考虑消费者环境偏好的闭环供应链奖惩与补贴机制研究
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摘要
考虑消费者具有环境偏好差异,构建分散决策下无政府机制、基于产品环保度的奖惩机制、基于废品回收量的补贴机制以及基于奖惩与补贴双机制下的闭环供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,求解模型得出产品的零售价、回收价等决策变量。研究表明:当无政府介入市场时,采取不同闭环供应链战略的企业专注各自的细分市场,定价策略很大程度受消费者环境偏好影响。与无政府机制相比,奖惩与补贴双机制下主动回收的制造商利润增加,不回收的制造商利润减少,但产品环保总量和废品回收量增加,说明奖惩与补贴机制能有效引导制造商的回收积极性,并有利于整个环境的环保,同时,零售商与回收商利润的增加也促使他们积极地参与闭环供应链,从而使得整个闭环供应链得以协调。
Affected by consumers′ differences in environmental preferences,the decentralized decision-making models of the non-Reward-Penalty Mechanism as well as the Reward-Penalty Mechanism which is composed of product environmental protection or subsidization based on waste recycling quantity or product environmental protection and subsidization based on waste recycling quantity were constructed.By solving and comparing the results of these models,the product retail price and recycling price and other decision variable were obtained respectively.Research shows that when there is no government intervention in the market,companies adopting different closed-loop supply chain strategies focus on their respective market segments,and the pricing strategy is largely influenced by consumer environmental preferences.Compared with the non-Reward-Penalty mechanism,the profit of the recycling manufacturers under the dual mechanism of reward,penalty and subsidy increases,the profit of non-recycling manufacturers decreases,but the total level of environmental protection and recycling amount of wastes increases,indicating that the incentive and punishment mechanism effectively guides manufacturing and promotes the environmental protection of the entire environment.Meanwhile the increase of the retailers' and recyclers' profits has prompted them to actively participate in CLSC,thus enabling the entire closed-loop supply chain to be coordinated.
Affected by consumers′ differences in environmental preferences,the decentralized decision-making models of the non-Reward-Penalty Mechanism as well as the Reward-Penalty Mechanism which is composed of product environmental protection or subsidization based on waste recycling quantity or product environmental protection and subsidization based on waste recycling quantity were constructed.By solving and comparing the results of these models,the product retail price and recycling price and other decision variable were obtained respectively.Research shows that when there is no government intervention in the market,companies adopting different closed-loop supply chain strategies focus on their respective market segments,and the pricing strategy is largely influenced by consumer environmental preferences.Compared with the non-Reward-Penalty mechanism,the profit of the recycling manufacturers under the dual mechanism of reward,penalty and subsidy increases,the profit of non-recycling manufacturers decreases,but the total level of environmental protection and recycling amount of wastes increases,indicating that the incentive and punishment mechanism effectively guides manufacturing and promotes the environmental protection of the entire environment.Meanwhile the increase of the retailers' and recyclers' profits has prompted them to actively participate in CLSC,thus enabling the entire closed-loop supply chain to be coordinated.
引文
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[17] 张汉江,余华英,李聪颖.闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化[J].中国管理科学,2016,(08):71-78.
[18] 葛静燕,黄培清,李娟.社会环保意识和闭环供应链定价策略——基于纵向差异模型的研究[J].工业工程与管理,2007,(04):6-10+24.
[19] 周维浪,韩小花,沈莹.考虑消费者行为的闭环供应链定价和服务水平决策及协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2017,(10):2241-2250.
[2] 缪朝炜,夏志强.基于以旧换新的闭环供应链决策模型[J].管理科学学报,2016,(09):49-66.
[3] Atasu A,Toktay L B,Van Wassenhove L N.How Collection Cost Structure Drives a Manufacturer′s Reverse Channel Choice[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(5):1089-1102.
[4] 聂佳佳.零售商信息分享对闭环供应链回收模式的影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,(05):69-82.
[5] Mitra S,Webster S.Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,111(2):287-298.
[6] 贡文伟,李虎,梅强.政府引导下的逆向供应链契约设计[J].运筹与管理,2012,(03):242-249.
[7] Aksen D,Aras N,Karaarslan A G.Design and analysis of government subsidized collection systems for incentive-dependent returns[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2009,119(2):308-327.
[8] 余福茂,钟永光,沈祖志.考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,(05):131-137.
[9] 王文宾,达庆利.考虑政府引导的电子类产品逆向供应链奖惩机制设计[J].中国管理科学,2010,(02):62-67.
[10] 王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,(01):36-41.
[11] 王文宾,达庆利,聂锐.闭环供应链视角下废旧电器电子产品回收再利用的激励机制与对策[J].软科学,2012,(08):44-48.
[12] 聂佳佳,王文宾,吴庆.奖惩机制对零售商负责回收闭环供应链的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2011,(02):52-59.
[13] 王文宾,陈琴,达庆利.奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,(06):57-63.
[14] 易余胤,梁家密.奖惩机制下的再制造闭环供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2013,(04):841-849.
[15] Juhong G,Haiyan W,Hongshuai H,et al.Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain based on premium and penalty mechanism[C]//2013 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2013:896-900.
[16] 王文宾,邓雯雯,白拓,等.碳排放约束下制造商竞争的逆向供应链政府奖惩机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,(02):188-194.
[17] 张汉江,余华英,李聪颖.闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化[J].中国管理科学,2016,(08):71-78.
[18] 葛静燕,黄培清,李娟.社会环保意识和闭环供应链定价策略——基于纵向差异模型的研究[J].工业工程与管理,2007,(04):6-10+24.
[19] 周维浪,韩小花,沈莹.考虑消费者行为的闭环供应链定价和服务水平决策及协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2017,(10):2241-2250.