反腐败、政商关系转型与企业绩效
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摘要
利用2013年以来中国政府的强力反腐行动作为一个准自然实验,本文基于上市公司数据,对政商关系转型如何影响企业绩效进行了经验分析,主要结论如下:上市公司维护旧政商关系的腐败性支出会降低业绩;反腐行动在打破旧政商关系、创造公平竞争环境上显现了成效,有政治关联和没有关联的两类公司的业绩差距在缩小,因为前一类公司出现了提高资源使用效率的"挖潜"现象,其中尤以民营控股上市公司为甚;反腐后上市公司的整体业绩出现了显著下滑,暗示着存在官员不作为现象,也说明依靠法治的新型政商关系的建立尚未完成。此外,反腐后上市公司整体研发投入显著增加,但尚未有证据表明研发投入已经改善了公司业绩。为使中国经济尽早转向高质量发展,应该在破除旧政商关系的同时加快建立新型政商关系,形成法治基础上对官员的激励与可问责机制。
The anti-corruption campaign of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC) significantly changes firms' political connections. In this study, we empirically examine how this transformation of government-business relationships affects firm performance. We find that firms' expense for building up political connections has negative impact on their performance. The Anti-corruption campaign has destroyed the old pattern of government-business relationships, and created a fair competitive environment. The performance gap among firms with different level of political connections has been narrowed, because firms with higher level of political connection has made better use of their available resources, especially for the private listed firms. In addition, we find that the anti-corruption campaign has significant negative impact on the performance of all firms, probably indicating the phenomenon of government officials' sloth administration after the anti-corruption campaign. Last, we find that firms have significantly increased their R&D expenses after the anti-corruption campaign; but there is no significant evidence that the increased R&D has improved firm performance.
The anti-corruption campaign of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC) significantly changes firms' political connections. In this study, we empirically examine how this transformation of government-business relationships affects firm performance. We find that firms' expense for building up political connections has negative impact on their performance. The Anti-corruption campaign has destroyed the old pattern of government-business relationships, and created a fair competitive environment. The performance gap among firms with different level of political connections has been narrowed, because firms with higher level of political connection has made better use of their available resources, especially for the private listed firms. In addition, we find that the anti-corruption campaign has significant negative impact on the performance of all firms, probably indicating the phenomenon of government officials' sloth administration after the anti-corruption campaign. Last, we find that firms have significantly increased their R&D expenses after the anti-corruption campaign; but there is no significant evidence that the increased R&D has improved firm performance.
引文
(1)Fisman, R.,“Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” The American Economic Review, 2001, 91(4), pp. 1095-1102; Khwaja, A.I. and A. Mian,“Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 120(4), pp.1371-1411; Cooper, M.J., H. Gulen, and A.V. Ovtchinnikov,“Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns,” The Journal of Finance, 2010, 65(2),pp. 687-724; Coulomb, R. and M. Sangnier,“The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value:Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?,” Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 115, pp. 158-170; Mironov, M. and E. Zhuravskaya,“Corruption in Procurement:Evidence from Financial Transactions Data,” American Economic Journal:Economic Policy, 2016, 8(2), pp. 287-321.
(2)Leff, Nathaniel H.“Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American Behavior Scientist, 1964, 8, pp. 8-14; Huntington, Samuel P.Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven:Yale Univ. Press, 1968.
(3)Rajan, R G, L. Zingales,“Which capitalism? Lessons form the east Asian crisis,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1998, 11(3), pp. 40-48.
(1)黄少卿:《经济转轨中的合同执行》,上海:上海远东出版社,2012年。
(2)Faccio, M.“Politically Connected Firms,” The American Economic Review, 2006, 96, pp. 369-386.
(3)Cai H., H. Fang, and L.C.Xu.“Eat, Dirnk, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, 54(1), pp. 55-78.
(4)胡旭阳、史晋川:《民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资-以中国民营企业500强为例》,《中国工业经济》2008年第4期。
(5)Shleifer A., Vishny R.W.“Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 1994, 109(4), pp. 995-1025.
(6)Fan, J.P.H., T.J. Wong, and Zhang, T.“Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance Of China’ s Newly Partially Privatized Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 2007(84), pp. 330-357.
(7)Dong Z, Wei X, Zhang Y.“The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society:Evidence from China,”Journal of Comparative Economics,2016, 44(2), pp. 353-371.
(8)党力、杨瑞龙、杨继东:《反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释》,《中国工业经济》2015年第7期。
(9)“八项规定”的全称为《关于改进工作作风、密切联系群众的八项规定》,2012年12月4日,中共中央政治局召开会议,审议通过了这一规定。根据中央纪委监察部网站发布的数据显示,截至2015年10月31日,全国累计查处违反中央八项规定精神问题104934起,处理人数138867人,其中55289人受到党纪政纪处分。
(1)Faccio, M.“Politically Connected Firms,” The American Economic Review, 2006, 96, pp.369-386.
(2)譬如,杜兴强、陈韫慧、杜颖洁:《寻租、政治联系与“真实”业绩-基于民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》2010年第10期;邓建平、曾勇:《政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗》,《中国工业经济》2009年第2期。
(3)Cai H., H. Fang, and L. C. Xu.“Eat, Dirnk, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, 54(1), pp. 55-78.
(4)钟覃琳、陆振飞、袁淳:《反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应-基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究》,《金融研究》2016年第9期。
(1)即便按照钟覃琳等人的回归结果,其表3中反腐败虚拟变量(Post)的回归系数皆为负数,似乎也应该解释为反腐本身降低了企业绩效。
(2)吴文峰、吴冲锋、芮萌:《中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠》,《管理世界》2009年第3期。
(3)余明桂、潘红波:《政治关联、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款》,《管理世界》2008年第8期。
(1)Khwaja, A. I., and A. Mian.“Do Lenders Favor Politically-Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 120, pp. 1371-1411.
(2)张敏、张胜、申慧慧、王成方:《政治关联与信贷资源配置效率-来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》2010年第11期。
(3)余明桂、回雅甫、潘红波:《政治联系、寻租与地方财政补贴有效性》,《经济研究》2010年第3期。
(4)Luil, F.T.“An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery,” Journal of Development Economics, 1985, 93(4), pp. 760-781.
(5)Beck, P., and M. Mahe.“A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Market,” Economic Letters, 1986, 20(1), pp. 1-5.
(6)田利辉、张伟:《政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应》,《经济研究》2013年第11期。
(7)罗党论、甄丽明:《民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束-基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》2008年第12期。
(1)Ahern, K.R., A. Dittmar,“The Changing of the Boards:The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127(1), pp. 137-197.
(1)Post实际反映的是时间趋势,包含了该时间段发生的可能影响企业业绩的所有事件,因此会导致对反腐效应的有偏解释。鉴于我们并没有观察到在反腐后时间窗口期间,有能在全国范围内持续影响企业业绩的其他事件,本文认为,Post的回归系数主要反映了反腐败和政商关系转型对上市公司整体业绩的影响。
(1)刘瑞明、赵仁杰:《国家高新区推动了地区经济发展吗?-基于双重差分方法的验证》,《管理世界》2015年第8期。
(1)Daivd Francis, Sahar Hussain, Marc Schiffbauer,“Do Politically Connected Firms Innovate, Contributing to Long-Term Economic Growth?”Policy Research Working Paper, 2018.
(2)王德祥、李昕:《政府补贴、政治关联与企业创新投入》,《财政研究》2017年第8期。
(3)党力、杨瑞龙、杨继东:《反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释》,《中国工业经济》2015年第7期。
(4)Lang, G.“Measuring the Returns of R&D-An Empirical Study of the German Manufacturing Sector over 45 Years,” Research Policy, 2009, 38(11), pp.1438-1445.
(5)袁建国、后青松、程晨:《企业政治资源的诅咒效应-基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察》,《管理世界》2015年第1期。
(2)Leff, Nathaniel H.“Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American Behavior Scientist, 1964, 8, pp. 8-14; Huntington, Samuel P.Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven:Yale Univ. Press, 1968.
(3)Rajan, R G, L. Zingales,“Which capitalism? Lessons form the east Asian crisis,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1998, 11(3), pp. 40-48.
(1)黄少卿:《经济转轨中的合同执行》,上海:上海远东出版社,2012年。
(2)Faccio, M.“Politically Connected Firms,” The American Economic Review, 2006, 96, pp. 369-386.
(3)Cai H., H. Fang, and L.C.Xu.“Eat, Dirnk, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, 54(1), pp. 55-78.
(4)胡旭阳、史晋川:《民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资-以中国民营企业500强为例》,《中国工业经济》2008年第4期。
(5)Shleifer A., Vishny R.W.“Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 1994, 109(4), pp. 995-1025.
(6)Fan, J.P.H., T.J. Wong, and Zhang, T.“Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance Of China’ s Newly Partially Privatized Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 2007(84), pp. 330-357.
(7)Dong Z, Wei X, Zhang Y.“The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society:Evidence from China,”Journal of Comparative Economics,2016, 44(2), pp. 353-371.
(8)党力、杨瑞龙、杨继东:《反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释》,《中国工业经济》2015年第7期。
(9)“八项规定”的全称为《关于改进工作作风、密切联系群众的八项规定》,2012年12月4日,中共中央政治局召开会议,审议通过了这一规定。根据中央纪委监察部网站发布的数据显示,截至2015年10月31日,全国累计查处违反中央八项规定精神问题104934起,处理人数138867人,其中55289人受到党纪政纪处分。
(1)Faccio, M.“Politically Connected Firms,” The American Economic Review, 2006, 96, pp.369-386.
(2)譬如,杜兴强、陈韫慧、杜颖洁:《寻租、政治联系与“真实”业绩-基于民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》2010年第10期;邓建平、曾勇:《政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗》,《中国工业经济》2009年第2期。
(3)Cai H., H. Fang, and L. C. Xu.“Eat, Dirnk, Firms, Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms,” Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, 54(1), pp. 55-78.
(4)钟覃琳、陆振飞、袁淳:《反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应-基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究》,《金融研究》2016年第9期。
(1)即便按照钟覃琳等人的回归结果,其表3中反腐败虚拟变量(Post)的回归系数皆为负数,似乎也应该解释为反腐本身降低了企业绩效。
(2)吴文峰、吴冲锋、芮萌:《中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠》,《管理世界》2009年第3期。
(3)余明桂、潘红波:《政治关联、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款》,《管理世界》2008年第8期。
(1)Khwaja, A. I., and A. Mian.“Do Lenders Favor Politically-Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, 120, pp. 1371-1411.
(2)张敏、张胜、申慧慧、王成方:《政治关联与信贷资源配置效率-来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》2010年第11期。
(3)余明桂、回雅甫、潘红波:《政治联系、寻租与地方财政补贴有效性》,《经济研究》2010年第3期。
(4)Luil, F.T.“An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery,” Journal of Development Economics, 1985, 93(4), pp. 760-781.
(5)Beck, P., and M. Mahe.“A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Market,” Economic Letters, 1986, 20(1), pp. 1-5.
(6)田利辉、张伟:《政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应》,《经济研究》2013年第11期。
(7)罗党论、甄丽明:《民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束-基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》2008年第12期。
(1)Ahern, K.R., A. Dittmar,“The Changing of the Boards:The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127(1), pp. 137-197.
(1)Post实际反映的是时间趋势,包含了该时间段发生的可能影响企业业绩的所有事件,因此会导致对反腐效应的有偏解释。鉴于我们并没有观察到在反腐后时间窗口期间,有能在全国范围内持续影响企业业绩的其他事件,本文认为,Post的回归系数主要反映了反腐败和政商关系转型对上市公司整体业绩的影响。
(1)刘瑞明、赵仁杰:《国家高新区推动了地区经济发展吗?-基于双重差分方法的验证》,《管理世界》2015年第8期。
(1)Daivd Francis, Sahar Hussain, Marc Schiffbauer,“Do Politically Connected Firms Innovate, Contributing to Long-Term Economic Growth?”Policy Research Working Paper, 2018.
(2)王德祥、李昕:《政府补贴、政治关联与企业创新投入》,《财政研究》2017年第8期。
(3)党力、杨瑞龙、杨继东:《反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释》,《中国工业经济》2015年第7期。
(4)Lang, G.“Measuring the Returns of R&D-An Empirical Study of the German Manufacturing Sector over 45 Years,” Research Policy, 2009, 38(11), pp.1438-1445.
(5)袁建国、后青松、程晨:《企业政治资源的诅咒效应-基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察》,《管理世界》2015年第1期。