考虑不同商业目标和公平关切的动态博弈模型及复杂性研究
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摘要
建立双寡头零售商具有不同商业目标和公平关切的动态价格博弈模型,着重分析了基于零售商考虑不同商业目标和公平关切下的价格博弈模型的复杂性。数值模拟了不同参数数值组合条件下的价格动态博弈过程,通过系统稳定域,分岔,李雅普诺夫指数,混沌吸引子等对模型进行了复杂性分析,发现零售商考虑公平关切会使自身稳定域减小;公平关切的水平越高,系统越容易进入混沌状态。同时研究了价格调整速度对零售商利润的影响,结果发现当价格调整速度过大时,系统会进入混沌状态,利润值波动剧烈且平均利润随着价格调整速度的增大而减小。最后选择控制因子对系统混沌进行了控制,该研究对零售商价格决策有着很好的借鉴意义。
The paper establishes the dynamic double oligarchy price game model with oligopoly retailers considering the different business objectives and fairness concern,and emphatically analyzes the influence of fairness concern and price adjustment speed on model complexity based on retailer's different business objectives. The dynamic price game process under different parameters combination is studied via stability region,bifurcation,Lyapunov exponent,chaos attractors,and so on,by using numerical simulation,and the complexity analysis shows that retailers consider fairness concern will reduce its own stability domain; the higher level of fairness concern,the easier the system is in the chaotic state. At the same time,the paper studies the effect of price adjustment speed on the profit of retailers. The results find that when the price adjustment speed is too large,the system will be in the chaotic state finally,the profit will fluctuate violently and the average profit will decrease with increasing of the price adjustment speed. Finally,the control factor is chosen to control the chaos of the system. The research will provide a good reference of the price decision for retailers.
The paper establishes the dynamic double oligarchy price game model with oligopoly retailers considering the different business objectives and fairness concern,and emphatically analyzes the influence of fairness concern and price adjustment speed on model complexity based on retailer's different business objectives. The dynamic price game process under different parameters combination is studied via stability region,bifurcation,Lyapunov exponent,chaos attractors,and so on,by using numerical simulation,and the complexity analysis shows that retailers consider fairness concern will reduce its own stability domain; the higher level of fairness concern,the easier the system is in the chaotic state. At the same time,the paper studies the effect of price adjustment speed on the profit of retailers. The results find that when the price adjustment speed is too large,the system will be in the chaotic state finally,the profit will fluctuate violently and the average profit will decrease with increasing of the price adjustment speed. Finally,the control factor is chosen to control the chaos of the system. The research will provide a good reference of the price decision for retailers.
引文
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[15]周艳菊,鲍茂景,陈晓红,等.基于公平关切的低碳供应链广告合作-减排成本分担契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):121-129.
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[18]邢伟,汪寿阳,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[19] Choi S,Messinger P R. The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships:an experimental study[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2016,251(3):798-813.
[20] Katok E,Pavlov V. Fairness in supply chain contracts:a laboratory study[J]. Journal of Operations Management,2013,31(3):129-137.
[21] Hornibrook S,Fearne A,Lazzarin M. Exploring the association between fairness and organisational outcomes in supply chain relationships[J]. International Journal of Retail&Distribution Management,2009,20(9):790-803.
[22] Feng M,Fry M J,Raturi A S,et al. Supply-chain performance anomalies:fairness concerns under private cost information author-name:qin,fei[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 252(1):170-182.
[23] Li B,Hou P W,Li Q H. Cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain with a fairness concern of the manufacturer[J]. Ima Journal of Management Mathematics,2015:dpv025.
[24] Qu D,Han Y. Optimal pricing for dual-channel supply chain with fairness concerned manufacturer[C]//Control and Decision Conference. IEEE,2013:1723-1727.
[25]许明辉,胡兵.考虑零售商公平关切的期权合约研究[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(6):112-119.
[26]姚锋敏,滕春贤.公平关切下零售商主导的闭环供应链决策模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(1):117-123.
[27] Rand D. Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics,1978,5(2):173-184.
[28] Puu T. The chaotic duopolists revisited[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1998,33(3-4):385-394.
[29] Huang Y,Liu L,Qi E. The dynamic decision in riskaverse complementary product manufacturers with corporate social responsibility[J]. Kybernetes,2016,45(2):244-265.
[30] Huang Y M,Liu L,Qi E S. Simulation on the complementary product strategy based on the cournot-bertrand mixed game model[J]. International Journal of Simulation Modelling,2014,13(4):497-509.
[2] Jansen T,Lier A V,Witteloostuijn A V. A note on strategic delegation:the market share case[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(3):531-539.
[3] Cooper L G,Nakanishi M. Market share analysis:evaluating competitive marketing effectiveness[M]. 1988.
[4] Carpenter G S,Cooper L G,Hanssens D M,et al. Modeling asymmetric competition[J]. Marketing Science,1988,7(4):393-412.
[5] Szymanski D M. An Analysis of the market share-profitability relationship[J]. Journal of Marketing,1993,57(3):1-18.
[6] Dutta B K,King W R. A competitive scenario modeling system[J]. Management Science, 1980, 26(3):261-273.
[7] Li T,Ma J. Complexity analysis of dual-channel game model with different managers’business objectives[J].Communications in Nonlinear Science&Numerical Simulation,2015,20(1):199-208.
[8] Fehr E,Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness,competition,and cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999,114(3):817-868.
[9] Haitao Cui T,Raju J S,Zhang Z J. Fairness and channel coordination[J]. Management Science,2007,53(8):1303-1314.
[10] Pavlov V,Katok E. Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain contracts[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2011.
[11] Katok E,Olsen T,Pavlov V. Wholesale pricing under mild and privately known concerns for fairness[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(2):285-302.
[12]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[13]孙玉玲,洪美娜,石岿然.考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(6):103-111.
[14]刘琦铀,张成科,宾宁,等.公平关切及低碳视角下供应链两部定价契约问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):60-68.
[15]周艳菊,鲍茂景,陈晓红,等.基于公平关切的低碳供应链广告合作-减排成本分担契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):121-129.
[16]石松,颜波,石平.考虑公平关切的自主减排低碳供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3079-3091.
[17] Li Q H,Li B. Dual-channel supply chain equilibrium problems regarding retail services and fairness concerns[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling,2016,40(15-16):7349-7367.
[18]邢伟,汪寿阳,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[19] Choi S,Messinger P R. The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships:an experimental study[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2016,251(3):798-813.
[20] Katok E,Pavlov V. Fairness in supply chain contracts:a laboratory study[J]. Journal of Operations Management,2013,31(3):129-137.
[21] Hornibrook S,Fearne A,Lazzarin M. Exploring the association between fairness and organisational outcomes in supply chain relationships[J]. International Journal of Retail&Distribution Management,2009,20(9):790-803.
[22] Feng M,Fry M J,Raturi A S,et al. Supply-chain performance anomalies:fairness concerns under private cost information author-name:qin,fei[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 252(1):170-182.
[23] Li B,Hou P W,Li Q H. Cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain with a fairness concern of the manufacturer[J]. Ima Journal of Management Mathematics,2015:dpv025.
[24] Qu D,Han Y. Optimal pricing for dual-channel supply chain with fairness concerned manufacturer[C]//Control and Decision Conference. IEEE,2013:1723-1727.
[25]许明辉,胡兵.考虑零售商公平关切的期权合约研究[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(6):112-119.
[26]姚锋敏,滕春贤.公平关切下零售商主导的闭环供应链决策模型[J].控制与决策,2017,32(1):117-123.
[27] Rand D. Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics,1978,5(2):173-184.
[28] Puu T. The chaotic duopolists revisited[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1998,33(3-4):385-394.
[29] Huang Y,Liu L,Qi E. The dynamic decision in riskaverse complementary product manufacturers with corporate social responsibility[J]. Kybernetes,2016,45(2):244-265.
[30] Huang Y M,Liu L,Qi E S. Simulation on the complementary product strategy based on the cournot-bertrand mixed game model[J]. International Journal of Simulation Modelling,2014,13(4):497-509.