股权激励模式、盈余管理与公司治理
摘要
本文以我国实施股权激励计划的上市公司为样本,以剔除盈余管理"噪音"的总资产收益率度量公司绩效,研究限制性股票及股票期权两种激励模式对盈余管理及公司绩效的影响。研究发现,相对于限制性股票,股票期权模式与盈余管理程度和剔除盈余管理影响的公司绩效均具有显著的正相关关系;公司处于高科技行业、公司的成长性及规模对激励模式与公司绩效之间的关系起调节作用。上述结果表明,相对于限制性股票,股票期权更有助于提高公司绩效水平,但也会诱发更为严重的盈余管理问题;公司最终应该选择何种激励模式,受到公司所处行业、成长性及公司规模的影响。
引文
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[3]Ofek E,Yermack D.Taking Stock:Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(3):1367-1384.
[4]Aboody D,Johnson N B,Kasznik R.Employee stock options and future firm performance:Evidence from option repricings[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(1):74-92.
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[29]Johnson,T.L.,So,Eric.The Option to Stock Volume Ratio and Future Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(2):262-286.
[30]李曤.股票期权与限制性股票股权激励方式的比较研究[J].经济管理,2008,23-24(30):11-13.
[31]徐宁,徐向艺.控制权激励双重性与技术创新动态能力---基于高科技上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2012(10):109-121.
[32]肖淑芳,石琦,王婷,易肃.上市公司股权激励方式选择偏好---基于激励对象视角的研究[J].会计研究,2016,(06):55-62+95.
[33]马娟,万解秋.股权激励契约设计与公司盈余管理行为[J].南通大学学报(社会科学版),2014,(03):128-134.
[34]沈小燕,王娜.股权激励契约与盈余管理行为:以光明乳业限制性股票为例[J].苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015(05):128-137.
[35]许娟娟,陈艳,陈志阳.股权激励、盈余管理与公司绩效[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(03):100-112.
[36]Cornett M M,Marcus A J,Tehranian H.Corporate governance and pay-for-performance:The impact of earnings management.[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(2):357-373.
[37]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值---基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(09):101-116+172.
[2]Jensen M C,Murphy K J.Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives[J].Journal of Political E-conomy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[3]Ofek E,Yermack D.Taking Stock:Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(3):1367-1384.
[4]Aboody D,Johnson N B,Kasznik R.Employee stock options and future firm performance:Evidence from option repricings[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(1):74-92.
[5]张治理,肖星.我国上市公司股权激励计划择时问题研究[J].管理世界,2012(07):180-181.
[6]邵帅,周涛,吕长江.产权性质与股权激励设计动机---上海家化案例分析[J].会计研究,2014(10):43-50+96.
[7]Beneish,M.,M.Vargus.Insider trading,earnings quality,and accrual mispricing,Accounting Review2001,77(4):755-791.
[8]Baker T,Reitenga A,Collins D.Stock Option Com pensation and Earnings Management Incentives[J].Journal of Accounting Auditing&Finance,2003,18(4):557-582.
[9]Bergstresser D,Philippon T.CEO incentives and earnings management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(3):511-529.
[10]Bergstresser D,Desai M,Rauh J.Earnings manipulation,pension assumptions,and managerial investment decisions[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2006,121(1):157-195.
[11]Cornett M M,Mcnutt J J,Tehranian H.Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S.bank holding companies[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2009,15(4):412-430.
[12]Morgan A G,Poulsen A B.Linking Pay to Performance-Compensation Proposals in the S&P 500[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,62(3):489-523.
[13]Kato H K,Lemmon M,Luo M,et al.An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options:Evidence from Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,78(2):435-461.
[14]Denis D J,Hanouna P,Sarin A.Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):467-488.
[15]Larcker D F,Irem Tuna.Corporate Governance,Accounting Outcomes,and Organizational Performance[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2011,82(4):963-1008.
[16]Sun B.Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics&Control,2014,41(985):276-290.
[17]夏纪军,张晏.控制权与激励的冲突---兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析[J].经济研究,2008(03):87-98.
[18]Sapp S G.The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation[J].European Financial Management,2008,volume 14(4):710-746(37).
[19]Dechow P M,Sweeney A P.Detecting Earnings Management[J].Accounting Review A Quarterly Journal of the American Accounting Association,1994,70(2):193-225.
[20]Jones J J.Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228.
[21]Kothari S P,Leone A J,Wasley C E.Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2005,39(1):163-197.
[22]Raman K,Shahrur H.Relationship Specific Investment and Earnings Management:Evidence on Corporate Suppliers and Customers[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(4):1041-1081.
[23]Louis H,Robinson D,Sbaraglia A.An integrated analysis of the association between accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual anomaly[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2008,13(1):23-54.
[24]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,1999(09):25-35.
[25]Feltham,GA.,M.Wu.Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus options[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2001,6·(l):7-28.
[26]Richard A.Lambert,David F.Larcker.Stock Options,Restricted Stock,and Incentives[R].Working Paper,2004.
[27]Sanders,W.G.,Hambriek,D.C.Swinging for the fences:the effects of CEO Stock Options on company risk taking and performance[J].Academy of Management Joumal,2007(50):1055-1078.
[28]Yan,Wendy Wu.Executive Compensation:Stock Options or Restricted Stocks[J].Forthcoming at Intennational Review of Economics&Finance,2011,20(4):633-644.
[29]Johnson,T.L.,So,Eric.The Option to Stock Volume Ratio and Future Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(2):262-286.
[30]李曤.股票期权与限制性股票股权激励方式的比较研究[J].经济管理,2008,23-24(30):11-13.
[31]徐宁,徐向艺.控制权激励双重性与技术创新动态能力---基于高科技上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2012(10):109-121.
[32]肖淑芳,石琦,王婷,易肃.上市公司股权激励方式选择偏好---基于激励对象视角的研究[J].会计研究,2016,(06):55-62+95.
[33]马娟,万解秋.股权激励契约设计与公司盈余管理行为[J].南通大学学报(社会科学版),2014,(03):128-134.
[34]沈小燕,王娜.股权激励契约与盈余管理行为:以光明乳业限制性股票为例[J].苏州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015(05):128-137.
[35]许娟娟,陈艳,陈志阳.股权激励、盈余管理与公司绩效[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(03):100-112.
[36]Cornett M M,Marcus A J,Tehranian H.Corporate governance and pay-for-performance:The impact of earnings management.[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(2):357-373.
[37]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值---基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(09):101-116+172.