西方反腐领域新举措:从“各自为政”到“双剑合力”
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摘要
近年来,各国政府、企业及国际组织都为严厉打击腐败犯罪而努力。政府机关和社会组织形成了两股打击腐败犯罪的力量,即政府机关通过利用、发展和实施公法权力,社会组织通过利用、发展和实施私法制度,二者联合起来共同对抗腐败犯罪。然而,这两股力量却不是相互配合的关系。西方社会出现的打击腐败犯罪的新模式——双剑反腐,同时出力,以补充传统的反腐手段。这种模式融合了国家司法人员在适用反腐败法律时行使自由裁量权以及金融机构控制企业投资融资渠道、施加股东权利的方式来制约和规范市场交易行为。以公诉人实施自由裁量权制度敦促企业革新内部管理、加强自律;在公诉人向企业施压的同时,利用主权投资人的资本权力加强企业的内部管理。两种手段并用,预防腐败。借鉴这两种反腐策略,结合中国具体国情,可以为中国反腐败制度的建设、严厉有效地打击腐败犯罪,提供新的思路。
In recent years,governments,international organizations and enterprises all contribute greatly to the battle of the anti-corruption.The efforts of these institutions consist of the simultaneous application of the development and enforcement of public legal regimes and the implementation and operation of private compliance systems.The compliance systems created by business and regulatory system made by government are not coordinated well.However,recent regulatory and compliance trends suggest the emergence of a"Two Swords One Thrust Strategy"as a supplemental approach to the enforcement of anti-corruption rules and norms.The"Two Sword One Thrust Strategy"combines the power of state officials to exercise discretion in managing anti-corruption laws and the authority of financial institutions to control the access of enterprises to their investment universe or to exercise their shareholder authority to influence corporate behavior.The essay examines the possibility of developing this strategy:the emerging efforts to institutionalize rules for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal investigations to compel corporate governance reform;at the meantime,the use of market power by sovereign investors to influence compliance oriented corporate governance reform that parallels those advanced by prosecutors.The essay ends by suggesting the utility of this newstrategic thinking for developing Chinese anti-corruption efforts by considering the reality of Chinese regulatory condition.
In recent years,governments,international organizations and enterprises all contribute greatly to the battle of the anti-corruption.The efforts of these institutions consist of the simultaneous application of the development and enforcement of public legal regimes and the implementation and operation of private compliance systems.The compliance systems created by business and regulatory system made by government are not coordinated well.However,recent regulatory and compliance trends suggest the emergence of a"Two Swords One Thrust Strategy"as a supplemental approach to the enforcement of anti-corruption rules and norms.The"Two Sword One Thrust Strategy"combines the power of state officials to exercise discretion in managing anti-corruption laws and the authority of financial institutions to control the access of enterprises to their investment universe or to exercise their shareholder authority to influence corporate behavior.The essay examines the possibility of developing this strategy:the emerging efforts to institutionalize rules for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal investigations to compel corporate governance reform;at the meantime,the use of market power by sovereign investors to influence compliance oriented corporate governance reform that parallels those advanced by prosecutors.The essay ends by suggesting the utility of this newstrategic thinking for developing Chinese anti-corruption efforts by considering the reality of Chinese regulatory condition.
引文
[1]Cazurra A C.Who cares about corruption.Journal of International Business Studies,2006,37(6):807-822.
[2]The ten principles of the UN global compact.http://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles,2017-09-05.
[3]Cassin R L.Fund dumps Petrofac shares on SFO probe concerns.http://www.fcpablogcom/blog/2017/9/8/funddumps-petrofac-shares-on-sfo-probe-concerns.html,2017-09-05.
[4]U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission.SEC enforcement actions:FCPA cases.http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml,2017-09-08.
[5]Alun milford on deferred prosecution agreements,remarks delivered at the cambridge symposium on economic crime2017,http://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/09/05/alun-milford-on-deferred-prosecution-agreements/,2017-09-08.
[6]Daugherty D A.The separation of powers and abuses in prosecutorial discretion.Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,1988—1989,79:953-962.
[7]Gershman B L.A moral standard for the prosecutor’s exercise of the charging discretion.Fordham Urban Law Journal,1992,20(3):513-515.
[8]American Bar Association.Criminal justice standards for the prosecution function(4th Ed.).http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/Prosecution Function Fourth Edition.html,2017-09-08.
[9]Arlen J.Prosecuting beyond the rule of law:Corporate mandates imposed through deferred prosecution agreements.Journal of Legal Analysis,2016,8(1):191-234.
[10]Arlen J,Kraakman R.Controlling corporate misconduct:An analysis of corporate liability regimes.New York University Law Review,1997,72:687-699.
[11]Cunningham L.Deferred Prosecutions and corporate governance:An Integrated approach to investigation and reform.Florida Law Review,2014,66:1-3.
[12]Uhlmann D M.Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the crosion of corporate criminal liability.Maryland Law Review,2013,72:1295-1298.
[13]Corporate Prosecution Principles Resource Page.Federal evidence review.http://federalevidence.com/corporateprosecution-principles#aug 2008,2017-09-15.
[14]United States Department of Justice,Criminal Division.The fraud section’s foreign corrupt practices act enforcement plan and guidance.http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download,2017-09-17.
[15]Backer L C.Theorizing regulatory governance within its ecology:The structure of management in an age of globalization.http://ssrn.com/abstract=2783018,2017-09-17.
[16]Backer L C.Moving forward the UN guiding principles for business and human rights:Between enterprise social norm,state domestic legal orders,and the treaty law that might bind them all.Fordham International Law Journal,2015,38(2):457-460.
[17]Ethics Council.For a listing of the cases with links to original sources.http://etikkradet.no/en/gross-corruptio n-2/,2017-09-17.
[18]Johan H.Andresen,the chair’s report.In Council on ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global annual report 2016.http://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/etikkradet-2017/files/2017/03/Etikkraadet_annual_report_2016_web.pdf,2017-09-17.
[19]Council of Ethics,Letter of 2 Sept.2008.http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Svarbrev-til-Finansdepartementet_ENG-2008.pdf,2017-09-17.
[20]China’s corporate social responsibility with national characteristics:Coherence and dissonance with the global business and human rights project.In Martin J,Bravo K E(eds.)Human Rights and Business:Moving Forward,Looking Back.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015.
[21]Backer L C.Realizing socio-economic rights under emerging global regulatory frameworks:The potential impact of privatization and the role of companies in China and India.The George Washington International Law Review,2013,45(4):615-680.
[22]Lin L-W.Corporate social responsibility in China:Window dressing or structural change?Berkeley Journal of International Law,2010,28(1):64-76.
[23]Backer L C.Corporate social responsibility with Chinese characteristics,part II.Law at the End of the Day.http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/corporate-social-responsibility-with.html,2017-09-17.
[24]Hua L-F.Wielding the sword:President Xi’s new anti-corruption campaign.In Rose-Ackerman S,Lagunes P F(eds.)Greed,Corruption,and the Modern State,http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492407,2017-09-17.
[25]Backer L C.Chinese SOEs in Latin America—CSR and culture.Law at the End of the Day(May 20,2013),http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/chinese-soes-in-latin-america-csr-and.html,2017-09-17.
[26]Backer L C.Sovereign investing and markets-based transnational rule of law building:The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in global markets.American University International Law Review,2013,29:1-122.
[27]Backer L C.Governance without government:An overview and application of interactions between law-state and governance-corporate systems.In Handl G,Zekoll J,Zumbansen P(eds.).Beyond Territoriality:Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization.Netherlands&Boston,MA:Martinus Nijhoff,2012.
[28]Corruption in Brazil.The big oily:The petrobras scandal explained.The Economist(30 Dec.2014),http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21637437-petrobras-scandal-explained-big-oily,2017-09-17.
[29]Backer L C.Should financial institutions have obligations to manage the human rights impacts of their clients?Final statement friends of the earth Europe and friends of the earth Netherlands/Milieudefensie-Rabobank.Law at the End of the Day(January 2016),http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/should-financial-institutions-have.html,2017-09-17.
[30]Council on Ethics.Recommendation to put a company in the Government Pension Fund Global under observation:Petroleo Brasileiro SA,http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Recommendation-Petrobras-21-December-2015.pdf,2017-09-17.
[31]OECD.Anti-corruption ethics and compliance handbook for business(2013).https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-Corruption Ethics Compliance Handbook.pdf,2017-09-17.
[32]美国司法部犯罪组:《致Nortek公司的信函》,https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot-program/declinations,2017-09-17.
[33]Spalding A B.Restoring pre-existing compliance through the FCPA pilot program.University of Toledo Law Review,2017,48:519-521.
(1)欧洲议会非公开听证会上调查了这些有关腐败的指控。
(2)1999年6月14日,在阿尔及利亚首都阿尔及尔订立了《非洲联盟预防和打击腐败公约》。1999年11月4日,在法国斯特拉斯堡通过《腐败民法公约》,于2003年11月1日生效并向非成员国开放。1999年1月27日,在法国斯特拉斯堡通过《腐败刑法公约》,于2002年7月1日生效并向非成员国开放。该公约的附则在2003年5月15日通过,于2005年2月1日生效。《公约》规定,睦邻国家在国家刑法中纳入对公私营部门主动和被动贿赂行为的定罪,包括贿赂外国和国内议会成员大会和国际组织官员。1996年3月,《美洲国家反腐败公约》于委内瑞拉的加拉加斯通过,实现了美洲各国政府间的反腐合作。1997年12月17日,经合组织(OECD)签署的《经合组织关于打击国际商业交易中行贿外国公职人员行为的公约》,于1999年2月15日生效,对所有经合组织国家和一些非成员国开放。2005年12月14日,《联合国反腐败公约》第58/4号决议生效。2003年9月29日,《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约及其议定书》第55/25号决议生效。
(3)《联合国反对国际商业交易中的贪污贿赂行为宣言》于1996年12月通过。该宣言考察如何更广泛地适用于反腐败背景之下。
(1)司法部评论道:“由于联邦检察官在打击刑事犯罪的检务工作中拥有宽泛的自由裁量权,为了司法公正和效率,所有检察官应当按照起诉守则中设立的原则开展工作、履行职责。”参见§9-28.110 Principles of Federal Prosecution。
(1)根据§9-28.700(A),对合作程度的评估取决于各种因素,如合作的及时性、内部调查的效率、合作的主动性等。
(2)PBO规定了一些因素,如合规方案的全面性;刑事不端行为的程度和普遍性;涉及的企业员工人数和认识水平;不当行为的严重性、持续时间及发生频率;公司采取的补救行动,包括针对先前合规计划发现的过去违规者的纪律处分以及根据经验教训对企业合规计划的修订等。
(1)参见FCPA Enforcement Plan and Guidance,supra。将起诉守则和联邦量刑守则作为试点计划的基础。
(2)追诉时,在量刑指南罚款范围中至少25%的范围内减刑。
(3)其核心在于对人际交往行为的管理及对人际交往方式实施中所基于的意识形态的管理。管理性政府与良好治理紧密联系,至少在方式和目的层面,但同时这种管理意味着同有效治理和制度权威遵守相契合。这一管理方式通过私人自我治理延伸了民主行政的可能性。
(1)社会信用在这里被理解为更普遍的意义上的排名和声誉,但也可以从更正式的意义上理解为评级。中国目前正在积极发展和运用这一制度。参见《社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014-2020)》。
(1)具体参见First discussed in Larry CatáBacker,Law at the End of the Day,http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/incoherence-in-corruption-and.html。
[2]The ten principles of the UN global compact.http://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles,2017-09-05.
[3]Cassin R L.Fund dumps Petrofac shares on SFO probe concerns.http://www.fcpablogcom/blog/2017/9/8/funddumps-petrofac-shares-on-sfo-probe-concerns.html,2017-09-05.
[4]U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission.SEC enforcement actions:FCPA cases.http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml,2017-09-08.
[5]Alun milford on deferred prosecution agreements,remarks delivered at the cambridge symposium on economic crime2017,http://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/09/05/alun-milford-on-deferred-prosecution-agreements/,2017-09-08.
[6]Daugherty D A.The separation of powers and abuses in prosecutorial discretion.Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,1988—1989,79:953-962.
[7]Gershman B L.A moral standard for the prosecutor’s exercise of the charging discretion.Fordham Urban Law Journal,1992,20(3):513-515.
[8]American Bar Association.Criminal justice standards for the prosecution function(4th Ed.).http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/Prosecution Function Fourth Edition.html,2017-09-08.
[9]Arlen J.Prosecuting beyond the rule of law:Corporate mandates imposed through deferred prosecution agreements.Journal of Legal Analysis,2016,8(1):191-234.
[10]Arlen J,Kraakman R.Controlling corporate misconduct:An analysis of corporate liability regimes.New York University Law Review,1997,72:687-699.
[11]Cunningham L.Deferred Prosecutions and corporate governance:An Integrated approach to investigation and reform.Florida Law Review,2014,66:1-3.
[12]Uhlmann D M.Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the crosion of corporate criminal liability.Maryland Law Review,2013,72:1295-1298.
[13]Corporate Prosecution Principles Resource Page.Federal evidence review.http://federalevidence.com/corporateprosecution-principles#aug 2008,2017-09-15.
[14]United States Department of Justice,Criminal Division.The fraud section’s foreign corrupt practices act enforcement plan and guidance.http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download,2017-09-17.
[15]Backer L C.Theorizing regulatory governance within its ecology:The structure of management in an age of globalization.http://ssrn.com/abstract=2783018,2017-09-17.
[16]Backer L C.Moving forward the UN guiding principles for business and human rights:Between enterprise social norm,state domestic legal orders,and the treaty law that might bind them all.Fordham International Law Journal,2015,38(2):457-460.
[17]Ethics Council.For a listing of the cases with links to original sources.http://etikkradet.no/en/gross-corruptio n-2/,2017-09-17.
[18]Johan H.Andresen,the chair’s report.In Council on ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global annual report 2016.http://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/etikkradet-2017/files/2017/03/Etikkraadet_annual_report_2016_web.pdf,2017-09-17.
[19]Council of Ethics,Letter of 2 Sept.2008.http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Svarbrev-til-Finansdepartementet_ENG-2008.pdf,2017-09-17.
[20]China’s corporate social responsibility with national characteristics:Coherence and dissonance with the global business and human rights project.In Martin J,Bravo K E(eds.)Human Rights and Business:Moving Forward,Looking Back.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015.
[21]Backer L C.Realizing socio-economic rights under emerging global regulatory frameworks:The potential impact of privatization and the role of companies in China and India.The George Washington International Law Review,2013,45(4):615-680.
[22]Lin L-W.Corporate social responsibility in China:Window dressing or structural change?Berkeley Journal of International Law,2010,28(1):64-76.
[23]Backer L C.Corporate social responsibility with Chinese characteristics,part II.Law at the End of the Day.http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/corporate-social-responsibility-with.html,2017-09-17.
[24]Hua L-F.Wielding the sword:President Xi’s new anti-corruption campaign.In Rose-Ackerman S,Lagunes P F(eds.)Greed,Corruption,and the Modern State,http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492407,2017-09-17.
[25]Backer L C.Chinese SOEs in Latin America—CSR and culture.Law at the End of the Day(May 20,2013),http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/chinese-soes-in-latin-america-csr-and.html,2017-09-17.
[26]Backer L C.Sovereign investing and markets-based transnational rule of law building:The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in global markets.American University International Law Review,2013,29:1-122.
[27]Backer L C.Governance without government:An overview and application of interactions between law-state and governance-corporate systems.In Handl G,Zekoll J,Zumbansen P(eds.).Beyond Territoriality:Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization.Netherlands&Boston,MA:Martinus Nijhoff,2012.
[28]Corruption in Brazil.The big oily:The petrobras scandal explained.The Economist(30 Dec.2014),http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21637437-petrobras-scandal-explained-big-oily,2017-09-17.
[29]Backer L C.Should financial institutions have obligations to manage the human rights impacts of their clients?Final statement friends of the earth Europe and friends of the earth Netherlands/Milieudefensie-Rabobank.Law at the End of the Day(January 2016),http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/should-financial-institutions-have.html,2017-09-17.
[30]Council on Ethics.Recommendation to put a company in the Government Pension Fund Global under observation:Petroleo Brasileiro SA,http://etikkradet.no/files/2017/05/Recommendation-Petrobras-21-December-2015.pdf,2017-09-17.
[31]OECD.Anti-corruption ethics and compliance handbook for business(2013).https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-Corruption Ethics Compliance Handbook.pdf,2017-09-17.
[32]美国司法部犯罪组:《致Nortek公司的信函》,https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/pilot-program/declinations,2017-09-17.
[33]Spalding A B.Restoring pre-existing compliance through the FCPA pilot program.University of Toledo Law Review,2017,48:519-521.
(1)欧洲议会非公开听证会上调查了这些有关腐败的指控。
(2)1999年6月14日,在阿尔及利亚首都阿尔及尔订立了《非洲联盟预防和打击腐败公约》。1999年11月4日,在法国斯特拉斯堡通过《腐败民法公约》,于2003年11月1日生效并向非成员国开放。1999年1月27日,在法国斯特拉斯堡通过《腐败刑法公约》,于2002年7月1日生效并向非成员国开放。该公约的附则在2003年5月15日通过,于2005年2月1日生效。《公约》规定,睦邻国家在国家刑法中纳入对公私营部门主动和被动贿赂行为的定罪,包括贿赂外国和国内议会成员大会和国际组织官员。1996年3月,《美洲国家反腐败公约》于委内瑞拉的加拉加斯通过,实现了美洲各国政府间的反腐合作。1997年12月17日,经合组织(OECD)签署的《经合组织关于打击国际商业交易中行贿外国公职人员行为的公约》,于1999年2月15日生效,对所有经合组织国家和一些非成员国开放。2005年12月14日,《联合国反腐败公约》第58/4号决议生效。2003年9月29日,《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约及其议定书》第55/25号决议生效。
(3)《联合国反对国际商业交易中的贪污贿赂行为宣言》于1996年12月通过。该宣言考察如何更广泛地适用于反腐败背景之下。
(1)司法部评论道:“由于联邦检察官在打击刑事犯罪的检务工作中拥有宽泛的自由裁量权,为了司法公正和效率,所有检察官应当按照起诉守则中设立的原则开展工作、履行职责。”参见§9-28.110 Principles of Federal Prosecution。
(1)根据§9-28.700(A),对合作程度的评估取决于各种因素,如合作的及时性、内部调查的效率、合作的主动性等。
(2)PBO规定了一些因素,如合规方案的全面性;刑事不端行为的程度和普遍性;涉及的企业员工人数和认识水平;不当行为的严重性、持续时间及发生频率;公司采取的补救行动,包括针对先前合规计划发现的过去违规者的纪律处分以及根据经验教训对企业合规计划的修订等。
(1)参见FCPA Enforcement Plan and Guidance,supra。将起诉守则和联邦量刑守则作为试点计划的基础。
(2)追诉时,在量刑指南罚款范围中至少25%的范围内减刑。
(3)其核心在于对人际交往行为的管理及对人际交往方式实施中所基于的意识形态的管理。管理性政府与良好治理紧密联系,至少在方式和目的层面,但同时这种管理意味着同有效治理和制度权威遵守相契合。这一管理方式通过私人自我治理延伸了民主行政的可能性。
(1)社会信用在这里被理解为更普遍的意义上的排名和声誉,但也可以从更正式的意义上理解为评级。中国目前正在积极发展和运用这一制度。参见《社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014-2020)》。
(1)具体参见First discussed in Larry CatáBacker,Law at the End of the Day,http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/incoherence-in-corruption-and.html。