我国近海捕捞渔业管理政策困境、逻辑与取向
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摘要
近年海洋捕捞资源衰退甚至"无鱼可捕"的事实表明现有管理政策具有明显局限性和需要完善。文章梳理了我国现有近海捕捞渔业管理政策,实证检验了其有效性,并剖析了政策困境的逻辑,提出了未来选择的方向。研究发现:(1)我国现有近海捕捞渔业管理政策诸多,但有效性较低,导致1978—2016年近海捕捞渔业资源衰退了1.57倍;(2)现有政策过度依赖行政,缺乏激励相容机制,未能充分调动市场与渔民、社区等扩大增量和减少产量的积极性,是现有政策局限的基本逻辑;(3)未来,应以明晰产权、改善规则为中心,构建充分调动渔民、社区、社会组织和市场主体等积极性的激励相容制度,避免具有公共池塘属性的渔业陷入捕捞渔民囚徒困境与资源公地悲剧。研究有利于我国近海捕捞资源恢复与保护,可为有关部门提供决策参考。
The fact that the decline of marine fishing resources in recent years or even no fish caught indicate that the existing management policies have obvious limitations and it needs to be improved. Based on the existing management policies, this paper empirical tests its validity and issues, and analyzes its causes and puts forward the direction of governance. Three results show that: Firstly, there are many existing marine fishery management policies in China, but the validity is very low, which result in decline by 1.57 for capture fisheries resources from 1978 to 2016. Secondly, existing policies are excessively dependent on administration, lack of incentive compatibility and fail to fully use the market mechanisms. The basic logic of existing policy limitations is that it does not incite fishermen and the community to expand the increment and reducing production. Thirdly, in the future, it should focus on clarifying property rights and improving rules to fully mobilize fishermen and communities, constructing positive incentive compatibility system to avoid prisoner's dilemma and tragedy of the commons. The study is conducive to the recovery and protection of marine fishing resources in China and can provide decision-making reference for relevant departments.
The fact that the decline of marine fishing resources in recent years or even no fish caught indicate that the existing management policies have obvious limitations and it needs to be improved. Based on the existing management policies, this paper empirical tests its validity and issues, and analyzes its causes and puts forward the direction of governance. Three results show that: Firstly, there are many existing marine fishery management policies in China, but the validity is very low, which result in decline by 1.57 for capture fisheries resources from 1978 to 2016. Secondly, existing policies are excessively dependent on administration, lack of incentive compatibility and fail to fully use the market mechanisms. The basic logic of existing policy limitations is that it does not incite fishermen and the community to expand the increment and reducing production. Thirdly, in the future, it should focus on clarifying property rights and improving rules to fully mobilize fishermen and communities, constructing positive incentive compatibility system to avoid prisoner's dilemma and tragedy of the commons. The study is conducive to the recovery and protection of marine fishing resources in China and can provide decision-making reference for relevant departments.
引文
[1]金显仕,窦硕增,单秀娟,等.我国近海渔业资源可持续产出基础研究的热点问题[J].渔业科学进展,2015(1):124-131.
[2]陈琦,韩立民.我国海洋捕捞业生产的波动特征及成因分析[J].经济地理,2016(1):105-112.
[3]于立,孙康,徐斌.“三渔问题”与公共政策调整思路——辽东湾海蜇捕捞案例分析[J].公共管理学报,2007(2):30-35,120.
[4]张波,唐启升.渤、黄、东海高营养层次重要生物资源种类的营养级研究[J].海洋科学进展,2004(4):393-404.
[5]慕永通.我国海洋捕捞业的困境与出路[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版),2005(2):1-5.
[6]绿色和平.中国海洋幼杂鱼捕捞现状及启示[J].海洋与渔业·水产前沿,2017(9):63-67.
[7]Russell E S. Some theoretical considerations on the “overfishing”problem[J]. Journal of Marine Science, 1931, 6(1):1-20.
[8]ClineTJ,SchindlerDE,HilbornR.Fisheriesportfolio diversification and turnover buffer Alaskan fishing communities fromabruptresourceandmarketchanges[J].Nature Communications, 2017(8):140-152.
[9]OphulsW.Leviathanoroblivion[M]//DalyHE.Towarda steady state economy. San Francisco:Freeman Press, 1973:229.
[10]DemsetzH.Towardatheoryofpropertyrights[J].American Economic Review, 1967, 57(2):347-359.
[11]Johnson O E G. Economic analysis, the legal framework and land tenuresystems[J].TheJournalofLawandEconomics,1972,15(1):259-276.
[12]陈新军,周应祺.论渔业资源的可持续利用[J].资源科学,2001(2):70-74.
[13]HardinG.Thetragedyofthecommons[J].Science,1968(162):1243-1248.
[14]Ostrom E. Governing the commons:The evolution of institutions for collective action[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[15]陈作志,林昭进,邱永松.基于AHP的南海海域渔业资源可持续利用评价[J].自然科学学报,2010(2):249-257.
[16]SchaeferMB.Someaspectsofthedynamicsofpopulations important to the management of the commercial marine fishery[J].Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 1991, 53(1-2):253-279.
[17]晁敏,全为民,李纯厚,等.东海区海洋捕捞渔获物的营养级变化研究[J].海洋科学,2005(9):51-54.
[18]李继龙,曹坤,丁放,等.基于渔获物统计的中国近海鱼类营养级结构变换及其与捕捞作业的关系[J].中国水产科学,2017(1):109-119.
[19]刘子飞,孙慧武,韩杨,等.基于乡村振兴的“三渔”发展战略研究[J].山东农业科学,2018(4):166-172.
[20][美]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆,罗伊·加德纳,詹姆斯·沃克.规则、博弈与公共池塘资源[M].王巧玲,任睿,译.西安:陕西人民出版社,1994.
[21]韩晶.对海洋渔业资源资产产权制度的重新解读[J].经济研究导刊,2016(4):52-53.
[22]2018年农业农村部“百乡万户调”活动辽宁组.渔业发展与改革见闻[J].中国渔业经济,2018(2):9-13.
[23]李周.以生态法治红线硬约束守住增长绿线[J].中国生态文明,2016(5):57-61.
[24]沈满红.论环境经济手段[J].经济研究,1997(10):54-61.
[25]OlsonM.Thelogicofcollectiveaction:Publicgoodsandthe theoryofgroups[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1965.
[26]闫玉科.我国海洋渔业资源可持续利用研究——基于海洋渔业资源衰退现象的经济学解析[J].农业经济问题,2009(8):100-104.
[27]AchesonJ,GardnerR.FishingfailureandsuccessintheGulf ofMaine:Lobsterandgroundfishmanagement[J].Maritime Studies, 2014, 13(8):1-21.
(1)为了避免时间序列趋势带来的伪回归问题,研究先计算海洋衰退得分fz分别与所选取的6个因素的灰色关联度系数(关联分辨系数ρ=0.2),结果发现,各因素关联度系数均在0.5以上,不存在序列伪回归问题;同时,尝试运用ARIMAX模型、Chow检验分别考察渔业资源衰退序列相关、结构突变情况,结果排除了这些问题,限于篇幅,未列出结果。
(1)我国虽然有捕捞许可证政策,但其执行力度有限,没有真正发挥限制作用,渔民捕捞的权利自由度仍很高,且“三无”渔船和违规、偷鱼等行为频繁,所以不影响研究所关注的产权、排他性这一关键点。
(2)在对黄渤海、东海海区伏季休渔制度调研中船老大、渔民均反映,即使是2017年实施的“史上最严”休渔背景下,仍时常有渔船晚上出海作业至凌晨归来,尤其是个别作业方式、个别品种禁渔期结束后,出港进入捕捞区后,更换或使用违禁渔具等进行违规作业的捕捞行为频繁可见,这些违规违法现象举报多次终是无果,即使个别进行了处罚也只是象征性的,几乎没有起到制度应有的效果。
(1)数据来源于《中国科学报》对中国水产科学研究院黄海所单秀娟、中国科学院海洋所杨红生研究员等的采访报道,《我国近海几近捕捞的话题再次进入公众视野无鱼可捕促结构调整》,《中国科学报》,2016年8月30日,参考网址:http://www.shuichan.cc/news_view-293857.html。
[2]陈琦,韩立民.我国海洋捕捞业生产的波动特征及成因分析[J].经济地理,2016(1):105-112.
[3]于立,孙康,徐斌.“三渔问题”与公共政策调整思路——辽东湾海蜇捕捞案例分析[J].公共管理学报,2007(2):30-35,120.
[4]张波,唐启升.渤、黄、东海高营养层次重要生物资源种类的营养级研究[J].海洋科学进展,2004(4):393-404.
[5]慕永通.我国海洋捕捞业的困境与出路[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版),2005(2):1-5.
[6]绿色和平.中国海洋幼杂鱼捕捞现状及启示[J].海洋与渔业·水产前沿,2017(9):63-67.
[7]Russell E S. Some theoretical considerations on the “overfishing”problem[J]. Journal of Marine Science, 1931, 6(1):1-20.
[8]ClineTJ,SchindlerDE,HilbornR.Fisheriesportfolio diversification and turnover buffer Alaskan fishing communities fromabruptresourceandmarketchanges[J].Nature Communications, 2017(8):140-152.
[9]OphulsW.Leviathanoroblivion[M]//DalyHE.Towarda steady state economy. San Francisco:Freeman Press, 1973:229.
[10]DemsetzH.Towardatheoryofpropertyrights[J].American Economic Review, 1967, 57(2):347-359.
[11]Johnson O E G. Economic analysis, the legal framework and land tenuresystems[J].TheJournalofLawandEconomics,1972,15(1):259-276.
[12]陈新军,周应祺.论渔业资源的可持续利用[J].资源科学,2001(2):70-74.
[13]HardinG.Thetragedyofthecommons[J].Science,1968(162):1243-1248.
[14]Ostrom E. Governing the commons:The evolution of institutions for collective action[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[15]陈作志,林昭进,邱永松.基于AHP的南海海域渔业资源可持续利用评价[J].自然科学学报,2010(2):249-257.
[16]SchaeferMB.Someaspectsofthedynamicsofpopulations important to the management of the commercial marine fishery[J].Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 1991, 53(1-2):253-279.
[17]晁敏,全为民,李纯厚,等.东海区海洋捕捞渔获物的营养级变化研究[J].海洋科学,2005(9):51-54.
[18]李继龙,曹坤,丁放,等.基于渔获物统计的中国近海鱼类营养级结构变换及其与捕捞作业的关系[J].中国水产科学,2017(1):109-119.
[19]刘子飞,孙慧武,韩杨,等.基于乡村振兴的“三渔”发展战略研究[J].山东农业科学,2018(4):166-172.
[20][美]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆,罗伊·加德纳,詹姆斯·沃克.规则、博弈与公共池塘资源[M].王巧玲,任睿,译.西安:陕西人民出版社,1994.
[21]韩晶.对海洋渔业资源资产产权制度的重新解读[J].经济研究导刊,2016(4):52-53.
[22]2018年农业农村部“百乡万户调”活动辽宁组.渔业发展与改革见闻[J].中国渔业经济,2018(2):9-13.
[23]李周.以生态法治红线硬约束守住增长绿线[J].中国生态文明,2016(5):57-61.
[24]沈满红.论环境经济手段[J].经济研究,1997(10):54-61.
[25]OlsonM.Thelogicofcollectiveaction:Publicgoodsandthe theoryofgroups[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1965.
[26]闫玉科.我国海洋渔业资源可持续利用研究——基于海洋渔业资源衰退现象的经济学解析[J].农业经济问题,2009(8):100-104.
[27]AchesonJ,GardnerR.FishingfailureandsuccessintheGulf ofMaine:Lobsterandgroundfishmanagement[J].Maritime Studies, 2014, 13(8):1-21.
(1)为了避免时间序列趋势带来的伪回归问题,研究先计算海洋衰退得分fz分别与所选取的6个因素的灰色关联度系数(关联分辨系数ρ=0.2),结果发现,各因素关联度系数均在0.5以上,不存在序列伪回归问题;同时,尝试运用ARIMAX模型、Chow检验分别考察渔业资源衰退序列相关、结构突变情况,结果排除了这些问题,限于篇幅,未列出结果。
(1)我国虽然有捕捞许可证政策,但其执行力度有限,没有真正发挥限制作用,渔民捕捞的权利自由度仍很高,且“三无”渔船和违规、偷鱼等行为频繁,所以不影响研究所关注的产权、排他性这一关键点。
(2)在对黄渤海、东海海区伏季休渔制度调研中船老大、渔民均反映,即使是2017年实施的“史上最严”休渔背景下,仍时常有渔船晚上出海作业至凌晨归来,尤其是个别作业方式、个别品种禁渔期结束后,出港进入捕捞区后,更换或使用违禁渔具等进行违规作业的捕捞行为频繁可见,这些违规违法现象举报多次终是无果,即使个别进行了处罚也只是象征性的,几乎没有起到制度应有的效果。
(1)数据来源于《中国科学报》对中国水产科学研究院黄海所单秀娟、中国科学院海洋所杨红生研究员等的采访报道,《我国近海几近捕捞的话题再次进入公众视野无鱼可捕促结构调整》,《中国科学报》,2016年8月30日,参考网址:http://www.shuichan.cc/news_view-293857.html。