基于产品相关性及研发创新下的销售方式偏好研究
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摘要
针对零售商捆绑上游多个制造商产品的现状,考察了由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统,制造商进行研发投资降低各自产品成本,零售商进行产品销售并选择分开销售还是捆绑销售。考虑制造商研发行为下,探究供应链成员对不同相关性产品销售方式的偏好。研究发现,(1)对于独立产品,系统成员不存在共同的偏好。(2)对于互补产品,并非"一绑就灵",分开销售会成为系统成员的共同偏好,而非捆绑销售。(3)对于替代产品,并非不能捆绑,感知价值相差处于中间范围的低成本替代产品和感知价值相差较小的高成本替代产品均在捆绑销售下更有利可图。
In practice,it is common for retailers to bundle the products from multiple manufacturers.For example,Gome launches"complete sets of home appliance",which bundles several well-known brands of TVs and refrigerators.These products are provided by multiple upstream manufacturers.Ctrip.com bundles air transportation,hotel accommodation,etc.,are also from different suppliers.Based on the above business phenomenon.A three-stage game model for members in a supply chain system consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer is constructed in this paper.The manufacturers invest in R&D to reduce the cost of their products and decide the wholesale price of products.The retailer then orders the product from the manufacturers and selects the appropriate sales method,i.e.,separate sales or bundled sales.By comparing the R&D level of the manufacturers and the profit of the supply chain members between separate sales and bundled sales under different product relevance,the supply chain member's preference for different sales methods is explored.It is found that,for independent products,separate sales is always the dominant strategy,but there is no common preference among system members;for complementary products,the role of non-coordination at the supply side of the product and the differences in perceived value of consumers will exceed the complementary linkage advantage of the product itself,resulting in the failure of the binding strategy and making the separate sale as a common preference for system members;for substitute products,the low cost products with the moderate consumer perception differences and the high cost products with less consumer perception differences are more profitable under bundling.The research results of this paper provide good theoretical guidance for the practical application of the bundled sales strategy.
In practice,it is common for retailers to bundle the products from multiple manufacturers.For example,Gome launches"complete sets of home appliance",which bundles several well-known brands of TVs and refrigerators.These products are provided by multiple upstream manufacturers.Ctrip.com bundles air transportation,hotel accommodation,etc.,are also from different suppliers.Based on the above business phenomenon.A three-stage game model for members in a supply chain system consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer is constructed in this paper.The manufacturers invest in R&D to reduce the cost of their products and decide the wholesale price of products.The retailer then orders the product from the manufacturers and selects the appropriate sales method,i.e.,separate sales or bundled sales.By comparing the R&D level of the manufacturers and the profit of the supply chain members between separate sales and bundled sales under different product relevance,the supply chain member's preference for different sales methods is explored.It is found that,for independent products,separate sales is always the dominant strategy,but there is no common preference among system members;for complementary products,the role of non-coordination at the supply side of the product and the differences in perceived value of consumers will exceed the complementary linkage advantage of the product itself,resulting in the failure of the binding strategy and making the separate sale as a common preference for system members;for substitute products,the low cost products with the moderate consumer perception differences and the high cost products with less consumer perception differences are more profitable under bundling.The research results of this paper provide good theoretical guidance for the practical application of the bundled sales strategy.
引文
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[8]魏航.同质时鲜产品捆绑销售的最优策略[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(6):7-21.
[9]杨光勇,计国君.捆绑策略对于低性能产品引入的价值[J].管理科学学报,2017,(4):84-100.
[10]Banciu M,Gal-Or E,Mirchandani P.Bundling strategies when products are vertically differentiated and capacities are limited[M].INFORMS,2010,56(12):2207-2223.
[11]Cao Qingning,Stecke K E,Zhang Jun.The impact of limited supply on a firm's bundling strategy[J].Production&Operations Management,2016,24(12):1931-1944.
[12]Banciu M,degaard F.Optimal product bundling with dependent valuations:The price of independence[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,255(2):481-495.
[13]Honhon D,Pan X A.Improving profits by bundling vertically differentiated products[J].Production&Operations Management,2017,26(8):1481-1497.
[14]Bhargava H K.Retailer-driven product bundling in a distribution channel[J].Marketing Science,2012,31(6):1014-1021.
[15]Girju M,Prasad A,Ratchford B T.Pure components versus pure bundling in a marketing channel[J].Journal of Retailing,2013,89(4):423-437.
[16]Taleizadeh A A,Charmchi M.Optimal advertising and pricing decisions for complementary products[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering International,2015,11(1):111-117.
[17]高尚,滕春贤,孙嘉轶.不同主导力量下基于捆绑销售的旅游供应链决策分析[J].中国软科学,2016,(7):155-161.
[18]李四杰,邵灵芝.考虑消费者策略行为的供应商产品升级策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):1-10.
[19]Gurevich G,Cohen Y,Keren B.Optimizing bundling policy of single-period products:Perspectives of producers and retailers[J].International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems,2014,5(4):1-25.
[20]Pan Lin,Zhou Shuijin.Optimal bundling and pricing decisions for complementary products in a two-layer supply chain[J].Journal of Systems Science&Systems Engineering,2017:1-21.
[21]Chakravarty A,Mild A,Taudes A.Bundling decisions in supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,231(3):617-630.
[22]Shao Lingzhi.Bundling and cooperation of complementary product[C]//International Conference on Electronic,Mechanical,Information and Management Society,2016.
[2]Adams W J,Yellen J L.Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(3):475-498.
[3]Schmalensee R.Gaussian demand and commodity bundling[J].Journal of Business,1984,57(1):S211-S230.
[4]Bakos Y,Brynjolfsson E.Bundling information goods:Pricing[J].Management Science,1997,45(12):1613-1630.
[5]McCardle K F,Rajaram K,Tang C S.Bundling retail products:Models and analysis[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,177(2):1197-1217.
[6]Sheikhzadeh M,Elahi E.Product bundling:Impacts of product heterogeneity and risk considerations[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,144(1):209-222.
[7]张凯,李向阳.双边市场中平台企业搭售行为分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(3):117-124.
[8]魏航.同质时鲜产品捆绑销售的最优策略[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(6):7-21.
[9]杨光勇,计国君.捆绑策略对于低性能产品引入的价值[J].管理科学学报,2017,(4):84-100.
[10]Banciu M,Gal-Or E,Mirchandani P.Bundling strategies when products are vertically differentiated and capacities are limited[M].INFORMS,2010,56(12):2207-2223.
[11]Cao Qingning,Stecke K E,Zhang Jun.The impact of limited supply on a firm's bundling strategy[J].Production&Operations Management,2016,24(12):1931-1944.
[12]Banciu M,degaard F.Optimal product bundling with dependent valuations:The price of independence[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,255(2):481-495.
[13]Honhon D,Pan X A.Improving profits by bundling vertically differentiated products[J].Production&Operations Management,2017,26(8):1481-1497.
[14]Bhargava H K.Retailer-driven product bundling in a distribution channel[J].Marketing Science,2012,31(6):1014-1021.
[15]Girju M,Prasad A,Ratchford B T.Pure components versus pure bundling in a marketing channel[J].Journal of Retailing,2013,89(4):423-437.
[16]Taleizadeh A A,Charmchi M.Optimal advertising and pricing decisions for complementary products[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering International,2015,11(1):111-117.
[17]高尚,滕春贤,孙嘉轶.不同主导力量下基于捆绑销售的旅游供应链决策分析[J].中国软科学,2016,(7):155-161.
[18]李四杰,邵灵芝.考虑消费者策略行为的供应商产品升级策略[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(4):1-10.
[19]Gurevich G,Cohen Y,Keren B.Optimizing bundling policy of single-period products:Perspectives of producers and retailers[J].International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems,2014,5(4):1-25.
[20]Pan Lin,Zhou Shuijin.Optimal bundling and pricing decisions for complementary products in a two-layer supply chain[J].Journal of Systems Science&Systems Engineering,2017:1-21.
[21]Chakravarty A,Mild A,Taudes A.Bundling decisions in supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,231(3):617-630.
[22]Shao Lingzhi.Bundling and cooperation of complementary product[C]//International Conference on Electronic,Mechanical,Information and Management Society,2016.