政府补贴与企业产能过剩:是“雪中送炭”还是“雪上加霜”——政府补贴程度与资产专用性的调节视角
|
摘要
采集2008—2015年中国制造业上市企业样本,采用随机前沿生产函数(SFA)和多元回归方法验证了政府补贴和资产专用性对于企业产能过剩的影响。研究表明,政府补贴与企业产能利用率呈倒U型曲线关系。政府补贴对国有企业产能利用率起到了"雪上加霜"的作用,资产专用性对国有和非国有企业产能利用率具有显著负向影响,而且负向调节了政府补贴对企业产能利用率的影响。
The research collects the samples of listed manufacturing companies in China from 2008 ~ 2015,and uses a stochastic frontier production function( SFA) and multivariate regression method to test the effect of the government subsidies and asset specificity to the enterprise overcapacity. The research shows the relationship of between the government subsidies and the enterprise capacity utilization rate is inverted U type; low-level government subsidies played a role of "timely help"on the capacity utilization rate of nonstate-owned enterprises,while high-level government subsidies was "one disaster after another". The government subsidies played a role of"one disaster after another"to capacity utilization rate of the state-owned enterprise. The assets specificity has a significant negative impact on the capacity utilization rate of the state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,and moderates negatively the effect of government subsidies to the capacity utilization rate.
The research collects the samples of listed manufacturing companies in China from 2008 ~ 2015,and uses a stochastic frontier production function( SFA) and multivariate regression method to test the effect of the government subsidies and asset specificity to the enterprise overcapacity. The research shows the relationship of between the government subsidies and the enterprise capacity utilization rate is inverted U type; low-level government subsidies played a role of "timely help"on the capacity utilization rate of nonstate-owned enterprises,while high-level government subsidies was "one disaster after another". The government subsidies played a role of"one disaster after another"to capacity utilization rate of the state-owned enterprise. The assets specificity has a significant negative impact on the capacity utilization rate of the state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,and moderates negatively the effect of government subsidies to the capacity utilization rate.
引文
[1]黄先海,宋学印,诸竹君.中国产业政策的最优实施空间界定[J].中国工业经济,2015(4):57-69.
[2]赵璨,王竹,泉杨德,等.企业迎合行为与政府补贴绩效研究[J].中国工业济,2015(7):130-145.
[3]BRENNER R.The Economics of Global Turbulence[M].NewYork:Verso,2006:26,29,35-36,38-39.
[4]CROTTY J R.Rethinking Marxian Investment Theory:KeynesMinsky Instability,Competitive Regime Shifts and Coerced Investment[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,1993,23(1):1-26.
[5]韩国高.中国工业产能过剩问题研究[M].北京:科学出版社,2014:6-31,10,11,107-112.
[6]邵敏,包群.政府补贴与企业生产率——基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2012(7):70-82.
[7]钱爱民,付东.信贷资源配置与企业产能过剩[J].经济理论与经济管理,2017(4):30-41.
[8]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响——基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(6):94-107.
[9]陈霞,许松涛.资产专用性、淘汰落后产能政策与上市公司资本投资[J].经济与管理,2013(11):66-71.
[10]谢彦明,汪戎,纳鹏杰.资产锁定与企业产能过剩[J].现代经济探讨,2017(7):82-87,109.
[2]赵璨,王竹,泉杨德,等.企业迎合行为与政府补贴绩效研究[J].中国工业济,2015(7):130-145.
[3]BRENNER R.The Economics of Global Turbulence[M].NewYork:Verso,2006:26,29,35-36,38-39.
[4]CROTTY J R.Rethinking Marxian Investment Theory:KeynesMinsky Instability,Competitive Regime Shifts and Coerced Investment[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,1993,23(1):1-26.
[5]韩国高.中国工业产能过剩问题研究[M].北京:科学出版社,2014:6-31,10,11,107-112.
[6]邵敏,包群.政府补贴与企业生产率——基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2012(7):70-82.
[7]钱爱民,付东.信贷资源配置与企业产能过剩[J].经济理论与经济管理,2017(4):30-41.
[8]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响——基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(6):94-107.
[9]陈霞,许松涛.资产专用性、淘汰落后产能政策与上市公司资本投资[J].经济与管理,2013(11):66-71.
[10]谢彦明,汪戎,纳鹏杰.资产锁定与企业产能过剩[J].现代经济探讨,2017(7):82-87,109.