基于偏好异质性的家庭农场扶持政策研究——黄淮海平原570个粮食类农场的实证分析
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摘要
依据黄淮海平原5省570个粮食类家庭农场的调研数据,运用选择实验法,在对家庭农场忽略的属性进行信息处理的基础上,借助混合Logit模型和潜在类别模型,分析家庭农场对不同扶持政策的偏好程度,以及不同偏好类型的家庭农场特征差异。结果发现:采用推断性属性非参与方法进行信息处理后的模型拟合效果最好;家庭农场更偏好农业补贴、信贷支持和技术支持,但其对政策传播渠道的偏好也不能忽视;面临相同的政策属性组合时,受教育水平高、经营规模合理和对扶持政策认知程度高的家庭农场利润率提升的可能性更大;家庭农场可划分为资金偏好型、知识与技术偏好型、土地流转偏好型和政策信息偏好型四种类型。应该基于偏好异质性制定家庭农场扶持政策,将扶持政策向家庭农场相对更为偏好的农业补贴、信贷支持和技术支持适当倾斜,并对农场主受教育水平高、经营规模合理和对扶持政策认知度高的家庭农场进行重点扶持。
Employing the choice experiment method in surveying 570 family farms in Huang-huaihai Plains,this paper processes the information on attributes neglected in grain family farms and analyzes preferences for different support policies and the characteristics of grain family farms with heterogeneity preferences with the assistance of mixed logit and latent class models.Results show that the model using inferred attribute non-attendance method has the best fit;policies comprising agricultural subsidy,credit support and technical support are preferred by grain family farms;the preference of grain family farms for policy communication channel cannot be ignored;grain family farms with high education level,reasonable land scale and high cognitive competence to supporting policies are expected to increase profit rate in front of the same policy;there are four types of grain family farms,namely the capital-preferred,the knowledge-and-technology-preferred,the land-transfer-preferred and the policy-preferred.Family farm supporting policy must be formulated on the basis of heterogeneity preferences,and the supporting policy should be appropriately inclined to the preferred agricultural subsidy,credit and technical support.Family farms with highly-educated farmers,reasonable land scale and high cognitive competence must be intensively supported.
Employing the choice experiment method in surveying 570 family farms in Huang-huaihai Plains,this paper processes the information on attributes neglected in grain family farms and analyzes preferences for different support policies and the characteristics of grain family farms with heterogeneity preferences with the assistance of mixed logit and latent class models.Results show that the model using inferred attribute non-attendance method has the best fit;policies comprising agricultural subsidy,credit support and technical support are preferred by grain family farms;the preference of grain family farms for policy communication channel cannot be ignored;grain family farms with high education level,reasonable land scale and high cognitive competence to supporting policies are expected to increase profit rate in front of the same policy;there are four types of grain family farms,namely the capital-preferred,the knowledge-and-technology-preferred,the land-transfer-preferred and the policy-preferred.Family farm supporting policy must be formulated on the basis of heterogeneity preferences,and the supporting policy should be appropriately inclined to the preferred agricultural subsidy,credit and technical support.Family farms with highly-educated farmers,reasonable land scale and high cognitive competence must be intensively supported.
引文
[1]邹心平.论家庭农场在新型农业经营体系中的主体地位[J].求实,2017(2):84-96.
[2]黄琦,陶建平.2008—2014年家庭农场研究动态及展望——基于文献计量方法[J].经济体制改革,2016(4):83-88.
[3]GAO Y,ZHANG X,LU J,et al.Adoption behavior of green control techniques by family farms in China:evidence from 676family farms in Huang-huai-hai Plain[J].Crop protection,2017(99):76-84.
[4]徐辉.农业新型经营主体家庭农场培育研究——基于湖北省的调查[J].学术论坛,2014(1):68-71,166.
[5]BARNES A,SUTHERLAND L A,TOMA L,et al.The effect of the common agricultural policy reforms on intentions towards food production:evidence from livestock farmers[J].Land use policy,2016,50(4):548-558.
[6]KIHL Y W.Farm structure and rural policy in Japan[J].Food policy,1982,7(4):332-336.
[7]BOTTERILL L C.Agricultural policy in Australia:deregulation,bipartisanship and agrarian sentiment[J].Australian journal of political science,2016,51(4):667-682.
[8]GAO Y,ZHANG X,WU L,et al.Resource basis,ecosystem and growth of grain family farm in China:based on rough set theory and hierarchical linear model[J].Agricultural systems,2017(154):157-167.
[9]TZOURAMANI I,LIONTAKIS A,SINTORI A,et al.Assessing organic cherry farmers’strategies under different policy options[J].Modern economy,2014,5(4):313-323.
[10]MCFADDEN T,GORMAN M.Exploring the concept of farm household innovation capacity in relation to farm diversification in policy context[J].Journal of rural studies,2016(46):60-70.
[11]MEDINA G,ALMEIDA C,NOVAES E,et al.Development conditions for family farming:lessons from Brazil[J].World development,2015(74):386-396.
[12]TOADER M,ROMAN G V.Family farming-examples for rural communities development[J].Agriculture and agricultural science procedia,2015(6):89-94.
[13]杜志雄,肖卫东.家庭农场发展的实际状态与政策支持[J].改革,2014(6):39-51.
[14]姜涛.家庭农场在新型农业经营体系中的作用解析[J].中州学刊,2017(1):33-38.
[15]苏昕,刘昊龙.中国特色家庭农场的时代特征辨析[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(3):105-113.
[16]高杨,李佩.粮食类家庭农场的影响因素[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(3):1-11.
[17]YIN S J,CHEN M,XU Y J,et al.Chinese consumers’willingness to pay for safety label on tomato:evidence from choice experiments[J].China agricultural economic review,2017(11):41-155.
[18]SCARPA R,GILBRIDE T J,CAMPBELL D,et al.Modelling attribute non-attendance in choice experiments for rural landscape valuation[J].European review of agricultural economics,2009,36(2):151-174.
[19]PAN D,ZHOU G,ZHANG N,et al.Farmers’preferences for livestock pollution control policy in China:a choice experiment method[J].Journal of cleaner production,2016(131):572-582.
[20]孔祥智,楼栋.农业技术推广的国际比较、时态举证与中国对策[J].改革,2012(1):12-23.
[21]张德元,潘纬.家庭农场信贷配给与治理路径[J].农村经济,2015(3):59-63.
[22]兰勇,周孟亮,易朝辉.我国家庭农场金融支持研究[J].农业技术经济,2015(6):48-56.
[23]王东强,田书芹.统筹城乡发展中新生代农民职业教育培训模式比较研究[J].教育发展研究,2015(9):70-77.
[24]刘剑虹,陈传锋,谢杭.农民教育培训现状的调查与思考——基于全国百村万民的实证分析[J].教育研究,2015(2):123-129.
[25]谢梅,赵颀.惠农政策的传播效果评估及策略思考[J].农村经济,2016(7):22-28.
[26]赵伟峰,王海涛,刘菊.我国家庭农场发展的困境及解决对策[J].经济纵横,2015(4):37-41.
[27]SCHULZ N,BREUSTEDT G,LATACZ L U.Assessing farmers’willingness to accept“greening”:insights from a discrete choice experiment in Germany[J].Journal of agricultural economics,2014,65(1):26-48.
[28]PANDA S.Farmer education and household agricultural income in rural India[J].International journal of social economics,2015,42(6):514-529.
[29]朱启臻,胡鹏辉,许汉泽.论家庭农场:优势、条件与规模[J].农业经济问题,2014(7):11-17,110.
[30]尹世久,高杨,吴林海.构建中国特色食品安全社会共治体系[M].北京:人民出版社,2017.
[31]CAMPBELL D,HENSHER D A,SCARPA R.Non-attendance to attributes in environmental choice analysis:a latent class specification[J].Journal of environmental planning and management,2011,54(8):1061-1076.
[32]HESS S,HENSHER D A.Using conditioning on observed choices to retrieve individual-specific attribute processing strategies[J].Transportation research part B,2010,44(6):781-790.
[33]YANG D T,AN M Y.Human capital,entrepreneurship,and farm household earnings[J].Journal of development economics,2002,68(1):65-88.
[34]KIRWAN B E.The incidence of U.S.agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates[J].Journal of political economy,2009,117(1):138-164.
[35]PETRINI M A,ROCHA J V,BROWN J C,et al.Using an analytic hierarchy process approach to prioritize public policies addressing family farming in Brazil[J].Land use policy,2016(51):85-94.
[36]RUTO E,GARROD G.Investigating farmers’preferences for the design of agri-environment schemes:a choice experiment approach[J].Journal of environmental planning and management,2009,52(5):631-647.
(1)本文未将税收优惠和农业保险作为家庭农场扶持政策的属性变量,其原因分别在于:第一,从2006年1月1日起,我国废止《农业税条例》,对直接从事农业生产、有农业收入的单位和个人免征农业税。第二,我国虽然通过保费补贴、管理费补贴和再保险补贴等,降低保险公司经营风险和提高保险公司服务供给的积极性,但保险公司定损和赔付的手续繁琐、保额不能补偿家庭农场的基本物化成本、部分险种赔付标准过高、大部分县没有专门的查勘定损专家组。此外,种植业核定理赔要到作物收割时才能进行赔付,耽误了家庭农场种植其他作物。可见,农业保险政策更多偏向于保险公司。
(1)指行为个体报告的非参与信息可能与其他不可观测的因素存在相关性。
(1)分成2~7类时的BIC值依次为:3 517.423、3 462.210、3 225.083、3 364.759、3 497.655、3 633.787。
[2]黄琦,陶建平.2008—2014年家庭农场研究动态及展望——基于文献计量方法[J].经济体制改革,2016(4):83-88.
[3]GAO Y,ZHANG X,LU J,et al.Adoption behavior of green control techniques by family farms in China:evidence from 676family farms in Huang-huai-hai Plain[J].Crop protection,2017(99):76-84.
[4]徐辉.农业新型经营主体家庭农场培育研究——基于湖北省的调查[J].学术论坛,2014(1):68-71,166.
[5]BARNES A,SUTHERLAND L A,TOMA L,et al.The effect of the common agricultural policy reforms on intentions towards food production:evidence from livestock farmers[J].Land use policy,2016,50(4):548-558.
[6]KIHL Y W.Farm structure and rural policy in Japan[J].Food policy,1982,7(4):332-336.
[7]BOTTERILL L C.Agricultural policy in Australia:deregulation,bipartisanship and agrarian sentiment[J].Australian journal of political science,2016,51(4):667-682.
[8]GAO Y,ZHANG X,WU L,et al.Resource basis,ecosystem and growth of grain family farm in China:based on rough set theory and hierarchical linear model[J].Agricultural systems,2017(154):157-167.
[9]TZOURAMANI I,LIONTAKIS A,SINTORI A,et al.Assessing organic cherry farmers’strategies under different policy options[J].Modern economy,2014,5(4):313-323.
[10]MCFADDEN T,GORMAN M.Exploring the concept of farm household innovation capacity in relation to farm diversification in policy context[J].Journal of rural studies,2016(46):60-70.
[11]MEDINA G,ALMEIDA C,NOVAES E,et al.Development conditions for family farming:lessons from Brazil[J].World development,2015(74):386-396.
[12]TOADER M,ROMAN G V.Family farming-examples for rural communities development[J].Agriculture and agricultural science procedia,2015(6):89-94.
[13]杜志雄,肖卫东.家庭农场发展的实际状态与政策支持[J].改革,2014(6):39-51.
[14]姜涛.家庭农场在新型农业经营体系中的作用解析[J].中州学刊,2017(1):33-38.
[15]苏昕,刘昊龙.中国特色家庭农场的时代特征辨析[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(3):105-113.
[16]高杨,李佩.粮食类家庭农场的影响因素[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(3):1-11.
[17]YIN S J,CHEN M,XU Y J,et al.Chinese consumers’willingness to pay for safety label on tomato:evidence from choice experiments[J].China agricultural economic review,2017(11):41-155.
[18]SCARPA R,GILBRIDE T J,CAMPBELL D,et al.Modelling attribute non-attendance in choice experiments for rural landscape valuation[J].European review of agricultural economics,2009,36(2):151-174.
[19]PAN D,ZHOU G,ZHANG N,et al.Farmers’preferences for livestock pollution control policy in China:a choice experiment method[J].Journal of cleaner production,2016(131):572-582.
[20]孔祥智,楼栋.农业技术推广的国际比较、时态举证与中国对策[J].改革,2012(1):12-23.
[21]张德元,潘纬.家庭农场信贷配给与治理路径[J].农村经济,2015(3):59-63.
[22]兰勇,周孟亮,易朝辉.我国家庭农场金融支持研究[J].农业技术经济,2015(6):48-56.
[23]王东强,田书芹.统筹城乡发展中新生代农民职业教育培训模式比较研究[J].教育发展研究,2015(9):70-77.
[24]刘剑虹,陈传锋,谢杭.农民教育培训现状的调查与思考——基于全国百村万民的实证分析[J].教育研究,2015(2):123-129.
[25]谢梅,赵颀.惠农政策的传播效果评估及策略思考[J].农村经济,2016(7):22-28.
[26]赵伟峰,王海涛,刘菊.我国家庭农场发展的困境及解决对策[J].经济纵横,2015(4):37-41.
[27]SCHULZ N,BREUSTEDT G,LATACZ L U.Assessing farmers’willingness to accept“greening”:insights from a discrete choice experiment in Germany[J].Journal of agricultural economics,2014,65(1):26-48.
[28]PANDA S.Farmer education and household agricultural income in rural India[J].International journal of social economics,2015,42(6):514-529.
[29]朱启臻,胡鹏辉,许汉泽.论家庭农场:优势、条件与规模[J].农业经济问题,2014(7):11-17,110.
[30]尹世久,高杨,吴林海.构建中国特色食品安全社会共治体系[M].北京:人民出版社,2017.
[31]CAMPBELL D,HENSHER D A,SCARPA R.Non-attendance to attributes in environmental choice analysis:a latent class specification[J].Journal of environmental planning and management,2011,54(8):1061-1076.
[32]HESS S,HENSHER D A.Using conditioning on observed choices to retrieve individual-specific attribute processing strategies[J].Transportation research part B,2010,44(6):781-790.
[33]YANG D T,AN M Y.Human capital,entrepreneurship,and farm household earnings[J].Journal of development economics,2002,68(1):65-88.
[34]KIRWAN B E.The incidence of U.S.agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates[J].Journal of political economy,2009,117(1):138-164.
[35]PETRINI M A,ROCHA J V,BROWN J C,et al.Using an analytic hierarchy process approach to prioritize public policies addressing family farming in Brazil[J].Land use policy,2016(51):85-94.
[36]RUTO E,GARROD G.Investigating farmers’preferences for the design of agri-environment schemes:a choice experiment approach[J].Journal of environmental planning and management,2009,52(5):631-647.
(1)本文未将税收优惠和农业保险作为家庭农场扶持政策的属性变量,其原因分别在于:第一,从2006年1月1日起,我国废止《农业税条例》,对直接从事农业生产、有农业收入的单位和个人免征农业税。第二,我国虽然通过保费补贴、管理费补贴和再保险补贴等,降低保险公司经营风险和提高保险公司服务供给的积极性,但保险公司定损和赔付的手续繁琐、保额不能补偿家庭农场的基本物化成本、部分险种赔付标准过高、大部分县没有专门的查勘定损专家组。此外,种植业核定理赔要到作物收割时才能进行赔付,耽误了家庭农场种植其他作物。可见,农业保险政策更多偏向于保险公司。
(1)指行为个体报告的非参与信息可能与其他不可观测的因素存在相关性。
(1)分成2~7类时的BIC值依次为:3 517.423、3 462.210、3 225.083、3 364.759、3 497.655、3 633.787。