医疗纠纷中医患双方预防投入不足的法经济学解析
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摘要
文章从法经济学角度分析了在医疗纠纷发生过程中医患双方预防投入不足的原因,即医方的原因为医疗资源配置不合理,医疗服务价格扭曲-医生人力成本被严重低估,信息不对称导致医方存在道德风险;患方的原因为过错成本低、违法行为未支付合理对价,并在此基础上,从医方和患方角度构建了预防医疗纠纷的法经济学路径,即医方的路径:合理配置医疗资源,完善分级诊疗制度;制定合理的医疗技术服务价格,对医生实现正激励;建立合理的控制机制,实现最佳预防;患方的路径:采取比较过错归责原则,实现最佳预防;让病人为违法行为支付合理对价,实现理性解决纠纷的激励。
It analyzed the reasons for the insufficient investment in preventing doctor-patient disputes from the economic perspective,which included the irrational allocation of medical resources,medical service price distortion which led doctor manpower cost seriously underestimated,and the asymmetric information from the aspects of doctors or hospitals causing the doctors’moral hazard.The legal remedy for the patients was relatively simple due to the existence of fault liability,therefore had convinced the patients acting provocatively.On the above basis,it constructed the economic path for preventing disputes from the perspective of hospitals and patients.The hospital path included rational allocating for medical resources and implementing hierarchy health care system;designing reasonable medical technical service prices,realizing positive incentive for the doctors;setting up reasonable controlling mechanism to realize the best prevention.The path for patients included realizing the best prevention as adopting the comparative negligence liability principle,encouraging patients to pay the rational prices for the illegal behavior so as to realize the incentive for rationally resolving disputes.
It analyzed the reasons for the insufficient investment in preventing doctor-patient disputes from the economic perspective,which included the irrational allocation of medical resources,medical service price distortion which led doctor manpower cost seriously underestimated,and the asymmetric information from the aspects of doctors or hospitals causing the doctors’moral hazard.The legal remedy for the patients was relatively simple due to the existence of fault liability,therefore had convinced the patients acting provocatively.On the above basis,it constructed the economic path for preventing disputes from the perspective of hospitals and patients.The hospital path included rational allocating for medical resources and implementing hierarchy health care system;designing reasonable medical technical service prices,realizing positive incentive for the doctors;setting up reasonable controlling mechanism to realize the best prevention.The path for patients included realizing the best prevention as adopting the comparative negligence liability principle,encouraging patients to pay the rational prices for the illegal behavior so as to realize the incentive for rationally resolving disputes.
引文
[1]沈群红.现行医疗服务定价与补偿机制探究[J].中国软科学,2009(3):54.
[2]崔爽,韩成禄.浅析技术劳务价值在医疗服务项目价格中的体现[J].卫生经济研究,2004(3):47.
[3]史书源,史芮源,田立启.公立医院医务人员薪酬制度改革研究[J].卫生经济研究,2016(4):23.
[4]沈群红.现行医疗服务定价与补偿机制探究[J].中国软科学,2009(3):57.
[5][美]斯蒂文·萨维尔.事故法的经济分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[6][德]汉斯-贝恩德·舍费尔,克劳斯·奥特.民法的经济分析[M].江清云,杜涛,译.北京:法律出版社,2009.
[7][美]理查德·波斯纳.法律的经济分析(第七版)[M].蒋兆康,译.北京:法律出版社,2012.
[2]崔爽,韩成禄.浅析技术劳务价值在医疗服务项目价格中的体现[J].卫生经济研究,2004(3):47.
[3]史书源,史芮源,田立启.公立医院医务人员薪酬制度改革研究[J].卫生经济研究,2016(4):23.
[4]沈群红.现行医疗服务定价与补偿机制探究[J].中国软科学,2009(3):57.
[5][美]斯蒂文·萨维尔.事故法的经济分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[6][德]汉斯-贝恩德·舍费尔,克劳斯·奥特.民法的经济分析[M].江清云,杜涛,译.北京:法律出版社,2009.
[7][美]理查德·波斯纳.法律的经济分析(第七版)[M].蒋兆康,译.北京:法律出版社,2012.