我国《民法总则》第16条关于胎儿利益保护的质疑——基于规范的实证分析与理论研究
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摘要
《民法总则》第16条规定了为胎儿利益计的特殊情况下的"权利能力",此是对第13条"权利能力始于出生"原则的例外《民法总则》将对胎儿的所谓"权利能力"限制在"利益保护所需"的限度内,是保证胎儿只能作原告,不能作被告。故多数国家一般将胎儿利益的保护限于继承和损害赔偿请求权,我国《民法总则》第16条将"继承"和"接受赠与"明确列入其中,但却没有规定胎儿的法定代理人,此为体系化中的漏洞。特别是,"赠与"在我国法上属于合同,如何签订胎儿的赠与合同以及赠与合同什么时候生效都未规定,应解释为"胎儿出生时生效"为宜,以避免胎儿作为被告出现。另外,《民法总则》第16条是否包括胎儿对第三人侵害其自身的"损害赔偿请求权"甚有疑问。笔者认为,应解释为没有必要包括其中,因为这种损害赔偿请求权仅仅是因果关系问题,而不是权利能力问题。而且用因果关系解决,对于胎儿的保护更加有利。但应当包括胎儿对于加害其扶养义务人致死的损害赔偿请求权。另外,因胎儿娩出为死体或者活体而决定其是否真正享有权利或者利益,故涉及胎儿请求权的诉讼时效期间,应该在胎儿出生之前不开始计算。
Article 16 of the "General Principles of Civil Law" provides the "right capacity" for the benefit of the fetus in special circumstances. This is a breakthrough and an exception to the principle of "right capacity begins at birth" in article 13. the General principles of Civil Law limit the so-called "right capacity" to the limits of "necessary for the interests protection of the fetus", which is to ensure that the fetus can only serve as the plaintiff and cannot be the defendant. Therefore, most countries generally limit the protection of fetus to the right of claim for inheritance and compensation for damages. Article 16 of China's General principles of Civil Law explicitly includes inheritance and acceptance of gifts, but there is no provision for the legal agent of the fetus, which is a loophole in systematization.In particular, the gift belongs to the contract in the law of our country, how to sign a gift contract for the fetus, and when it will come into effect are not stipulated,which should be interpreted as "when the fetus is born", so as to avoid the fetus appearing as the defendant. In addition, it is doubtful whether Article 16 of the General principles of Civil Law includes the fetus' s "right to claim damages" when the third party infringe himself/herself. I don't think it's necessary to explain to include it, because the claim for damages is only a matter of causation, not a question of right capacity. And the use of causal relationships to solve the problem is more beneficial to the protection of the fetus. However, it should include the claiming damages right of the fetus that his/her death due to the maintenance agent. In addition, the fetus is decapitated as a dead body or a living body decides whether he/she truly enjoys rights or interests, so the period of limitation of litigation involving fetus claims should not be calculated before the fetus is born.
Article 16 of the "General Principles of Civil Law" provides the "right capacity" for the benefit of the fetus in special circumstances. This is a breakthrough and an exception to the principle of "right capacity begins at birth" in article 13. the General principles of Civil Law limit the so-called "right capacity" to the limits of "necessary for the interests protection of the fetus", which is to ensure that the fetus can only serve as the plaintiff and cannot be the defendant. Therefore, most countries generally limit the protection of fetus to the right of claim for inheritance and compensation for damages. Article 16 of China's General principles of Civil Law explicitly includes inheritance and acceptance of gifts, but there is no provision for the legal agent of the fetus, which is a loophole in systematization.In particular, the gift belongs to the contract in the law of our country, how to sign a gift contract for the fetus, and when it will come into effect are not stipulated,which should be interpreted as "when the fetus is born", so as to avoid the fetus appearing as the defendant. In addition, it is doubtful whether Article 16 of the General principles of Civil Law includes the fetus' s "right to claim damages" when the third party infringe himself/herself. I don't think it's necessary to explain to include it, because the claim for damages is only a matter of causation, not a question of right capacity. And the use of causal relationships to solve the problem is more beneficial to the protection of the fetus. However, it should include the claiming damages right of the fetus that his/her death due to the maintenance agent. In addition, the fetus is decapitated as a dead body or a living body decides whether he/she truly enjoys rights or interests, so the period of limitation of litigation involving fetus claims should not be calculated before the fetus is born.
引文
[1]张荣顺.民法总则解读[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2017.
[2]王洪平.论胎儿的民事权利能力及权利实现机制[J].法学论坛,2017,(4):35-42.
[3][德]卡尔·拉伦茨.德国民法通论(上册)[M].王晓晔,等译.北京:法律出版社,2003.
[4][德]迪特尔·梅迪库斯.德国民法总论[M].邵建东,译.北京:法律出版社,2000.
[5][日]山本敬三.民法讲义I[M].解亘,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[6]王泽鉴.民法总则[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[7][日]进江幸治.民法讲义I[M].渠涛,等译.北京:北京大学出版社,2015.
[8]朱庆育.民法总论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2016.
[9]尹田.论胎儿利益的民法保护[J].云南大学学报(法学版),2002,(1):49-52.
[10]杨巍.论胎儿利益的民法保护[J].环球法律评论,2007,(4):88-97.
[11]叶玉莎.基于民法总则草案中胎儿利益法律保护规定的思考[J].法制博览,2017,(2):135-136.
[12]李锡鹤.胎儿不应有法律上的利益[J].东方法学,2017,(1):2-13.
[13]陈东强.关于胎儿利益保护法律适用问题的探讨[J].山东审判,2017,(5):23-25.
[14]朱晓峰.民法典编纂视野下胎儿利益的民法规范[J].法学评论,2016,(1):179-190.
(1)[德]卡尔·拉伦茨:《德国民法通论》(上册),王晓晔等译,法律出版社2003年版,第124-125页。Vgl. Erman/Saenger, 13. Aufl. 2011 Band 1, BGB § 1 Rn. 2, 其中明确指出,胎儿本身不具备权利能力,但在其出生的前提下受到特别规定的保护。
(2)例如Jauernig/Mansel, 16. Aufl. 2015, BGB ,作者虽然认为胎儿享有“一定的法律地位”(gewisse Rechtsposition),却并未直接采用权利能力(Rechtsf权利能力htsp)的措辞。相同的情形参见HK-BGB/Heinrich D?rner, 9. Aufl. 2016, BGB § 1 Rn. 4。
(3)Vgl. BverfG NJW 1993, 1751. 德国联邦宪法法院在该判决中认为未出生的生命亦享有人格尊严。在文献中占绝对多数的观点也都认为胎儿正是基于德国基本法第1条第1款以及第2条第2款第1句(Art. 1 Abs. 1 und Art. 2 Abs. 2 S. 1 GG)规定的基本权利而享有“基本权利能力”(Grundrechtsfaehigkeit)。Vgl. MüKoBGB/Schmitt, 7. Aufl. 2015, BGB § 1 Rn. 25.
(4)尽管在德国法在学理上承认胎儿可以接受赠与,但德国民法典中却无相关规定。Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger, 45. Ed. 1.11.2017, BGB § 1 Rn. 29:胎儿可在附加的迟缓条件下,即其事后成功出生从而具备完全的权利能力的条件下,成为赠与的对象。
(5)当然,这里的返还请求权基础究竟为不当得利还是物权返还请求权,还要看是否承认物权行为的无因性。我国学理和立法对此认识和规定不一,我是主张无因性的,因此,在这里姑且算作“不当得利”吧。
(6)Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger BGB § 1 Rn. 26,对于出生前的损害,胎儿直接受到《德国民法典》第823条第1款的保护。
(7)这里是指《德国民法典》第844条第2款的规定,该款规定:“在侵害发生时,死者与第三人处于其据以对该第三人依法律规定负有扶养义务的关系中,且因死者被致死,该第三人被剥夺请求扶养的权利的,赔偿义务人必须在死者在推测的生存期间会有义务扶养费的限度内,通过支付定期金向该第三人给予损害赔偿;准用第843条第2款至第4款的规定。即使该第三人在侵害发生时已被孕育成胎儿但尚未出生,也发生该项赔偿义务。”
(8)类似的争论参见BGH NJW 1972, 1126.
(9)Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger, 45. Ed. 1.11.2017, BGB § 1 Rn. 33: 在对母体进行伤害以及由其引起的胎儿伤害案件中,若认为未出生的胎儿具备部分权利能力(Teilrechtsf?higkeit),则应考察其因果关系。
[2]王洪平.论胎儿的民事权利能力及权利实现机制[J].法学论坛,2017,(4):35-42.
[3][德]卡尔·拉伦茨.德国民法通论(上册)[M].王晓晔,等译.北京:法律出版社,2003.
[4][德]迪特尔·梅迪库斯.德国民法总论[M].邵建东,译.北京:法律出版社,2000.
[5][日]山本敬三.民法讲义I[M].解亘,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[6]王泽鉴.民法总则[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[7][日]进江幸治.民法讲义I[M].渠涛,等译.北京:北京大学出版社,2015.
[8]朱庆育.民法总论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2016.
[9]尹田.论胎儿利益的民法保护[J].云南大学学报(法学版),2002,(1):49-52.
[10]杨巍.论胎儿利益的民法保护[J].环球法律评论,2007,(4):88-97.
[11]叶玉莎.基于民法总则草案中胎儿利益法律保护规定的思考[J].法制博览,2017,(2):135-136.
[12]李锡鹤.胎儿不应有法律上的利益[J].东方法学,2017,(1):2-13.
[13]陈东强.关于胎儿利益保护法律适用问题的探讨[J].山东审判,2017,(5):23-25.
[14]朱晓峰.民法典编纂视野下胎儿利益的民法规范[J].法学评论,2016,(1):179-190.
(1)[德]卡尔·拉伦茨:《德国民法通论》(上册),王晓晔等译,法律出版社2003年版,第124-125页。Vgl. Erman/Saenger, 13. Aufl. 2011 Band 1, BGB § 1 Rn. 2, 其中明确指出,胎儿本身不具备权利能力,但在其出生的前提下受到特别规定的保护。
(2)例如Jauernig/Mansel, 16. Aufl. 2015, BGB ,作者虽然认为胎儿享有“一定的法律地位”(gewisse Rechtsposition),却并未直接采用权利能力(Rechtsf权利能力htsp)的措辞。相同的情形参见HK-BGB/Heinrich D?rner, 9. Aufl. 2016, BGB § 1 Rn. 4。
(3)Vgl. BverfG NJW 1993, 1751. 德国联邦宪法法院在该判决中认为未出生的生命亦享有人格尊严。在文献中占绝对多数的观点也都认为胎儿正是基于德国基本法第1条第1款以及第2条第2款第1句(Art. 1 Abs. 1 und Art. 2 Abs. 2 S. 1 GG)规定的基本权利而享有“基本权利能力”(Grundrechtsfaehigkeit)。Vgl. MüKoBGB/Schmitt, 7. Aufl. 2015, BGB § 1 Rn. 25.
(4)尽管在德国法在学理上承认胎儿可以接受赠与,但德国民法典中却无相关规定。Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger, 45. Ed. 1.11.2017, BGB § 1 Rn. 29:胎儿可在附加的迟缓条件下,即其事后成功出生从而具备完全的权利能力的条件下,成为赠与的对象。
(5)当然,这里的返还请求权基础究竟为不当得利还是物权返还请求权,还要看是否承认物权行为的无因性。我国学理和立法对此认识和规定不一,我是主张无因性的,因此,在这里姑且算作“不当得利”吧。
(6)Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger BGB § 1 Rn. 26,对于出生前的损害,胎儿直接受到《德国民法典》第823条第1款的保护。
(7)这里是指《德国民法典》第844条第2款的规定,该款规定:“在侵害发生时,死者与第三人处于其据以对该第三人依法律规定负有扶养义务的关系中,且因死者被致死,该第三人被剥夺请求扶养的权利的,赔偿义务人必须在死者在推测的生存期间会有义务扶养费的限度内,通过支付定期金向该第三人给予损害赔偿;准用第843条第2款至第4款的规定。即使该第三人在侵害发生时已被孕育成胎儿但尚未出生,也发生该项赔偿义务。”
(8)类似的争论参见BGH NJW 1972, 1126.
(9)Vgl. BeckOK BGB/Bamberger, 45. Ed. 1.11.2017, BGB § 1 Rn. 33: 在对母体进行伤害以及由其引起的胎儿伤害案件中,若认为未出生的胎儿具备部分权利能力(Teilrechtsf?higkeit),则应考察其因果关系。