基于SNA的特大型工程投资项目关键利益主体识别与博弈分析
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摘要
特大型工程投资项目在建设过程中涉及众多利益主体,解决不同行为主体之间的利益冲突、关键利益主体的利益博弈问题对于项目的成功实施至关重要。首先构建特大型工程投资项目利益相关者矩阵,通过社会网络分析测算出项目的关键利益主体:施工方、项目法人、地方政府及移民;然后基于博弈理论,对关键利益主体利益冲突进行博弈分析,以找出影响博弈均衡的关键因素,并讨论复制动态演化点;提出了完善监督管理制度、加大投机行为处罚力度、建立合理的移民管理制度的对策。
The oversized construction investment projects involve many stakeholders in the process of construction. It is very important for the projects to solve the conflicts of interests among different actors and the game of interests of the key stakeholders.Based on this problem,the matrix of the key stakeholders of the oversized construction investment projects is established,namely,the constructor,the project owner,the local government and the immigrants through the social network analysis. And then based on the evolutionary game theory,the conflicts of the key stakeholders are analyzed to find out the key factors that affect the equilibrium of the game by using the dynamic evolutionary game model as well as how to balance the interests between them. Finally, according to the analysis results, the countermeasures are put forward to improve the supervision and management system and to establish a reasonable immigration management system.
The oversized construction investment projects involve many stakeholders in the process of construction. It is very important for the projects to solve the conflicts of interests among different actors and the game of interests of the key stakeholders.Based on this problem,the matrix of the key stakeholders of the oversized construction investment projects is established,namely,the constructor,the project owner,the local government and the immigrants through the social network analysis. And then based on the evolutionary game theory,the conflicts of the key stakeholders are analyzed to find out the key factors that affect the equilibrium of the game by using the dynamic evolutionary game model as well as how to balance the interests between them. Finally, according to the analysis results, the countermeasures are put forward to improve the supervision and management system and to establish a reasonable immigration management system.
引文
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[12] LIANG X,YU T,GUO L.Understanding stakeholders’ influence on project success with a new SNA method:a case study of the green retrofit in China[J].Sustainability,2017,9(10):1927.
[13] 沈岐平,杨静.建设项目利益相关者管理框架研究[J].工程管理学报,2010,24(4):412-419.
[14] 张合军,陈建国,贾广社,等.社会网络分析与建设工程绩效目标设置[J].科技进步与对策,2009,26(21):176-180.
[15] 崇丹,李永奎,乐云.城市基础设施建设项目群组织网络关系治理研究:一种网络组织的视角[J].软科学,2012,26(2):13-19.
[16] 华坚,张长征,吴祠金.利益博弈与群体力量:基于演化博弈的群体性事件生成机理及其化解[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,17(4):53-59,91.
[2] 王波,黄德春,华坚,等.水利工程建设社会稳定风险评估与实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(4):149-154.
[3] 张长征,黄德春,王波.重大水利工程环境损害的社会稳定风险评价研究述评[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013,15(4):54-57.
[4] BERINGER C,JONAS D,GEMUNDEN H G.Establishingproject portfolio management:an exploratory analysis of the influence of internal stakeholders’ interactions[J].Project Management Journal,2012,43(6):16-32.
[5] 卓菁.基于利益相关者视角的建设项目管理目标及对策研究[J].改革与战略,2012,28(4):41-43.
[6] SECHI G M,ZUCCA R,ZUDDAS P.Water costs allocation in complex systems using a cooperative game theory approach[J].Water Resources Management,2013,27(6):1781-1796.
[7] 王孟钧,陆洋.建设项目主体间冲突型博弈的效益分析及制度设计[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(13):31-34.
[8] 孙蕾,孙绍荣.重大基础工程引发的利益冲突与治理机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(1):34-42.
[9] WEI S,YANG H.Using game theory based approaches to simulate stakeholder conflicts concerning domestic water allocation and pollution reduction ininterbasin water transfer in China[J].Journal of Beijing Normal University,2010,43(3):254-267.
[10] 丁荣贵,刘芳,孙涛,等.基于社会网络分析的项目治理研究:以大型建设监理项目为例[J].中国软科学,2010(6):132-140.
[11] 范如国.复杂网络结构范型下的社会治理协同创新[J].中国社会科学,2014(4):98-120,206.
[12] LIANG X,YU T,GUO L.Understanding stakeholders’ influence on project success with a new SNA method:a case study of the green retrofit in China[J].Sustainability,2017,9(10):1927.
[13] 沈岐平,杨静.建设项目利益相关者管理框架研究[J].工程管理学报,2010,24(4):412-419.
[14] 张合军,陈建国,贾广社,等.社会网络分析与建设工程绩效目标设置[J].科技进步与对策,2009,26(21):176-180.
[15] 崇丹,李永奎,乐云.城市基础设施建设项目群组织网络关系治理研究:一种网络组织的视角[J].软科学,2012,26(2):13-19.
[16] 华坚,张长征,吴祠金.利益博弈与群体力量:基于演化博弈的群体性事件生成机理及其化解[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,17(4):53-59,91.