科技型企业创业风险、堑壕效应与控制权配置
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摘要
将创业者事后敲竹杠和创业成功后堑壕效应的前向延伸作为影响因素,构建模型对科技型企业创业过程中投资者和创业者之间风险分担、收益分配及控制权配置的影响进行分析。结果发现:完全信息下创业者最优努力水平和帕累托最优风险分担可以实现,投资者和创业者主要矛盾前移至创业开始前的收益分担;信息不对称下帕累托最优风险分担不可能实现,创业者有动机通过采取降低努力水平、事后敲竹杠和事前堑壕效应行为取得额外收益,以此分散人力资本风险;创业者首先倾向于选择后两种行为获取更高的控制权配置收益,失败时将倾向于回到降低努力水平选择上。因此,投资者适度分权可避免创业者出现降低努力水平的行为,从而提升创业成功概率。
The paper takes entrepreneur after rip off and advance entrenchment effect after the venture success as influencing factors into account the analysis, builds a model to analyze the risk sharing, income distribution and the corporate control allocation between investors and entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial process of technological enterprise. The study found: Pareto optimal risk sharing and entrepreneur's best effort level can be achieved under the complete information, and the main contradiction is moved forward to the profit sharing before the start of business; the Pareto optimal risk under asymmetric information sharing can not be achieved, entrepreneurs have the motivation to include reducing the effort level, after rip off and advance entrenchment effect behavior to obtain additional revenue to disperse the risk of human capital; entrepreneurs tend to choose two kinds of behavior after the first to profit allocation of control rights in higher, failure will tend to go back to reduce the effort level choice, so investor's moderate decentralization of the control right can avoid the probability that the entrepreneur reduces the effort level and improve the probability of success.
The paper takes entrepreneur after rip off and advance entrenchment effect after the venture success as influencing factors into account the analysis, builds a model to analyze the risk sharing, income distribution and the corporate control allocation between investors and entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial process of technological enterprise. The study found: Pareto optimal risk sharing and entrepreneur's best effort level can be achieved under the complete information, and the main contradiction is moved forward to the profit sharing before the start of business; the Pareto optimal risk under asymmetric information sharing can not be achieved, entrepreneurs have the motivation to include reducing the effort level, after rip off and advance entrenchment effect behavior to obtain additional revenue to disperse the risk of human capital; entrepreneurs tend to choose two kinds of behavior after the first to profit allocation of control rights in higher, failure will tend to go back to reduce the effort level choice, so investor's moderate decentralization of the control right can avoid the probability that the entrepreneur reduces the effort level and improve the probability of success.
引文
[1] JEAN ETIENNE DE BELTIGNIES.Financing the entrepreneurial venture[J].Management Science,2008,54 (1):151-166.
[2] 陈敏灵,党兴华,韩瑾,石琳.科技型创业企业的控制权配置机理及仿真——基于相机控制模式下的分析[J].软科学,2015(7):83-88.
[3] BERLE A A,MEANS G C. The modern corporation and private property(revised edition)[M]. New York: Harcourt,Brace and World Inc,1932:121-126.
[4] FAMA E F,JENSEN M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,88(2):301-325.
[5] SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R.Managerial entrenchment:the case of manager-specific investment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(1):191-192.
[6] (美)哈罗德·德姆赛茨.所有权控制与企业:论经济活动的组织[M].段毅才,译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999:109-112.
[7] (美)加里·贝克尔.人力资本:理论和实践分析(第3版)[M].陈耿宣,译.北京:机械工业出版社,2016:214.
[8] (美)奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度:企业、市场和关系合同(引进版)[M].孙经纬,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2017:151-153.
[9] KLEIN B.Vertical integration,appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1978,21(6):231.
[10] 易阳,宋顺林,谢新敏,等.创始人专用性资产、堑壕效应与公司控制权配置——基于雷士照明的案例分析[J].会计研究,2016(1):63-70.
[11] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2009:1-2.
[2] 陈敏灵,党兴华,韩瑾,石琳.科技型创业企业的控制权配置机理及仿真——基于相机控制模式下的分析[J].软科学,2015(7):83-88.
[3] BERLE A A,MEANS G C. The modern corporation and private property(revised edition)[M]. New York: Harcourt,Brace and World Inc,1932:121-126.
[4] FAMA E F,JENSEN M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,88(2):301-325.
[5] SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R.Managerial entrenchment:the case of manager-specific investment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(1):191-192.
[6] (美)哈罗德·德姆赛茨.所有权控制与企业:论经济活动的组织[M].段毅才,译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999:109-112.
[7] (美)加里·贝克尔.人力资本:理论和实践分析(第3版)[M].陈耿宣,译.北京:机械工业出版社,2016:214.
[8] (美)奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度:企业、市场和关系合同(引进版)[M].孙经纬,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2017:151-153.
[9] KLEIN B.Vertical integration,appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1978,21(6):231.
[10] 易阳,宋顺林,谢新敏,等.创始人专用性资产、堑壕效应与公司控制权配置——基于雷士照明的案例分析[J].会计研究,2016(1):63-70.
[11] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2009:1-2.