公共预算决策及时性的动态均衡分析
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摘要
公共预算决策的及时性是政府善政和国家治理能力的重要体现。本文基于前景理论,构建了预算决策的"双群体"静态和动态前景博弈模型,以全面透析和模拟预算决策的真实世界。研究表明,预算决策及时与否与预算偏离度、决策者的支出偏好、损失厌恶程度以及延迟成本密切相关。为避免预算延迟,应制定有利于平滑收入波动的预算制度,重点加强极端财政状况时期的预算管理和控制;引导决策者形成一致的支出偏好,并适当延长决策层的任期;建立预算决策奖惩激励机制以及信息网络共享平台。
The timely decision-making of the public budget is the important manifestation of the government's good governance and the capacity of national governance. Based on the prospect theory,this paper constructs the"double-group"static and dynamic prospect game models,so as to fully analyze and simulate the real world of budget decisions. The results show that whether the budget decision is timely or not is related to budget deviation,decision-maker's preference,loss aversion and delay cost. To avoid budget delays,a budget system should be developed to smooth the fluctuations of income,with emphasis on budget management and control during periods of extreme fiscal conditions; decision-makers should be guided to form consistent spending preferences and to extend the leader's tenure; and the budgetary incentives mechanism and information network sharing platform should also be established.
The timely decision-making of the public budget is the important manifestation of the government's good governance and the capacity of national governance. Based on the prospect theory,this paper constructs the"double-group"static and dynamic prospect game models,so as to fully analyze and simulate the real world of budget decisions. The results show that whether the budget decision is timely or not is related to budget deviation,decision-maker's preference,loss aversion and delay cost. To avoid budget delays,a budget system should be developed to smooth the fluctuations of income,with emphasis on budget management and control during periods of extreme fiscal conditions; decision-makers should be guided to form consistent spending preferences and to extend the leader's tenure; and the budgetary incentives mechanism and information network sharing platform should also be established.
引文
[1]邓研华.公共预算研究述评:基于政治学的视角[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011(5):43-48.
[2]阿伦·威尔达夫斯基,布莱登·斯瓦德洛.预算与治理[M].苟燕楠,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2010.
[3]WILDAVSKY A.Political implications of budgetary reform[J].Public Administration Review,1961,21(4):183-190.
[4]爱伦·鲁宾.公共预算中的政治:收入与支出,借贷与平衡[M].叶丽娟,马骏,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001.
[5]谢庆奎,单继友.公共预算的本质:政治过程[J].天津社会科学,2009(1):56-58.
[6]OYAKOJO M.The political dynamics behind government budgeting process[EB/OL].(2015-02-17)[2016-11-30].http://patimes.org/political-dynamics-government-budgeting-process/.
[7]RUBIN I.The politics of Public budgeting:getting and spending,borrowing and balancing[M].New Jersey:Chatham House Publishers,1990.
[8]PATZ R.From politicised budgeting to political budgets in the EU?[C].Milan:International Conference on Public Policy,2015.
[9]SHI M,SVENSSON J.Political budget cycles:do they differ across countries and why?[J].Journal of Public Economics,2006,90(8-9):1367-1389.
[10]BRENDER A,DRAZEN A.Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2005,52(7):1271-1295.
[11]苟燕楠,董静.公共预算决策——现代观点[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[12]栾晓峰.公共预算权利、体制与文化[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2015.
[13]江钰辉,吴金光.财政监督嵌入预算编制的三方博弈分析与制度优化[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2015(1):37-44.
[14]LIMONGI F,FIGUEIREDO A.The budget process and legislative behavior:individual amendments,support for the executive branch,and government programs[J].Dados,2005,48(4):737-776.
[15]SAVOIE D J.The politics of public spending in Canada[M].Toronto:University of Toronto Press,1990.
[16]CAIDEN N,WILDAVSKY A.Planning and budgeting in poor countries[M].New York:John Wiley and Sons Inc.,1974.
[17]KELLY J,WANNA J.New public management and the politics of government budgeting[J].International Public Management Review,2000,1(1):33-55.
[18]SHAH A.Public sector governance and accountability series:participatory budgeting[R].Washington:World Bank,2007.
[19]ROBINSON M.Performance budgeting:linking funding and results[M].New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2007.
[20]RAGHUNANDAN M,FYFE D,KISTOW B et al.Examining the behavioural aspects of budgeting with particular emphasis on public sector/service budgets[J].International Journal of Business&Social Science,2012,3(14):107-116.
[21]BRENDER A,DRAZEN A.Elections,leaders,and the composition of government spending[J].Journal of Public Economics,2013,97(1):18-31.
[22]MONGE P R.Theoretical and analytical issues in studying organizational processes[J].Organization Science,1990,1(4):406-430.
[23]BERRY,W D.The confusing case of budgetary incrementalism:too many meanings for a single concept[J].The Journal of Politics,1990,52(1):167-196.
[24]AUERBACH,A J.Fiscal uncertainty and how to deal with it[C].Washington DC:Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution Conference,2014.
[25]董静,苟燕楠.公共预算决策分析框架与中国预算管理制度改革[J].财贸经济,2004(11):38-42.
[26]BHATTI I,PHAUP M.Budgeting for fiscal uncertainty and bias:a federal process proposal[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2015,35(2):89-105.
[27]LELOUP L T.From micro budgeting to macro budgeting:evolution in theory and practice[M]∥RUBIN I.New directions in budget theory.Albany:State University of New York Press,1988.
[28]HEARN J J,PHAUP M.Making better budget decisions easier:some changes suggested by behavioral research[R].Washington DC:Brookings Institution,2016.
[29]李允杰,孙克难,李显峰,等.政府财务与预算[M].台北:五南出版社,2007.
[30]MEO T M.The new economics of organization[J].American Journal of Political Science,1984,28(4):739-777.
[31]JOYCE P.The costs of budget uncertainty:analyzing the impact of late appropriations[R].Washington DC:IBM Center for the Business of Government,2012.
[32]SPEER I D.The causes of budget gridlock in california:institutions,parties,and conflict[D].Los Angeles:University of California,2016.
[33]BRASS C T.Shutdown of the federal government:causes,processes,and effects[R].Washington CD:Congressional Research Service,2013.
[34]MEYERS R T.Biennial budgeting by the U.S.Congress[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2009,8(2):21-32.
[35]MEYERS R T.Late appropriations and government shutdowns:frequency,causes,consequences,and remedies[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,1997,17(3):25-38.
[36]CLARKE W.Divided government and budget conflict in the U.S.States[J].Legislative Studies Quarterly,1998,23(1):5-22.
[37]BINDER S A.The dynamics of legislative gridlock,1947-96[J].The American Political Science Review,1999,93(3):519-533.
[38]MASKET S.It takes an outsider:extral egislative organization and partisanship in the California Assembly,1849-2006[J].American Journal of Political Science,2007,51(3):482-497.
[39]NCSL.Late state budgets[EB/OL].(2010-08-27)[2016-11-29].http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx.
[40]ANDERSEN A L,LASSEN D D,NIELSEN L H W.The impact of fiscal governance on bond markets:evidence from late budgets and state government borrowing costs[Z].Epru Working Paper No.2010-11,2010.
[41]CUMMINS J.An empirical analysis of california budget gridlock[J].State Politics&Policy Quarterly,2012,12(12):23-42.
[42]ANDERSENA A L,LASSEN D D,NIELSEN L H W.The impact of late budgets on state government borrowing costs[J].Journal of Public Economics,2014,109(1):27-35.
[43]KLARNER C E,PHILLIPS J H,MUCKLER M.Overcoming fiscal gridlock:institutions and budget bargaining[J].The Journal of Politics,2012,74(4):992-1009.
[44]MOODY.Trend of on time state budgets continues as revenues improve[R].New York:Moody's Investor Service,2012.
[45]LU E Y,CHEN G.A day late and a dollar short?A study of budget passage in New York state[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2016,36(3):3-21.
[46]KAHNEMAN D,TVERSKY A.Prospect theory:an analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1979,47(2):263-292.
[47]马蔡琛,赵灿.公共预算遵从的行为经济学分析——基于前景理论的考察[J].河北学刊,2013(4):127-130.
[48]BARTLE J R,JUN M.Applying transaction cost theory to public budgeting and finance[M]∥BARTLE J R.Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting.New York:JAI Press,2001.
[49]马蔡琛,袁娇.中期预算改革的国际经验与中国现实[J].经济纵横,2016(4):114-120.
[50]SCHICK A.The federal budget:politics,policy,process[M].Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press,2000:67.
[51]KAHNEMAN D.Thinking,fast and slow[M].New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux,2013.
[52]GREEN M,THOMPSON F.Organizational process models of budgeting[Z].[S.L.]:SSRN Electronic Journal,December 2002.
[53]WILADVSKY A.The politics of the budgetary process[M].Boston:Little Brown&Co,1974.
[54]SANTOS,MARIA H D C,MACHADO,et al.O Jogo Orcamentário da Uni2o:relac7es executivo-legislativo na terra do pork-barrel[R].Brasília:Editora da Un B/ENAP,1997.
(1)此处铁三角是指政客(特定的公职人员)、官僚(公共行政人员和公务员)和公众(包括利益集团)。
(1)此处凹函数是指决策者的效用函数是预算数的增函数,当预算数增加时,决策者所获得的效用或满意度也相应增加,但随着预算数的逐渐增加,决策者对预算数额的敏感度呈递减趋势。
(2)此处凸函数是指决策者的效用函数为预算数的减函数,当预算数减少时,决策者所获得的效用或满意度也逐渐下降,但随着预算数的削减,决策者对预算缩减的敏感度逐渐减弱。
(1)值得注意的是,?>δm这一假设对结论是至关重要的。如果没有?>δm这一假设,不论预算收入增加或减少,决策双方都极有可能将所有变化的预算收入分配给其最偏好的项目。倘若假设?<δb1,则对保守派A而言,这意味着可能会出现E2 (1)在美国预算史上,预算决策延迟现象屡见不鲜。自2002年以来,美国至少有19个州在新财年开始时仍未通过最终预算,5个州甚至经历了政府关门的情形。
[2]阿伦·威尔达夫斯基,布莱登·斯瓦德洛.预算与治理[M].苟燕楠,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2010.
[3]WILDAVSKY A.Political implications of budgetary reform[J].Public Administration Review,1961,21(4):183-190.
[4]爱伦·鲁宾.公共预算中的政治:收入与支出,借贷与平衡[M].叶丽娟,马骏,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001.
[5]谢庆奎,单继友.公共预算的本质:政治过程[J].天津社会科学,2009(1):56-58.
[6]OYAKOJO M.The political dynamics behind government budgeting process[EB/OL].(2015-02-17)[2016-11-30].http://patimes.org/political-dynamics-government-budgeting-process/.
[7]RUBIN I.The politics of Public budgeting:getting and spending,borrowing and balancing[M].New Jersey:Chatham House Publishers,1990.
[8]PATZ R.From politicised budgeting to political budgets in the EU?[C].Milan:International Conference on Public Policy,2015.
[9]SHI M,SVENSSON J.Political budget cycles:do they differ across countries and why?[J].Journal of Public Economics,2006,90(8-9):1367-1389.
[10]BRENDER A,DRAZEN A.Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2005,52(7):1271-1295.
[11]苟燕楠,董静.公共预算决策——现代观点[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[12]栾晓峰.公共预算权利、体制与文化[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2015.
[13]江钰辉,吴金光.财政监督嵌入预算编制的三方博弈分析与制度优化[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2015(1):37-44.
[14]LIMONGI F,FIGUEIREDO A.The budget process and legislative behavior:individual amendments,support for the executive branch,and government programs[J].Dados,2005,48(4):737-776.
[15]SAVOIE D J.The politics of public spending in Canada[M].Toronto:University of Toronto Press,1990.
[16]CAIDEN N,WILDAVSKY A.Planning and budgeting in poor countries[M].New York:John Wiley and Sons Inc.,1974.
[17]KELLY J,WANNA J.New public management and the politics of government budgeting[J].International Public Management Review,2000,1(1):33-55.
[18]SHAH A.Public sector governance and accountability series:participatory budgeting[R].Washington:World Bank,2007.
[19]ROBINSON M.Performance budgeting:linking funding and results[M].New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2007.
[20]RAGHUNANDAN M,FYFE D,KISTOW B et al.Examining the behavioural aspects of budgeting with particular emphasis on public sector/service budgets[J].International Journal of Business&Social Science,2012,3(14):107-116.
[21]BRENDER A,DRAZEN A.Elections,leaders,and the composition of government spending[J].Journal of Public Economics,2013,97(1):18-31.
[22]MONGE P R.Theoretical and analytical issues in studying organizational processes[J].Organization Science,1990,1(4):406-430.
[23]BERRY,W D.The confusing case of budgetary incrementalism:too many meanings for a single concept[J].The Journal of Politics,1990,52(1):167-196.
[24]AUERBACH,A J.Fiscal uncertainty and how to deal with it[C].Washington DC:Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution Conference,2014.
[25]董静,苟燕楠.公共预算决策分析框架与中国预算管理制度改革[J].财贸经济,2004(11):38-42.
[26]BHATTI I,PHAUP M.Budgeting for fiscal uncertainty and bias:a federal process proposal[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2015,35(2):89-105.
[27]LELOUP L T.From micro budgeting to macro budgeting:evolution in theory and practice[M]∥RUBIN I.New directions in budget theory.Albany:State University of New York Press,1988.
[28]HEARN J J,PHAUP M.Making better budget decisions easier:some changes suggested by behavioral research[R].Washington DC:Brookings Institution,2016.
[29]李允杰,孙克难,李显峰,等.政府财务与预算[M].台北:五南出版社,2007.
[30]MEO T M.The new economics of organization[J].American Journal of Political Science,1984,28(4):739-777.
[31]JOYCE P.The costs of budget uncertainty:analyzing the impact of late appropriations[R].Washington DC:IBM Center for the Business of Government,2012.
[32]SPEER I D.The causes of budget gridlock in california:institutions,parties,and conflict[D].Los Angeles:University of California,2016.
[33]BRASS C T.Shutdown of the federal government:causes,processes,and effects[R].Washington CD:Congressional Research Service,2013.
[34]MEYERS R T.Biennial budgeting by the U.S.Congress[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2009,8(2):21-32.
[35]MEYERS R T.Late appropriations and government shutdowns:frequency,causes,consequences,and remedies[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,1997,17(3):25-38.
[36]CLARKE W.Divided government and budget conflict in the U.S.States[J].Legislative Studies Quarterly,1998,23(1):5-22.
[37]BINDER S A.The dynamics of legislative gridlock,1947-96[J].The American Political Science Review,1999,93(3):519-533.
[38]MASKET S.It takes an outsider:extral egislative organization and partisanship in the California Assembly,1849-2006[J].American Journal of Political Science,2007,51(3):482-497.
[39]NCSL.Late state budgets[EB/OL].(2010-08-27)[2016-11-29].http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx.
[40]ANDERSEN A L,LASSEN D D,NIELSEN L H W.The impact of fiscal governance on bond markets:evidence from late budgets and state government borrowing costs[Z].Epru Working Paper No.2010-11,2010.
[41]CUMMINS J.An empirical analysis of california budget gridlock[J].State Politics&Policy Quarterly,2012,12(12):23-42.
[42]ANDERSENA A L,LASSEN D D,NIELSEN L H W.The impact of late budgets on state government borrowing costs[J].Journal of Public Economics,2014,109(1):27-35.
[43]KLARNER C E,PHILLIPS J H,MUCKLER M.Overcoming fiscal gridlock:institutions and budget bargaining[J].The Journal of Politics,2012,74(4):992-1009.
[44]MOODY.Trend of on time state budgets continues as revenues improve[R].New York:Moody's Investor Service,2012.
[45]LU E Y,CHEN G.A day late and a dollar short?A study of budget passage in New York state[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2016,36(3):3-21.
[46]KAHNEMAN D,TVERSKY A.Prospect theory:an analysis of decision under risk[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1979,47(2):263-292.
[47]马蔡琛,赵灿.公共预算遵从的行为经济学分析——基于前景理论的考察[J].河北学刊,2013(4):127-130.
[48]BARTLE J R,JUN M.Applying transaction cost theory to public budgeting and finance[M]∥BARTLE J R.Evolving Theories of Public Budgeting.New York:JAI Press,2001.
[49]马蔡琛,袁娇.中期预算改革的国际经验与中国现实[J].经济纵横,2016(4):114-120.
[50]SCHICK A.The federal budget:politics,policy,process[M].Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press,2000:67.
[51]KAHNEMAN D.Thinking,fast and slow[M].New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux,2013.
[52]GREEN M,THOMPSON F.Organizational process models of budgeting[Z].[S.L.]:SSRN Electronic Journal,December 2002.
[53]WILADVSKY A.The politics of the budgetary process[M].Boston:Little Brown&Co,1974.
[54]SANTOS,MARIA H D C,MACHADO,et al.O Jogo Orcamentário da Uni2o:relac7es executivo-legislativo na terra do pork-barrel[R].Brasília:Editora da Un B/ENAP,1997.
(1)此处铁三角是指政客(特定的公职人员)、官僚(公共行政人员和公务员)和公众(包括利益集团)。
(1)此处凹函数是指决策者的效用函数是预算数的增函数,当预算数增加时,决策者所获得的效用或满意度也相应增加,但随着预算数的逐渐增加,决策者对预算数额的敏感度呈递减趋势。
(2)此处凸函数是指决策者的效用函数为预算数的减函数,当预算数减少时,决策者所获得的效用或满意度也逐渐下降,但随着预算数的削减,决策者对预算缩减的敏感度逐渐减弱。
(1)值得注意的是,?>δm这一假设对结论是至关重要的。如果没有?>δm这一假设,不论预算收入增加或减少,决策双方都极有可能将所有变化的预算收入分配给其最偏好的项目。倘若假设?<δb1,则对保守派A而言,这意味着可能会出现E2