动态博弈视角下绿色住宅激励模式优选研究
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摘要
为探讨政府不同激励政策对提高绿色住宅有效供给与需求的有效性,运用动态博弈法构建了政府不介入情形下、补贴型激励模式下及补贴—惩罚型激励模式下绿色住宅开发销售的决策模型,并相互比较了三种情形的决策结果。研究表明,当奖惩与补贴满足一定条件时:补贴—惩罚型激励模式下高质量绿色住宅的消费率最高,且消费率随着奖惩力度的增大而提高;补贴型激励模式下绿色住宅销售价格最低;补贴—惩罚型激励模式下开发商与消费者的利润高于政府不介入情形和补贴型激励模式下的利润。通过比较分析,发现补贴—惩罚型激励模式比补贴型激励模式和政府不介入情形都更有效。研究结果能够为政府制定绿色住宅激励政策提供决策支持。
To learn the effectiveness of government incentive policies toward demand and supply of green residential housing, three decision models of green residential housing established by dynamic game theory were compared. They are subsidy type, subsidy-punishment type and the type without government intervention. The research shows that the highest sell rate of high-quality houses is from the subsidy-punishment type, with subsidies and rewards and punishments meeting certain conditions, and the sell rate will increase as the rise of rewards and punishments. While the lowest price of green residential housing is from the subsidy type. By contrast with subsidy type and without government intervention type, the subsidy-punishment type can obtain the highest profit of developers and consumers. Through comparing and analyzing, found the subsidy-punishment type is most effective. The research result can provide support for the government to formulate incentive policies of green residential housing.
To learn the effectiveness of government incentive policies toward demand and supply of green residential housing, three decision models of green residential housing established by dynamic game theory were compared. They are subsidy type, subsidy-punishment type and the type without government intervention. The research shows that the highest sell rate of high-quality houses is from the subsidy-punishment type, with subsidies and rewards and punishments meeting certain conditions, and the sell rate will increase as the rise of rewards and punishments. While the lowest price of green residential housing is from the subsidy type. By contrast with subsidy type and without government intervention type, the subsidy-punishment type can obtain the highest profit of developers and consumers. Through comparing and analyzing, found the subsidy-punishment type is most effective. The research result can provide support for the government to formulate incentive policies of green residential housing.
引文
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[2]中华人民共和国建设部,中华人民共和国科技部.绿色建筑技术导则[M].北京:中国建筑工业出版社,2005.
[3]住房和城乡建设部科技与产业化发展中心.2015年全国绿色建筑评价标识统计报告[R].北京,2016.
[4]仇保兴.全面提高绿色建筑质量[J].住宅产业,2013(4):13-17.
[5]仇保兴.我国绿色建筑发展和建筑节能的形势与任务[J].城市发展研究,2012(5):1-7.
[6]吴文浩.供给侧改革视角下绿色建筑推进机制研究[J].科技进步与对策,2016(16):124-128.
[7]刘玉明.北京市发展绿色建筑的激励政策研究[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2012(2):46-51.
[8]Chan E H,Qian Q K,Lam P T.The market for green building in developed Asian cities:The perspectives of building designers[J].Energy Policy,2009,37(8):3061-3070.
[9]董丛.浅谈推行绿色住宅存在问题及发展对策[J].建筑经济,2013(1):87-90.
[10]Huseynov E F O.Planning of sustainable cities in view of green architecture[J].Procedia Engineering,2011,21(11):534-542.
[11]刘佳,刘伊生,施颖.基于演化博弈的绿色建筑规模化发展激励与约束机制研究[J].科技管理研究,2016(4):239-243.
[12]Sauer M G,Siddiqi K.Incentives for green residential construction[C].Seattle:Construction Research Congress,2009.
[13]马辉,王建廷.基于多因素分析的绿色住宅开发驱动模型研究[J].科技管理研究,2012(6):226-231.
[14]金占勇,孙金颖,刘长滨,等.基于外部性分析的绿色建筑经济激励政策设计[J].建筑科学,2010(6):57-62.
[15]王肖文,刘伊生.绿色住宅市场化发展驱动机理及其实证研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014(9):2274-2282.
[16]张仕廉,李学征,刘一.绿色建筑经济激励政策分析[J].生态经济,2006(5):312-315.
[17]林敏.绿色住宅发展初期的财政补贴细则研究[J].生态经济,2014(4):99-102.
[18]Akerlof G.The Market for“Lemons”:Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500.
[19]周慧中.经济激励和经济改革[M].汤敏,茅于轼.现代经济学前沿专题.北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[20][美]曼昆.经济学原理:微观经济学分册[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2015:73,145,233.
[21]陈洁,王方华.感知价值对不同商品类别消费者购买意愿影响的差异[J].系统管理学报,2012(6):803-808.