融资约束、支付方式与并购绩效
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  • 英文篇名:Financial Constraints, the Method of Payment and the M & A Performance
  • 作者:李井林 ; 刘淑莲 ; 韩雪
  • 英文作者:LI JING-lin;LIU SHU-lian;HAN Xue;School of Accounting, Hubei University of Economics;School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics;
  • 关键词:融资约束 ; 支付方式 ; 并购绩效
  • 英文关键词:financial constraints;;method of payment;;M&A performance
  • 中文刊名:SXCJ
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
  • 机构:湖北经济学院会计学院;东北财经大学会计学院;
  • 出版日期:2014-07-14 16:14
  • 出版单位:山西财经大学学报
  • 年:2014
  • 期:v.36;No.262
  • 基金:国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司如何选择并购对价与融资方式?——基于嵌套结构的经验研究”(71172120)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:SXCJ201408012
  • 页数:11
  • CN:08
  • ISSN:14-1221/F
  • 分类号:119-129
摘要
以我国上市公司2009~2011年发生的并购事件为研究对象,运用Logit回归模型构建的融资约束指数,实证检验了融资约束对主并公司支付方式选择的影响;采用事件研究法检验不同支付方式的并购绩效差异;考察了融资约束与支付方式选择对并购绩效影响的交互效应。研究结果表明:相比非融资约束的主并公司,存在融资约束的主并公司更倾向于使用股票支付方式;使用股票支付获得累计超常收益显著为正,且显著大于现金支付获得的累计超常收益。对样本按融资约束分组的进一步检验结果表明,上述结论仅对融资约束公司成立,非融资约束公司不同支付方式下的超常收益并无显著差异。研究结论意味着,融资约束的主并公司在支付方式选择时并不遵循优序融资理论,留存有限的现金资源而选择股票支付是为并购后实现投资机会而保持融资灵活性的理性行为。
        This paper takes the domestic M&A events initiated by the listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as the study sample.Firstly, it empirically tests the effect of acquirers' financial constraint on their payment choices using financial constraint index created by Logit model, and the acquirers' M&A performance of the different payments using event studying method. Moreover, the interacted effect of financial constraint and the payment methods on M&A performance is tested. The results indicate that, financially constrained acquirers are more likely to use stock in acquisitions; The CAR of stock payments is positive and significant, and also greater than cash payments. Further test of the subsample according to the financial constraint, the results show that this conclusion is only established in financially constrained acquirers, and there is no significant difference in different payment choices of unconstrained acquirers. The findings complements that the pecking order of capital structure is violated for the payments choice of constrained acquirers,and it is rational for them offering stock to maintain financial flexibility for future investments after the acquisition.
引文
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    ①本文将融资约束程度高的公司视为融资约束公司,将融资约束程度低的公司视为非融资约束公司。
    ②通过对CSMAR中国上市公司并购重组研究数据库中的卖方公司上市情况进行筛选,发现在构成研究样本的642个并购事件中,目标公司为上市公司的并购样本为15个,仅占全样本的2.34%。
    ③变量选择借鉴Faccio and Masulis(2005)以及Alshwer and Sibilkov(2011)对并购支付方式选择的影响因素的变量选取。
    ④如果同一家上市公司在同一天宣告两笔或者两笔以上相同并购标的的并购交易,则将这些交易合并为一起事件。
    ⑤此标准参考了刘淑莲、张广宝和耿琳(2012)的筛选标准,因为随着交易规模的增加,支付方式选择趋于多样化,而金额较小的并购对收购公司没有实质性影响,对本文的研究而言可能是一种噪音。
    ⑥根据CSMAR中国上市公司并购重组研究数据库关于并购对价方式的分类标准进行统计后发现,1998~2006年的股票对价并购为64起,2007~2011年的股票对价并购升至1 033起。
    ⑦并购前一年末主并公司融资缺口DEFt=DIVt+Xt+ΔWt+Rt-Ct,如果DEF>0,则主并公司为融资约束公司,Constraint=1 ;否则为非融资约束公司,Constraint=0。其中,DEFt为融资缺口;DIVt为公司支付的现金股利;Xt为资本性支出;ΔWt为营运资本净增加额;Rt为一年内到期的长期负债;Ct为息税后经营现金流净额。

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