中国碳市场配额分配方法探索
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摘要
区域碳排放不平衡是中国统一碳市场配额分配方法设计需要考虑的特殊背景,而历史法和基准线法无法解决由该背景导致的"鞭打快牛"效应和"拔苗助长"效应,亟需探索适用于中国碳市场的配额分配方法。本文首先梳理了碳配额分配的相关研究,发现在中国碳市场,历史法存在固定基年和滚动基年选择的两难,基准线法存在"一产品一基准值"原则取舍的两难。其次,基于"共同但有区别的减排责任原则"提出一种配额分配方法——历史—基准趋近法。最后,分别采用历史法、基准线法和历史—基准趋近法进行配额试分配并进行比较。结果显示,历史—基准趋近法不仅可以同时避免"鞭打快牛"效应和"拔苗助长"效应,而且具有良好的政策目标协同性,在控排系数公平性、分配结果精准性和减排成本可行性3个方面均优于另外2种配额分配方法,有效降低了区域经济发展不平衡加剧的风险。研究结论表明,历史—基准趋近法较适用于区域排放不平衡的情形,可作为中国统一碳市场启动初期配额分配方法选择和优化的参考。
The imbalance of regional emissions is a peculiarity for China's unified carbon market.However, neither grandfathering method nor benchmarking method can avoid punishing good performers and applying too much pressure on poor performers. By examining existing research on allowance allocation, we found that in China's carbon market, the grandfathering method faces a dilemma of choosing a fixed-base-year or a rolling-base-year, and the benchmarking method faces a dilemma ofwhether to apply the principle of"one benchmark for one product."Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility for emission reduction, this studyproposeda new method of allowance allocation, that is, grandfathering-benchmarking approaching method.Then, using this method to simulate the allowance allocation and comparing the result with the methods of grandfathering and benchmarking alone,the results show that the grandfatheringbenchmarking approaching method not only can avoid punishing good performers and applying too much pressure on poor performers, but also work in coordination with carbon reduction target.Comparing with the other two methods, itsemission control coefficientis fair, the allocation resultis more accurate, and the cost of emission reduction is more acceptable. It has better performance in reducing the risk of worsening regional economic imbalance.The conclusion of the study shows thatgrandfathering-benchmarking approaching methodcan deal with the situation of strong regional emission disparity. It can be used as a reference for the selection and optimization of allowanceallocation method in the initial stage of China's unified carbon market.
The imbalance of regional emissions is a peculiarity for China's unified carbon market.However, neither grandfathering method nor benchmarking method can avoid punishing good performers and applying too much pressure on poor performers. By examining existing research on allowance allocation, we found that in China's carbon market, the grandfathering method faces a dilemma of choosing a fixed-base-year or a rolling-base-year, and the benchmarking method faces a dilemma ofwhether to apply the principle of"one benchmark for one product."Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility for emission reduction, this studyproposeda new method of allowance allocation, that is, grandfathering-benchmarking approaching method.Then, using this method to simulate the allowance allocation and comparing the result with the methods of grandfathering and benchmarking alone,the results show that the grandfatheringbenchmarking approaching method not only can avoid punishing good performers and applying too much pressure on poor performers, but also work in coordination with carbon reduction target.Comparing with the other two methods, itsemission control coefficientis fair, the allocation resultis more accurate, and the cost of emission reduction is more acceptable. It has better performance in reducing the risk of worsening regional economic imbalance.The conclusion of the study shows thatgrandfathering-benchmarking approaching methodcan deal with the situation of strong regional emission disparity. It can be used as a reference for the selection and optimization of allowanceallocation method in the initial stage of China's unified carbon market.
引文
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[5]齐绍洲,王班班.碳交易初始配额分配:模式与方法的比较分析[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2013, 66(5):19-28.[Qi S Z, Wang B B. Initial allowances allocation in carbon trading:Comparison of modes and methods[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2013, 66(5):19-28.]
[6]姚晔,夏炎,范英,等.基于环境生产技术效率的中国2030年区域减排目标路径研究[J].资源科学, 2017, 39(12):2335-2343.[Yao Y, Xia Y, Fan Y, et al. The pathway of Chinese regional carbon emission in 2030:A research based on ZSG environmental production technology efficiency[J]. Resources Science, 2017, 39(12):2335-2343.]
[7]王文举,李峰.我国统一碳市场中的省际间配额分配问题研究[J].求是学刊, 2015, 42(2):44-51.[Wang W J, Li F. Study on quota distribution among provinces in our unified carbon market[J]. Seeking Truth, 2015, 42(2):44-51.]
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[10] Burtram D, Kahn D, Palmer K. CO2allowance allocation in the regional greenhouse gas initiative and the effect on electricity investors[J]. Electricity Journal, 2006, 19(2):79-90.
[11]袁永娜,石敏俊,李娜.碳排放许可的初始分配与区域协调发展:基于多区域CGE模型的模拟分析[J].管理评论, 2013, 25(2):43-50.[Yuan Y N, Shi M J, Li N. Analysis of regional assignment of carbon emission permits and its impacts on regional development in China:Based on a multi-regional computable equilibrium model[J]. Management Review, 2013, 25(2):43-50.]
[12] Crantom P, Kerr S. Tradeable carbon permit auctions:How and why to auction not grandfather[J]. Energy Policy, 2002, 30(4):333-345.
[13]李继峰.电价管制会显著降低碳交易效率[N].中国能源报,2014-11-03(04).[Li J F. Tariff Control Will Significantly Reduce the Efficiency of Carbon Trading[N]. China Energy News, 2014-11-03(04).]
[14] Gagelman F. The Influence of the Allocation Method on Market Liquidity, Volatility and Firms’Investment Decisions[A]. Antes R,Hansjürgens B, Letmathe P. Emissions Trading[C]. New York:Springer, 2008.
[15] Woerdman E, Arcuri A, ClòS. Emissions trading and the polluterpays principle:Do polluters pay under grandfathering?[J]. Review of Law&Economics, 2008, 4(2):565-590.
[16]孙永平.全球气候治理视域下的中国碳市场[N].光明日报(理论版), 2018-02-27(15).[Sun Y P. China’s Carbon Market under the Perspective of Global Climate Governance[N]. Guangming Daily(Theoretical Version), 2018-02-27(15).]
[17]张希良.国家碳市场总体设计中几个关键指标之间的数量关系[J].环境经济研究, 2017, 2(3):1-5.[Zhang X L. The quantitative relations of some key indicators in China’s national emission trading system design[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics, 2017, 2(3):1-5.]
[18]何建坤.新时代应对气候变化和低碳发展长期战略的新思考[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2018,(4):13-21.[He J K. New idea on China’s long-term strategy of addressing climate change and low-carbon development for new era[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2018,(4):13-21.]
[19]李峰,王文举.中国试点碳市场配额分配方法比较研究[J].经济与管理研究, 2015,(4):9-15.[Li F, Wang W J. Comparative research on quota allocation methods in China’s pilot carbon market[J]. Research on Economics and Management, 2015,(4):9-15.]
[20] Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management. National Allocation Plan for Austria Pursuant to Sec. 11 of the Austrian Emission Allowances Trading Act(EZG)for the Period 2008-2012[EB/OL].(2007-06-29)[2018-09-08].http://www.emissionshandelsregister.at/fileadmin/site/emissionhandel/pdf/enAT_NAP2_2008-2012.pdf.
[21]熊灵,齐绍洲,沈波.中国碳交易试点配额分配的机制特征、设计问题与改进对策[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2016,69(3):56-64.[Xiong L, Qi S Z, Shen B. The comparative features,problems and improvement measures of allowance allocation mechanism of China’s carbon trading pilots[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2016, 69(3):56-64.]
[22] Michael G, Christian A, Martinpersson U. Allowance allocation in the European emissions trading system:A commentary[J]. Climate Policy, 2005, 5(1):127-136.
[23]曹静,周亚林.行业覆盖、市场规模与碳排放权交易市场总体设计[J].改革, 2017,(11):126-135.[Cao J, Zhou Y L. Industrial coverage, market scale and overall design of trading market of carbon emission right[J]. Reform, 2017,(11):126-135.]
[24]中国能源网.碳交易市场配额分配方案征集意见中,电力行业预分配比例暂定70%[EB/OL].(2017-06-02)[2018-03-06].http://www. cnenergy. org/hb/tpf/201706/t20170602_444547. html/.[China Energy Network. Quota Allocation Scheme of Carbon Trading Market In Soliciting Opinions, the Pre-allocation Proportion of Power Industry Is Tentatively Set at 70%[EB/OL].(2017-06-02)[2018-03-06]. http://www.cnenergy.org/hb/tpf/201706/t20170602_444547.html/.]
[25]叶飞,令狐大智.双寡头竞争环境下的碳配额分配策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(12):3038-3046.[Ye F, Linghu D Z. Carbon quota allocation policy in duopoly[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(12):3038-3046.]
[26]李钢,廖建辉.基于碳资本存量的碳排放权分配方案[J].中国社会科学, 2015,(7):66-81.[Li G, Liao J H. A scheme for allocating carbon emission permits on the basis of carbon capital stocks[J]. Social Sciences in China, 2015,(7):66-81.]
[27] Paustian K, Ravindranath N H, Amstel V A R. 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories[R]. Hayama:IPCC,2006.
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1)中国工业统计年鉴中的产值数据统计口径为规模以上企业,各省(市、区)分行业能源消费数据兼有规模以上和全口径,考虑到本文涉及的7个重点行业均为资本密集型行业,市场准入门槛高,单个企业规模一般较大,规模以上企业几乎包含了该行业所有产出,也即囊括了该行业绝大多数的能源消费。如,山西省统计年鉴中“主要年份主要工业产品产量”数据显示,本文7个重点行业规模以上产出均占全部产出的94%以上,电力、钢铁、有色等行业为99%以上,其他省(市、区)的情况类似。为了避免数据口径统一过程中由于方法误差或其他主观因素等造成误差扩大,本文未对7个重点行业能源消费数据进行数据口径的统一。
2)《巴黎协定》中国国家自主贡献目标规定“到2030年,中国单位GDP的CO2排放将比2005年下降60%~65%,CO2排放在2030年左右达到峰值并争取尽早达到峰值”。
3)按照配额分配参照标准的不同,历史法又可分为历史排放法和历史强度下降法,前者参考基年碳排放总量进行配额分配,后者依据基年碳排放强度确定配额数量。配额试分配中所指历史法的含义为后者。
[2] Peace J, Juliani T. The coming carbon market and its impact on the American economy[J]. Policy&Society, 2009, 27(4):305-316.
[3]宣晓伟,张浩.碳排放权配额分配的国际经验及启示[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2013, 23(12):10-15.[Xuan X W, Zhang H. International experiences and lessons of carbon emission permit allocation method[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment,2013, 23(12):10-15.]
[4]段茂盛,庞韬.全国统一碳排放权交易体系中的配额分配方式研究[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2014, 67(5):5-12.[Duan M S, Pang T. Key issues in allowance allocation in China’s future unified national emissions trading scheme[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2014, 67(5):5-12.]
[5]齐绍洲,王班班.碳交易初始配额分配:模式与方法的比较分析[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2013, 66(5):19-28.[Qi S Z, Wang B B. Initial allowances allocation in carbon trading:Comparison of modes and methods[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2013, 66(5):19-28.]
[6]姚晔,夏炎,范英,等.基于环境生产技术效率的中国2030年区域减排目标路径研究[J].资源科学, 2017, 39(12):2335-2343.[Yao Y, Xia Y, Fan Y, et al. The pathway of Chinese regional carbon emission in 2030:A research based on ZSG environmental production technology efficiency[J]. Resources Science, 2017, 39(12):2335-2343.]
[7]王文举,李峰.我国统一碳市场中的省际间配额分配问题研究[J].求是学刊, 2015, 42(2):44-51.[Wang W J, Li F. Study on quota distribution among provinces in our unified carbon market[J]. Seeking Truth, 2015, 42(2):44-51.]
[8] Qin Q, Liu Y, Li X, et al. A multi-criteria decision analysis model for carbon emission quota allocation in China’s east coastal areas:Efficiency and equity[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 168:410-419.
[9]杨军,赵永斌,丛建辉.全国统一碳市场碳配额的总量设定与分配:基于碳交易三大特性的再审视[J].天津社会科学, 2017,(5):110-114.[Yang J, Zhao Y B, Cong J H. The cap setting and allowance allocation of unified national carbon market:A review based on three properties of emissions trading scheme[J]. Tianjin Social Sciences, 2017,(5):110-114.]
[10] Burtram D, Kahn D, Palmer K. CO2allowance allocation in the regional greenhouse gas initiative and the effect on electricity investors[J]. Electricity Journal, 2006, 19(2):79-90.
[11]袁永娜,石敏俊,李娜.碳排放许可的初始分配与区域协调发展:基于多区域CGE模型的模拟分析[J].管理评论, 2013, 25(2):43-50.[Yuan Y N, Shi M J, Li N. Analysis of regional assignment of carbon emission permits and its impacts on regional development in China:Based on a multi-regional computable equilibrium model[J]. Management Review, 2013, 25(2):43-50.]
[12] Crantom P, Kerr S. Tradeable carbon permit auctions:How and why to auction not grandfather[J]. Energy Policy, 2002, 30(4):333-345.
[13]李继峰.电价管制会显著降低碳交易效率[N].中国能源报,2014-11-03(04).[Li J F. Tariff Control Will Significantly Reduce the Efficiency of Carbon Trading[N]. China Energy News, 2014-11-03(04).]
[14] Gagelman F. The Influence of the Allocation Method on Market Liquidity, Volatility and Firms’Investment Decisions[A]. Antes R,Hansjürgens B, Letmathe P. Emissions Trading[C]. New York:Springer, 2008.
[15] Woerdman E, Arcuri A, ClòS. Emissions trading and the polluterpays principle:Do polluters pay under grandfathering?[J]. Review of Law&Economics, 2008, 4(2):565-590.
[16]孙永平.全球气候治理视域下的中国碳市场[N].光明日报(理论版), 2018-02-27(15).[Sun Y P. China’s Carbon Market under the Perspective of Global Climate Governance[N]. Guangming Daily(Theoretical Version), 2018-02-27(15).]
[17]张希良.国家碳市场总体设计中几个关键指标之间的数量关系[J].环境经济研究, 2017, 2(3):1-5.[Zhang X L. The quantitative relations of some key indicators in China’s national emission trading system design[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics, 2017, 2(3):1-5.]
[18]何建坤.新时代应对气候变化和低碳发展长期战略的新思考[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2018,(4):13-21.[He J K. New idea on China’s long-term strategy of addressing climate change and low-carbon development for new era[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2018,(4):13-21.]
[19]李峰,王文举.中国试点碳市场配额分配方法比较研究[J].经济与管理研究, 2015,(4):9-15.[Li F, Wang W J. Comparative research on quota allocation methods in China’s pilot carbon market[J]. Research on Economics and Management, 2015,(4):9-15.]
[20] Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management. National Allocation Plan for Austria Pursuant to Sec. 11 of the Austrian Emission Allowances Trading Act(EZG)for the Period 2008-2012[EB/OL].(2007-06-29)[2018-09-08].http://www.emissionshandelsregister.at/fileadmin/site/emissionhandel/pdf/enAT_NAP2_2008-2012.pdf.
[21]熊灵,齐绍洲,沈波.中国碳交易试点配额分配的机制特征、设计问题与改进对策[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2016,69(3):56-64.[Xiong L, Qi S Z, Shen B. The comparative features,problems and improvement measures of allowance allocation mechanism of China’s carbon trading pilots[J]. Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy&Social Science), 2016, 69(3):56-64.]
[22] Michael G, Christian A, Martinpersson U. Allowance allocation in the European emissions trading system:A commentary[J]. Climate Policy, 2005, 5(1):127-136.
[23]曹静,周亚林.行业覆盖、市场规模与碳排放权交易市场总体设计[J].改革, 2017,(11):126-135.[Cao J, Zhou Y L. Industrial coverage, market scale and overall design of trading market of carbon emission right[J]. Reform, 2017,(11):126-135.]
[24]中国能源网.碳交易市场配额分配方案征集意见中,电力行业预分配比例暂定70%[EB/OL].(2017-06-02)[2018-03-06].http://www. cnenergy. org/hb/tpf/201706/t20170602_444547. html/.[China Energy Network. Quota Allocation Scheme of Carbon Trading Market In Soliciting Opinions, the Pre-allocation Proportion of Power Industry Is Tentatively Set at 70%[EB/OL].(2017-06-02)[2018-03-06]. http://www.cnenergy.org/hb/tpf/201706/t20170602_444547.html/.]
[25]叶飞,令狐大智.双寡头竞争环境下的碳配额分配策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(12):3038-3046.[Ye F, Linghu D Z. Carbon quota allocation policy in duopoly[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(12):3038-3046.]
[26]李钢,廖建辉.基于碳资本存量的碳排放权分配方案[J].中国社会科学, 2015,(7):66-81.[Li G, Liao J H. A scheme for allocating carbon emission permits on the basis of carbon capital stocks[J]. Social Sciences in China, 2015,(7):66-81.]
[27] Paustian K, Ravindranath N H, Amstel V A R. 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories[R]. Hayama:IPCC,2006.
[28]何建坤. CO2排放峰值分析:中国的减排目标与对策[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2013, 23(12):1-9.[He J K. Analysis of CO2emissions peak:China’s objective and strategy[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2013, 23(12):1-9.]
[29]李雪松,娄峰,张友国.“十三五”及2030年发展目标与战略研究[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2016.[Li X S, Lou F, Zhang Y G. Research of"Thirteenth Five-Year Plan"and 2030 Development Goals and Strategy[M]. Beijing:Social Sciences Literature Publishing House, 2016.]
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1)中国工业统计年鉴中的产值数据统计口径为规模以上企业,各省(市、区)分行业能源消费数据兼有规模以上和全口径,考虑到本文涉及的7个重点行业均为资本密集型行业,市场准入门槛高,单个企业规模一般较大,规模以上企业几乎包含了该行业所有产出,也即囊括了该行业绝大多数的能源消费。如,山西省统计年鉴中“主要年份主要工业产品产量”数据显示,本文7个重点行业规模以上产出均占全部产出的94%以上,电力、钢铁、有色等行业为99%以上,其他省(市、区)的情况类似。为了避免数据口径统一过程中由于方法误差或其他主观因素等造成误差扩大,本文未对7个重点行业能源消费数据进行数据口径的统一。
2)《巴黎协定》中国国家自主贡献目标规定“到2030年,中国单位GDP的CO2排放将比2005年下降60%~65%,CO2排放在2030年左右达到峰值并争取尽早达到峰值”。
3)按照配额分配参照标准的不同,历史法又可分为历史排放法和历史强度下降法,前者参考基年碳排放总量进行配额分配,后者依据基年碳排放强度确定配额数量。配额试分配中所指历史法的含义为后者。