摘要
文章利用对称和非对称演化博弈模型开展了驾驶员偷盗油品行为的探究,填补了国内外驾驶员偷盗油品行为经济学理论研究的空白,揭示了驾驶员之间以及驾驶员与监管部门之间动态博弈过程,能够在实际工作中进行有针对性的部署。
Symmetric and asymmetric evolutionary game model was carried out on the driver behavior using oil stealing. This paper fills the gap of domestic driver behavioral economics theory research,reveals the dynamic game process between the driver and the driver and between regulators,can work in practice to carry out targeted deployment.
引文
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