混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究——基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析
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摘要
混合所有制企业治理结构问题是当前中国深化国有企业改革,全面推进市场化所亟待解决的关键问题。伴随着民营资本与国有资本融合程度的不断加深,民营资本作为第二大股东力量的不断增强,如果不能有效权衡二者之间的股权关系就会直接导致控制权纷争,从而引发治理效率缺失。解决国有股权和民营股权的激励相容问题,需要我们明晰二者之间股权制衡的动因、路径以及形成的最终绩效。本文以股权分置改革后的"鄂武商"为案例,根据上市公司股权结构特征,借鉴股东关系理论,探讨上市公司民营第二大股东对国有第一大股东的制衡机理。研究结果表明,民营参股股东与国有控股股东进行适度控制权争夺是符合效率原则的市场化行为,其制衡动因受到股权性质、现金流权、股权比例等因素的影响。参股股东可以通过引入关系股东、争取董事会席位及运用法律制度等路径制衡大股东。本文从股权制衡的视角诠释了混合所有制企业中第二大股东的治理作用与治理机制,为化解当前国有控股企业中民营股东与国有股东的"控制权冲突"提供了必要的借鉴。
Governance structure in mixed ownership enterprise is the most important problem for deepening the reform of national firms and promoting the market comprehensively in China.The power of the second largest shareholders in private companies is strengthing along with state-run equity and the private equity integration deepening.Because an ineffective balance of equity relationship between those capitals will directly lead to the loss of efficiency,which is caused by conflicts of control.It is necessary to know motivations,paths and ultimate results of equity balance between the state-run equity and the private equity,in order to find the solution of incentive compatibility between these two equities.This paper studies the balance mechanism between the second largest shareholders in private companies and the largest shareholders in stated-owned companies based on the case of "E Wushang" after Chinese equity division reform,according to the new characteristics of equity structure of listed companies and the theory of shareholder relations.The results show that appropriate control contention between the private shareholder and die state-owned shareholder is consistent with efficiency principle.The motivation of balance mechanism is affected by ownership properties,cash flow rights and shareholding ratio.Equity participate shareholders can balance the large shareholders by introducing associated shareholders,striving for board seats and application of law.It explains second-largest shareholder's influences in the mixed ownership enterprise from ownership control perspective,which provides a reference to reconcile "control conflict" between private shareholders and state-owned shareholders in state holding enterprises.
Governance structure in mixed ownership enterprise is the most important problem for deepening the reform of national firms and promoting the market comprehensively in China.The power of the second largest shareholders in private companies is strengthing along with state-run equity and the private equity integration deepening.Because an ineffective balance of equity relationship between those capitals will directly lead to the loss of efficiency,which is caused by conflicts of control.It is necessary to know motivations,paths and ultimate results of equity balance between the state-run equity and the private equity,in order to find the solution of incentive compatibility between these two equities.This paper studies the balance mechanism between the second largest shareholders in private companies and the largest shareholders in stated-owned companies based on the case of "E Wushang" after Chinese equity division reform,according to the new characteristics of equity structure of listed companies and the theory of shareholder relations.The results show that appropriate control contention between the private shareholder and die state-owned shareholder is consistent with efficiency principle.The motivation of balance mechanism is affected by ownership properties,cash flow rights and shareholding ratio.Equity participate shareholders can balance the large shareholders by introducing associated shareholders,striving for board seats and application of law.It explains second-largest shareholder's influences in the mixed ownership enterprise from ownership control perspective,which provides a reference to reconcile "control conflict" between private shareholders and state-owned shareholders in state holding enterprises.
引文
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[2]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,and Shleifer,A.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[3]Laeven,L.,Levine,R.Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(2):579-604.
[4]Maury,B.,Pajuste,A.Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.
[5]郝云宏,朱炎娟,金杨华.大股东控制权私利行为模式研究:伦理决策的视角[J].中国工业经济,2013,(6):83-95.
[6]Lopez-de-Foronda,O.,Lopez-Iturriaga,F.J.,and Santamarfa-Mariscal,M.Ownership Structure,Sharing of Control and Legal Framework:International Evidence[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2007,15(6):1130-1143.
[7]魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界,2013,(3):133-147.
[8]唐克敏.关于国有企业改革的系列问题思考[J].经济问题,2014,(1):25-30.
[9]张媛春,邹东海.国有股东的控股地位和控制权市场竞争——基于“鄂武商事件”的案例研究[J].经济管理,2012,(8):53-64.
[10]程敏英,魏明海.关系股东的权力超额配置[J].中国工业经济,2013,(10):108-120.
[11]Faccio,M.,Lang,L.H.P.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
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[14]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——中国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007,(6):68-75.
[15]陈信元,汪辉.股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,(11):102-110.
[16]李忠海,张涤新.基金持股与公司绩效:基金作为第二大股东持股的视角[J].上海经济研究,2011,(1):68-78.
[17]Shleifer,A.,Wolfenzon,D.Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):3-27.
[18]张旭辉,黄雷.多个大股东股权结构对股权代理成本的影响[J].开发研究,2012,(5):93-97.
[19]Zwiebel,J.Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control[J].Review of Economic Studies,1995,62(2):161-185.
[20]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.W.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[21]Laeven,L.,Levine,R.Beyond the Biggest=Do Other Large Shareholders Influence Corporate Valuations[R].University of Minnesota,2004.
[22]Jara-Bertin,M.,LoPez-Iturriaga,F.J.,and LoPez-de-Foronda,O.The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms:How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2008,16(3):146-159.
[23]Cheng,M.,Lin,B.,Wei,M.How Does the Relationship between Multiple Large Shareholders Affect Corporate Valuations?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2013,(70):43-70.
[24]Belot,F.Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value:Evidence from French Listed Firms[EB/OL].Http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1282144,2010.
[25]Burkart,M.,Gromb,D.Large Shareholders,Monitoring,and the Value of the Firm[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):693-728.
[26]辛清泉,梁政山,郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与国有企业总经理变更研究[J].证券市场导报,2013,(4):45-49.
[27]祝继高,王春飞.大股东能有效控制管理层吗?——基于国美电器控制权争夺的案例研究[J].管理世界,2012,(4):138-152.
[28]杨黎.控制权争夺对公司治理与公司绩效的影响分析——以武商集团股份有限公司为例[D].中山大学,2010.
[29]大众证券报.鄂武商三董事反对涉足消费金融或与股权争夺有关[EB/OL].Http://Finance.Sina.Com.CN/Stock/S/20140829/101420159679.Shtml/2014-08-29.
[30]郝云宏.少数股也可以谋取企业的相对控制权[J].中外企业家,1998,(6):42.
[31]钱江晚报.银泰向鄂武商股东“隔空喊话”高管不为争控制权[EB/OL].Http://News.Hexun.Com/2011-07-05/131161253.Html/2011-07-05.
[32]安宇宏.混合所有制经济[J].宏观经济管理,2014,(8):85.
[33]高闯,关鑫.社会资本、网络连带与上市公司终极股东控制权——基于社会资本理论的分析框架[J].中国工业经济,2008,(9):88-97.
[34]李维安.深化国有企业改革与发展混合所有制[J].南开管理评论,2014,(3):1.
①2006年9月,围绕武商集团第一大股东的“头把交椅”,当时的武汉国资与“银泰系”展开了长达一年多的较量角逐。银泰系此举的真正意图是想进一步向武汉国资争取取得更多利益,争取更多话语权。2007年11月,浙江银泰收购武汉世纪中商,高调进入湖北百货领域,并期望整合在湖北的产业,目前在湖北共有6家门店。据了解,浙江银泰及湖北银泰由中国银泰投资有限公司控股。浙江银泰已连续6年稳坐浙江百货业头把交椅,并于2007年在中国香港上市。
②以6.8元/股向激励对象授予2495.2万股限制性股票,其业绩考核条件中,2016年和2017年仅要求净利润和净资产收益率有所增长。根据草案,本次激励对象包括公司董事长刘江超以及7位副总经理职务的8名高级管理人员,以及其他233名核心骨干员工。该股权激励计划有效期为5年,包括2年锁定期和3年解锁期,锁定期满后为解锁期,激励对象可在符合解锁条件后按33%、33%和34%比例解锁。
[2]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,and Shleifer,A.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[3]Laeven,L.,Levine,R.Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(2):579-604.
[4]Maury,B.,Pajuste,A.Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.
[5]郝云宏,朱炎娟,金杨华.大股东控制权私利行为模式研究:伦理决策的视角[J].中国工业经济,2013,(6):83-95.
[6]Lopez-de-Foronda,O.,Lopez-Iturriaga,F.J.,and Santamarfa-Mariscal,M.Ownership Structure,Sharing of Control and Legal Framework:International Evidence[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2007,15(6):1130-1143.
[7]魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界,2013,(3):133-147.
[8]唐克敏.关于国有企业改革的系列问题思考[J].经济问题,2014,(1):25-30.
[9]张媛春,邹东海.国有股东的控股地位和控制权市场竞争——基于“鄂武商事件”的案例研究[J].经济管理,2012,(8):53-64.
[10]程敏英,魏明海.关系股东的权力超额配置[J].中国工业经济,2013,(10):108-120.
[11]Faccio,M.,Lang,L.H.P.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[12]Bloch,F.,Hege,U.Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests[R].MPRA Paper,2003.
[13]Attig,N.,El Ghoul,S.,Guedhami,0.,and Rizeanu,S.The Governance Role of Multiple Large Shareholders:Evidence from the Valuation of Cash Holdings[J].Journal of Management and Governance,2013,17(2):419-451.
[14]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——中国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007,(6):68-75.
[15]陈信元,汪辉.股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,(11):102-110.
[16]李忠海,张涤新.基金持股与公司绩效:基金作为第二大股东持股的视角[J].上海经济研究,2011,(1):68-78.
[17]Shleifer,A.,Wolfenzon,D.Investor Protection and Equity Markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):3-27.
[18]张旭辉,黄雷.多个大股东股权结构对股权代理成本的影响[J].开发研究,2012,(5):93-97.
[19]Zwiebel,J.Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control[J].Review of Economic Studies,1995,62(2):161-185.
[20]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.W.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[21]Laeven,L.,Levine,R.Beyond the Biggest=Do Other Large Shareholders Influence Corporate Valuations[R].University of Minnesota,2004.
[22]Jara-Bertin,M.,LoPez-Iturriaga,F.J.,and LoPez-de-Foronda,O.The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms:How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2008,16(3):146-159.
[23]Cheng,M.,Lin,B.,Wei,M.How Does the Relationship between Multiple Large Shareholders Affect Corporate Valuations?Evidence from China[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2013,(70):43-70.
[24]Belot,F.Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value:Evidence from French Listed Firms[EB/OL].Http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1282144,2010.
[25]Burkart,M.,Gromb,D.Large Shareholders,Monitoring,and the Value of the Firm[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):693-728.
[26]辛清泉,梁政山,郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与国有企业总经理变更研究[J].证券市场导报,2013,(4):45-49.
[27]祝继高,王春飞.大股东能有效控制管理层吗?——基于国美电器控制权争夺的案例研究[J].管理世界,2012,(4):138-152.
[28]杨黎.控制权争夺对公司治理与公司绩效的影响分析——以武商集团股份有限公司为例[D].中山大学,2010.
[29]大众证券报.鄂武商三董事反对涉足消费金融或与股权争夺有关[EB/OL].Http://Finance.Sina.Com.CN/Stock/S/20140829/101420159679.Shtml/2014-08-29.
[30]郝云宏.少数股也可以谋取企业的相对控制权[J].中外企业家,1998,(6):42.
[31]钱江晚报.银泰向鄂武商股东“隔空喊话”高管不为争控制权[EB/OL].Http://News.Hexun.Com/2011-07-05/131161253.Html/2011-07-05.
[32]安宇宏.混合所有制经济[J].宏观经济管理,2014,(8):85.
[33]高闯,关鑫.社会资本、网络连带与上市公司终极股东控制权——基于社会资本理论的分析框架[J].中国工业经济,2008,(9):88-97.
[34]李维安.深化国有企业改革与发展混合所有制[J].南开管理评论,2014,(3):1.
①2006年9月,围绕武商集团第一大股东的“头把交椅”,当时的武汉国资与“银泰系”展开了长达一年多的较量角逐。银泰系此举的真正意图是想进一步向武汉国资争取取得更多利益,争取更多话语权。2007年11月,浙江银泰收购武汉世纪中商,高调进入湖北百货领域,并期望整合在湖北的产业,目前在湖北共有6家门店。据了解,浙江银泰及湖北银泰由中国银泰投资有限公司控股。浙江银泰已连续6年稳坐浙江百货业头把交椅,并于2007年在中国香港上市。
②以6.8元/股向激励对象授予2495.2万股限制性股票,其业绩考核条件中,2016年和2017年仅要求净利润和净资产收益率有所增长。根据草案,本次激励对象包括公司董事长刘江超以及7位副总经理职务的8名高级管理人员,以及其他233名核心骨干员工。该股权激励计划有效期为5年,包括2年锁定期和3年解锁期,锁定期满后为解锁期,激励对象可在符合解锁条件后按33%、33%和34%比例解锁。