecht:Springer,2007,201-210.
[7]Zalla,T.'The Cognitive Role of Phenomenal Consciousness'[A],Marraffa,M.,De Caro,M.,Ferretti,F.(Eds)Cartographies of the Mind:Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection[C],Dordrecht:Springer,2007,189-200.
[8]Damasio,A.R.'The Brain Binds Entities and Events by Multiregional Activation from Convergence Zones'[J].Neural Computation,1989,1(1):123-132.
[9]Crick,F.'Function of the Thalamic Reticular Complex:The Searchlight Hypothesis'[A],Kosslyn,S.M.,Andersen,R.A.(Eds)Frontiers in Cognitive Neuroscience[C],Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1992,366-372.
[10]Wilkes,K.V.'Is Consciousness Important?'[J].British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,1984,35(3):223-243.
[11]Rosenthal,D.M.'Two Concepts of Consciousness'[J].Philosophical Studies,1986,49(3):329-359.
[12]Gazzaniga,M.S.,Ivry,R.B.,Mangunden,G.R.认知神经科学:关于心智的生物学[M].周晓林、高定国等译,北京:中国轻工业出版社,2011,394-396.
[13]Sperry,R.W.,Gazzaniga,M.S.,Bogen,J.E.'Interhemispheric Relationships:The Neocortical C o m m i s s u r e s;S y n d r o m e s o f H e m i s p h e r e Disconnection'[A],Vinken,P.J.,Bruyn,G.W.(Eds)Handbook of Clinical Neurology[C],Vol.4.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1969,273-290.
[14]Frisby,J.P.Seeing[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1979,101.
[15]Bayne,T'The Unity of Consciousness'[EB/OL].https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/.2018-03-18.
[16]Jaegwon,K.Supereminence and Mind[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993,246.
[17]Hurley,S.L.'Action,the Unity of Consciousness,and Vehicle Externalism'[A],Cleeremans,A.(Ed)The Unity of Consciousness:Binding,Integration,and Dissociation[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,72-94.
(1)托马斯·内格尔(Thomas Nagel)将意识划分为P-意识(Phenomenal consciousness)和A-意识(Access consciousness)。P-意识即现象意识,其属性是经验属性,其状态也是经验状态,也就是说,若一种状态是P-意识的话,它有经验属性;一种状态具有经验属性是说“拥有它像什么样”的属性。例如,当我们看、听、嗅、味和感觉到痛时,我们就拥有P-意识。P-意识的经验属性既包括感觉、感受和知觉的属性,也包括思想、希望和情感的属性,它的一个重要特征是意向内容上的差异往往造成了这种意识的差异。此外,P-意识的不同通常产生了意向差异性。A-意识又称为存取意识,是一种推理意识,一种可访问意识,很容易与现象意识混为一谈。如果一种表征是A-意识,那么它是可以直接在推理中使用的,即直接使用“理性”来控制行动。
(1)麦科洛(Celeste McCollough Howard)1965年发现了一种颜色视觉的附随性后效现象。她先让观察者交替观察通过红色滤光片投射的黑-白垂直栅条和通过绿色滤光片投射的黑-白水平栅条,把这两个图形作为适应图形。若干分钟之后再呈现一个测验图形,这个测验图形一半是黑-白垂直栅条;另一半是黑-白水平栅条,这时观察者就把图形上所有的白垂直栅条看成是发绿的,把所有白水平栅条看成是发红的。这种现象就是麦科洛颜色后效应。