供应链间上游核心企业竞争与结构选择
|
摘要
考虑两条供应链间相互竞争的上游核心企业,分别决定是否将产品销售外包给各自的下游零售商,从而形成向下分散式的供应链结构。第三方无成本优势的前提下,制造商和零售商间引入收益共享契约,利用Hotelling模型探讨向下分散式结构对核心企业间博弈均衡结构及供应链利润的影响。结论表明:与集中式相比,分散式供应链本身具有结构优势,在提升自身供应链利润的同时也会促进另一条竞争供应链的利润水平,有悖于通常认为的"双重边际化效应",从结构优势的视角解释了第三方外包,并且收益共享比例决定了供应链竞争的均衡结构及其演化。
Considering two competing upstream dominant enterprises in their respective supply chain, each firm decides whether to outsource the retail to the downstream third-party retailer and thus forming a downward decentralized supply chain structure. On the premise that the retailer has no advantage on sales cost, the revenue-sharing contract is introduced between manufacturer and retailer, and the influence of decentralized structure on the game equilibrium structure and supply chain profit is analyzed by Hotelling model. The results show that, compared with centralized structure, downward decentralized supply chain itself has the structural advantage that improve its supply chain profits and the competitive supply chain. This discovery is contrary to the common double marginalization effect and explains the outsourcing choice from the perspective of structural advantage. In addition, the values of sharing ratio in revenue-sharing contracts determine the equilibrium structures and evolution of supply chain competition.
Considering two competing upstream dominant enterprises in their respective supply chain, each firm decides whether to outsource the retail to the downstream third-party retailer and thus forming a downward decentralized supply chain structure. On the premise that the retailer has no advantage on sales cost, the revenue-sharing contract is introduced between manufacturer and retailer, and the influence of decentralized structure on the game equilibrium structure and supply chain profit is analyzed by Hotelling model. The results show that, compared with centralized structure, downward decentralized supply chain itself has the structural advantage that improve its supply chain profits and the competitive supply chain. This discovery is contrary to the common double marginalization effect and explains the outsourcing choice from the perspective of structural advantage. In addition, the values of sharing ratio in revenue-sharing contracts determine the equilibrium structures and evolution of supply chain competition.
引文
[1]Das T,Teng B.A resource-based theory of strategic alliances[J].Journal of Management,2000,26:31-61.
[2]葛泽慧,孟志青,胡奇英.竞争与合作:数学模型及供应链管理[M].北京:科学出版社,2011:7-8.
[3]Zhao X,Shi C.Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains[J].Int J Production Economics,2011,134:434-446.
[4]Chen K,Liang J,Li J.Information structures and pricing decisions in competing supply chains[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2012,21(2):226-254.
[5]Li B,Zhou Y,Li J,et al.Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels[J].Int J Production Economics,2013,143:188-197.
[6]Li B,Zhou Y,Wang X.Equilibrium analysis of distribution channel structures under power imbalance and asymmetric information[J].International Journal of Production Research,2013,51(9):2698-2714.
[7]Wang J,Wang A,Wang Y.Markup pricing strategies between a dominant retailer and competitive manufacturers[J].Computer&Industrial Engineering,2013,64:235-246.
[8]Veldman J,Gaalman G.A model of strategic product quality and process improvement incentives[J].Int J Production Economics,2014,149(1):202-210.
[9]Liu Y,Tyagi R.The benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization[J].Management Science,2011,57(4):741-751.
[10]Yang S,Shi C,Zhang Y,et al.Price competition for retailers with profit and revenue targets[J].Int J Production Economics,2014,154:233-242.
[11]Wu Q,Chen H.Chain-to-chain competition under demand uncertainty[J].Journal of the Operations Research Society of China,2016,4(1):49-75.
[12]Li X,Li Y.Chain-to-chain competition on product sustainability[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:2058-2065.
[13]Liu X.Contracting for competitive supply chains under network externalities and demand uncertainty[J].Discrete Dynamics in Nature&Society,2016,2016(1):1-9.
[14]李娟,黄培清,顾锋,等.基于供应链间品牌竞争的库存管理策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2009(3):71-76.
[15]徐兵,朱道立.零售商水平竞争下二层供应链协调策略设计[J].管理工程学,2009(4):54-58.
[16]徐兵,朱道立.零售商水平竞争分析与供应链协调策略设计[J].系统工程学报,2010(5):609-615.
[17]李柏勋.供应链间竞争决策模型与契约选择博弈[D].广州:华南理工大学,2011.
[18]李柏勋,周永务,王圣东.供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型[J].科研管理,2012,12:50-58.
[19]李晓静,艾兴政,唐小我.基于链与链竞争的再制造产品销售渠道的研究[J].系统工程学报,2016(5):666-675.
[20]刘晓婧,艾兴政,唐小我.网络外部性下基于不确定环境的竞争供应链纵向结构选择[J].控制与决策,2016(10):1817-1823.
[21]D’Aspremont C,Thisse J.On Hotelling’s“stability in competition”[J].Econometrica,1979,47(5):1145-1150.
[2]葛泽慧,孟志青,胡奇英.竞争与合作:数学模型及供应链管理[M].北京:科学出版社,2011:7-8.
[3]Zhao X,Shi C.Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains[J].Int J Production Economics,2011,134:434-446.
[4]Chen K,Liang J,Li J.Information structures and pricing decisions in competing supply chains[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2012,21(2):226-254.
[5]Li B,Zhou Y,Li J,et al.Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels[J].Int J Production Economics,2013,143:188-197.
[6]Li B,Zhou Y,Wang X.Equilibrium analysis of distribution channel structures under power imbalance and asymmetric information[J].International Journal of Production Research,2013,51(9):2698-2714.
[7]Wang J,Wang A,Wang Y.Markup pricing strategies between a dominant retailer and competitive manufacturers[J].Computer&Industrial Engineering,2013,64:235-246.
[8]Veldman J,Gaalman G.A model of strategic product quality and process improvement incentives[J].Int J Production Economics,2014,149(1):202-210.
[9]Liu Y,Tyagi R.The benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization[J].Management Science,2011,57(4):741-751.
[10]Yang S,Shi C,Zhang Y,et al.Price competition for retailers with profit and revenue targets[J].Int J Production Economics,2014,154:233-242.
[11]Wu Q,Chen H.Chain-to-chain competition under demand uncertainty[J].Journal of the Operations Research Society of China,2016,4(1):49-75.
[12]Li X,Li Y.Chain-to-chain competition on product sustainability[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:2058-2065.
[13]Liu X.Contracting for competitive supply chains under network externalities and demand uncertainty[J].Discrete Dynamics in Nature&Society,2016,2016(1):1-9.
[14]李娟,黄培清,顾锋,等.基于供应链间品牌竞争的库存管理策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2009(3):71-76.
[15]徐兵,朱道立.零售商水平竞争下二层供应链协调策略设计[J].管理工程学,2009(4):54-58.
[16]徐兵,朱道立.零售商水平竞争分析与供应链协调策略设计[J].系统工程学报,2010(5):609-615.
[17]李柏勋.供应链间竞争决策模型与契约选择博弈[D].广州:华南理工大学,2011.
[18]李柏勋,周永务,王圣东.供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型[J].科研管理,2012,12:50-58.
[19]李晓静,艾兴政,唐小我.基于链与链竞争的再制造产品销售渠道的研究[J].系统工程学报,2016(5):666-675.
[20]刘晓婧,艾兴政,唐小我.网络外部性下基于不确定环境的竞争供应链纵向结构选择[J].控制与决策,2016(10):1817-1823.
[21]D’Aspremont C,Thisse J.On Hotelling’s“stability in competition”[J].Econometrica,1979,47(5):1145-1150.