民营化、融资约束与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的证据
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摘要
本文研究国有企业民营化对企业创新的影响及其影响机制。利用中国工业企业数据库,以民营化企业为实验组、以国有企业为对照组进行双重差分检验,结果发现,国有企业民营化显著抑制了企业创新,而融资约束是抑制民营化企业创新的重要因素。进一步检验发现,融资约束对民营化企业创新的抑制作用主要存在于金融发展水平较低的地区,而在金融发展水平较高的地区,这种抑制作用并不明显。本文的研究结果从融资约束的角度拓展了民营化影响企业创新的相关研究,且从民营化的角度为金融市场如何影响企业创新提供了新的视角。此外,本文有助于澄清有关民营化的争议,为进一步深化混合所有制改革、加强金融对民营企业的支持以促进民营企业的创新和发展提供理论依据和政策参考。
This paper analyzes the impact of privatization on enterprise innovation in an attempt to clarify whether privatization can promote the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The privatization of SOEs,in theory,has both positive and negative effects on enterprise innovation. On the one hand,privatization reduces government intervention and the policy burden of SOEs. The goal of privatized enterprises is no longer to be subordinate to the government or officials,but to maximize the value of the enterprise. At the same time,privatization alleviates the agency problem of SOEs,thus raising the level of risk-taking and enthusiasm for innovation. On the other hand,innovation has a high risk and failure rate,requiring a large amount of capital to maintain long-term investment in innovation. After enterprises are transformed from state-owned to private,they are likely to suffer from credit discrimination. Therefore,after privatization,the resource advantage of a former SOE is weakened,its financing is limited,and thus its innovation activities are restricted.This paper tests whether privatization promotes or inhibits enterprise innovation, using non-listed companies in China's industrial enterprise database from 2005 to 2011 as sample. We use the difference indifferences (DID) method and take the enterprises privatized from former SOEs as the treatment group and SOEs as the control group. The results show that innovation in privatized enterprises decreases significantly. We further test whether financial constraints are an important mechanism inhibiting the innovation of privatized enterprises. The results show that innovation decreases significantly in privatized enterprises with higher financial constraints,while there is no significant change in innovation in those with lower financial constraints.This suggests that financial constraints are an important factor restricting the innovation of privatized enterprises.Finally,we find that financial constraints significantly impede innovation of privatized enterprises in regions with underdeveloped financial market,which is not apparent in regions with developed financial market.This paper makes three contributions. First,it enriches the literature on the impact of privatization on innovation from the perspective of financial constraints. Tan et al. (2015) and Zhong et al. (2016) use listed companies as samples to examine the impact of privatization on enterprise innovation,but do not reach a consistent conclusion. Importantly,both of the aforementioned papers ignore the impact of financial constraints on innovation. In this paper,non-listed companies that are more likely to be subject to financial constraints are used as the sample,and we find that financial constraints are a vital factor restraining the innovation of privatized enterprises. This paper thus expands the literature on the impact of privatization on innovation from the perspective of financial constraints.Second,this paper extends the literature on the influence of financial markets on innovation from the perspective of privatization. We find that the development of a regional financial market within a country can alleviate the adverse impact of financial constraints on the innovation of privatized enterprises.Third,this paper clarifies the controversy over privatization. The results imply that the privatization of SOEs does not necessarily succeed without a solution to the financial constraints on privatized enterprises and improvements in regional financial development to further alleviate this impediment to innovation of privatized enterprises.This paper has important policy implications. On November 1,2018,President Xi Jinping stressed the vital role of the private economy in China's economic development at the Private Enterprise Forum,and proposed to enhance financial support for private enterprises to solve the difficulties and costs of financing of private enterprises. Given the finding that the privatization of SOEs affects enterprise innovation,this paper proves the significance of alleviating the financial constraints on private enterprises and promoting the development of financial markets to promote innovation of private enterprises.
This paper analyzes the impact of privatization on enterprise innovation in an attempt to clarify whether privatization can promote the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The privatization of SOEs,in theory,has both positive and negative effects on enterprise innovation. On the one hand,privatization reduces government intervention and the policy burden of SOEs. The goal of privatized enterprises is no longer to be subordinate to the government or officials,but to maximize the value of the enterprise. At the same time,privatization alleviates the agency problem of SOEs,thus raising the level of risk-taking and enthusiasm for innovation. On the other hand,innovation has a high risk and failure rate,requiring a large amount of capital to maintain long-term investment in innovation. After enterprises are transformed from state-owned to private,they are likely to suffer from credit discrimination. Therefore,after privatization,the resource advantage of a former SOE is weakened,its financing is limited,and thus its innovation activities are restricted.This paper tests whether privatization promotes or inhibits enterprise innovation, using non-listed companies in China's industrial enterprise database from 2005 to 2011 as sample. We use the difference indifferences (DID) method and take the enterprises privatized from former SOEs as the treatment group and SOEs as the control group. The results show that innovation in privatized enterprises decreases significantly. We further test whether financial constraints are an important mechanism inhibiting the innovation of privatized enterprises. The results show that innovation decreases significantly in privatized enterprises with higher financial constraints,while there is no significant change in innovation in those with lower financial constraints.This suggests that financial constraints are an important factor restricting the innovation of privatized enterprises.Finally,we find that financial constraints significantly impede innovation of privatized enterprises in regions with underdeveloped financial market,which is not apparent in regions with developed financial market.This paper makes three contributions. First,it enriches the literature on the impact of privatization on innovation from the perspective of financial constraints. Tan et al. (2015) and Zhong et al. (2016) use listed companies as samples to examine the impact of privatization on enterprise innovation,but do not reach a consistent conclusion. Importantly,both of the aforementioned papers ignore the impact of financial constraints on innovation. In this paper,non-listed companies that are more likely to be subject to financial constraints are used as the sample,and we find that financial constraints are a vital factor restraining the innovation of privatized enterprises. This paper thus expands the literature on the impact of privatization on innovation from the perspective of financial constraints.Second,this paper extends the literature on the influence of financial markets on innovation from the perspective of privatization. We find that the development of a regional financial market within a country can alleviate the adverse impact of financial constraints on the innovation of privatized enterprises.Third,this paper clarifies the controversy over privatization. The results imply that the privatization of SOEs does not necessarily succeed without a solution to the financial constraints on privatized enterprises and improvements in regional financial development to further alleviate this impediment to innovation of privatized enterprises.This paper has important policy implications. On November 1,2018,President Xi Jinping stressed the vital role of the private economy in China's economic development at the Private Enterprise Forum,and proposed to enhance financial support for private enterprises to solve the difficulties and costs of financing of private enterprises. Given the finding that the privatization of SOEs affects enterprise innovation,this paper proves the significance of alleviating the financial constraints on private enterprises and promoting the development of financial markets to promote innovation of private enterprises.
引文
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1此处数据是匹配后数据,具体匹配方法在匹配检验中阐述。
1我们确实需要更加直观地表示信贷优势和政府补贴的变动。但是,工业企业数据库中没有政府补贴这个变量,无法衡量民营化前后政府补贴的变化。同时,工业企业数据库也没有具体的贷款变量,如短期贷款和长期贷款,不过,工业企业数据库中有总资产、所有者权益和利息支出3个指标,我们采用总资产减去所有者权益的方法计算出负债总额,同时用利息支出除以负债总额得到利息支出占总负债的比重,尝试以这两个指标的趋势解释民营化企业受到的信贷歧视。
1SA指数来源于Hadlock and Pierce(2010)的计算公式:SA指数=-0. 737×Size+0. 043×Size2-0. 04×Age。
2篇幅所限,我们仅汇报了模型(1)的检验结果,模型(2)的检验结果与模型(1)一致。
3分组时,我们分年度、分行业、分实验组和对照组按照融资约束的大小进行分组,减少样本选择偏差的影响。
1限于篇幅,我们仅汇报了以模型(1)进行检验的结果,以模型(2)进行检验得出的结果与模型(1)一致。
[2]胡一帆、宋敏和张俊喜,2006,《中国国有企业民营化绩效研究》,《经济研究》第7期,第49~60页。
[3]姜付秀,石贝贝和马云飙,2016,《信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束》,《经济研究》第6期,第83~97页。
[4]江静,2014,《融资约束与中国企业储蓄率:基于围观数据的考察》,《管理世界》第8期,第18~29页。
[5]江伟和李斌,2006,《制度环境、国有产权与银行差别贷款》,《金融研究》第11期,第116~126页。
[6]鞠晓生、卢荻和虞义华,2013,《融资约束、营运资本管理与企业创新可持续性》,《经济研究》第1期,第4~16页。
[7]李广子和刘力,2009,《债务融资成本与民营信贷歧视》,《金融研究》第12期,第137~150页。
[8]李文贵和余明桂,2015,《民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新》,《管理世界》第4期,第112~125页。
[9]林毅夫、蔡昉和李周,1997,《充分信息与国有企业改革》,上海人民出版社。
[10]刘小玄,2003,《国有企业民营化的均衡模型》,《经济研究》第9期,第21~31页。
[11]唐清泉和巫岑,2015,《银行业结构与企业创新活动的融资约束》,《金融研究》第7期,第116~134页。
[12]解维敏和方红星,2011,《金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投入》,《金融研究》第5期,第171~183页。
[13]余明桂、李文贵和潘红波,2013,《民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担》,《经济研究》第9期,第112~124页。
[14]余明桂和潘红波,2010,《金融发展、商业信用与产品市场竞争》,《管理世界》第8期,第117~129页。
[15]余明桂、范蕊和钟慧洁,2016,《中国产业政策与企业技术创新》,《中国工业经济》第12期,第5~22页。
[16]余明桂、钟慧洁和范蕊,2016,《业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?》,《经济研究》第12期,第104~117页。
[17]张杰、芦哲、郑文平和陈志远,2012,《融资约束、融资渠道与企业R&D投入》,《世界经济》第10期,第66~90页。
[18]张维迎,1999,《企业理论与中国企业改革》,上海人民出版社。
[19]张维迎,2000,《产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争》,《经济研究》第6期,第41~50页。
[20]张璇、王鑫和刘碧,2017,《吃喝费用、融资约束与企业出口行为——世行中国企业调查数据的证据》,《金融研究》第5期,第176~190页。
[21]钟昀珈、张晨宇和陈德球,2016,《国企民营化与企业创新效率:促进还是抑制?》,《财经研究》第7期,第4~15页。
[22]朱红军、王彬和田子莘,2007,《民营化为何不能改善公司经营绩效——国光瓷业民营化的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》第1期,第121~128页。
[23]Bertrand,M.,E. Duflo and S. Mullainathan,2004,“How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?,”Quarterly Journal of Economics,119(1),pp. 249~275.
[24]Black,B.,R. Kraakman and A. Tarassova,2000,“Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:What Went Wrong?,”Stanford Law Review,52(6),pp. 1731~1808.
[25]Bortolotti,B. and M. Faccio,2009,“Government Control of Privatized Firms,”Review of Financial Studies,22(8),pp. 2907~2939.
[26]Boubakri,N.,J.-C. Cosset,and W. Saffar,2013,“The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate RiskTaking:Evidence from Privatization,”Journal of Financial Economics,108(3),pp. 641~658.
[27]Boycko,M.,A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny,1996,“A Theory of Privatisation,”Economic Journal,106(435),pp.309~319.
[28]Brandt,L. and H. Li,2003,“Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies:Ideology,Information,or Incentives?,”Journal of Comparative Economics,31(3),pp. 387~413.
[29]Brandt,L.,J. Van Biesebroeck and Y. Zhang,2012,“Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing,”Journal of Development Economics,97(2),pp. 339~351.
[30]Brav,O.,2009,“Access to Capital,Capital Structure,and the Funding of the Firm,”Journal of Finance,64(1),pp.263~308.
[31]Brown,J. R.,S. M. Fazzari and B. C. Petersen,2009,“Financing Innovation and Growth:Cash Flow,External Equity,and the 1990s R&D Boom,”Journal of Finance,64(1),pp. 151~185.
[32]Chen,H.,J. Z. Chen,G. J. Lobo and Y. Wang,2010,“Association between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism,”Journal of Accounting Research,48(5),pp. 973~1014.
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1此处数据是匹配后数据,具体匹配方法在匹配检验中阐述。
1我们确实需要更加直观地表示信贷优势和政府补贴的变动。但是,工业企业数据库中没有政府补贴这个变量,无法衡量民营化前后政府补贴的变化。同时,工业企业数据库也没有具体的贷款变量,如短期贷款和长期贷款,不过,工业企业数据库中有总资产、所有者权益和利息支出3个指标,我们采用总资产减去所有者权益的方法计算出负债总额,同时用利息支出除以负债总额得到利息支出占总负债的比重,尝试以这两个指标的趋势解释民营化企业受到的信贷歧视。
1SA指数来源于Hadlock and Pierce(2010)的计算公式:SA指数=-0. 737×Size+0. 043×Size2-0. 04×Age。
2篇幅所限,我们仅汇报了模型(1)的检验结果,模型(2)的检验结果与模型(1)一致。
3分组时,我们分年度、分行业、分实验组和对照组按照融资约束的大小进行分组,减少样本选择偏差的影响。
1限于篇幅,我们仅汇报了以模型(1)进行检验的结果,以模型(2)进行检验得出的结果与模型(1)一致。