考虑风险厌恶的供应链退货策略研究
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摘要
考虑供应链成员的风险厌恶,本文构建单一制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,通过逆向递归法求得完全退货和无退货两种不同策略下的均衡解,对比并提出供应链成员如何选择退货策略的最优条件。数值实验分析了供应链成员的风险厌恶程度对均衡结果的影响。结论表明:供应链成员风险厌恶程度越高,零售商越倾向于全退货策略;当厌恶程度足够大时,制造商和零售商均会选择全退货策略。此外,最优订购量不受零售商风险厌恶程度的影响,批发价格和制造商绩效水平与风险厌恶程度呈负相关关系。
Considering the risk aversion of supply chain's members,in the literature,we construct a SC system composed of a single manufacturer and retailer,then the method of backward induction is used to obtain game equilibrium.For the no-return policy and full-return policy,the conditions how the members choose channel policy are acquired by comparison and analysis on optimal parameters. Finally,the effect of the risk attitude of the members on the equilibrium is verified by numerical experiments. The results show that the more risk averse to supply chain members,the more likely the retailer tends toward full-return policy. When the risk sensitivity is large enough,the whole supply chain will choose the full-return policy. In addition,we find that order size is not affected by the retailer's risk sensitivity,the wholesale price and the manufacturer's MS value are negatively correlated with the risk sensitivity of the members.
Considering the risk aversion of supply chain's members,in the literature,we construct a SC system composed of a single manufacturer and retailer,then the method of backward induction is used to obtain game equilibrium.For the no-return policy and full-return policy,the conditions how the members choose channel policy are acquired by comparison and analysis on optimal parameters. Finally,the effect of the risk attitude of the members on the equilibrium is verified by numerical experiments. The results show that the more risk averse to supply chain members,the more likely the retailer tends toward full-return policy. When the risk sensitivity is large enough,the whole supply chain will choose the full-return policy. In addition,we find that order size is not affected by the retailer's risk sensitivity,the wholesale price and the manufacturer's MS value are negatively correlated with the risk sensitivity of the members.
引文
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[2]陈子林,张子刚,陈金菊.基于反向物流的商品定价和退货政策研究[J].管理学报,2006,3(2):179-181,194.
[3]代建生,秦开大.零售商促销下供应商的回购契约设计[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(1):163-171.
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[6] Kandel E. The right of return[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1996,39(1):329-356.
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[13] Seung H Y. Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,154(10):146-155.
[14]陈崇萍,陈志祥.网络销售中退货担保与定价决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):52-60.
[15]刘春玲,黎继子,肖位春,等.电子商务环境下基于退货策略的MC决策与协调[J].科研管理,2016,37(2):141-151.
[16]陈敬贤,梁樑.存在顾客退货的竞争性企业产品定位决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3123-3132.
[17]单汨源,江黄山,刘小红.在线零售商盈利能力及其退货策略研究[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(11):123-128.
[18]史成东,闫秀霞,张正民,等. Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链[J].管理学报,2014,11(10):1520-1527.
[19]姚忠.退货策略在单周期产品供应链管理中的作用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(6):69-73.
[20]李新军,达庆利.随机需求条件下产品退货政策协调与优化[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(3):56-60.
[21]张福利,达庆利.不确定需求条件下制造商的退货政策[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(2):185-193.
[22] Lau H S,Lau A H L. Manufacturer’s pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1999,116(2):291-304.
[23]张福利,施建军,徐小林.基于多零售商和不确定需求的制造商退货政策研究[J].预测,2013,32(4):52-57.
[24] Padmanabhan V,Png I P L. Manufacturer’s returns policies and retail competition[J]. Marketing Science,1997,16(1):91-94.
[25] Tsay A A. Risk sensitivity in distribution channel partnerships:implications for manufacturer return policies[J]. Journal of Retailing,2002,78(2):147-160.
[26] Gurnani H,Sharma A,Grewal D. Optimal returns policy under demand uncertainty[J]. Journal of Retailing,2010,86(2):137-147.
[27] Ohmura S,Matsuo H. The effect of risk aversion on distribution channel contracts:implications for return policies[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2016,176(1):29-40.
[28]秦娟娟,赵道致.风险偏好信息非对称下的供应链寄存契约研究[J].管理学报,2011,8(2):284-288.
[29]丁松,但斌.随机需求下考虑零售商风险偏好的生鲜农产品最优订货策略[J].管理学报,2012,9(9):1382-1387.
[30]徐志春.零售商风险厌恶情形下的契约协调[J].管理学报,2013,10(12):1855-1859.
[31]张新,罗新星.损失厌恶型零售商参与的供应链商业信用与收益共享协同研究[J].管理学报,2017,14(5):759-766.
[2]陈子林,张子刚,陈金菊.基于反向物流的商品定价和退货政策研究[J].管理学报,2006,3(2):179-181,194.
[3]代建生,秦开大.零售商促销下供应商的回购契约设计[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(1):163-171.
[4]翟春娟,李勇建. B2C模式下的在线零售商退货策略研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(1):62-68.
[5]李勇建,许磊,杨晓丽.产品预售、退货策略和消费者无缺陷退货行为[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(5):105-113.
[6] Kandel E. The right of return[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1996,39(1):329-356.
[7] Tsay A A. Managing retail channel overstock:markdown money and return policies[J]. Journal of Retailing,2001,77(4):457-492.
[8] Wang H. Do returns policies intensify retail competition[J]. Marketing Science,2004,23(4):611-613.
[9] Padmanabhan V,Png I P L. Reply to “Do returns policies intensify retail competition?”[J]. Marketing Science,2004,23(4):614-618.
[10]徐玖平,雷臻.一对多配退货系统的嵌套策略成本优化模型[J].管理学报,2005,2(5):505-512.
[11] Yue X,Raghunathan S. The impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007,180(2):630-647.
[12]姜宏,齐二石,霍艳芳,等.基于顾客惰性行为的无理由退货策略研究[J].管理学报,2012,9(10):1531-1535.
[13] Seung H Y. Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,154(10):146-155.
[14]陈崇萍,陈志祥.网络销售中退货担保与定价决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):52-60.
[15]刘春玲,黎继子,肖位春,等.电子商务环境下基于退货策略的MC决策与协调[J].科研管理,2016,37(2):141-151.
[16]陈敬贤,梁樑.存在顾客退货的竞争性企业产品定位决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3123-3132.
[17]单汨源,江黄山,刘小红.在线零售商盈利能力及其退货策略研究[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(11):123-128.
[18]史成东,闫秀霞,张正民,等. Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链[J].管理学报,2014,11(10):1520-1527.
[19]姚忠.退货策略在单周期产品供应链管理中的作用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(6):69-73.
[20]李新军,达庆利.随机需求条件下产品退货政策协调与优化[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(3):56-60.
[21]张福利,达庆利.不确定需求条件下制造商的退货政策[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(2):185-193.
[22] Lau H S,Lau A H L. Manufacturer’s pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1999,116(2):291-304.
[23]张福利,施建军,徐小林.基于多零售商和不确定需求的制造商退货政策研究[J].预测,2013,32(4):52-57.
[24] Padmanabhan V,Png I P L. Manufacturer’s returns policies and retail competition[J]. Marketing Science,1997,16(1):91-94.
[25] Tsay A A. Risk sensitivity in distribution channel partnerships:implications for manufacturer return policies[J]. Journal of Retailing,2002,78(2):147-160.
[26] Gurnani H,Sharma A,Grewal D. Optimal returns policy under demand uncertainty[J]. Journal of Retailing,2010,86(2):137-147.
[27] Ohmura S,Matsuo H. The effect of risk aversion on distribution channel contracts:implications for return policies[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2016,176(1):29-40.
[28]秦娟娟,赵道致.风险偏好信息非对称下的供应链寄存契约研究[J].管理学报,2011,8(2):284-288.
[29]丁松,但斌.随机需求下考虑零售商风险偏好的生鲜农产品最优订货策略[J].管理学报,2012,9(9):1382-1387.
[30]徐志春.零售商风险厌恶情形下的契约协调[J].管理学报,2013,10(12):1855-1859.
[31]张新,罗新星.损失厌恶型零售商参与的供应链商业信用与收益共享协同研究[J].管理学报,2017,14(5):759-766.