分权、外部性与边界效应
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摘要
分权创造竞争激励的同时也带来了协调不足的问题。当经济活动存在正外部性,地方政府会策略性地减少辖区边界上的公共投资,产生区域发展中的边界效应。本文构建了存在外部性的政府投资模型来说明边界效应的产生机制,并从三方面给出经验证据:第一,利用县级经济统计和夜间灯光数据,在控制影响本地生产率的因素后,发现省份边界县的经济产出显著低于其他县,即存在区域经济发展的省界效应。第二,由省政府主导投资的交通设施存在显著的省界效应,这种效应并不存在于由中央政府主导投资的交通设施。第三,基于夜间灯光亮度的微观地理数据,利用撤县设区的政策实验和双重差分模型,发现地级市政府统筹权力的加强显著提高了原市辖区与被撤并县交界处的经济活动水平,即降低了区县边界效应。本文的结果表明,在保证地方政府竞争激励的前提下,建立政府间协调和利益共享机制,对于实现区域协调发展战略至关重要。
China's decentralized governance structure has contributed greatly to economic development by generating intergovernmental competition for capital(Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997). However, intense governmental competition also leads to "race to the bottom" problems, such as local protectionism, infrastructure segmentation, and poor environmental stewardship(Young, 2000; Cai et al., 2016; Tombe and Zhu, 2017). With the rising sophistication of production processes and the increasing scope of economic specialization, interregional cooperation is becoming increasingly important. Concerned with the lack of regional coordination and its negative impacts on the sustainability of economic growth, the 19 th CPC National Congress put forward the coordinated regional development strategy. While the literature devotes much effort to exploring the benefits of fiscal decentralization around the globe, studies of the costs of decentralization are relatively rare. This paper argues that decentralization creates incentives for competition but leads to a lack of coordination(Garicano and Rayo, 2016). When there are externalities to economic activities, local governments strategically reduce public investments at their borders, resulting in border effects in regional development. To support this argument, I use one simple model and two sets of empirical tests.First, I build a public investment model of local governments with positive spillovers to illustrate the mechanism of border effects under a decentralized governance structure. If the externalities of public investment decrease with distance, it is optimal for an output-maximizing local government to invest less at the border of its jurisdiction. The lack of public investment at borders results in the underdevelopment of these regions. There are no such border effects with centralized governance. One important prediction of this model is that border areas enjoy more public investment and hence faster economic growth when the governance structure shifts from decentralization to centralization.Second, I use a county-level dataset to document the relative underdevelopment of provincial border counties. After controlling for factors that potentially affect local productivity levels(such as market access, geographical conditions, cultural identity and human historical activities), I find that counties located near provincial borders have significantly lower average night-time light and per capita GDP and that this gap widens over time. Furthermore, I show that transport infrastructure investments dominated by provincial governments display significant border effects after controlling for local characteristics; border effects are not significant for in the investments initiated by the central government.Finally, I exploit a policy shock to examine whether improving intergovernmental coordination reduces border effects. Using point-level night-time light data and difference-in-differences estimation, I find that city-county mergers, a reform that strengthens the coordinating power of prefecture governments and so is a form of centralization, improves the relative development of border areas lying between urban districts and merged counties. This result is robust to alternative specifications and choices of city centers. In addition, the policy greatly reduces resource misallocation(measured based on the method of Hsieh & Klenow(2009)) between districts and merged counties. Both results satisfy the assumption of a common trend between treatment and control groups.The findings of this paper have important policy implications for China's regional development strategy. Given the central role of local governments in China's regional development, one important implication for the design of future regional policies is that while it is important to maintain incentives for local officials to compete, establishing a coordination and interest-sharing mechanism across governments is essential for achieving the harmonious development of regions proposed by the 19 th CPC National Congress.
China's decentralized governance structure has contributed greatly to economic development by generating intergovernmental competition for capital(Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997). However, intense governmental competition also leads to "race to the bottom" problems, such as local protectionism, infrastructure segmentation, and poor environmental stewardship(Young, 2000; Cai et al., 2016; Tombe and Zhu, 2017). With the rising sophistication of production processes and the increasing scope of economic specialization, interregional cooperation is becoming increasingly important. Concerned with the lack of regional coordination and its negative impacts on the sustainability of economic growth, the 19 th CPC National Congress put forward the coordinated regional development strategy. While the literature devotes much effort to exploring the benefits of fiscal decentralization around the globe, studies of the costs of decentralization are relatively rare. This paper argues that decentralization creates incentives for competition but leads to a lack of coordination(Garicano and Rayo, 2016). When there are externalities to economic activities, local governments strategically reduce public investments at their borders, resulting in border effects in regional development. To support this argument, I use one simple model and two sets of empirical tests.First, I build a public investment model of local governments with positive spillovers to illustrate the mechanism of border effects under a decentralized governance structure. If the externalities of public investment decrease with distance, it is optimal for an output-maximizing local government to invest less at the border of its jurisdiction. The lack of public investment at borders results in the underdevelopment of these regions. There are no such border effects with centralized governance. One important prediction of this model is that border areas enjoy more public investment and hence faster economic growth when the governance structure shifts from decentralization to centralization.Second, I use a county-level dataset to document the relative underdevelopment of provincial border counties. After controlling for factors that potentially affect local productivity levels(such as market access, geographical conditions, cultural identity and human historical activities), I find that counties located near provincial borders have significantly lower average night-time light and per capita GDP and that this gap widens over time. Furthermore, I show that transport infrastructure investments dominated by provincial governments display significant border effects after controlling for local characteristics; border effects are not significant for in the investments initiated by the central government.Finally, I exploit a policy shock to examine whether improving intergovernmental coordination reduces border effects. Using point-level night-time light data and difference-in-differences estimation, I find that city-county mergers, a reform that strengthens the coordinating power of prefecture governments and so is a form of centralization, improves the relative development of border areas lying between urban districts and merged counties. This result is robust to alternative specifications and choices of city centers. In addition, the policy greatly reduces resource misallocation(measured based on the method of Hsieh & Klenow(2009)) between districts and merged counties. Both results satisfy the assumption of a common trend between treatment and control groups.The findings of this paper have important policy implications for China's regional development strategy. Given the central role of local governments in China's regional development, one important implication for the design of future regional policies is that while it is important to maintain incentives for local officials to compete, establishing a coordination and interest-sharing mechanism across governments is essential for achieving the harmonious development of regions proposed by the 19 th CPC National Congress.
引文
高翔、龙小宁,2016:《省级行政区划造成的文化分割会影响区域经济吗?》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期。
行伟波、李善同,2009:《本地偏好,边界效应与市场一体化——基于中国地区间增值税流动数据的实证研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
黄新飞、陈珊珊、李腾,2014:《价格差异、市场分割与边界效应——基于长三角15个城市的实证研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
刘毓芸、徐现祥、肖泽凯,2015:《劳动力跨方言流动的倒U型模式》,《经济研究》第10期。
陆铭、陈钊,2009:《分割市场的经济增长——为什么经济开放可能加剧地方保护?》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐为,2018:《经济分权与中小城市发展:基于撤县设市的政策效果分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
唐为,2019:《行政壁垒与城市群市场一体化——基于资源空间配置效率的视角》,《经济学(季刊)》。
唐为、王媛,2015:《行政区划调整与人口城市化:来自撤县设区的经验证据》,《经济研究》第9期。
陶然、陆曦、苏福兵、汪晖,2009:《地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思》,《经济研究》第7期。
许宝华、宫田一郎,1999:《汉语方言大词典》,中华书局。
杨进,2015:《增城融入广州发展战略格局》,《广州日报》。
张五常,2009:《中国的经济制度》,中信出版社。
张学良,2012:《中国交通基础设施促进了区域经济增长吗——兼论交通基础设施的空间溢出效应》,《中国社会科学》第3期。
赵红军、胡玉梅,2018:《谁影响了中国历代都城地理位置的兴衰变迁?——一个基于量化经济史的实证分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
周黎安,2004:《晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因》,《经济研究》第6期。
周黎安、陶婧,2011:《官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例》,《金融研究》第3期。
Alesina, A., W.Easterly, and J.Matuszeski, 2011, “Artificial States”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(2), 246—277.
Cai, H., Y.Chen, and Q.Gong, 2016, “Polluting Thy Neighbor: Unintended Consequences of China's Pollution Reduction Mandates”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 76, 86—104.
Chung, J. H., and T.Lam, 2004, “China's ‘City System’ in Flux: Explaining Post-Mao Administrative Changes”, China Quarterly, 180(1), 945—964.
Duvivier, C., and H.Xiong, 2013, “Transboundary Pollution in China: A Study of Polluting Firms' Location Choices in Hebei Province”, Environment and Development Economics, 18(04), 459—483.
Engel, C., and J. H.Rogers, 1996, “How Wide is the Border?”, American Economic Review, 86(5), 1112—1125.
Gaigné, C., R.Stéphane, and J.Thisse, 2016, “How to Make the Metropolitan Area Work? Neither Big Government, nor Laissez-faire”, Journal of Public Economics, 134, 100—113.
Garicano, L., and L.Rayo, 2016, “Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases”, Journal of Economic Literature, 54(1), 137—192.
Glaeser, E. L., 2008, Cities, Agglomeration, and Spatial Equilibrium, Oxford University Press.
Henderson, J. V., A.Storeygard, and D. N. Weil, 2012, “Measuring Economic Growth From Outer Space”, American Economic Review, 102(2), 994—1028.
Hodler, R., and P. A. Raschky, 2014, “Regional Favoritism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2), 995—1033.
Hsieh, C., and P. J. Klenow, 2009, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1403—48.
Keen, M., and M. Marchand, 1997, “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending”, Journal of Public Economics, 66(1), 33—53.
Krugman, P., 1993, “First Nature, Second Nature, and Metropolitan Location”, Journal of Regional Science, 33(2), 129—144.
Li, H., and L.Zhou, 2005, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”, Journal of Public Economics, 89(9), 1743—1762.
Lipscomb, M., and A. M.Mobarak, 2017, “Decentralization and Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders in Brazil”, Review of Economic Studies, 84(1), 464—502.
McCallum, J., 1995, “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns”, American Economic Review, 85(3), 615—623.
Montinola, G., Y.Qian, and B. R.Weingast, 1995, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”, World Politics, 48(1), 50—81.
Oates, W. E., 1999, “An Essay On Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120—1149.
Pinkovskiy, M. L., 2017, “Growth Discontinuities at Borders”, Journal of Economic Growth, 22(2), 145—192.
Poncet, S., 2003, “Measuring Chinese Domestic and International Integration”, China Economic Review, 14(1), 1—21.
Qian, Y., and B. R.Weingast, 1997, “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 83—92.
Sigman, H., 2002, “International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?”, American Economic Review, 92(4), 1152—1159.
Sigman, H., 2005, “Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(1), 82—101.
Tang, W., and G. J. D.Hewings, 2017, “Do City-county Mergers in China Promote Local Economic Development?”, Economics of Transition, 25(3), 439—469.
Tiebout, C. M., 1956, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416—424.
Tombe, T., and X.Zhu, 2019, “Trade, Migration and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of China”, American Economic Review.
Wildasin, D. E., 1989, “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy”, Journal of Urban Economics, 25(2), 193—212.
Xu, C., 2011, “The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development”, Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076—1151.
Young, A., 2000, “The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1091—1135.
(1)新时期我国的扶贫对象分为国家扶贫开发工作重点县和集中连片特殊困难地区县两类,两者名单部分重合。
(2)此处没有考虑资本和劳动。由于私人资本、劳动与公共投资之间存在互补效应,纳入这些因素将进一步加强“边界效应”。
(3)详见http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/srtm-90m-digital-elevation-database-v4-1介绍。
(4)新经济地理学将各地区的地理特征分为两类,一类是第一地理特征(first nature geography),如山区、到港口距离等;另一类是第二地理特征(second nature geography),如市场潜力(Krugman,1993)。
(5)高速公路分为中央和省政府规划投资,但现有数据无法区分两种类型的高速公路。
(6)地区经济规模是我国交通基础设施路线选择的重要指标。
(7)由灯光最亮点确定的市中心的位置非常稳定,所有地级市1992—2000年市中心的距离变化均值为1.87公里,中位值为0.95公里,5%分位数为0公里,95%分位数为4.64公里。使用1992年、1994年、1996年、1998年和2000年的灯光最亮点作为市中心位置,结果与表4非常接近。
(8)2018年4月,长三角区域合作办公室发布《长江三角洲一体化发展三年行动计划(2018—2020年)》(征求意见稿),其中的重要内容是建设互联互通的综合交通网络,并着力推进省界断头路建设,提升省际公路通达能力。
行伟波、李善同,2009:《本地偏好,边界效应与市场一体化——基于中国地区间增值税流动数据的实证研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
黄新飞、陈珊珊、李腾,2014:《价格差异、市场分割与边界效应——基于长三角15个城市的实证研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
刘毓芸、徐现祥、肖泽凯,2015:《劳动力跨方言流动的倒U型模式》,《经济研究》第10期。
陆铭、陈钊,2009:《分割市场的经济增长——为什么经济开放可能加剧地方保护?》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐为,2018:《经济分权与中小城市发展:基于撤县设市的政策效果分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
唐为,2019:《行政壁垒与城市群市场一体化——基于资源空间配置效率的视角》,《经济学(季刊)》。
唐为、王媛,2015:《行政区划调整与人口城市化:来自撤县设区的经验证据》,《经济研究》第9期。
陶然、陆曦、苏福兵、汪晖,2009:《地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思》,《经济研究》第7期。
许宝华、宫田一郎,1999:《汉语方言大词典》,中华书局。
杨进,2015:《增城融入广州发展战略格局》,《广州日报》。
张五常,2009:《中国的经济制度》,中信出版社。
张学良,2012:《中国交通基础设施促进了区域经济增长吗——兼论交通基础设施的空间溢出效应》,《中国社会科学》第3期。
赵红军、胡玉梅,2018:《谁影响了中国历代都城地理位置的兴衰变迁?——一个基于量化经济史的实证分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
周黎安,2004:《晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因》,《经济研究》第6期。
周黎安、陶婧,2011:《官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例》,《金融研究》第3期。
Alesina, A., W.Easterly, and J.Matuszeski, 2011, “Artificial States”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(2), 246—277.
Cai, H., Y.Chen, and Q.Gong, 2016, “Polluting Thy Neighbor: Unintended Consequences of China's Pollution Reduction Mandates”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 76, 86—104.
Chung, J. H., and T.Lam, 2004, “China's ‘City System’ in Flux: Explaining Post-Mao Administrative Changes”, China Quarterly, 180(1), 945—964.
Duvivier, C., and H.Xiong, 2013, “Transboundary Pollution in China: A Study of Polluting Firms' Location Choices in Hebei Province”, Environment and Development Economics, 18(04), 459—483.
Engel, C., and J. H.Rogers, 1996, “How Wide is the Border?”, American Economic Review, 86(5), 1112—1125.
Gaigné, C., R.Stéphane, and J.Thisse, 2016, “How to Make the Metropolitan Area Work? Neither Big Government, nor Laissez-faire”, Journal of Public Economics, 134, 100—113.
Garicano, L., and L.Rayo, 2016, “Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases”, Journal of Economic Literature, 54(1), 137—192.
Glaeser, E. L., 2008, Cities, Agglomeration, and Spatial Equilibrium, Oxford University Press.
Henderson, J. V., A.Storeygard, and D. N. Weil, 2012, “Measuring Economic Growth From Outer Space”, American Economic Review, 102(2), 994—1028.
Hodler, R., and P. A. Raschky, 2014, “Regional Favoritism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2), 995—1033.
Hsieh, C., and P. J. Klenow, 2009, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1403—48.
Keen, M., and M. Marchand, 1997, “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending”, Journal of Public Economics, 66(1), 33—53.
Krugman, P., 1993, “First Nature, Second Nature, and Metropolitan Location”, Journal of Regional Science, 33(2), 129—144.
Li, H., and L.Zhou, 2005, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”, Journal of Public Economics, 89(9), 1743—1762.
Lipscomb, M., and A. M.Mobarak, 2017, “Decentralization and Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders in Brazil”, Review of Economic Studies, 84(1), 464—502.
McCallum, J., 1995, “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns”, American Economic Review, 85(3), 615—623.
Montinola, G., Y.Qian, and B. R.Weingast, 1995, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”, World Politics, 48(1), 50—81.
Oates, W. E., 1999, “An Essay On Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120—1149.
Pinkovskiy, M. L., 2017, “Growth Discontinuities at Borders”, Journal of Economic Growth, 22(2), 145—192.
Poncet, S., 2003, “Measuring Chinese Domestic and International Integration”, China Economic Review, 14(1), 1—21.
Qian, Y., and B. R.Weingast, 1997, “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 83—92.
Sigman, H., 2002, “International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?”, American Economic Review, 92(4), 1152—1159.
Sigman, H., 2005, “Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(1), 82—101.
Tang, W., and G. J. D.Hewings, 2017, “Do City-county Mergers in China Promote Local Economic Development?”, Economics of Transition, 25(3), 439—469.
Tiebout, C. M., 1956, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416—424.
Tombe, T., and X.Zhu, 2019, “Trade, Migration and Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of China”, American Economic Review.
Wildasin, D. E., 1989, “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy”, Journal of Urban Economics, 25(2), 193—212.
Xu, C., 2011, “The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development”, Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076—1151.
Young, A., 2000, “The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1091—1135.
(1)新时期我国的扶贫对象分为国家扶贫开发工作重点县和集中连片特殊困难地区县两类,两者名单部分重合。
(2)此处没有考虑资本和劳动。由于私人资本、劳动与公共投资之间存在互补效应,纳入这些因素将进一步加强“边界效应”。
(3)详见http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/srtm-90m-digital-elevation-database-v4-1介绍。
(4)新经济地理学将各地区的地理特征分为两类,一类是第一地理特征(first nature geography),如山区、到港口距离等;另一类是第二地理特征(second nature geography),如市场潜力(Krugman,1993)。
(5)高速公路分为中央和省政府规划投资,但现有数据无法区分两种类型的高速公路。
(6)地区经济规模是我国交通基础设施路线选择的重要指标。
(7)由灯光最亮点确定的市中心的位置非常稳定,所有地级市1992—2000年市中心的距离变化均值为1.87公里,中位值为0.95公里,5%分位数为0公里,95%分位数为4.64公里。使用1992年、1994年、1996年、1998年和2000年的灯光最亮点作为市中心位置,结果与表4非常接近。
(8)2018年4月,长三角区域合作办公室发布《长江三角洲一体化发展三年行动计划(2018—2020年)》(征求意见稿),其中的重要内容是建设互联互通的综合交通网络,并着力推进省界断头路建设,提升省际公路通达能力。