考虑碳排放与定价的云制造供应链协调机制研究
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摘要
面向制造型企业低碳发展的现实需求,基于云制造平台运营商主导的Stackelberg博弈,引入价格与碳减排量共同影响的需求函数,综合对比了集中决策与分散决策下云制造供应链最优碳减排量、最优定价及供应链总利润,提出了云制造模式下供应链环境治理的协调机制。主要结论包括:①为实现分散决策的帕累托改进,基于决策主体有限理性的假设,设计了旁支付自执行契约对分散决策的云制造供应链系统进行环境协调优化。②通过算例验证了该契约的有效性,实现了对云制造供应链系统利润增加值的公平分配。③在灵敏度分析中还发现,云制造供应链利润与碳减排成本及消费者的价格敏感系数负相关,与消费者的低碳偏好正相关,且消费者的低碳偏好程度对云制造供应链的总利润的影响最大。本研究为我国云制造服务提供商和云服务平台运营商的运营及低碳发展提供了理论指导和决策参考。
Based on the realistic demand of low carbon development in manufacturing enterprises,this paper led into the demand function for the cloud manufacturing platform operators-dominated Stackelberg game,which was affected by both the price and the carbon reduction.The optimal carbon reduction,price and system profit of the supply chain in the process of the centralized decision and the decentralized decision were compared comprehensively,and the environmental governance coordination mechanism for cloud manufacturing supply chain was proposed.The main conclusions are as follows:(1) In order to improve Pareto's improvement of the decentralized decision,the self enforcing contract was designed to realize the environment coordination of the cloud manufacturing supply chain system of the decentralized decision based on the assumption of the cold chain members' bounded rationality.(2) The validity of the contract was verified through an example,and it realized the fair distribution of the added profit of the cloud manufacturing supply chain system.(3) In sensitivity analysis,it is found that the profit of cloud manufacturing supply chain is negatively related to the cost of carbon emission reduction and consumer price sensitivity,and is positively related to consumer low carbon preference,and the consumer's low carbon preference has the greatest impact on the total profit of the cloud manufacturing supply chain.The research conclusion and contract design will provide decision-making reference for cloud manufacturing service providers and cloud service platform operators in daily operation and carbon emission reduction in China.
Based on the realistic demand of low carbon development in manufacturing enterprises,this paper led into the demand function for the cloud manufacturing platform operators-dominated Stackelberg game,which was affected by both the price and the carbon reduction.The optimal carbon reduction,price and system profit of the supply chain in the process of the centralized decision and the decentralized decision were compared comprehensively,and the environmental governance coordination mechanism for cloud manufacturing supply chain was proposed.The main conclusions are as follows:(1) In order to improve Pareto's improvement of the decentralized decision,the self enforcing contract was designed to realize the environment coordination of the cloud manufacturing supply chain system of the decentralized decision based on the assumption of the cold chain members' bounded rationality.(2) The validity of the contract was verified through an example,and it realized the fair distribution of the added profit of the cloud manufacturing supply chain system.(3) In sensitivity analysis,it is found that the profit of cloud manufacturing supply chain is negatively related to the cost of carbon emission reduction and consumer price sensitivity,and is positively related to consumer low carbon preference,and the consumer's low carbon preference has the greatest impact on the total profit of the cloud manufacturing supply chain.The research conclusion and contract design will provide decision-making reference for cloud manufacturing service providers and cloud service platform operators in daily operation and carbon emission reduction in China.
引文
[1] 胡艳娟,武理哲,张霖,等.云制造服务评价理论与方法研究综述[J].计算机集成制造系统,2017,23(03):640-649.
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[3] 王薇薇,洪跃,张在房.服务型制造混合供应链的稳定性及弹性评估[J].计算机集成制造系统,2018,24(01):203-212.
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[12] Hou J,Zeng A Z,Zhao L.Coordination with a backup supplier through buy-back contract under supply disruption[J].Transportation Research Part E,2010,46(6):881-895.
[13] 刘浪,石岩.回购契约应对非常规突发事件的三级供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(2):296-303.
[14] 蹇明,方新,靳留乾,等.基于期望准则和分布自由的回购契约协调模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(9):67-78.
[15] Kim J S,Park S I,Shin K Y.A quantity flexibility contract model for a system with heterogeneous suppliers[J].Computers & Operations Research,2014,41(1):98-108.
[16] Li X,Lian Z,Choong K K,et al.A quantity-flexibility contract with coordination[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,179:273-284.
[17] 吴双胜,刘浪,穆昌兵.价格随机条件下参与者均风险厌恶的应急数量弹性契约研究[J].华东交通大学学报,2017,34(4):75-83.
[18] 何龙飞,赵道致,刘阳.基于自执行契约设计的供应链动态博弈协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(10):1864-1878.
[19] 夏良杰,赵道致,何龙飞,等.基于自执行旁支付契约的供应商与制造商减排博弈与协调[J].管理学报,2014,11(05):750-757.
[20] Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N.Reverse Channel Design:The Case of Competing Retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[21] D’Aspremont C,Jacquemin A.Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[22] 肖人彬,余睿武.成本扰动与广告协同下的供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2011,17(10):2248-2255.
[23] 江世英,李随成.考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收益共享契约[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(06):169-176.
[2] 吴成霞,赵道致,潘新宇.云服务平台预测信息分享对制造商渠道策略的影响[J].软科学,2016,30(04):105-110.
[3] 王薇薇,洪跃,张在房.服务型制造混合供应链的稳定性及弹性评估[J].计算机集成制造系统,2018,24(01):203-212.
[4] 李伯虎,张霖,任磊,等.云制造典型特征、关键技术与应用[J].计算机集成制造系统,2012,18(07):1345-1356.
[5] Liu X F,Shahriar M R,Sunny S,et al.Cyber-physical manufacturing cloud:Architecture,virtualization,communication,and testbed[J].Journal of Manufacturing Systems,2017,43:352-364.
[6] Wang X,Wang X,Su Y.Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering[J].Applied Mathematical Modeling,2013,37(6):3848-3860.
[7] Cao E,Ma Y,Wan C,et al.Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain[J].Operations Research Letters,2013,41(4):410-414.
[8] 毕功兵,瞿安民,梁樑.不公平厌恶下供应链的批发价格契约与协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(1):134-140.
[9] Palsule-Desai O D.Supply chain coordination using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts[J].Omega,2013,41(4):780-796.
[10] Arani H V,Rabbani M,Rafiei H.A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,178:42-56.
[11] 刘云志,樊治平.考虑损失规避与质量水平的供应链协调契约模型[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(1):89-102.
[12] Hou J,Zeng A Z,Zhao L.Coordination with a backup supplier through buy-back contract under supply disruption[J].Transportation Research Part E,2010,46(6):881-895.
[13] 刘浪,石岩.回购契约应对非常规突发事件的三级供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(2):296-303.
[14] 蹇明,方新,靳留乾,等.基于期望准则和分布自由的回购契约协调模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(9):67-78.
[15] Kim J S,Park S I,Shin K Y.A quantity flexibility contract model for a system with heterogeneous suppliers[J].Computers & Operations Research,2014,41(1):98-108.
[16] Li X,Lian Z,Choong K K,et al.A quantity-flexibility contract with coordination[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,179:273-284.
[17] 吴双胜,刘浪,穆昌兵.价格随机条件下参与者均风险厌恶的应急数量弹性契约研究[J].华东交通大学学报,2017,34(4):75-83.
[18] 何龙飞,赵道致,刘阳.基于自执行契约设计的供应链动态博弈协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(10):1864-1878.
[19] 夏良杰,赵道致,何龙飞,等.基于自执行旁支付契约的供应商与制造商减排博弈与协调[J].管理学报,2014,11(05):750-757.
[20] Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N.Reverse Channel Design:The Case of Competing Retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[21] D’Aspremont C,Jacquemin A.Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[22] 肖人彬,余睿武.成本扰动与广告协同下的供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2011,17(10):2248-2255.
[23] 江世英,李随成.考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收益共享契约[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(06):169-176.