国企董事社会网络水平对双重任务的影响分析:股权混合度的调节效应
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摘要
基于2010-2015年央企控股的上市公司,从社会资源视角详细解读了国企中具有"亦官亦商"双重身份的政府官员型董事和企业家型董事的社会网络对于国企双重任务的功能偏好,同时检验股权混合度在董事社会网络与双重任务之间的调节作用,并在商业竞争与特殊功能两类功能企业样本中进一步挖掘和巩固研究结论。研究发现,政府官员型董事社会网络促进企业社会责任、削弱经济绩效;企业家型董事社会网络促进经济绩效、削弱社会责任;股权混合度能够加强企业家型董事社会网络对于双重任务的作用,而削弱政府官员型董事社会网络的作用;股权混合度的调节效应在总样本和商业竞争类企业中普遍存在,但在特殊功能类企业中很难发挥作用。
Based on the 906 CSOEs from 2010—2015,this paper interpreted functional preferences of official directors' social network(ODSN)and entrepreneur directors' social networks(EDSN)to dual task from the perspective of social resources.Meanwhile we introduced the moderating effect of equity mixed degree(EMD),and consolidated conclusions in different functional enterprises.The empirical analysis found that:ODSN related positively to corporate social responsibility(CSR)and negatively to corporate economic performance(CEP);EDSN related positively to CEP and negatively to CSR;EMD provided a favorable environment for EDSN to work,while weaken the effect of ODSN on corporate task;the moderating effect of EMD was prevalent in all samples and commercial competition enterprises,while was difficult to work in special functional enterprises.
Based on the 906 CSOEs from 2010—2015,this paper interpreted functional preferences of official directors' social network(ODSN)and entrepreneur directors' social networks(EDSN)to dual task from the perspective of social resources.Meanwhile we introduced the moderating effect of equity mixed degree(EMD),and consolidated conclusions in different functional enterprises.The empirical analysis found that:ODSN related positively to corporate social responsibility(CSR)and negatively to corporate economic performance(CEP);EDSN related positively to CEP and negatively to CSR;EMD provided a favorable environment for EDSN to work,while weaken the effect of ODSN on corporate task;the moderating effect of EMD was prevalent in all samples and commercial competition enterprises,while was difficult to work in special functional enterprises.
引文
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[23]李彬,谷慧敏,高伟.制度压力如何影响企业社会责任:基于旅游企业的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2011(6):67-75.
[24]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
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[26]孙俊华,贾良定.高层管理团队与企业战略关系研究述评[J].科技进步与对策,2009,26(9):150-155.
[27]王雪莉,马琳,王艳.高管团队职能背景对企业绩效的影响:以中国信息技术行业上市公司为例[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(4):80-93.
[28]黄祥芳,周伟,张立中.高管团队特征对企业社会责任的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究[J].内蒙古财经大学学报,2015,13(2):50-55.
[29]张兆国,靳小翠,李庚秦.企业社会责任与财务绩效之间交互跨期影响实证研究[J].会计研究,2013(8):32-39.
[30]逯东,林高,黄莉,等.“官员型”高管、公司业绩和非生产性支出——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2012(6):139-153.
[31]刘新民,王垒,李垣.企业家类型、控制机制与创新方式选择研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2013(8):102-110.
[32]叶勇,蓝辉旋,李明.多个大股东股权结构与公司业绩研究[J].预测,2013,32(2):26-30,75.
[33]黄群慧,余菁.新时期的新思路:国有企业分类改革与治理[J].中国工业经济,2013(11):5-17.
[2]Peng M W,Heath P S.The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition:Institutions,Organizations,and Strategic Choice[J].Academy of Management Review,1996,21(2):492-528.
[3]王垒,刘新民,王松.基于双重委托代理的创业企业治理框架构建与研究展望[J].山东科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016,18(3):68-73.
[4]Ueng C J.The Analysis of Corporate Governance Policy and Corporate Financial Performance[J].Journal of Economics and Finance,2016,40(3):514-523.
[5]Lau C M,Lu Y,Liang Q.Corporate Social Responsibility in China:A Corporate Governance Approach[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2016,136(1):73-87.
[6]Borghesi R,Houston J F,Naranjo A.Corporate Socially Responsible Investments:CEO Altruism,Reputation,and Shareholder Interests[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,26(2):164-181.
[7]Xia F,Walker G.How much Does Owner Type Matter for Firm Performance?Manufacturing Firms in China 1998-2007[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(4):576-585.
[8]Sul W,Choi H M,Quan R S.Shareholder Conflict as a Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility Commitment for Shared Growth[J].Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,2014,50(5):97-110.
[9]Grove H,Patelli L,Victoravich L M,et al.Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:Evidence from US Commercial Banks[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2011,19(5):418-436.
[10]Harjoto M,Laksmana I,Lee R.Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2015,132(4):641-660.
[11]Post C,Byron K.Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance:A Meta-analysis[J].Academy of Management Journal,2015,58(5):1546-1571.
[12]Gaur S S,Bathula H,Singh D.Ownership Concentration,Board Characteristics and Firm Performance[J].Management Decision,2015,53(5):911
[13]Shaw T S,Cordeiro J J,Saravanan P.Director Network Resources and Firm Performance:Evidence from Indian Corporate Governance Reforms[J].Asian Business&Management,2016,15(3):1-36.
[14]Charas S.Improving Corporate Performance by Enhancing Team Dynamics at the Board Level[J].International Journal of Disclosure and Governance,2015,12(2):107-131.
[15]Peng M W,Mutlu C C,Sauerwald S,et al.Board Interlocks and Corporate Performance among Firms Listed Abroad[J].Journal of Management History,2015,21(2):257-282.
[16]Wincent J,Thorgren S,Anokhin S.Entrepreneurial Orientation and Network Board Diversity in Network Organizations[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2014,29(2):327-344.
[17]Chen Y,Wang Y,Lin L.Independent Directors’Board Networks and Controlling Shareholders’Tunneling Behaviorq[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2014,7(2):101-118.
[18]Nakamura E.The Impact of Shareholders’Types on Corporate Social Responsibility:Evidence from Japanese Firms[J].Journal of Global Responsibility,2013,4(1):113-130.
[19]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[20]Mori N.Directors’Diversity and Board Performance:Evidence from East African Microfinance Institutions[J].Journal of African Business,2014,15(2):100-113.
[21]杜兴强,郭剑花,雷宇.政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩:“政府干预”抑或“关系”?[J].金融研究,2009(11):158-174
[22]Xu E,Xu K.A Multilevel Analysis of the Effect of Taxation Incentives on Innovation Performance[J].IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,2013,60(1):137-147.
[23]李彬,谷慧敏,高伟.制度压力如何影响企业社会责任:基于旅游企业的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2011(6):67-75.
[24]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
[25]衣凤鹏,徐二明.高管政治关联与企业社会责任——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济与管理研究,2014(5):5-13.
[26]孙俊华,贾良定.高层管理团队与企业战略关系研究述评[J].科技进步与对策,2009,26(9):150-155.
[27]王雪莉,马琳,王艳.高管团队职能背景对企业绩效的影响:以中国信息技术行业上市公司为例[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(4):80-93.
[28]黄祥芳,周伟,张立中.高管团队特征对企业社会责任的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究[J].内蒙古财经大学学报,2015,13(2):50-55.
[29]张兆国,靳小翠,李庚秦.企业社会责任与财务绩效之间交互跨期影响实证研究[J].会计研究,2013(8):32-39.
[30]逯东,林高,黄莉,等.“官员型”高管、公司业绩和非生产性支出——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2012(6):139-153.
[31]刘新民,王垒,李垣.企业家类型、控制机制与创新方式选择研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2013(8):102-110.
[32]叶勇,蓝辉旋,李明.多个大股东股权结构与公司业绩研究[J].预测,2013,32(2):26-30,75.
[33]黄群慧,余菁.新时期的新思路:国有企业分类改革与治理[J].中国工业经济,2013(11):5-17.