基于产品质量监管视角的政府、企业与消费者博弈策略研究
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摘要
鉴于政府、企业与消费者在产品质量监管过程中的重要作用,提出了三方协同监管产品质量的新模式。有别于政府、企业和消费者间的两两博弈,构建了政府、企业和消费者共同参与的产品质量监管博弈模型。通过求解博弈模型的混合战略Nash均衡解,分析了影响三方策略选择的因素,并代入实际数据运用Matlab 7.0对博弈模型进行了算例分析。研究结果表明影响政府监管行为的因素是政府对违规企业的惩罚、企业对消费者损失的赔偿、企业生产合格产品与不合格产品的成本。企业生产合格产品的行为与政府监管成本、企业受到政府惩罚力度、生产不合格产品对政府造成的直接经济损失及间接经济损失因素有关。消费者维权成本及企业对消费者损失的赔偿是影响消费者维权的主要因素。研究得出政府监管企业概率越大,企业生产合格产品的概率越大;消费者维权概率变大时,企业生产合格产品的概率变大,而此时政府监管生产企业的概率变小。最后,从产品质量监管角度,提出了提高政府监管效率、保障企业产品质量、发挥消费者监督优势的建议及措施。
In view of the important role of government,enterprise and consumer in product quality regulation,the new pattern of coordinated regulation is put forward,which can make up the loopholes and improve the efficiency of government regulation.Based on that,the tripartite model of product quality regulation among government,enterprise and consumer is constructed to explore the mixed Nash equilibrium and action strategy.Then,using Matlab 7 analyzes the game model by substituting the actual data.The results show that the factors that influence the government regulation behavior are the government's punishment to the illegal enterprise,the enterprise's compensation for the loss of the consumer,the cost of the qualified products and unqualified products.The production of qualified products is related to the cost of government regulation,the government's punishment,the direct and indirect economic losses caused by the production of substandard products.Cost of rights protection and compensation for consumers' losses are the main factors that affect consumers' strategic choice.Research also makes clear that the greater the probability of government regulation,the greater the probability of the production of qualified products;when the probability of consumer supervision becomes large,the probability of enterprises to produce qualified products also becomes large,and the probability of government regulation of the enterprise becomes small.Finally,based on the perspective of government regulation,the measures to deal with the interests of all parties are given,the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to ensure the quality of the products and to exert the advantages of the consumer supervision.
In view of the important role of government,enterprise and consumer in product quality regulation,the new pattern of coordinated regulation is put forward,which can make up the loopholes and improve the efficiency of government regulation.Based on that,the tripartite model of product quality regulation among government,enterprise and consumer is constructed to explore the mixed Nash equilibrium and action strategy.Then,using Matlab 7 analyzes the game model by substituting the actual data.The results show that the factors that influence the government regulation behavior are the government's punishment to the illegal enterprise,the enterprise's compensation for the loss of the consumer,the cost of the qualified products and unqualified products.The production of qualified products is related to the cost of government regulation,the government's punishment,the direct and indirect economic losses caused by the production of substandard products.Cost of rights protection and compensation for consumers' losses are the main factors that affect consumers' strategic choice.Research also makes clear that the greater the probability of government regulation,the greater the probability of the production of qualified products;when the probability of consumer supervision becomes large,the probability of enterprises to produce qualified products also becomes large,and the probability of government regulation of the enterprise becomes small.Finally,based on the perspective of government regulation,the measures to deal with the interests of all parties are given,the countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to ensure the quality of the products and to exert the advantages of the consumer supervision.
引文
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[16]Wen Decheng,Cheng Liying.An Analysis of discerning customer behavior:An exploratory study[J].Total Quality Management&Business Excellence,2013,24(11):1316-1331.
[17]Schmeiser S.Consumer inference and the regulation of consumer information[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2014,37(37):192-200.
[18]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,(2):111-120.
[19]张卫东,耿笑.基于三方博弈模型的网络交易平台收费机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):135-141
[20]杨丰梅,王安瑛,吴军,等.基于博弈论的C2B2C模式下电商信用监管机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(8):2102-2110.
[21]韩霁.要中国制造,更要“中国质造”[N].光明日报,2015-11-24(11).
[2]于涛,刘长玉.政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):90-96.
[3]周雄伟,刘鹏超,陈晓红.信息不对称条件下双寡头市场中质量差异化产品虚假信息问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(3):133-140.
[4]Narasimhan R,Ghosh S,Mendez D A.Dynamic model of product quality and pricing decisions on sales response[J].Decision Sciences,2007,24(5):893-908.
[5]Shi Hongyan,Liu Yunchuan,Petruzzi N C.Consumer heterogeneity,product quality,and distribution channels[J].Management Science,2013,59(5):1162-1176.
[6]Yasuda T.Food safety regulation in the United States:An empirical and theoretical examination[J].Independent Review,2010,15(2):201-226.
[7]吴元元.信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化-食品安全治理的新视野[J].中国社会科学,2012,(6):115-133.
[8]于涛,刘长玉.政府与生产企业间产品质量问题博弈分析[J].山东大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2014,(2):63-69.
[9]曹裕,俞传艳,万光羽.政府参与下食品企业监管博弈研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,(1):141-147.
[10]Fairchild R J.The manufacturing sector’s environmental motives:A game-theoretic analysis[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2007,79(3):333-344.
[11]AndréF J,González P,Porteiro N.Strategic quality competition and the porter hypothesis[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2007,57(2):182-194.
[12]王志国,李磊,杨善林,等.动态博弈下引导企业低碳技术创新的政府低碳规制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(12):139-147.
[13]刘长玉,于涛.绿色产品质量监管的三方博弈关系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,(10):170-176.
[14]Chao G H,Iravani S M R,Savaskan R C.Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts[J].Management Science,2009,55(7):1122-1138.
[15]许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):131-141.
[16]Wen Decheng,Cheng Liying.An Analysis of discerning customer behavior:An exploratory study[J].Total Quality Management&Business Excellence,2013,24(11):1316-1331.
[17]Schmeiser S.Consumer inference and the regulation of consumer information[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2014,37(37):192-200.
[18]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,(2):111-120.
[19]张卫东,耿笑.基于三方博弈模型的网络交易平台收费机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):135-141
[20]杨丰梅,王安瑛,吴军,等.基于博弈论的C2B2C模式下电商信用监管机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(8):2102-2110.
[21]韩霁.要中国制造,更要“中国质造”[N].光明日报,2015-11-24(11).