第二大股东对第一大股东的制衡路径分析——基于中国民营企业与国有企业的多案例研究
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摘要
文章以中国后股权分置改革时期为背景,借鉴西方多个大股东的相关理论,运用多案例研究方法,通过选取两组五家具有多个大股东结构的上市公司(第一组:西藏药业和锦州港;第二组:ST景谷、天科股份和中百集团)进行案例内纵向研究、组内跨案例对比和组间跨案例对比研究,探讨第二大股东进行制衡的路径。研究发现:第二大股东主要采取引入关系股东、争取董事会席位的制衡路径;无论第二大股东采取何种制衡路径,第二大股东自身会获得一定好处,但并不能保证公司整体效率;国有企业的民营参股股东进行制衡总体上没有违反效率原则。
By the background of a equity division reform in China as the background and based on the theory of multiple large shareholders in the West and the method of multiple cases study,the paper selects five listed enterprises( the first group: Tibet Rhodiola Pharmaceutical Holding Co.,Ltd,Jinzhou Port Co.,Ltd; the second group: Yunnan Jinggu Forestry Co.,Ltd,Sichuan Tianyi Science & Technology Co.,Ltd,Zhongbai Holdings Group Co.,Ltd) of two groups with multiple large shareholders and explores the balancing path of the second largest shareholders through study of longitudinal study in the cases,comparative study within the group and comparative study of cross-cases between groups. The results show that : the second largest shareholder can balance the largest shareholder by introducing associated shareholders,striving for board seats after the equity division reform; regardless of the path taken by the second-largest shareholder,the second-largest shareholders themselves will receive certain benefits,but it cannot guarantee the enterprises' overall efficiency; and the balancing of privately operated second-largest shareholders of the stateowned enterprises in the competition has no violation of the principle of efficiency.
By the background of a equity division reform in China as the background and based on the theory of multiple large shareholders in the West and the method of multiple cases study,the paper selects five listed enterprises( the first group: Tibet Rhodiola Pharmaceutical Holding Co.,Ltd,Jinzhou Port Co.,Ltd; the second group: Yunnan Jinggu Forestry Co.,Ltd,Sichuan Tianyi Science & Technology Co.,Ltd,Zhongbai Holdings Group Co.,Ltd) of two groups with multiple large shareholders and explores the balancing path of the second largest shareholders through study of longitudinal study in the cases,comparative study within the group and comparative study of cross-cases between groups. The results show that : the second largest shareholder can balance the largest shareholder by introducing associated shareholders,striving for board seats after the equity division reform; regardless of the path taken by the second-largest shareholder,the second-largest shareholders themselves will receive certain benefits,but it cannot guarantee the enterprises' overall efficiency; and the balancing of privately operated second-largest shareholders of the stateowned enterprises in the competition has no violation of the principle of efficiency.
引文
[1]张媛春,邹东海.国有股东的控股地位和控制权市场竞争——基于“鄂武商事件”的案例研究[J].经济管理,2012(8):53-64.
[2]叶建宏,汪炜.政策性负担、薪酬委员会独立性与经理人超额薪酬——来自后股改时期国有上市公司的证据[J].江西财经大学学报,2015(4):31-41.
[3]郝云宏,汪茜.混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究——基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析[J].中国工业经济,2015(3):148-160.
[4]JENSEN M,MECKLING W.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[5]LAPORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[6]LAEVEN L,LEVINE R.Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(2):579-604.
[7]MAURY B,PAJUSTE A.Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.
[8]ATTIG N,EI GHOUL S,GUEDHAMI O.Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role?Evidence from East Asia[J].Journal of Financial Research,2009,32(4):395-422.
[9]DHILLON A,ROSSETTO S.Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders[EB/OL].(2009-03-18)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=891548.
[10]LAPORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[11]CRONQVIST H,FAHLENBRACH R.Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2007,22(10):3941-3976.
[12]祝继高,王春飞.大股东能有效控制管理层吗?——基于国美电器控制权争夺的案例研究[J].管理世界,2012(4):138-152.
[13]吴佳.制衡股东性质与企业投资效率研究[D].苏州:苏州大学商学院,2012.
[14]BENNEDSEN M,WOLFENZON D.The Balance of Power in Closely-Held Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139.
[15]BELOT F.Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value:Evidence From French Listed Firms[EB/OL].(2010-09-01)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282144,2010.
[16]关鑫,齐晓飞.上市公司股东间合作机制构建研究[J].中国工业经济,2015(2):115-127.
[17]SYRIOPOULOS T,TSATSARONIS M,ROUMPIS E.Financial Decisions,Ownership and Governance on Corporate Value[EB/OL].(2007-03-05)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=968280,2007.
[18]辛清泉,梁政山,郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与国有企业总经理变更研究[J].证券市场导报,2013(4):45-49.
[19]郑丙金,段彦.ST兴业控股与控制权争夺战及其反思[J].国际商务财会,2010(2):83-85.
[20]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007(6):68-75.
[21]魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界,2013(3):133-147.
[22]林树,陈浩.机构投资者能提高公司业绩吗?——基于民营上市公司的经验研究[J].山东社会科学,2013(10):101-105.
[23]张欣哲,周静,罗春燕,等.民营公司两权分离度、内部制衡机制与经营绩效关系[J].证券市场导报,2012(4):41-46.
[24]陈凌,王萌,朱建安.中国家族企业的现代转型——第六届“创业与家族企业成长”国际研讨会侧记[J].管理世界,2011(4):163-166.
[25]中财网.中百集团:经营者薪酬管理办法[EB/OL].(2014-12-15)[2015-06-04].http://www.cfi.net.cn/p20141215003300.html.
[26]郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与总经理变更、股利政策的实证研究[D].重庆:重庆大学工商管理学院,2013.
[27]方军雄.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界,2012(11):144-155.
1对于涨薪,第二大股东一方认为:研发、销售和管理人才是公司发展的动力,为了留住有能力的人才就应该涨薪,提高20%的薪酬水平对员工来说是最基本的增长。第一大股东一方表示:公司目前的业绩水平不足以支撑给员工大幅加薪;若上调20%—40%的薪酬,可能影响公司的长远盈利;如果在员工加薪范围的实际操作中纳入高管,那可能是变相给高管加薪;调整高管薪酬应该基于公司业绩的变化,高管的工作范围、职责的变化等;目前也缺乏相应的业绩考核标准来提升高管薪酬。
1关于盈投控股一方更换董事长的提议,其理由是:目前西南化研院的法定代表人也是天科股份的董事长,即同是天科股份的法定代表人;两单位存在同业竞争问题。对此,昊华集团一方表示:自公司上市以来,与西南化研院的关联交易公平、公开;尽管曾经出现过几次可能由两家单位同时投标的情形,但并不能准确的定义为同业竞争,且更换董事长并不能就此规避这些问题。
[2]叶建宏,汪炜.政策性负担、薪酬委员会独立性与经理人超额薪酬——来自后股改时期国有上市公司的证据[J].江西财经大学学报,2015(4):31-41.
[3]郝云宏,汪茜.混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究——基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析[J].中国工业经济,2015(3):148-160.
[4]JENSEN M,MECKLING W.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[5]LAPORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[6]LAEVEN L,LEVINE R.Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(2):579-604.
[7]MAURY B,PAJUSTE A.Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.
[8]ATTIG N,EI GHOUL S,GUEDHAMI O.Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role?Evidence from East Asia[J].Journal of Financial Research,2009,32(4):395-422.
[9]DHILLON A,ROSSETTO S.Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders[EB/OL].(2009-03-18)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=891548.
[10]LAPORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[11]CRONQVIST H,FAHLENBRACH R.Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2007,22(10):3941-3976.
[12]祝继高,王春飞.大股东能有效控制管理层吗?——基于国美电器控制权争夺的案例研究[J].管理世界,2012(4):138-152.
[13]吴佳.制衡股东性质与企业投资效率研究[D].苏州:苏州大学商学院,2012.
[14]BENNEDSEN M,WOLFENZON D.The Balance of Power in Closely-Held Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139.
[15]BELOT F.Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value:Evidence From French Listed Firms[EB/OL].(2010-09-01)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282144,2010.
[16]关鑫,齐晓飞.上市公司股东间合作机制构建研究[J].中国工业经济,2015(2):115-127.
[17]SYRIOPOULOS T,TSATSARONIS M,ROUMPIS E.Financial Decisions,Ownership and Governance on Corporate Value[EB/OL].(2007-03-05)[2015-06-04].http://ssrn.com/abstract=968280,2007.
[18]辛清泉,梁政山,郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与国有企业总经理变更研究[J].证券市场导报,2013(4):45-49.
[19]郑丙金,段彦.ST兴业控股与控制权争夺战及其反思[J].国际商务财会,2010(2):83-85.
[20]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007(6):68-75.
[21]魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界,2013(3):133-147.
[22]林树,陈浩.机构投资者能提高公司业绩吗?——基于民营上市公司的经验研究[J].山东社会科学,2013(10):101-105.
[23]张欣哲,周静,罗春燕,等.民营公司两权分离度、内部制衡机制与经营绩效关系[J].证券市场导报,2012(4):41-46.
[24]陈凌,王萌,朱建安.中国家族企业的现代转型——第六届“创业与家族企业成长”国际研讨会侧记[J].管理世界,2011(4):163-166.
[25]中财网.中百集团:经营者薪酬管理办法[EB/OL].(2014-12-15)[2015-06-04].http://www.cfi.net.cn/p20141215003300.html.
[26]郭磊.非控股股东派驻董事与总经理变更、股利政策的实证研究[D].重庆:重庆大学工商管理学院,2013.
[27]方军雄.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界,2012(11):144-155.
1对于涨薪,第二大股东一方认为:研发、销售和管理人才是公司发展的动力,为了留住有能力的人才就应该涨薪,提高20%的薪酬水平对员工来说是最基本的增长。第一大股东一方表示:公司目前的业绩水平不足以支撑给员工大幅加薪;若上调20%—40%的薪酬,可能影响公司的长远盈利;如果在员工加薪范围的实际操作中纳入高管,那可能是变相给高管加薪;调整高管薪酬应该基于公司业绩的变化,高管的工作范围、职责的变化等;目前也缺乏相应的业绩考核标准来提升高管薪酬。
1关于盈投控股一方更换董事长的提议,其理由是:目前西南化研院的法定代表人也是天科股份的董事长,即同是天科股份的法定代表人;两单位存在同业竞争问题。对此,昊华集团一方表示:自公司上市以来,与西南化研院的关联交易公平、公开;尽管曾经出现过几次可能由两家单位同时投标的情形,但并不能准确的定义为同业竞争,且更换董事长并不能就此规避这些问题。