准市场下我国排水权交易管理研究——基于演化博弈视角
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摘要
为解决洪水时期流域上下游、左右岸区域主体之间争相排水的问题,亟须构建"准市场"下的排水权交易制度。立足于我国区域间防洪排水问题,提出排水权的概念,设计"准市场"下排水权交易制度框架及运行机制,通过构建区域间排水权交易的演化博弈模型,探讨影响区域间排水权交易的影响因素,最后利用Matlab软件进行仿真研究,分析各影响因素的变化对交易主体行为策略选择的影响程度的研究表明,构建"准市场"机制下的排水权交易制度可以促进区域主体运用经济手段解决洪涝灾害问题。在洪涝灾害时期,各地区应从区域整体利益出发,积极谈判交易排放洪水的权力。发达地区通过购买欠发达地区的排水权,以减轻洪水给自身带来的损失;欠发达地区利用出售排水权获得的收益进行灾后重建,这样可以使区域整体洪涝灾害损失降至最低,促进区域和谐稳定发展。
During the flood period, in order to solve the problem of discharging flood between the upstream and downstream of the basin and between the main bodies of the left and right banks, it is urgent to construct a drainage right trading system under the quasi market. Based on the problem of flood control and drainage in China's regions, the concept of drainage right is put forward, and the system framework and operation mechanism of drainage right transaction under "quasi market"are designed. By constructing an evolutionary game model of inter-regional drainage rights trading, the influencing factors of inter-regional drainage rights trading are discussed. Finally, the simulation study is carried out by using MATLAB software to analyze the impact of the changes of the influencing factors on the behavior strategy choice of the trading subjects. The results show that the establishment of the drainage right trading system under the quasi market mechanism can promote the regional main body to use economic means to solve the flood disaster. During the period of flood disasters, all regions should actively negotiate and trade the power to discharge flood water from the perspective of the overall interests of the region. Developed areas can reduce the losses caused by floods by purchasing the drainage rights of underdeveloped areas. Underdeveloped areas can use the proceeds obtained from the sale of drainage rights to rebuild after disasters, so as to minimize the overall loss of flood disasters in the region and promote the harmonious and stable development of the region.
During the flood period, in order to solve the problem of discharging flood between the upstream and downstream of the basin and between the main bodies of the left and right banks, it is urgent to construct a drainage right trading system under the quasi market. Based on the problem of flood control and drainage in China's regions, the concept of drainage right is put forward, and the system framework and operation mechanism of drainage right transaction under "quasi market"are designed. By constructing an evolutionary game model of inter-regional drainage rights trading, the influencing factors of inter-regional drainage rights trading are discussed. Finally, the simulation study is carried out by using MATLAB software to analyze the impact of the changes of the influencing factors on the behavior strategy choice of the trading subjects. The results show that the establishment of the drainage right trading system under the quasi market mechanism can promote the regional main body to use economic means to solve the flood disaster. During the period of flood disasters, all regions should actively negotiate and trade the power to discharge flood water from the perspective of the overall interests of the region. Developed areas can reduce the losses caused by floods by purchasing the drainage rights of underdeveloped areas. Underdeveloped areas can use the proceeds obtained from the sale of drainage rights to rebuild after disasters, so as to minimize the overall loss of flood disasters in the region and promote the harmonious and stable development of the region.
引文
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(2)Zhang Z,He X,et al,“An Improved ‘Dynamic Control Operation Module’ for Cascade Reservoirs”,Water Resources Management,6(2018).
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(10)潘海英,叶晓丹:《水权市场建设的政府作为:一个总体框架》,《改革》,2018年第1期。
(11)李良序,罗慧:《中国水资源管理博弈特征分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2006年第2期。
(12)Deng X.,Xu Z.,et al.,“Transaction costs associated with agricultural water trading in the Heihe River Basin,Northwest China”,Agricultural Water Management,186(2017).
(13)Bekchanov M.,Bhaduri A.,et al.,“Potential gains from water rights trading in the Aral Sea Basin”,Agricultural Water Management,152(2015).
(14)Sun L.,Li C.,et al.,“Interval Optimization Model Considering Terrestrial Ecological Impacts for Water Rights Transfer from Agriculture to Industry in Ningxia,China”,Scientific Reports,7,1(2017).
(15)刘红,唐元虎:《外部性的经济分析与对策:评科斯与庇古思路的效果一致性》,《南开经济研究》,2002年第1期。
(16)Bjornlund H.,Mckay J.,“Aspects of water markets for developing countries:experiences from Australia,Chile and the US”,Environment and development economics,7(2002).
(17)刘钢,杨柳等:《准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2017年第4期。
(18)吴凤平,于倩雯等:《基于市场导向的水权交易价格形成机制理论框架研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2018年第7期。
(19)胡彩娟:《排污权交易市场协同发展制度指标体系研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2018年第4期。
(20)于凤存,王友员,袁先江等:《排水权概念的提出及基本特征初探》,《灌溉排水学报》,2014年第2期。
(21)Kuppuswamy V.,Bayus B.L.,“Crowdfunding Creative Ideas:The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013.
(22)Friedman D.,“Evolutionary Games in Economics”,Econometrica,59 ,3(1991).
(2)Zhang Z,He X,et al,“An Improved ‘Dynamic Control Operation Module’ for Cascade Reservoirs”,Water Resources Management,6(2018).
(3)于凤存,王友贞,袁先江等:《排水权概念的提出及基本特征初探》,《灌溉排水学报》,2014年第2期。
(4)张仁田,童利忠:《水权、水权分配与水权交易体制的初步研究》,《水利发展研究》,2002年第5期。
(5)罗勇:《生态环境制度的经济学分析与强化方向》,《辽宁大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2018年第6期。
(6)王亚华:《关于我国水价、水权和水市场改革的评论》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2007年第5期。
(7)胡鞍钢,王亚华:《转型期水资源配置的公共政策:准市场和政治民主协商》,《经济研究参考》,2002年第1期。
(8)夏朋,倪晋仁:《政府管制下的水权制度博弈分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2007年第5期。
(9)Roberts A.M.,Seymour E.J.,“ The Role of Regional Organisations in Managing Environmental Water in the Murray-Darling Basin,Australia”,Economic Papers A journal of applied economics and policy,30,2(2011).
(10)潘海英,叶晓丹:《水权市场建设的政府作为:一个总体框架》,《改革》,2018年第1期。
(11)李良序,罗慧:《中国水资源管理博弈特征分析》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2006年第2期。
(12)Deng X.,Xu Z.,et al.,“Transaction costs associated with agricultural water trading in the Heihe River Basin,Northwest China”,Agricultural Water Management,186(2017).
(13)Bekchanov M.,Bhaduri A.,et al.,“Potential gains from water rights trading in the Aral Sea Basin”,Agricultural Water Management,152(2015).
(14)Sun L.,Li C.,et al.,“Interval Optimization Model Considering Terrestrial Ecological Impacts for Water Rights Transfer from Agriculture to Industry in Ningxia,China”,Scientific Reports,7,1(2017).
(15)刘红,唐元虎:《外部性的经济分析与对策:评科斯与庇古思路的效果一致性》,《南开经济研究》,2002年第1期。
(16)Bjornlund H.,Mckay J.,“Aspects of water markets for developing countries:experiences from Australia,Chile and the US”,Environment and development economics,7(2002).
(17)刘钢,杨柳等:《准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2017年第4期。
(18)吴凤平,于倩雯等:《基于市场导向的水权交易价格形成机制理论框架研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2018年第7期。
(19)胡彩娟:《排污权交易市场协同发展制度指标体系研究》,《中国人口·资源与环境》,2018年第4期。
(20)于凤存,王友员,袁先江等:《排水权概念的提出及基本特征初探》,《灌溉排水学报》,2014年第2期。
(21)Kuppuswamy V.,Bayus B.L.,“Crowdfunding Creative Ideas:The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013.
(22)Friedman D.,“Evolutionary Games in Economics”,Econometrica,59 ,3(1991).