信贷配置偏好、贷后债务治理与房地产企业投资
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摘要
基于2003~2014年中国A股上市房地产企业的微观数据,从商业银行信贷配置偏好与贷后债务治理两个视角考察了商业银行信贷对房地产企业投资行为的影响机制和作用效果。研究结果表明,商业银行信贷配置更偏爱风险承担水平高的房地产企业,且两者间的敏感度随土地价格上升而增加;银行贷款规模与房地产企业过度投资程度显著正相关,且银行信贷对投资不足行为也没有显著缓解作用;高风险偏好的信贷配置行为与失效的债务治理机制是商业银行信贷助推房地产投资过热的症结所在。
Based on the microdata of China' s A-share listed real estate enterprises from 2003 to 2014,this paper explores the mechanisms of influence and action on real estate enterprises' investment behaviors exerted by commercial bank credit from the perspectives of commercial banks' credit allocation preference and post-loan debt governance. The research findings can be summarized as follows: 1) commercial bank credit allocation has a preference for real estate enterprises with a high risk-taking level,and the degree of sensitiveness between them increases as the land prices rise; 2) bank loan scale has a significant positive correlation with the degree of overinvestment of real estate enterprises,and bank credit has no significant mitigative effect on underinvestment behaviors; 3) the credit allocation behaviors of high risk appetite and failed debt governance mechanism are the crucial reasons why commercial bank credit aggravates overinvestment in real estate.
Based on the microdata of China' s A-share listed real estate enterprises from 2003 to 2014,this paper explores the mechanisms of influence and action on real estate enterprises' investment behaviors exerted by commercial bank credit from the perspectives of commercial banks' credit allocation preference and post-loan debt governance. The research findings can be summarized as follows: 1) commercial bank credit allocation has a preference for real estate enterprises with a high risk-taking level,and the degree of sensitiveness between them increases as the land prices rise; 2) bank loan scale has a significant positive correlation with the degree of overinvestment of real estate enterprises,and bank credit has no significant mitigative effect on underinvestment behaviors; 3) the credit allocation behaviors of high risk appetite and failed debt governance mechanism are the crucial reasons why commercial bank credit aggravates overinvestment in real estate.
引文
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[17]王培辉.中国房地产价格泡沫原因分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2011(3).
[18]Jensen M.C.,1986.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers.American Economic Review,Vol.76,No.2:323-29.
[19]Stulz R.,1990.Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies.Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.26,No.1:3-27
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[21]范从来,王宇伟.公司金融硏究[M].北京:商务印书馆,2006.
[22]李春霞,叶瑶.基于负债和经理激励视角的企业投资不足研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,2015(1).
[23]Jensen M.C.,and Meckling W.H.,1976.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure.Netherlands:Springer:305-360.
[24]窦炜,刘星.债务杠杆、所有权特征与中国上市公司投资行为研究[J].经济与管理研究,2011(2).
[25]Myers S.C.,1977.Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.5,No.2:147-175.
[26]徐向艺,李鑫,自由现金流、负债融资与企业过度投资——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].软科学,2008(7).
[27]Richardson S.,2006.Over-investment of Free Cash Flow.Review of Accounting Studies,Vol.11,No.2-3:159-89.
[28]王善平,李志军.银行持股、投资效率与公司债务融资[J].金融研究,2011(5).
[29]Driscoll J.C.and Kraay A.C.,1998.Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data.Review of Economics&Statistics,Vol.80,No.4:549-560.
(1)限于篇幅,本文未列示稳健性检验的具体估计结果。
[2]Renaud M.,1996.Housing Finance in Transition Economies:the Early Years in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1565.
[3]Krugman P.,1998.What Happened to Asia,Global Competition and Integration.US:Springer.
[4]熊伟.我国房价持续上涨的流动性过剩因素分析与对策[J].生产力研究,2007(19).
[5]于博,植率.我国商业信用再配置的动机检验及其治理效应分析——来自上市公司信贷漏损的证据[J].广东财经大学学报,2017(4).
[6]万良勇.银行道德风险、利益侵占与信贷资金配置效率——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2010(4).
[7]徐明东,陈学彬.货币环境、资本充足率与商业银行风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(7).
[8]李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担[J].中国工业经济,2012(12).
[9]Bargeron L.L.,Lehn K.M.,and Zutter C.J.,2010.Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-taking.Journal of Accounting and Economics,Vol.49,No.1-2:34-52.
[10]Faccio M.,Marchica M.T.,and Mura R.,2016.CEO Gender,Corporate Risk-Taking,and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation.Journal of Corporate Finance,Vol.39:193-209.
[11]Nakano M.,and Nguyen P.,2012.Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking:Further Evidence from Japan.Corporate Governance an International Review,Vol.20,No.4:369-387.
[12]吴晓灵.中国金融体制改革30年回顾与展望[M].北京:人民出版社,2008.
[13]施华强,彭兴韵.商业银行软预算约束与中国银行业改革[J].金融研究,2003(10).
[14]R9theli T.F.,2001.Competition,Herd Behavior,and Credit Cycles:Evidence from Major Swiss Banks.Journal of Economics&Business,Vol.53,No.6:585-592.
[15]Guttentag J.,and Herring,R.,1984.Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder.Journal of Finance,Vol.39,No.5:1359-1382.
[16]刘骏民.利用虚拟经济的功能根治我国流动性膨胀——区别经济泡沫化与经济虚拟化的政策含义[J].开放导报,2010(1).
[17]王培辉.中国房地产价格泡沫原因分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2011(3).
[18]Jensen M.C.,1986.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers.American Economic Review,Vol.76,No.2:323-29.
[19]Stulz R.,1990.Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies.Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.26,No.1:3-27
[20]Grossman S.J.,and Hart O.,2010.Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives.Illinois:University of Chicago Press.
[21]范从来,王宇伟.公司金融硏究[M].北京:商务印书馆,2006.
[22]李春霞,叶瑶.基于负债和经理激励视角的企业投资不足研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,2015(1).
[23]Jensen M.C.,and Meckling W.H.,1976.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure.Netherlands:Springer:305-360.
[24]窦炜,刘星.债务杠杆、所有权特征与中国上市公司投资行为研究[J].经济与管理研究,2011(2).
[25]Myers S.C.,1977.Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.5,No.2:147-175.
[26]徐向艺,李鑫,自由现金流、负债融资与企业过度投资——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].软科学,2008(7).
[27]Richardson S.,2006.Over-investment of Free Cash Flow.Review of Accounting Studies,Vol.11,No.2-3:159-89.
[28]王善平,李志军.银行持股、投资效率与公司债务融资[J].金融研究,2011(5).
[29]Driscoll J.C.and Kraay A.C.,1998.Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data.Review of Economics&Statistics,Vol.80,No.4:549-560.
(1)限于篇幅,本文未列示稳健性检验的具体估计结果。