混合所有制与国有企业现金股利分配
|
摘要
混合所有制有助于促进国有企业现金股利分配。本文基于我国国有企业混合所有制改革的背景,以2003-2013年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本,考察混合所有制下的现金股利分配效应,将混合所有制程度测量为股东类别的多元化和股东股份的多元化之后,结果发现:(1)混合所有制程度与现金股利分配显著正相关,即股东类别的多元化、股东股份的多元化程度越高,现金股利分配强度越高、分配意愿越强;(2)民营参股程度越大、境外参股以及参股程度越高,现金股利分配强度越高、分配意愿越强;(3)进一步考察混合所有制在不同情境中的作用时,发现在地方国有企业(与中央国有企业情况相比)、在低控制权企业(与中等控制权、高控制权情况相比)中,混合所有制对现金股利分配政策(股利分配强度和分配意愿)的促进作用更强。上述研究不仅扩充了股利分配理论,也在实践上为混合所有制改革、政府制定股利政策和企业发放股利提供有益启示。
Mixed ownership refers to the form of cross-shareholdings,mutual integration and state capital of collective capital,non-public capital ownership,that is the form of the different shareholders properties( including both state-owned and the non-state-owned shareholders). Existing research pointed out that the mixed ownership not only can produce larger social surplus,but relative to other forms of ownership,the mixed ownership can effectively improve the production efficiency and increase performance of enterprises,so create more benefits for shareholders. At present,the research on cash dividend distribution from the perspective of mixed ownership is poor.In the state-owned enterprises,they may take more policy burdens,and their executives may seek personal gain for themselves by controlling more free cash flow,so the enterprises make the cash dividends are less distributed or even no distributed. Mixed ownership through diversified ownership structure to strengthen supervision mechanism,with the purpose of curbing excessive investment management and on-the-job consumption,and through equity checks and balances to ease the policy burden of state-owned enterprises which the government gives and to avoid transferring cash flow to government departments which is the controlling shareholder,so as to make the enterprise have more surplus cash,and could promote enterprise's cash dividend distribution.With the mixed ownership reform of Chinese state owned enterprises,based on the state-owned listed companies from2003-2013 in china,the paper explores the influence of the mixed ownership on the cash dividends. Classified the mixed ownership into the diversification of categories and proportion of shares of the shareholders,we find that: the degree of the mixed ownership and the cash dividends have positive relationships,that is,the more the diversification of categories and proportion of shares of the shareholders,the higher the distribution and the more strength the intention of cash dividends;the more the proportion of private ownership and the overseas shares,and with the overseas shares,the higher the distribution and the more strength the intention of cash dividends; when examining the moderating effects of several conditions,the results are that,in the companies of local state-owned( which contrary to the central state-owned companies),and the lower controlled companies( which contrary to medial and higher controlled companies),the more relationship between the mixed ownership and the cash dividends.The main contributions of the paper are:( 1) the studies of dividend policy mainly from external( legal level,market level) and enterprise features( industry level and form of system of ownership),etc.,but has yet to investigate the impact on the dividend policy from the perspective of mixed ownership,the article first from the perspective of the mixed ownership influence on cash dividend,and verify that the mixed ownership can effectively promote the implementation of the cash dividend distribution policy,which is a beneficial supplement to the dividend policy research;( 2) the existing research either used proportion of state-owned shares or proportion of non-state-owned measurements measured the mixed ownership,or alone measure the types of controlling shareholders. In this paper,we use the diversified index of shares innovative,and the results of verification are reasonable,which provides a useful tool for the study of mixed ownership;( 3) Existing research mainly inspects the effect of mixed ownership on enterprise productivity or performance,this article mainly focuses on the cash dividend distribution effects of mixed ownership,which also offers a new way to study the theory of the mixed ownership;( 4) the study confirmed that the share category diversity and diversified nature have the effect of promoting enterprise cash dividend distribution,and initially thought to be effective safeguard the rights and interests of the shareholders,the state-owned enterprises need not only to increase category diversification of shareholder,but also to improve the nature diversification of the shareholders,so the conclusion put forward the basis theoretical to the reform of mixed ownership in China.
Mixed ownership refers to the form of cross-shareholdings,mutual integration and state capital of collective capital,non-public capital ownership,that is the form of the different shareholders properties( including both state-owned and the non-state-owned shareholders). Existing research pointed out that the mixed ownership not only can produce larger social surplus,but relative to other forms of ownership,the mixed ownership can effectively improve the production efficiency and increase performance of enterprises,so create more benefits for shareholders. At present,the research on cash dividend distribution from the perspective of mixed ownership is poor.In the state-owned enterprises,they may take more policy burdens,and their executives may seek personal gain for themselves by controlling more free cash flow,so the enterprises make the cash dividends are less distributed or even no distributed. Mixed ownership through diversified ownership structure to strengthen supervision mechanism,with the purpose of curbing excessive investment management and on-the-job consumption,and through equity checks and balances to ease the policy burden of state-owned enterprises which the government gives and to avoid transferring cash flow to government departments which is the controlling shareholder,so as to make the enterprise have more surplus cash,and could promote enterprise's cash dividend distribution.With the mixed ownership reform of Chinese state owned enterprises,based on the state-owned listed companies from2003-2013 in china,the paper explores the influence of the mixed ownership on the cash dividends. Classified the mixed ownership into the diversification of categories and proportion of shares of the shareholders,we find that: the degree of the mixed ownership and the cash dividends have positive relationships,that is,the more the diversification of categories and proportion of shares of the shareholders,the higher the distribution and the more strength the intention of cash dividends;the more the proportion of private ownership and the overseas shares,and with the overseas shares,the higher the distribution and the more strength the intention of cash dividends; when examining the moderating effects of several conditions,the results are that,in the companies of local state-owned( which contrary to the central state-owned companies),and the lower controlled companies( which contrary to medial and higher controlled companies),the more relationship between the mixed ownership and the cash dividends.The main contributions of the paper are:( 1) the studies of dividend policy mainly from external( legal level,market level) and enterprise features( industry level and form of system of ownership),etc.,but has yet to investigate the impact on the dividend policy from the perspective of mixed ownership,the article first from the perspective of the mixed ownership influence on cash dividend,and verify that the mixed ownership can effectively promote the implementation of the cash dividend distribution policy,which is a beneficial supplement to the dividend policy research;( 2) the existing research either used proportion of state-owned shares or proportion of non-state-owned measurements measured the mixed ownership,or alone measure the types of controlling shareholders. In this paper,we use the diversified index of shares innovative,and the results of verification are reasonable,which provides a useful tool for the study of mixed ownership;( 3) Existing research mainly inspects the effect of mixed ownership on enterprise productivity or performance,this article mainly focuses on the cash dividend distribution effects of mixed ownership,which also offers a new way to study the theory of the mixed ownership;( 4) the study confirmed that the share category diversity and diversified nature have the effect of promoting enterprise cash dividend distribution,and initially thought to be effective safeguard the rights and interests of the shareholders,the state-owned enterprises need not only to increase category diversification of shareholder,but also to improve the nature diversification of the shareholders,so the conclusion put forward the basis theoretical to the reform of mixed ownership in China.
引文
[1]吕长江,周县华.公司治理结构与股利分配动机[J].天津:南开管理评论,2005,(3):9-17.
[2]朱东平.论混合所有制的经济合理性[J].北京:经济研究,1994,(5):34-39.
[3]张维迎.企业理论和中国企业改革[M].北京大学出版社,1999.
[4]Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny.The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and Their Cures[J].American Economic Association Papers&Proceedings,1998,87,(2):354-358.
[5]Bhattacharya,S.Imperfect Information,Dividend Policy,and“The Bird in the Hand”Fallacy[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10,(1):259-270.
[6]Dyl,E.A.and R.A.Weigand.The Information Content of Dividend Initiations:Additional Evidence[J].Financial Management,1998,27,(3):27-35.
[7]Jensen,M.C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76,(2):323-329.
[8]Gugler,K.P.and B.B.Yurtoglu.Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout in Germany[R].University of Vienna,Working Paper,2001.
[9]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):3-27.
[10]雷光勇,刘慧龙.市场化进程、最终控制人性质与现金股利行为[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(7):120-128.
[11]Kinkki,S.Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland[J].European Financial Management,2008,14,(3):470-502.
[12]魏志华,李茂良,李常青.半强制分红政策与中国上市公司分红行为[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(6):100-114.
[13]Lintner,J.Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends,Retained Earnings,and Taxes[J].American Economic Review,1956,(2):97-113.
[14]权小锋,滕明慧,吴世农.行业因素影响上市公司首发现金股利决策吗?[J].北京:经济管理,2010,(9):99-107.
[15]张海燕,陈晓.从现金红利看第一大股东对高级管理层监督[J].天津:南开管理评论,2008,(2):15-21.
[16]林川,曹国华,陈立泰.公司治理与现金股利分配倾向[J].北京:经济与管理研究,2011,(2):64-71.
[17]陈红,郭丹.股权激励计划:工具还是面具?——上市公司股权激励、工具选择与现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(2):85-99.
[18]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(5):124-133.
[18]董艳,李凤.管理层持股、股利政策与代理问题[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2011,(3):1015-1038.
[19]Bhattacharyya,N.Good Managers Work More and Pay Less Dividends-A Model of Dividend Policy[R].Working Paper,2003.
[20]Agrawal,A.and N.Jayaraman.The dividend Policies of All-equity Firms:A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory[J].Managerial&Decision Economics,1994,15,(2):139-148.
[21]林毅夫,刘明兴,章奇.政策性负担与企业的预算软约束:来自中国的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2004,(8):81-89.
[22]唐跃军,谢仍明.股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应[J].北京:中国工业经济,2006,(2):120-128.
[23]王化成,李春玲,卢闯.控股股东对上市公司现金股利政策影响的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(1):122-127.
[24]Omneya,A.,E.Ahmed and E.Sabri.Board Composition,Ownership Structure and Dividend Policies in an Emerging Market[J].Managerial Finance,2008,(34):953-964.
[25]邹小芃,陈雪洁.控制权和现金流权分离下的公司治理[J].杭州:浙江学刊,2003,(3):145-148.
[26]周中胜,罗正英.财政分权、利益输送与企业现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2011,(1):1-8.
[27]唐国琼,邹虹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究[J].成都:财经科学,2005,(2):147-153.
[28]周县华,范庆泉,吕长江,张新.外资股东与股利分配:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:世界经济,2012,(11):112-140.
[29]Adam,H.and A.Javid.The Ownership Structure and Dividend Payout Policy in Pakistan:Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange100 Index[J].Int.J.Buss.Mgt.Eco.Res.,2010,1,(1):58-69.
[30]袁志刚.关于国有资产流失问题的若干思考[J].北京:经济研究,1995,(4):37-41.
[31]郭克莎.中国所有制结构变动与资源总配置效应[J].北京:经济研究,1994,(7):3-13.
[32]黄速建.中国国有企业混合所有制改革研究[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(7):1-10.
[33]刘小玄,李利英.改制对企业绩效影响的实证分析[J].北京:中国工业经济,2005,(3):5-12.
[34]宋立刚,姚洋.改制对企业绩效的影响[J].北京:中国社会科学,2005,(2):123-142.
[35]胡一帆,宋敏,郑红亮.所有制结构改革对中国企业绩效的影响[J].北京:中国社会科学,2006,(4):50-64.
[36]张文魁.中国混合所有制企业的兴起及其公司治理[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[37]陈林,唐杨柳.国有企业部分民营化能否减轻其政策性负担[J].北京:经济与管理研究,2014,(7):42-51.
[38]陈闯,杨威.股权投资者异质性对董事会职能演进的影响——以平高电气为例[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(12):149-159.
[39]张祥建,郭丽虹,徐龙炳.中国国有企业混合所有制改革与企业投资效率——基于留存国有股控制和高管政治关联的分析[J].北京:经济管理,2015,(9):132-145.
[40]Strong,J.S.and J.R.Meyer.Sustaining Investment,Discretionary Investment and Valuation:A Residual Funds Study of The Paper Industry[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990.
[41]魏明海,柳建华.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(4):88-95.
[42]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(9):139-148.
[43]Kang,D.L.and A.B.Sorensen.Ownership Organization and Firm Performance[J].Annual Review of Sociology,1999,25,(1):121-144.
[44]陈晓,江东.股权多元化,公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].北京:经济研究,2000,(8):28-35.
[45]白重恩,路江涌,陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].北京:经济研究,2006,(8):4-13.
[46]Bennedsen,M.and D.Wolfenzon.The Balance Of Power In Closely Held Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58,(27):113-139.
[47]Boycko,M,A,Shleifer,R.W.Vishny.A Theory of Privatization[J].Economic Journal,1996,106,(435):309-319.
[48]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(5):124-133.
[49]王福胜,宋海旭.终极控制人、多元化战略与现金持有水平[J].北京:管理世界,2012,(7):124-136.
[50]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].北京:经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[51]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].北京:经济研究,2008,(4):41-52.
[52]邓建平,曾勇.上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究[J].北京:管理世界,2005,(7):139-147.
[53]Baba,N.Increased Presence of Foreign Investors and Dividend Policy of Japanese Firms[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2009,17,(2):163-174.
(1)注:因篇幅问题,控制变量未显示,下同。
(1)因篇幅问题,详细结果未汇报,留存备索。
[2]朱东平.论混合所有制的经济合理性[J].北京:经济研究,1994,(5):34-39.
[3]张维迎.企业理论和中国企业改革[M].北京大学出版社,1999.
[4]Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny.The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and Their Cures[J].American Economic Association Papers&Proceedings,1998,87,(2):354-358.
[5]Bhattacharya,S.Imperfect Information,Dividend Policy,and“The Bird in the Hand”Fallacy[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10,(1):259-270.
[6]Dyl,E.A.and R.A.Weigand.The Information Content of Dividend Initiations:Additional Evidence[J].Financial Management,1998,27,(3):27-35.
[7]Jensen,M.C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76,(2):323-329.
[8]Gugler,K.P.and B.B.Yurtoglu.Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout in Germany[R].University of Vienna,Working Paper,2001.
[9]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):3-27.
[10]雷光勇,刘慧龙.市场化进程、最终控制人性质与现金股利行为[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(7):120-128.
[11]Kinkki,S.Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland[J].European Financial Management,2008,14,(3):470-502.
[12]魏志华,李茂良,李常青.半强制分红政策与中国上市公司分红行为[J].北京:经济研究,2014,(6):100-114.
[13]Lintner,J.Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends,Retained Earnings,and Taxes[J].American Economic Review,1956,(2):97-113.
[14]权小锋,滕明慧,吴世农.行业因素影响上市公司首发现金股利决策吗?[J].北京:经济管理,2010,(9):99-107.
[15]张海燕,陈晓.从现金红利看第一大股东对高级管理层监督[J].天津:南开管理评论,2008,(2):15-21.
[16]林川,曹国华,陈立泰.公司治理与现金股利分配倾向[J].北京:经济与管理研究,2011,(2):64-71.
[17]陈红,郭丹.股权激励计划:工具还是面具?——上市公司股权激励、工具选择与现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(2):85-99.
[18]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(5):124-133.
[18]董艳,李凤.管理层持股、股利政策与代理问题[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2011,(3):1015-1038.
[19]Bhattacharyya,N.Good Managers Work More and Pay Less Dividends-A Model of Dividend Policy[R].Working Paper,2003.
[20]Agrawal,A.and N.Jayaraman.The dividend Policies of All-equity Firms:A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory[J].Managerial&Decision Economics,1994,15,(2):139-148.
[21]林毅夫,刘明兴,章奇.政策性负担与企业的预算软约束:来自中国的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2004,(8):81-89.
[22]唐跃军,谢仍明.股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应[J].北京:中国工业经济,2006,(2):120-128.
[23]王化成,李春玲,卢闯.控股股东对上市公司现金股利政策影响的实证研究[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(1):122-127.
[24]Omneya,A.,E.Ahmed and E.Sabri.Board Composition,Ownership Structure and Dividend Policies in an Emerging Market[J].Managerial Finance,2008,(34):953-964.
[25]邹小芃,陈雪洁.控制权和现金流权分离下的公司治理[J].杭州:浙江学刊,2003,(3):145-148.
[26]周中胜,罗正英.财政分权、利益输送与企业现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2011,(1):1-8.
[27]唐国琼,邹虹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究[J].成都:财经科学,2005,(2):147-153.
[28]周县华,范庆泉,吕长江,张新.外资股东与股利分配:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:世界经济,2012,(11):112-140.
[29]Adam,H.and A.Javid.The Ownership Structure and Dividend Payout Policy in Pakistan:Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange100 Index[J].Int.J.Buss.Mgt.Eco.Res.,2010,1,(1):58-69.
[30]袁志刚.关于国有资产流失问题的若干思考[J].北京:经济研究,1995,(4):37-41.
[31]郭克莎.中国所有制结构变动与资源总配置效应[J].北京:经济研究,1994,(7):3-13.
[32]黄速建.中国国有企业混合所有制改革研究[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(7):1-10.
[33]刘小玄,李利英.改制对企业绩效影响的实证分析[J].北京:中国工业经济,2005,(3):5-12.
[34]宋立刚,姚洋.改制对企业绩效的影响[J].北京:中国社会科学,2005,(2):123-142.
[35]胡一帆,宋敏,郑红亮.所有制结构改革对中国企业绩效的影响[J].北京:中国社会科学,2006,(4):50-64.
[36]张文魁.中国混合所有制企业的兴起及其公司治理[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[37]陈林,唐杨柳.国有企业部分民营化能否减轻其政策性负担[J].北京:经济与管理研究,2014,(7):42-51.
[38]陈闯,杨威.股权投资者异质性对董事会职能演进的影响——以平高电气为例[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(12):149-159.
[39]张祥建,郭丽虹,徐龙炳.中国国有企业混合所有制改革与企业投资效率——基于留存国有股控制和高管政治关联的分析[J].北京:经济管理,2015,(9):132-145.
[40]Strong,J.S.and J.R.Meyer.Sustaining Investment,Discretionary Investment and Valuation:A Residual Funds Study of The Paper Industry[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990.
[41]魏明海,柳建华.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资[J].北京:管理世界,2007,(4):88-95.
[42]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(9):139-148.
[43]Kang,D.L.and A.B.Sorensen.Ownership Organization and Firm Performance[J].Annual Review of Sociology,1999,25,(1):121-144.
[44]陈晓,江东.股权多元化,公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].北京:经济研究,2000,(8):28-35.
[45]白重恩,路江涌,陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].北京:经济研究,2006,(8):4-13.
[46]Bennedsen,M.and D.Wolfenzon.The Balance Of Power In Closely Held Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58,(27):113-139.
[47]Boycko,M,A,Shleifer,R.W.Vishny.A Theory of Privatization[J].Economic Journal,1996,106,(435):309-319.
[48]陈传明,孙俊华.企业家人口背景特征与多元化战略选择[J].北京:管理世界,2008,(5):124-133.
[49]王福胜,宋海旭.终极控制人、多元化战略与现金持有水平[J].北京:管理世界,2012,(7):124-136.
[50]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].北京:经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[51]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].北京:经济研究,2008,(4):41-52.
[52]邓建平,曾勇.上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究[J].北京:管理世界,2005,(7):139-147.
[53]Baba,N.Increased Presence of Foreign Investors and Dividend Policy of Japanese Firms[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2009,17,(2):163-174.
(1)注:因篇幅问题,控制变量未显示,下同。
(1)因篇幅问题,详细结果未汇报,留存备索。